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Abstract
This thesis examines, by reference to the political,
institutional, org anis ational, personnel, operational, methodological
and technical aspects of naval intelligence work, the developmental
aspects of its history from 1880 to 1945. By analysing specific naval
operations and discussing the strategic and tactical ramifications of
intelligence it seeks to throw light on the impact of intelligence on
naval warfare in this period. In so doing it reveals the place of
intelligence in the general naval history of the period. It is not a
definitive history, but rather a discursive analysis of those aspects
considered the most important.
In the pre-1914 era the N.I.D. was the heart of the
emergent Naval Staff, involved in strategic planning at the highest
level. World War I brought the need for an operational intelligence
organisation, with the priority of locating, identifying, and deducing
the intentions of major German units. Experience in war revealed
the necessity for a clear definition of the relationship between the
Operations Division and the N.I.D. The use of radio intelligence
and cryptanalysis gave N.I.D. great operational successes and
Admiral Hall the opportunity to involve N.I.D. in political issues.
The latter led to the review of N.I.D.'s role post 1918 and, in part,
its run-down. The inter-war period witnessed N.I.D.'s decline
as the most dynamic and influential Naval Staff department. Until
the foundation of O.I.C. and the coming of war N.I.D. was a back-
water. World War It witnessed a re-vitalisation, a more structured
and tightly controlled N.I.D., and the D.N.I.. as an important
echelon of the C.O.S. and J.LC. organisations. N.I.D. regained
its previous supremacy and was instrumental in the process towards
intelligence integration at the end of World War U. It scored great
operational successes.
The function of intelligence is demonstrated as being
paramount in the naval organisation and critical to the interests
of the State. Its maintenance was contingent upon variables which,
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During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Admiralty
became acutely aware of the need for an organisation to collect,
analyse, interpret and distribute to the appropriate authorities data
concerning potential enemies. This was part of the policy to
systeniatise British Naval policy. The nature of the organisation
which was initially created, in all its various facets, not least of all
its role and importance in naval policy making and action, has
changed dramatically.
The development of that organisation reflects the increasing
value attached to intelligence in determining the outcome of war at
sea. However, it was by no means an organically evolving
institution, expanding in proportion to any definable amount of
intelligence required at any given time, or even equipping itself with
techniques to keep pace with technological developments. It was a
far more fortuitous interaction of events that has led to the creation
of the Defence intelligence organisation that the United Kingdom
possesses today.
In tracing the growth of the intelligence organisation within
the naval institution one sees emerging a doctrine of intelligence,
3.
albeit it an unprecise and fluctuating one, but one which, by 1945,
was firmly entrenched. As a doctrine' and an organisation, naval
intelligence had to fight for its place within the hierarchy of organi-
sations that compose the Royal Navy, penetrating the infrastructure
of a highly complex and sophisticated institution not in any logical
way, but sometimes more by chance, at worst in a wifly-nilly attempt
to mould the course of action, at best in a forthright and prodigious
drive to dispel the fogs of war.
The degree of success, measured both in terms of quality of
intelligence and the impact it was to have, and the status intelligence
acquired in the process, stemmed mainly from the guiding personali-
ties of the time. It might be possible to trace the ups and downs of
naval intelligence in the twentieth century in graphical form, with
the Directors of Naval Intelligence on one axis and their successes
on the other. But this would preclude a more fundamental appraisal
of the various factors that account for its charismatic development,
and would fail, for instance, to explain the inner subtleties behind
1.	 By intelligence doctrine is meant the well-tried rules,
principles and procedures that make up the intelligence
process.
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the great successes of Admiral HaU's pragmatic intelligence officers
during the Great War, or the apparent failure of the intelligence
machinery in the nineteen thirties and its subsequent revival and
conquests during World War IL Above all else such an approach
would fail to trace the identification of the more elusive elements of
intelligence which came to form a body of doctrine by 1945. The
principles of intelligence and the organisation which emerged were
the result of an accumulation of vast experiences, and the often
costly interaction of individuals and groups. The monument for
those who worked in naval intelligence from its early beginnings until
1945 is the lasting place that it has now gained for itself within the
Defence structure. That this was not achieved much earlier is
explained chiefly by the absence within naval intelligence of a doctrine,
which in part coul& only be built up after years of experience, but
which also could only be gained after the need to develop intelligence
1.	 Hall, Admiral Sir William Reginald: 1870-1943; son of the
first DNI, William Henry Hall; entered RN 1884; Commander
1901; Captain 1905; naval assistant to the Controller of the
Navy, 1911-1913; Captain HMS Queen Mary 1913; B. of Heli-
goland Bight, 28 August, 1914; DNI 1914-1918; CB 1915;
KCMG 1918; promoted Rear-Admiral 1917; Vice-Admiral
1922; Admiral 1926; Hon. DCL Oxon. 1919, Hon. LLD Cantab.
1920; MP(Con) West Derby Division of Liverpool 1919;
principal agent of the Conservative Party, 1923; MP(Con)
Eastbourne, 1925. Retired from politics, 1929. A drawing by
Francis Dodd, Imperial War Museum.
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concepts, skills arid organisation had been recognised. The
problems were not apparent, and the immediate benefits not obvious.
There was nothing startlingly new about collecting information
about actual or possible enemies. Nelson used intelligence information
during the Trafalgar campaign. He and his great eighteenth century
predecessors realised the need for continuous and timely data con-
cerning the activities and possible intentions of the enemy, and the
strength and capabilities of his forces.
The Impact of W/T and Intelligence on Naval Operations and Command
However, in the pre-wireless era the commander at sea
could only acquire such information when he put into port or a fast
frigate located him. Similarly naval authorities ashore had no
knowledge of operational conditions, because of communications.
Even in the immediate operational environment senior officers afloat
were equally handicapped, since they were unable to exercise tactical
control outside the limits of visihulity.
With the advent of wireless telegraphy, and the later
explosion of communication technology, the significance and role of
6.
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intelligence changed accordingly. 	 But it was not a smooth transition.
In theory the situation had changed overnight. The Admiralty, with
intelligence and communication facilities, could obtain a detailed picture,
from a global to local and tactical levels, far more so than the comman-
der on the spot, whether he was in a single ship or submarine, or as
the leader of a large task force or group. In practice it did not work
this way immediately. It was a slow process whereby it became
recognised that commanders at sea should be supplied with as much
intelligence as practicable and given general directives, but left with
the individual right, and responsibility, to make the necessary tactical
decisions in the light of their knowledge and interpretation of the
situation. By 1939 this issue had been virtually resolved by the
Admiralty. Admiral J. H. Godfrey, Director of Naval Intelligence,
1939-1943, says this on the problem: "The British naval tradition
during the Second World War was to issue intelligence "raw", to leave
commanders to make what use of it they could, and not to dress it up
and make it look nice. The N.I.D. (Naval Intelligence Department)
developed a method of distinguishing in the out-message between
1.	 In July, 1908 the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Slade,
presented a detailed and lucid paper to the First Lord and First
Sea Lord on the effects of W/ T on naval strategy and intelligence
organisation. Slade MSS, Reel 3, National Maritime Museum.
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information, inference and comment which might well be perpetuated.
The command situation was changed in order to meet the
new requirements. Commanders-in-Chief were now able to plan
operations and dispose forces from ashore, and delegate the tactical
handling of ships to force commanders. In the inter-war period it
became obvious that they had to be ashore, since there was a growing
need for co-ordination, both on a purely Naval and tn-service basis.
Yet the harmony between operational headquarters ashore and the
sea-going command depended heavily on the viability of communi-
cations themselves, in terms of their technical reliability, but also
their vulnerability,	 nowpart of electronic warfare. There
were many crucial times during World War II when the maintenance
of radio silence was essential, such as the operation against the
Bismarck. Perhaps more important still the new structure of
organising naval operations depended on the quality of information
the Admiralty had at its disposal, which gave it the critical advantage
over the man on the spot. Instant communication from Whitehall
with the front line ship was fine, provided it was equalled by a system,
and methods, for collating intelligence information, making sound
decisions on the basis of this and issuing the correct orders. Behind
1.	 The Naval Memoirs of Admiral J. H. Godfrey - unpublished,
typescript, Vol. V, Part I, p. 82-8 3, National Maritime
Museum, Greenwich.
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this then lay a fundamental problem and, as will be seen, a dilemma
at times, over the whole system of naval command and control.
Admiral Slade had a clear view of the situation: '..... to sum up the
whole case in a few words, the Admiralty from the far wider view of
the operations that they possess, than that which is possible for the
Admiral to obtain, can lead him up to a situation where he can strike,
and is then given a free hand to do the best he can."1
Only in the light of experience has a coherent body of doctrine
emerged, by which the naval institution can attempt to optimise its
resources. The essential aims of British maritime strategy have not
changed in essence since Mahan rationalised them, and nor have the
inherent factors of sea warfare, not 1eat of all the flexibility and
mobility qualities of maritime forces, and also the very nature of the
sea environment. The need to plan naval strategy, on global and local
scales, to fulfill these aims, depends greatly on intelligence informatic
In the contemporary context the United Kingdom is concerned with the
totality of factors that constitute a nations make-up, both friendly,
1.	 Slade MSS, Reel 3, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
In World War U Admiral Godfrey was wary of the Admiralty-
based senior officer who used intelligence data and W/T, and
his rank, to deprive the commander at sea of his right to
make on-the-spot tactical decisions. He writes in his memoir
"Wireless telegraphy allied to accurate intelligence at the
centre play into the hands of anyone who by nature is a remote
controller". Godfrey MSS, Vol. V, part 2. P. 322-323,
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
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and also a potential foe, that may explain to the Defence planners
and executives the way they should review their role vis-a-vis other
nations. It is no longer regarded as satisfactory to know mere
details such as paper strengths, morale, state of training the
reliability of equipment, weaponry, speeds, and endurances, or
other traditional information such as the location of the enemy' s vital
interests and his main transport routes. It is now necessary to go
to a stage beyond this which encompasses the more subtle factors of
the economic, social, geographical and political variables that may
relate to an enemy at sea, and furthermore an appreciation of his
history, habits and doctrine that help towards an understanding of
his naval organisation. and role, and the place of this within the wider
political context, as well as the predictability of the nature of a possibi
war at sea, and the extent to which one can expect to break the enemy's
will to resist, or in certain circumstances his reactions to the real
threat of nuclear escalation.
The raison d'etre of the Royal Navy therefore rests largely
on the accuracy of predictions. To prevent such predictions coming
true or to meet them in the likelihood of their occurrence, at whatever
level, must be intimately dependent on a continuous process of
intelligence work, in peace and war. Intelligence can never be an
10.
infallible guide. At no time in the past has the course of a war
been accurately predicted. Some factors and variables remain too
complex and their inter-relationship too subtle to gauge. No
computer, using intelligence information, could have accurately
weighed the effect of an intangible such as the enemy's offensive
spirit in naval warfare during this period, although such intelligence
appreciations were obtained and proved very valuable.
Intelligence organisations today aim to provide the best
possible information available to those who make policy. A crucial
part of intelligence must involve interpretation, requiring as it does
special types of perception, at all levels. At one level a faculty for
imaginative insight into the decision-making processes of other
societies and cultures, and a facility for surveying the complex of
international affairs might be needed, and at another a calculated
assessment of a unit commander's next move could be the need. It
follows therefore that if the intelligence officer is to select that which
is significant for study and comment he must be constantly aware of
policy interests and concerns. Without this awareness there will
always be a danger that the spectacular and the trivial will be presented
as the important and significant. Good intelligence work will be a
constant dialogue between the two authorities. This state of affairs
11.
was not quickly reached within the naval intelligence organisation.
Without good intelligence planning becomes surmise, and the
commander is operating in a world limited by his own immediate
facilities. In the early days of World War I Jellicoe 1
 had to keep
strong forces at sea to meet the threat of any German forces that might
be sent out to attack the east coast of England and North Sea trade
routes. His general policy was based on very sound factors, but his
immediate short-term planning and tactical dispositions was limited
by lack of intelligence, resulting in wastefulness of effort and resources.
Naval intelligence grew out of its initial limitations and became
allied to the whole complex of major political decision-making in the
sphere of foreign and defence policy, and their relationship with e.conomic
1. Jellicoe, John Rushworth, First Earl Jellicoe, Admiral of the
Fleet; 1859-1935; entered RN 1872; Captain 1897; Naval assis-
tant to the Controller of the Navy, 1902; Director of naval
ordnance, 1905; Rear-Admiral 1907; Controller and Third Sea
Lord 1908; Vice-Admiral, commander Atlantic Fleet (flagship
EMS Prince of Wales) 1910; Second Sea Lord 1912; Admiral,
C. -in-C. Grand Fleet, 1915; First Sea Lord 1916; dismissed
by Geddes, Christmas Eve, 1917; Viscount Jellicoe 1918;
Admiral of the Fleet 1919.
2. Corbett, J.S.: History of the Great War based on official
documents: Naval Operations. Vol. I.
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policy and the contingent issues of party rivalries and electioneering.
The serious study of military intelligence is an essential part of the
wider areas of politics, government, and international affairs. It has
led one distinguished writer on intelligence matters to state: "... ••
public discussion of intelligence must be inhibited by the inevitable
content of the topic. However, it is undesirable and unhealthy that
there should be no public debate or consideration of a subject that is
of crucial importance in national and international decision-making,
and to which, after aU, public funds are devoted. 	 In a democratic
society government has the responsibility to communicate, albeit
perhaps in very general but nonetheless accurate terms, the reasons
for its defence policy. In the United Kingdom it is assumed that people
have a natural right to be told why arms are being purchased and the
possible uses to which they might be put. It is an unchallengable fact
that there are too many public controls to prevent British arms being
used for purposes other than those for which they were procured, without
1.	 Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong: Intelligence at the Top.
Strong, Major-General Sir Kenneth William Dobson: b. 1900;
ZLt. lbt. Royal Scots Fusiliers 1920; military career 1920-
1943 - command of 4/5bts. Royal Scots Fusiliers, Staff College,
Can-iberley; military attache Berlin; Feb. 1943-July 1945 head
of General Eisenhower' a Intelligence Staff; Director-General
of Political Intelligence, F. 0. 1945-1957; first Director of
Joint Intelligence Bureau, MOD 1948-1964; Director-General of
Intelligence, MOD 1964-1966.
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public consent by the rightful authorities. The resons for particular
policies are public concerns. However, it will be seen that the
detailed evidence for making long and short range predictions, based
on intelligence data is not necessarily communicated to the public,
both because it may not be in the immediate public interest to do so,
for security reasons, but also because certain types of major political
decisions, involving foreign and defence policies, do not require
public recourse to the minutiae of evidence to justify their having been
made. Thomas Hobbes wrote in ILeviathan!: "Fourthly, in Deliber-
ations that ought to be kept secret (whereof there may be many
occasions in Publiqu.e Businesse) the Cou.nsells of many, and especially
in Assemblies, are dangerous. And therefore great assemblies are
necessitated to commit such affairs to lesser numbers, and of such
persons as are most used, and in whose fidelity they have most
confidence.	 One can apply Hobbe& dictum to the relationship of
the Naval Intelligence Department with the decision-making authorities
within the Admiralty, and the present-day Admiralty Boards relation-
ship with the Defence Council. That all this work can be challenged,
if need be, within the forum of the House of Commons, completes the
modern context of Hobbes' dictum. Although Machiavelli would probably
1.	 Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan. Chapter twenty five.
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have disagreed with the relationship the Naval Intelligence Department
acquired, (through its own internal relationship within the naval
hierarchy, and hence external relationship within the Defence
structure) with the state, he would, speculatively speaking, perhaps
have approved of the growth of intelligence. Central to MachiavelliTs
political philosophy was his idea that a "prince ought to have no other
aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study than war and
its rules and disciplines; for this is the sole art that belongs to
him who rules. " British naval intelligence illustrates the growth
of an organisation, and the development of principles and methods
in order to perfect Machiavelli's art of war.
1.	 Machiavelli: The Prince. Chapter fourteen.
15.
CHAPTER ONE
The Development of British Naval Intelligence as an
Institution, and an Analysis of its Organisation.
16.
The Need for a Naval Intelligence Organisation
During the eighteen nineties the transformation of the Royal
Navy began, from a Navy of small battleships and cruisers, and ships
with auxiliary sail power, to a great fleet of nearly forty Dreadnought
battleships and battlecruisers, numerous fast cruiser squadrons, one
hundred and fifty destroyers, and a large submarine flotilla. The
turning-point came in 1889 with the passing of the Naval Defence Act.
By 1901 the effective range of the broadside was between two and three
thousand yards, and the effective raiige of torpedoes was increased
from two thousand to ten thousand yards between 1901 and 1914.
Certainly technological change had had a major effect upon war at
sea in the past. The use of the gun, and the broadside, had changed
the pattern of sea warfare in the sixteenth century. However, the
last quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed an unprecedented
advance in naval construction and weaponry, and the pace of change
that followed took the nineteenth century Navy by surprise.
In the wake of this advance arose needs to modify the
administration, organisation, and training of the Navy, and to revise
naval tactics and the finer practices of naval warfare. Controlling all
of these factors, in theo ry f not always in reality, was Briti3n's
17.
role and commitments in the world, and how a technically changing
Navy could fulfill its traditional global aims in the face of challenges
to British supremacy from the east and west. The Royal Navy' s
era of uncha].lenged dominance in the nineteenth century was both a
product and a cause of British economic and territorial supremacy.
From without came signs of opposition, and from within the
ideological basis of nineteenth century British industrial society was
changing, revealed in a multivariety of political, economic and
social innovations. The Royal Navy was in the midst of dynamic
change, and for a while it remained static. Central to this problem
were the basic aims of British maritime strategy. Were they to
change too? How were they to be achieved in a changing world
situation?
In a changing world, technologically and politically, there
was a growing need to establish within the Navy an organisation
which could collect a stock of basic factual data, kept well up to date,
with particular emphasis on current developments which might
impinge on the naval and national interests, thereby enabling itself
to make informed forecasts of the shape of things to come, the most
important part of the intelligence process. Before the international
situation deteriorated and the pre-1914 arms race began, the rate
18.
of technological change and the need for greater intelligence of the
technical accomplishments of foreign powers was incentive enough
to create the Naval Intelligence Department.
The birth and growth of the naval intelligence institution
stems then from an immediately recognisable need. However, it does
not reflect any major change of role in the Royal Navy. Its emergence
does exemplify the rapidly changing circumstances of Britain and
her defence responsibilities. It is, in part, a question of levels.
There are certain inalienable factors, self-evident, regarding
Britain's defence and the role of her Navy within this, such as the
economic factors regarding Britain and possible enemies. In 1914
for example, and indeed in 1939 too, it was common knowledge that
Britain could not live, let alone wage war, for more than four or
five weeks after her sea lines of communication to the outer world
were severed. This statement could be scaled down until one was
left with the problem of predicting the smallest movements of enemy
units at sea; going up the scale again, to the top, one could say,
using the previous example, that the whole issue of the maritime
war in 1914 thus depended on the battleworthiness of the Grand Fleet,
whose margin of superiority over its opponents was very slight, and
for periods vanished when several ships were being docked at the
19.
same time. Within the vast complex of levels, naval intelligence
had to find its level of usefulness. For an embryonic institution this
had all the attendant dangers of penetrating a traditional and highly
entrenched institution such as the Royal Navy. It could have no
doctrine, since this depended largely on experience and circumstances.
The circumstances of 1805 were widely different from those of the
Dreadnought era. There were no significant parallels in history to
be drawn on, and no one was able to produce a model for an intelligence
organisation, based on a logic drawn from existing naval circumstances
and experiences, or write a prognosis of future requirements.
The newly created Naval Intelligence Department not only
sought concrete objectives, and means to achieve them, but also
relationships with other departments. The logic of any modern insti-
tu.tion demands that it has aims or objectives and a structure or
organisation to meet these. This therefore implies clearly defined
responsibilities and authority, supported by terms of reference. The
relationship of such a body with other departments or units will be
clear, boundaries of interest will be precise, and the role of each part
in achieving the objectives of the whole organisation will be known to all.
Communications will be good. These elements were, in one sense at
least, alien to the Navy of the late nineteenth century, until Fisher
20.
took it by storm.	 These ideas were not verbalised, although the
Navy in practice did follow some of these precepts, and highly
successfully. To establish a viable position within the hierarchy
of naval departments and to develop a working relationship and
rapport with them was difficult in the extreme. This will become
apparent when the relationship with the Operations Division of the
Admiralty and the Naval Intelligence Department is examined.
Central to this problem was the ever-present and unquantifiable
factor of personalities, and their interaction, a factor that at times
was paramount. The penetration of a structure such as the nine-
teenth century Royal Navy by a new organisation could, and did on
many occasions, lead to highly charged personal relations.
The concepts and practical details of war at sea were still
firmly stated. The scope for diverging from these was indeed limited,
often at the perU of one' $ career. Nelson had thrown the Fighting
Instructions to the wind. Success was his justification. With the
technological revolution that was overtaking the Royal Navy there
1.	 Fisher, John, First Baron, Admiral of the Fleet: 1841-1920;
entered RN 1854; Captain 1874; Rear-Admiral 1890; Third
Sea Lord and Controller 1892-1895; C. -in-C. North America
1897; C. -in-C. Mediterranean 1899; Second Sea Lord 1902;
First Sea Lord 1904-1910; 1914-1915.
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was an ever growing need to re-think and establish new principles
of war at sea to meet all the contingencies of a future war, and also
for exercise purposes. The need to establish the bases upon which
such principles might be built was not self-evident.
As a result of these factors the early years of the Naval
Intelligence Department were stamped by an adherence to what are
regarded today as limited and specialised areas of naval intelligence
work. It also tended to become too unnecessarily involved with the
work of the British counter-espionage service and the Special Branch,
and at times became involved in activities which were well outside of
its naval scope. On an inter-service level the Naval Intelligence
Department was linked with its Army counterpart through the
Committee of Imperial Defence.
The Origins of the N.I.D.
The British government and Sea Lords became acutely aware
of the need for a body of uniformed experts providing intelligence after
the Balkan crisis of 1878. War with Russia had been narrowly averted,
and, despite threats from the Russians to occupy Constantinople, the
Mediterranean fleet had occupied the Straits. Naval attaches,
22.
especially in Paris and Rome, were pressing too for a central
authority to control and decide policy for sources providing
intelligence information. What they argued, and what the Balkan
crisis had revealed, was the need for a co-ordination of intelligence
information, (as then understood) with naval planning in the widest
context. After preparatory committee work from May, 1879 on-
wards by two successive First Lords, W. H. Smith and Lord North-
brook, the Board of Admiralty created the Foreign Intelligence
Committee, in December, 1882, later to become the Naval Entelli-
gence Department, (the N.I.D.) 	 The F.I.C.'s first Director
was Captain William Henry Hall, the father of Admiral Reginald
Hall, the Director of Naval Intelligence during World War I. The
Naval Intelligence Department was officially created in January 1887.
The next Director after Hall, Admiral Bridge, had a special
responsibility for collecting data on the movement of merchant and
war ships and preparing plans for the protection of trade in the event
of war.
1.	 Details of the re-organisation and work of the Foreign
Intelligence Committee and the creation and early work of
the Naval Intelligence Department are to be found in:
Adm.5, 6074, 1462, andAdm.116, 3106, andAdm.1, 6505,
6634, 6731, 6772, 6818B, 6868 A/B, 6922, 8623/64. See
especiaUy Adm. l/7l66B - Instructions for the Director of
Naval Intelligence, 24 January 1887.
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The main catalyst in the creation of the Foreign Intelligence
Committee (F.I. C.) and then the Naval Intelligence Department
(N.I.D.) was the need for a systematic study to be made of the needs
for the defence of trade. Before the F.I.C. there were no war plans
as such for the defence of trade. To facilitate this a body of know-
ledge would be required to analyse what British trade comprised,
(how much, where, along which routes, when, what sort of ships
and cargoes), what would be needed to defend it, and, equ.afly
important, how, and related to these - who would pose threats, and
what would be the nature of their threats. We now know how in the
latter part of the nineteenth century the Admiralty began to shift
its emphasis from the French and Russian torpedo boat and battle-
ship threats to the menace of German naval expansion. It was around
the threat to trade that discussion, planning, naval construction,
and exercises gathered.
Early pressure had come from J.C.R. Colomb.	 The
work of Professor B. McL. Ranft2 has shown how Colomb' s attacks
1. See his article: Naval Intelligence and the Protection of
Shipping in war. R.U.S.I. Journal.XXV. 1882. P.553-590.
Colomb, Sir J. C. R.: Captain, RM(rtd.) 1869; MP Tower
Hamlets (Con) 1886-1892; MP Great Yarmouth 1895-1906.
2. See his unpublished Oxford D. Phil. thesis: The Naval Defence
of British Sea-Borne Trade, 1860-1905. 1967. P. 116-117.
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in Parliament on the Admiralty' s lack of policy-making, which he
attributed to inadequate intelligence, led to the increase of the
government vote for naval intelligence from the £500 allocated in
1884 to between £4-5000 per annum and a staff of ten able young
naval officers. This occurred during the debate on the naval estimates
February-March 1887. As late as February, 1902 Colomb was still
not convinced that the Intelligence Department had enough detailed
information of the positions of merchant ships. Professor Ranft
has also shown how the early F.I. C. produced papers on what would
be required of the Navy in a French war and what strength it would
need, and outlines of possible naval operations against Russia. 2
He concludes: "Hall's insistence on the necessity for constant
intelligence about the movements of Russian cruisers in peacetime
and for Commanders-in-Chief to have detailed plans ready for
protecting trade at the outset of war were indications of the increasing
business-like working of the Admiralty at the time."3
/3.	 'i&S
1. See i unpublished Oxford D. Phil. thesis: The Naval Defence
of British Sea-Borne Trade, 1860-1905. 1967. P.141.
2. Ibid. P.184-185.
3. Ibid. P. 187.
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Admiral Bridge 1 inherited a much healthier and indeed more
powerful position from his predecessor, mainly as a result of the
problems which arose during Hall's period of office and their solution.
In 1884 Lord Charles Beresford, 2 a junior Lord of the Admiralty, had
bitterly attacked the Foreign Intelligence Committee, demanding in
the process the creation of a naval staff to prepare contingency plans
for all war eventualities. This furore had been mainly exacerbated
by the Pendjeh crisis on the Afghan border, as a result of which the
Fleet had shadowed the Russians in the Pacific. Hall suffered a
sardonic attack from the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette on 13th
October, 1886, who described the Captain as a "mere compiler of
information, a contemporary gazetter in breeches". Despite the
vitriolic comments from the Press and Beresford's personal attacks,
1. Bridge, Admiral Sir Cyprian: 1839-1924; entered RN 1853;
Captain 1877; DNI 1889-1894; C. -in-C. Australia 1894-1898,
China 1901-1904. Wrote two major books - The Art of Naval
Warfare (London 1907), and Sea Power and Other Studies
(London 1910).
2. Beresford, Lord Charles, Admiral: 1846-1919; entered RN
1859; MP(Con.) Waterford 1874-1880; Captain 1882; MP
East Marylebone 1885-1889; junior naval lord 1886-1888;
after resignation in January 1886 he became the most out-
spoken critic of naval policy; resigned seat in 1889 on
return to active service; Rear-Admiral 1897; MP York
1897-1900; second in command Mediterranean 1900-1902;
MPWoolwich 1902-1905; C.-in-C. Mediterranean 1905-1907;
Channel Fleet 1907-1909 until ordered to haul down his flag
after dispute with Fisher; MP Portsmouth 1910-1916.
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constructive reform did emerge with the formation of the Naval
Intelligence Department,(N.I.D.), which was given very wide ranging
responsibilities.
Along with Colomb, Lord Charles Beresford had been one of
the prime movers in pressing for a full N.I.D. to develop from the
F.I. C., again with the main idea of gathering data to help prepare
detailed war plans, especially for defending trade. His forceful
contribution to the creation of the N.I.D. cannot be overstressed.
With the development of the N.I.D. there originated the idea
of a Naval Staff, and in this sense the growth of an Admiralty-based
Naval Staff is inseparable from the concepts and growth of a Naval
Intelligence Department. Donald MacLachian has written: "The
Director of Naval Intelligence was the first, and was to remain there-
after the senior member of the Naval Staff directly responsible to the
First Sea Lord. That fact probably gave him greater prestige with
most naval officers than the activity of which he was in charge". 1
The instructions given to Captain Hafl read as follows: "to collect,
1.	 Donald MacLachlan: Room 39. P. 373. Before the modern idea
of a Naval Staff was developed the First Sea Lord considered
himself to be the Naval Staff.
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clas sify and record, with a complex index, all information which
bears a naval character, or which may be of value during naval
operations, to keep up our knowledge of progress made by foreign
countries in naval matters and to preserve the information in a form
readily available for reference". This development was very much
against the later ideas and reforms of Fisher, who was totally
against the idea of forming a naval staff. He thought it would convert
"splendid sea officers into very indifferent clerks". As an integral
part of an embryonic naval staff the early N.I.D. suffered from the
logical problem that there were no well-established naval staff
departments with which it could liaise. Hall found himself facing
the dilemma of having no planning division with which to co-ordinate
his intelligence work. As a result N.I.D. tended to trespass into
this area at the expense of its own intelligence efforts.
The extensive development of N.I.D.'s pre-1914 Naval Staff
work will be reviewed in later chapters. A bHef glimpse now will
reveal the extent of its activities, and the degree of influence it
exerted.
Professor Ranft' s thesis, in analysing the strategic and
tactical factors involved in the protection of trade, 1860-1905, and
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the body of thought relating to them, has shown how involved the
NI. D. was in the great controversy, and dilemma, over the relative
effectiveness of convoy, as ppposed to protecting the "sea-lanes"
and meeting points of trade routes, blockade, and seeking out and
destroying the enemy's main units wherever he might be in a pitched
battle. Central to this was the divergence of opinion over what
constituted "offensive" and "defensive" naval warfare. Many thought
convoy to be too defensive. In a fully documented account Ranft has
examined in detail the political ramifications of these divergent
policies, such as the significance attached to a Russian siezure of
Constantinople, the place of Egypt and Alexandria in British
Mediterranean strategy, and the strategic disposition of naval forces
on the China and Australia station. On the latter issue, and
specifically related to an N.I.D. memo. of 1 May, 1900 Ranft makes
the very significant comment: "This is yet another example of correc
strategic thinking in placing the protection of trade as the first
priority which at the same time failed to face up to the practical
difficulties of bringing an enemy to action and protecting merchant
ships in the enormous expanses of the Eastern seas. " He traces
this theme through his thesis, and concludes: "The British failure
1.	 Ranft thesis. P.215.
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to anticipate Germany's use of the submarine against sea-borne trade
is more understandable. The suitability of the submarine for such
warfare was unknown to the Germans themselves in 1914 and the
diplomatic disadvantages of using it ruthlessly long delayed its full
potential being realised. The failure to understand that the convoy
would provide the only effective defence was due not to any exceptional
stupidity on the part of those in control of the Admiralty but to the fact
that their thinking on the subject was necessarily heavily conditioned
by the complex and confused naval and commercial thinking about
the defence of sea-borne trade which they inherited 	 •,, 1 It is
chastening to recollect that by the spring of 1917 merchant shipping
losses were disastrous. Lloyd George wanted convoy introduced
against the advice of the Admirals. On 26 April, 1917 he ordered the
Admiralty Board to institute convoys. The first convoy sailed on
10 May, 1917. A.J.P.Taylor has written: "The institution of convoys
was his (Lloyd George' s) greatest stroke. It ensured that Great Britain
would go on to victory, and would survive at any rate the First World
War as a great power". 2
1. Ranft thesis. P.303.
2. A. 3. P. Taylor: The First World War. Hamish Hamilton.
1963. P.177-182.
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D.N.I.s from Custance onwards (1899-1902) (see appendix
C for the list of D.N.I. s from 1882-1945) until the end of World War I
were deeply concerned with the problems of invasion. In 1903 N.I.D.
was considering the implications of the loss of the command of the
sea in home waters and how this might affect an invasion threat. The
Military Intelligence Department (M.I.D.) were concerned - the
D.N.I., Battenburg (1902-1905) soon calmed their worst fears in a
paper presented to the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) in
July, 1903.1 Four years later the D.N.I., Slade (1907-1909) still
has the responsibility for drawing up counter-invasion plans with the
Army. The First Sea Lord, Fisher, leaves the matter entirely in
2Slade's hands.	 Similarly Fisher entrusted Slade with all manner of
naval business - not just intelligence, but planning, policy-making, and
general administration. Edmond Slade devised plans for a blockade
against Germany, and how the Navy should treat neutrals and contra-
band, and he developed a naval strategy for a possible war against the
United States (July, 1908), placing great stress on the role Canada
would play in such a war. He produced papers dealing with possible
attacks on Imperial territories, and he was particularly concerned with
1.	 Cab. 3/ 1/ 16A: 14 July, 1903. See also the M.I.D. paper,
Cab. 3/l/l3A.
2.	 Cab. 16/3A. 12 December, 1907.
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the possibility of Germany converting merchant ships for belligerent
purposes. He wrote: "The merchant ships so transformed into men-
of-war represent virtually a considerable accession of cruiser
strength to the enemy on all stations." As with all his predecessors
Slade was concerned with the defence of trade. However, he does
not appear to have advanced proposals for organisation in peacetime
much beyond the early days of Colomb and Lord Charles Beresford
in the 1880s. On 16 July, 1908 Slade wrote the First Lord and First
Sea Lord: "In order that the Admiralty may be in a position to provide
such protection as not only will enable trade to continue without undue
interruption, but will also instil such confidence in the ship-owners
as will encourage them to continue their regular sailings, it is first
of all necessary that accurate information as to what is taking place
on the trade routes be at all times available." To help facilitate
the latter Slade created port intelligence officers to liaise with
consuls, masters of merchant ships, shipping lines, the Admiralty,
and commanders of naval units. In all manner of other naval business
Slade was active, such as analysing the state of shipbuilding in
various countries, German and Russian operations in the Baltic,
and the British naval manoeuvres of July, 1908. 1
1.	 Slade MSS, Reel 3. National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
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In all these activities there was strong continuity from the
early 1880s until the end of the Great War, and in wartime of course
there was an immediate need for timely and accurate intelligence.
Throughout the Great War the DSN.L. assured the Prime Minister,
Cabinet, and Admiralty that the N.I.D. could give early and accurate
warning of any German preparations to invade England. 	 What is
more the D.N.I. pre-1914 never really lost his status within the
naval hierarchy on any occasion, or the respect of the First Lord.
In 1913 Churchill relied totally on the D.N.I., Admiral Henry F. O1ive
(D.N.I. 1913-1914) to furnish him with the facts and figures in favour
of eight not four further Dreadnoughts being built, (the Chancellor
of the Exchequer was opposing this). Churchill even consulted Oliver
about Fisher's recall as First Sea Lord (he had been retired in 1910).
Oliver's biographer writes:'.... Oliver ... expressed grave doubts
whether Fisher, with his dynamic personality and intolerance, would
work in double harness with Churchill who, unlike most First Lords,
would expect to be kept well informed and consulted about strategy
and dispositions of ships." With his staff of 7 Royal Marines officers,
2 Fleet Paymasters, 1 Staff Paymaster, 1 Engineer Commander,
1.	 See, for example, Admiral Hall's report, 27 December, 1917
"Possibilities of an attack on the United Kingdom." Adm.
167154.
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2 Commanders, and 10 clerks (minute by later Naval Staff standards)
Oliver enjoyed power and kudos second only to the First Sea Lord
himself.	 In marked contrast with the inter-war period the D.N.I.
was involved in the early and very basic discussions pre-1914 on the
strategic uses to which naval aircraft could be put. It was a former
DeN.I., Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Ottley, (D,N.I. 1905-1907) who,
as the Secretary of the C.I.D., instigated discussion and Naval
Staff talks on naval air power in January, 1912, and promoted the
eventual production of papers by Captain Murray F. Su.eter, the
Director of the Naval Air Department in August 1912. When the First
Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson and the First Lord,
Churchill, began discussions on the future use and development of
airships for naval purposes it was the D.N.I. who produced reports
for them on the Germans' Zeppelin naval airship policy.
The initial limits that this new department had set itself
is indicated by its early concentration of effort on re-organising the
cypher system. This received marked attention with the appointment
1. See Admiral Sir William James: A Great Seaman. Tie Lj
of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry F. Oliver. Witherby. 1956.
2. Cab. 38123/il, C.I.D. 172B.
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of Admiral. Beaumont as the N.I.D,'s third Director in 1894.1
Beaumont discovered the cypher records of a Captain Cator, R.N.,
who had produced work on cyphers when he was a lieutenant. These
challenged the old Vigenere system of cyphers. Admiral Sir Francis
Beaufort, who had the taa1 of developing cyphers, and was concerned
that all modern systems of encypherment were based on Vigenere' s
principles, (and therefore no cypher secrets would be safe from
a potential enemy in future), created a new cypher system for the
Royal Navy, based on Cator's ideas. His work gave the British Navy
a lead over the French and Germans, who were also busying them-
selves with cypher research.
The often parochial attitudes of the infant N. I. D. must be
seen in the light of its opposite number in the Army. During the
Boer War the Army had failed woefully to develop and use its
Intelligence Branch, which was regarded very much like a reference
library. By contrast, Admiral Custance, 2 Beaumont's successor as
Director in 1899, created an organisation that saw itself as something
1. Beaumont, Admiral Sir Lewis Anthony: b. 1847; entered RN
1860; Rear-Admiral 1897; DNI 1894-98; C.-in-C. Pacific
1899-1900; C. -in-C. Australia 1901-1903; Admiral 1906; C.-ir
C. Devonport 1905-1908.
2. Custance,Adrnjral Sir Reginald: 1847-l935;A DNI 1886-1890;
naval attache Washington and Paris l892-1895;DNI 1899-1902
second in command Channel Fleet; an opponent of Fisher' s
Dreadnought policy; author of The Ship of the Line (London 1912
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going beyond the work of code-developing and code-breaking. Admiral
Custance argued the case for the creation of a Naval Staff College and
a War Course at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. The Admiralty
Board sanctioned the latter in 1900, and senior naval officers began
to discuss and formulate for the first time in a formal environment a
maritime strategic doctrine, stimulated at that time by the publication
of Mahant s book in 1889. (The Staff College was founded in 1919).
In 1902 the N.I.D. acquired a Trade Division and a policy emerged
for routing merchant ships in the event of war. 1
Between 1898 and 1900 laws were passed in Germany
increasing the size of the German Navy from a small coastal defence
force into a High Seas Fleet. The arms race that ensued between the
great powers forced the Admiralty to make improvements in naval
1.	 The work of this division proved of critical value in the 19 14-
1918 war. Although much of its earlier ideas and plans had
to be modified in the light of war experiences (especially
unrestricted U-boat warfare), and temporarily abolished in
1909, the research and planning done from 1902 onwards
gave Britain an unparalleled start in the organisation of her
trade in time of war. Details are to be found in Adm. 137,
408-446, and. 2732-3045, Public Record Office. The records
of the work of the shipping and intelligence officers, (who
helped decide routes, planned convoys etc. in the light of
known and possible enemy moves) are to be found in Adm.
137, 324, 359-361, Public Record Office.
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intelligence. The free and easy methods of obtaining information
through the reports of naval attaches abroad, (who were able to visit
foreign arsenals and dockyards and secure information largely on a
quid pro quo basis) were now to all intents and purposes inadequate.
It began to develop new methods, though still tending to concentrate
on the revision of cyphering procedures, but, more important, the
interception of German cyphers and codes were set in motion. The
latter arose as much by chance than design. [n October, 1904,
Fisher became First Sea Lord. He invited Alfred Ewing, then a
professor of mechanical engineering at Cambridge, to become Director
of Naval Education.	 As a result of the close rlationship between
these two men Ewing developed ideas of his own on the organisation
of a code and cypher-breaking department. As a result of Ewing's
initiative, when war came in 19 1 4, the Royal Navy possessed the
nucleus of a cypher section, which was in fact already supplying
the Operations Division of the Admiralty with intercepted German naval
wireless signals, and had discovered the German method of cyphering.
1.	 Ewing, Sir James Alfred: 1855-1935; ed. Edinburgh Univ.;
Professor of Mech. Eng. and Physics at Imperial Univ.,
Tokyo. 1878; Prof. of Eng. Dundee Univ. 1883; Prof. of Eng.
Cambridge, 1890; DN EDS, 1903; invited by the DNI, Rear-
Admiral Sir H.F.Oljver, to establish Room 40, 1914; Vice-
Chancellor of Edinburgh University, 1916-1929. GB 1907;
KGB, 1911; FRS 1887. Portrait by Douglas Shields (c. 1903)
in the board room, Engineering Laboratory, Cambridge.
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The Development of Radio Intelligence and its Significance for N.I.D.
and Naval Operations.
It was around Ewing' s cypher team in the Admiralty that
the N.I.D. was first able to come to grips with its internal opponents,
and also have a major impact upon the war at sea. Fletcher Pratt
has written: "this was to have the most important effects on the
German naval effort, and through it on the whole coarse of the war.
Twice in the early days the Germans tried slipping flotillas of
destroyers down along the coast of Holland in an effort to raid the
British troop convoys across the Channel. Each time Room 40 read
their radio signals and knew of the proj ect. The first time fog and a
storm forced the raiders back to harbour; the second time a fast and
powerful British light cruiser waited across their path and sank four
of the German ships before they could get away. 	 Somewhat ironical
ly the strength of this team depended largely on civilian members,
whom Ewing had the good sense to import into the Admiralty because
of a lack of expertise and flair amongst naval personnel. The key men
who assessed the information pouring into the nerve centre of Ewing' s
organisation, Room 40 in the Admiralty, were all civilians.
1.	 FletcherPratt: Secret and Urgent. The Story of Codes
and Cyphers.
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Strategic Planning in Britain in the Early Twentieth Century
Outside the purely naval sphere there had been concern
long before the Great War began that there was not adequate attention
given to long-term military planning based on sound intelligence.
In January, 1904, Lord Esh.er's War Office Committee reported:
"The British Empire is pre-eminently a great Naval, Indian, and
Colonial power. There are, nonetheless, no means of co-ordinating
defence probl'ems, for dealing with them as a whole, for defining
the proper functions of the various elements, and for ensuring that,
on the one hand, peace preparations are carried out upon a consistent
plan, and, on the other hand, that, in times of emergency, a definite
war policy, based upon solid data, can be formulated." As a
result of this committee' s efforts the Committee of Imperial Defence
was founded on 4th May, 1904, very much a Balfour brain-child.
It is indicative of both the thinking of the time, and also of the
structural nature of such organisations that the Committee of Imperial
Defence was given a purely advisory role and no legal power at all.
However, the committee immediately set about creating sub and ad
hoc committees, their fundamental aim being the assessment of the
1.	 War Office Committee Report. January, 1904. Lord Esher
Chairman.
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military needs of the Empire, with special reference to Britain's
defensive preparations to meet the new political groupings of Europe.
A review of the Committee' s work indicates that hardly a
stone was left unturned. All manner of problems were reviewed -
the position of possible enemy and neutral shipping, enemy trade,
Britain's supplies, the control of railways and ports, the insurance
of ships and cargoes against war risks, counter-espionage, censor-
ship, the treatment of enemy aliens, cable and wireless communi-
cations, and so on. 1 Lord Oxford paid the Committee considerable
compliments when he wrote: "It would not be an unjust claim to
say that the government had by that date (August 1909) investigated
the whole of the ground covered by a possible war with Germany -
the naval position; the possibilities of a blockade; the invasion
problem, the Continental problem; the Egyptian problem".
ParalLel. to these events one sees a clearer identity for
the N.I.D. emerging. In some areas it lost a considerable amount
1. See Lt. Col. Sir Maurice Hankey: The Origin and Develop-
ment of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Army
arter1y. Vol. 14, April and July, 1927.
2. Lord Oxford: The Genesis of the War. See Chapter XV.
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of authority and influence gained between 1902 and 1909, for in the
latter year the N.I.D. Trade Division was abolished, and a new
Naval Mobiisation Department was created from the War and
Mobilisation Divisions of the N.I.D. Although stripped of several-"
of its hitherto major functions N.I.D. was back to its original
roles of the Hall and Bridge eras, collecting and collating intelligence.
The D.N.I. had momentarily lost ground, and the First Sea Lord
himself was without informed advice for his war plans. However,
in 1912 the Director of Naval Entelligence t s position was again
reasserted with Churchill's reforms in the Naval Staff structure,
with the quite clear separation of War Information, War Plans, and
War Arrangements. In this new scheme of things the First Lord
raised the Naval Intelligence Department to the senior position
within the Naval Staff, and the Director regained direct access to
the First Sea Lord.
The British Security Services and the N.I.D.
Parallel to these developments in higher defence planning
there were reforms within the counter-espionage service, an
organisation which was to have close connections with the N.I.D.
during the Great War. The Boer War had revealed the poverty of
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British counter-espionage, and with a European power struggle
emerging a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence
reconunended the establishment of a new intelligence organisation
on the military side, civilian in character and organisation, but one
which was regarded as a supplement to the N.I.D. The creation of
M.I.5 (counter-espionage) and M.I.6 (espionage) received additional
impetus as a result of the Agadir crisis of July, 1911.1 The
respective heads were Colonel Vernon Kell of the South StaZordsh.re
Regiment and Commander Mansfield Smith-Cumming,R.N..
	
There
was always a naval officer in charge of M. I. 6 until Admiral Sinclair
died in December, 1939. Kell was to work closely with Scotland
Yard, a combination which was to ultimately thwart the German
espionage machine, though initially his work was hampered by
British law, insofar as it gave protection to known German spies.
This situation was rectified in 1911 with the passing of the Official
Secrets Act, which had hitherto been confused and defective. The
law was put on a clear basis and extended so as to embrace every
possible mode of obtaining and conveying to the enemy information
which might be useful in war. However, the law did not affect
1.	 See Donald Mqj.achlan: Room 39. P. 383.
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M.I.5's legal position. While it could trace spies, it could not
arrest them. Any arrests made had to be with the co-operation of
Scotland Yard.
A son of an Archbishop of York, Basil Thomson, was
appointed to act as the link manbetween M.I.5, Scotland Yard, and
the recently created Special Branch. These bodies became closely
associated with the activities of the N.I.D., and it was the latter
which grew to dominate the scene, notably during World War I
with Hall's period as DN.I. Hall's drive, energy, ruthlessness
and purposeful character rendered M.I.5, M.I.6, and the Special
Branch echelons of the Naval Intelligence Department. Besides
dabbling in counter-espionage Hail wanted British agents in every
part of the world where he had interests, and he wanted them under
his direct control. This reveals the absence of central policy and
co-ordination of British intelligence efforts; that a senior naval
officer could extend his influence beyond the purely naval sphere
and even within that into areas that were purely civilian shows the
urgent need for a clear-cut definition of boundaries of interest.
The N.I.D., and certainly Ha1V s regime, did fill a vacuum and
his activities reflect the inadequacies of Britain's other intelligence
bodies. At the end of the nineteenth cer4i.iry the British Secret
(1)	 It ehould be noted that M.I.5. and. M.I.6. were the
military sections of the Secret Service dealing with
toutterespidnags *n* espionage respectively. They did not
have a universal responsibility for these aspects of
British intelligence work.
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Service tended to concentrate its efforts on detecting plots by Irish
rebels against B1ritain, and the researches of Richard Deacon have
shown that the Secret Service tended to concentrate too much on
French and Russian activities instead of German, despite the changing
European situation. However, he does show that in the long run
Britain easily had the best intelligence service of any foreign power
inside Russia during World War I and immediately afterwards. 1
Certainly	 and Gumming's departments scored successes; the
discovery of Karl Gustav Ernst's "post office" for the German secret
service in London enhanced Kell's reputation, and the organisation
the Special Intelligence Service established in the USA was a
prototype for the future. During World War I Sir William. Wiseman,
officially head of the British Pu.rchasing Commission in the United
States, controlled all Gumming's agents in that country, an
org anisation developed with some alacrity in the pre-1914 years.
There were unfortunate episodes too. In May, 1910 two Royal
Marine officers, Captain Trench and Lieutenant Brandon, acting
for the N. I. D., set off to gain knowledge of the Frisian islands.
They were captured, and sentenced to four years imprisonment;
seventeen months before their sentences expired they were pardoned
1.	 See Richard Deacon: A History of the British Secret
Service. (Muller, 1969).
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by the Kaiser to mark George V's visit to Berlin. However, it is
a pertinent point, that the efficacy of any British organisation must be
seen in the light of the effectiveness of foreign intelligence services.
The Germans were surely lacking in expertise and method too. It
was not until as late as July, 1914 that their master agent in Britain,
Steinhauer, realised the significance of Scapa Flow for the British
fleet.
The Flexibility of N. I. D. Org aniation
When examining the higher echelons of Defence planning
pre-l914 and the organisation created to meet actual war requirements
one can detect their obvious failings and omissions, which is the
prerogative of hindsight and experience, but in the same way as
comparing the merits or otherwise of British and foreign intelligence
expertise, when seen in terms of their results, reveals a more
realistic criterion for appraisal, so too does a glance at the compara-
tive war organisations of Great Britain and Germany. Churchill
gives an analytical account of the formation of the War Council in
the "World Crisis". 1 His discussion there is in marked contrast
1.	 See W.S,Churchil].: The World Crisi. Vol.11, Chapter IX.
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to Ludendorffs comments in his memoirs concerning military
planning and organisation in Berlin: "The machinery of government
in Berlin gave the impression of being extremely clumsy. The various
departments worked side by side without any real sympathy or cohesion,
and there was infinite over lapping. The left hand did not know what
the right hand was doing. 	 Whatever the eventual outcome of any
strategic policy it was equally critical that the organisatiort which
would facilitate such policy being made would be such that as much
evidence as possible would be brought in before the final decision
was made. This is central to the development of British intelligence
work. Even though at times the war organisation either rejected
or misused intelligence data, or was not aware of the need to collect
such data it was, above all else, sufficiently flexible and oriented
so as to adjust itself to needs that were often apparent only after
the event. In this area Britain undoubtedly scored over her foreign
allies and enemies.
Irrespective of military blunder or success, British Naval
Intelligence was to flower as a result of this ability within the British
1.	 General Ludendorif: My War Memories. P. 263.
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military machine, at political, bureaucratic, and uniformed
personnel levels, to recognise that there had been a need and its
fulfilment had been found wanting, and therefore innovation must
occur. In this sense British Naval Intelligence had a hopeful future,
since the developing logic behind defence thinking would naturally
lead to a heavy intelligence requirement. Causal relationships tend
to become lost though in this grey area of institutional development,
and one is left with the familiar hen or the egg problem. Did
intelligence help mould defence organisation and planning, in terms
of laying down various requirements, or was intelligence organisation,
methods, and its role in the defence hierarchy determined by non-
related factors, and how, and to what extent did these two fluctuate?
T1te answers to these questions will emerge when the activities of
some of the outstanding D.N,I. s and their principal subordinates are
examined later. At this stage the dominant factor to consider in
relation to intelligence growth is the flexibility of the higher defence
planiiing organisation. Through the Committee of Imperial Defence
the Prime Minister and Cabinet received collective advice on which
to base strategic decisions, instead of receiving separate and
possibly contradictory advice from the sea, land, and later air,
specialists. Working in close liaison with the Chiefs of Staff the
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the Committee of Imperial Defence furnished the government with
a comprehensive survey of Britain' s defensive situation as a whole,
based in part on appreciations from the intelligence bodies, the Foreign
Office, and other government departments. 1 Although naval intelligence
was to lose ground after the Great War the primary concerns were
still evident. For example, in February, 1920 the government set up
a sub-committee to overhaul Britain's pre-war arrangements in the
light of accumulated experience, and by the summer of 1921 the
Committee of Imperial Defence was in fuU swing again, conducting a
full investigation into defence requirements.
In many ways then a too mechanicafly organised N.I.D.
could have inhibited its growth, and because of the flexibility within
the defence machine its growth became organic - continually adjusting
and re-defining its roles and individual tasks through interaction with
the other defence bodies. But it is people that make institutions and
it was the ability and willingness of intelligence staffs, civilian and
uniformed, to invest their expertise and authority in inter-functional
exchange within the Naval Staff that produced this flexibility.
1.	 N.I.D. and the C.I.D. worked in close harmony, as the
papers of Sir George Clark, Secretary of the C.I.D. in its
early years, show. See Adm. 116, 3095, Public Record
Office.
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As a result of this interaction of personalities to meet
changing needs the organisation of naval intelligence never became
permanently structured in one particular way. It merely remained a
framework In which individual effort could be co-ordinated. The
First World War was the catalyst which ensured the survival of
these characteristics of the institution - the continua], adaption to meet
changing objectives, people, resources, and the environment in which
the work was performed. It was the clarification of the N.I.D.s
objectives which led to logical planning, instead of what had at times
prevailed in the pre-war years, namely periodic drives to achieve
limited goals. What Admiral Reginald Hall's era witnessed was the
imminent need to identify and group work according to priorities -
responsibilities were defined, authority delegated, and relationships
established for the purpose of enabling people to work most effectively
together in accomplishing the objectives set them. It was the process
that created the organisation, rather than the bureaucracy of the
organisation itself, which always remained in command.
The Growth of "Operational" Intelligence and the Jutland Experience
In August, 1914 the system of collecting and disseminating
intelligence was still very primitive. Let us look at one very
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important area - the control of merchant shipping. The world was
divided into intelligence areas, corresponding approximately, but by
no means exactly, to the limits of the naval stations. In each N.I.D.
area was one naval intelligence officer (under the command of the
Admiral commanding his station, not the D.N.I.), who received
reports from the reporting officers in his areas (these were usually
the consuls and other principal British officials in ports). He was
the link man with N.I.D. in the Admiralty and his area naval comman-
der. When war was declared each naval intelligence officer was given
control of the British merchant ships in his area or port(s). This
control was much less than it later became, and, in the early part of
the war, was almost wholly confined to the offering of suggestions to
masters as regards their route and procedure and precautions they
should take to lessen the chances of capture. If a trade route was
deemed unsafe a naval intelligence officer codd close it, and until it
was re-opened merchant shipping would proceed along it at their own
risk. As far then as the physical defensive aspects of British merchant
shipping organisation was concerned in 1914 this was almost non-
1
exis tent.
1.	 See the Naval Staff Monographs for World War I. Vol. 5.
Ps. 34-35, 41-43, 104-105. Ministry of Defence (Navy)
Library, Empress State Building, London.
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The Great War was the first great challenge to the N.I. D.,
for it was faced with the need to provide, for the first time,
"operational' t intelligence on a large scale. Admiral Denning,
(D.N.I. 1959-1964) has defined operational intelligence as "that part
of naval intelligence organisation which concerns itself solely with
obtaining, deducing, c 0-0 rdinating and promulgating intelligence which
immediately affects any naval operation being, or about to be, under-.
taken by British or Allied, or any part of British or Allied, fleets.
Room 40, the keystone of N.I.D. in World War I, fought a dogged
battle to win for itself the role implicit in Denning' s statement. Room
40' s role was regarded by the Operations Division as a mere passer-
on of information. It was not allowed to interpret, and this was
certainly exacerbated by the absence of cameraderie between Room
40 and the Operations Division. In other words total discretion was
left with the Operations Division as to what interpretation should be
placed on intelligence material and how, if at all, it should be used.
This, needless to say, rankled with intelligence workers, as did
the refusal by the Operations staff to provide N.I.D. with full,
1.	 Denning, Vice-Admiral Sir N.E.; b. 1904; Captain 1951; Direc
tor of Administrative Planning MOD (N) 1952; Director RN
College, 1956; Rear-Admiral 1958; Dept. of Chief of Naval
Personnel, 1958; Director General of Naval Manpower 1959;
DNI 1960-1964; Vice-Admiral 1961; Chief Naval Supply and
Secretariat officer, 1962-1964; Deputy Chief of the Defence
Staff (Intelligence) 1964-1965.
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up-to-date operational details, which in itself would help determine
intelligence requirements and establish criteria for sifting intelligence
and interpretation. This absence of a fundamental relationship
between the workers of Room 40 and operational staff officers could
have, and nearly did at Jutland, lead to disaster.
One major consequence of this breakdown was the loss of
confidence in intelligence data shown by sea-going commanders. At
times Room 40 was totally un'a.ware of the destination and the use to
which its intelligence material was put. Until the post-Jutland period
N. I, D. had its function withheld, mainly because the Operations
Division reserved the right to be the sole arbiter for vetting
intelligence material. When discussing Jutland Professor Arthur
Marder indicts the Operations Division for being too much of a one-
man show. Jackson, the head of Operations Division, 1 Marder
shows lacked creative thinking, as did his superior, Admiral Oliver,
the Chief of the War Staff, who tended to decide all. Marder lays
1. Jackson, Rear-Admiral Thomas: b. 1868; entered RN 1881;
Commander 1899; Captain 1905; Rear-Admiral 1916; naval
attache, Tokyo, 1906; DNI Jan. 1912-Oct. 1913; Director of
the Operations Division, Jan. 1915-June 1917.
2. Oliver, Admiral Sir Henry Francis: b. 1865; entered RN 1878,
Commander 1899, Captain 1903; Rear-Admiral 1913; DNI
1913-1914; DCNS and Chief of Admiralty War Staff 1914-l91
Vice-Admiral 1918; Vice-Admiral commanding Home Fleet
1919-1920; Second Sea Lord 1920-1924; Admiral 1923.
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the ultimate responsibility at the feet of the First Sea Lord, Sir
Henry Jackson, 1 who was quite satisfied with Oliver. The First Sea
Lord seldom visited the Operations Room, and the pack of vital
signals which were fed to the Operations Division by the N.I.D. were
merely put on file by one Captain Everett, and never consulted.
Procedure in the Admiralty tended to reflect procedure at
sea. Certainly "enemy reporting" and "action information" was a
universal fault in the British fleet. The fact that Jellicoe never knew
that the enemy was passing astern of him at Jutland indicates bad
reporting by the flotillas, but the records also indicate that Jellicoe
did not insist on receiving the minutiae of enemy positions and
strengths that would have enabled him to make the deductions Room 40
did, though admittedly from different sources. The necessity for
acquiring such information was not apparent until after Jutland, when
it became part of maritime tactical procedure. 2 What N.I.D.
1. Jackson, Sir Henry Bradwardine, Admiral of the Fleet:
entered RN 1868; Commander 1890; Captain 1896; Controller
and Third Sea Lord, 1905; commander third cruiser squad-
ron, 1908; Chief of the War Staff, Admiralty, 1913;
President of the RN College, 1916; Admiral of the Fleet,
1919; KCVO 1906, KCB 1910, GCB 1916.
2. N.I.D. was equally aware too of the urgent need for in-
coming intelligence data to be speedily transmitted. Hall wa
anxious that the Fleet in general and C-in-C's should trans-
mit any information considered relevant to the N.I.D.
immediately. Between August and September, 1915 measures
were taken to improve the transmission of intelligence. See
Adm.137, 1100, P.147-158, Public Record Office.
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succeeded in proving as a result of Jutland was that intelligence has
no value until it is placed in the hands of those who can act upon it;
the distribution of intelligence therefore became as important as its
collection. Jutland showed that the next worst thing to not having
intelligence is keeping it shut up. This advance in N.I.D. was
paralleled by a clearer statement of tactical procedure at sea - each
unit was to receive all relevant information of its own forces and
intelligence of the enemy, and was to be given definite instructions
in pursuance of the operational objectives. Moreover, in future
each unit commander was to keep his senior (and any other units
concerned) informed of changes in circumstances and his own
intentions, (subject to electronic policy imposed at the time). This
could not help but improve operatiunai. efficiency; "information" and
'cooperation" were the new watchwords. In what ways then had
Jutland revealed the paucity of these?
From the beginning to the end of the Jutland operation N.I.D.
Operations Division, and Jellicoe failed to work in harmony. During
the morning of 31 May, 1916 an officer from the operations room
asked Room 40 where the directional stations placed the German call-
sign ttDK (DK was the German C-in-Os harbour call-sign; when he
put to sea, he took another call-sign and transferred DK to the W/T
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station at 'W'ilhelmshaven. He did this to conceal the fact that the
fleet was at sea.) In Wilhelmshaven, he was told, and he asked no
more. He wrongly concluded that the German flagship was there and
passed a signal to that effect to Jellicoe at 12. 20 pm. That signal
went without N.I.D.s knowledge or confirmation. Professor Marder
writes: "But for the error in the Operations Division he (Jellicoe)
would undoubtedly have steamed at high speed and arrived in the battle
area somewhat earlier and so gained an hour or two of daylight.
Hence when Beatty2
 reported sighting a German battle cruiser squadron
at sea to Jellicoe their faith in intelligence data was shaken, and they
therefore tended to prefer on-the-spot reports throughoat the rest of
the battle. Jellicoe wanted knowledge of the German battle fleet's
formation, approximate position, course and speed, and it was
precisely on these points that the C-in-C was unable to obtain data
from the Operations Division. Jellicoe' s confidence in Operations
1. Arthur J. lvlarder: From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow.
Vol.1 P.43.
2. Beatty, David, First Earl, Admiral of the Fleet: 1871-1936;
Lieutenant 1892; promoted Commander, (aged 27) 1898;
Captain 1900; Naval secretary to First Lord (Churchill)
1912; Vice-Admiral. 1915, commander battle cruiser
squadrons (flagship HMS Lion); December 1916 acting
Admiral, C. -in-C. Grand Fleet (flagship HMS Queen
Elizabeth). First Sea Lord, November, 1919.
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was badly and permanently shaken. 1
If Jellicoe himself is to be criticised for not having sufficient
information available then it must rest on his failure to organise
immediate operational intelligence. The fourth Light Cruiser Squadron
and a flotilla could have been used for this purpose and sent off to the
south-east to collect information. Jellicoe could have insisted too
that his subordinates signal enemy dispositions to him immediately.
That Beatty, and several of the captains erred in this there is now
no doubt. During the fourth encounter none of the destroyer captains
involved took pains to inform the C-in-C of their life and death
struggle, and during the sixth encounter only one destroyer reported
the fight and position to the C-in-C. 	 But Beatty suffered too - he
never received the intelligence the Admiralty had wirelessed to
Jellicoe during the night. He did not therefore share his C-in-C's
appreciation of Scheer' s whereabouts.
1. See Jellicoe's own accounts in: The Grand Fleet and The
Crisis of the Naval War. In the former he writes: "I should
not for a moment have relied on Admiralty information of
the enemy in preference to reports from ships which actually
sighted him."
2. See Geoffrey Bennett' s account in: The Battle of Jutlan4.
56.
The second critical piece of intelligence information to
reach Jellicoe, namely the High Seas Fleet's impending dash for the
Horns Reef and home, was disregarded by him. Jeliicoe simply
distrusted the validity of Admiralty intelligence after the disastrous
consequences of the 9. 58 signal from the Admiralty to the Iron Duke.
This was the result of three intercepted enemy messages 'hich had
been decyphered by Room 40 and passed on to the Operations Division.
The 10.41 pm signal gave the course and speed of the High Seas
1Fleet.	 If Jellicoe had acted quickly and plotted the enemy' s track
from the last known position the Grand Fleet could have intercepted
the High Seas Fleet. In fairness to Jellicoe the Operations Division
did not send all the information they had received from Room 40 -
that Scheer had called for airship reconnaissance of Horns Reef;
in all, eight critical signals were not transmitted. On the basis of the
10. 10 pm signal (airship reconnaissance) and the 11. l5pm signal
(assembling of flotillas) Jellicoe could have made for Horns Reef in
time to cut off Scheer from his base. Jellicoe writes himself in the
"Grand Fleet": "Of course, if the Admiralty had given me the
information as to the airship reconnaissance at the Horns Reef I
1.	 The signal read: German battle fleet ordered home at 2114.
Battle cruisers in rear. Course SSE3/4E. Speed l6knots."
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should have altered in that direction during the night. , 1
It is vital, as well as interesting, to compare Jellicoe's
comments with those of Admiral Tovey, 2 referring to the intelligence
data given to him at the time of the Bismarck operation: "The accuracy
of the information supplied by the Admiralty and the speed with which it
was passed were remarkable; and the balance struck between infor-
mation and instruction passed to the forces out of visual touch with me
was ideal.	 This reflects the quite dramatic change between role,
organisation and effect between 1916 and 1941. So in one sense then
Jellicoe cannot be held blameworthy. Room 40 never knew Operations
were not passing on their information to the C-in-C and, in any event,
nor could they contact the Grand Fleet directly. Arthur Marder writes:
1. Jellicoe: The Grand Fleet.
2. Tovey, First Baron of Langton Maltravers, Admiral of the
Fleet John Cronyn: 1885-1971; Captain 1923; Naval Assistant
to the Second Sea Lord 1930-1932; Rear-Admiral 1935; Rear-
Admiral Destroyers, Mediterranean 1938-1940; Vice-Admiral
1939; second in command Mediterranean Fleet 1939; C.-in-C.
Home Fleet 1940-1943; Admiral 1942; Admiral of the Fleet
1943; C.-in-C. Nore 1943-1946.
3. Admiral Tovey: Sinking of the Bismarck, May, 1941 London
Gazette. 16 October, 1947.
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"Although Scheer was on the run a decisive result might have been
possible in the daylight hours of 1 June if the C-in-C had been better
served during the night with information from the Admiralty and his
own fleet.	 When Jellicoe realised what Scheer was doing it was
too late.
Post Jutland Intelligence Reforms
Jutland forced reform through. From November, 1916 the
Grand Fleet received daily summaries of all enemy movements and
changes. (Throughout World War II N.L.D.'s Information Section
promulgated Weekly Intelligence Reports to the Fleet). Admiral
Reginald Hall was convinced by Jutland that Room 40 should be an
intelligence centre and not just a cryptographic bureau, passing signals
to the Operations Division of the War Staff. By May, 1917 Room 40
came directly under Reginald Hailts control, and in July, 1917, Room
40 became a full section of the Intelligence Division, and began to send
full, intelligence reports to the Operations Division. In December, 1917
Room 40 and El (dealing with German U-boats) became sub-sections
(lD 25a and 1D 25b) of the German Section (14) of the N.I.D., under
1.	 Arthur Marder: From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Vol. 3.
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a single head. Above all else this was to lead to a greater protection
of British merchant shipping. Of equal importance at this time
was the creation of the Convoy Section of the Naval Staff (25 June, 1917)
which was to work hand-in-hand with the NI.D. Prior to this the
German and Enemy Submarines Section of the N.I.D. had been kept
separate from Room 40 and its cryptanalysis, and all of these from the
work of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Admiralty. All of these
organisations, united in the common goals of convoy protection and
U-boat destruction were fully integrated. The significance of the
separation of Room 40 from Sections El and 14 of the N.I.D. came
out officially as late as the Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland in 1922.
This showed how, because of organisational failures and the secrecy
attached to Room 40's work a combined picture of the U-boat threat
in particular had never emerged within the Naval Staff pre-1917. 1
Room 40 continued its general interception, decyphering,
and interpreting duties. The destruction of the Zeppelin L-32 on
24 September 1916 yielded to the Admiralty the new German naval
signal book. This had recently replaced the book captured from the
"Magdeburg" early in the war. This enabled Room 40 to continue to
1.	 Arthur J. Marder: From Dreadnought to Scapa Flo. Vol.4.
Ps. 264-266, 295. -
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decypher many German messages, particularly impending movements
from the Jade.	 Throughout 1917 and 1918 Room 40 continued to
track Zeppelin reconnaissance over the North Sea. They were
monitored as soon as they left their sheds and ample warning was given
to the Grand Fleet of their arrival. 2
It is a somewhat unfair criticism of the N.I.D. that it tended
during World War I to rely on one major form of intelligence at the
expense of others. This study will reveal the converse of this in
later chapters. However, the activities of Room 40 may have had,
indirectly, an unfortunate aftermath in the inter-war period. It is
very difficult to prove a causal relationship between the decline of
British Naval Intelligence between 1920 and 1938 and the overconfidence
generated by the code-breaking activities of Room 40. General Strong
has written, when discussing military intelligence overall in the 1930's
".... As far as the Admiralty was concerned, a legend had been built
up around a mysterious Room 40 and the highly secret operations of
Admiral "Blinker" Hall in World War I. Perhaps as a result there
1. On 27 August, 1914 the German cruiser "Magdeburg" was
wrecked in the Gulf of Finland. The Russians salvaged her,
and forwarded to London copies of the German Navy codes
found on her. By December Sir Alfred Ewing's team in Room
40 had decyphered enough to give advance warning of sorties
of the High Seas Fleet.
2. Arthur J. Marder: From Dreadnought to Scapa Flo. Vol.4.
P. 10.
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was a tendency for Naval Intelligence to feel itself superior, in
efficiency and influence, to the intelligence departments of the other
two Services; in fact, there was no justification at all for this
attitude. 1,1 Strong was intimately concerned with inter-war intelli-
gence organisation, and his observation is endorsed in other reliable
2published sources.
Inter-War N. I. D. Org anis ation and Developments
The outstanding feature of intelligence in the United Kingdom
between 1920 and 1938 is its indecisiveness. The problem stemmed
from the failure to identify intelligence targets. Intelligence coming
out of Germany in the 1920s and 1930s was scanty and unco-ordinated.
Those who regarded Germany as still one of the primary targets for
intelligence were outnumbered by those who were anti-French and
pro-German, and those who believed that Soviet Russia was the primar'
target. Besides lacking basic objectives, military intelligence in all
three services suffered from organisational problems. Strong writes:
1. Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong: Intelligence at the Top.
P. 18.
2. See in particular Donald MacLachian: Room 39. P. 28.
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"The intelligence staffs of the War Office, the Air Ministry, and
the Admiralty had little contact with each other and there were no
Jbixt staffs. As a result there was considerable duplication of effort
and waste of resources. Estimates of German strengths and
intentions were made quite independently by each Ministry, each
for its own use". 1 This comment is echoed by Richard Deacon in
his "History of the British Secret Service", (Muller, 1969), whose
sources show a lack of co-operation between M.I.6 and the N.I.D., anc
a failure on the part of the hierarchy of the Secret Service to give
coherent guidance to the government, though the treatment given to
intelligence data by inter-war politicians is a separate factor, dealt
with elsewhere. The Prime Minister, in theory, still remained the
titular head of the intelligence bodies, and the individual permanent
heads had direct access to their respective Secretaries of State,
To meet World War II requirements the Special Operations
Executive, (S.O.E.) was founded, under the direction of Sir Winston
Churchill, by Hu Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare. This
1.	 Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong: Intelligence at the Top.
P. 18.
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combined under its command D section of the Secret Intelligence
Service, (S.I.s.) The S.O.E. was something of a disaster in many
ways, despite the efforts of its three heads, Sir Frank Nelson, Sir
Charles Hambro, and Major-General Sir Cohn Gubbins. The relations
between the SSO.E., the S,I.S.,	 and PIW.E., (Political War-.
fare Executive), were never cordial, and at times marked by an almost
venomous mutual distrust.
Between 1918 and 1937 there were eight D.N.I. s, and they
must all, have felt that the N. I. D. was a shadow of its former self. It
was not until the mid l930s that one can detect any sign of revitalisation
in the N.I.D. after its post-war run-down. The latter was epitomised
by the fate of N.I.D.'s Movements Section. In October, 1920 it still
had on its staff one Commander, one Captain RM, one Lieutenant TtM,
and six clerks. By March, 1927 it had only a marine in charge and two
clerks. By December, 1928 it had ceased to exist.
In 1935 came the first signs of change with the appointment
of Vice-Admiral Sir William James as Deputy Chief of the Naval
1. See for example M.R.D.Foot: S.O.E. in France.
2. Godfrey Memoirs: Vol. 5. Part 1. P. 342.
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Staff. 1 He prompted the Admiralty Board to improve operational
intelligence. In December, 1936 the question of establishing an
operational intelligence centre was first raised. The anish
Civil War revealed deficiencies in passing intelligence to ships and
other relevant departments, and in June, 1937 a Lieutenant Commande
Norman Denning was brought into the N.I.D. tokvork out the
organisation required for a wartime operational intelligence centre,
and by November, 1937 his ideas began to come to fruition.
A.
Eventually he was able toXset up the 0.1. C., (Operational Intelligence
Centre), with three rooms in the Admiralty, and the assistance of a
signals expert. One of Denning's first major contributions was to
improve the direction-finding and interception organisation for, as
Denning said, it was possible for two separate divisions of the Navy
to have different plots of enemy fleet locations. On Denning' s
advice Rear-Admiral Troup (D.N.I. 1935_1939)Z had HF/DF stations
1. James was in charge of Room 40 for part of World War I and
Deputy D.N.I. after 1918. James, Admiral Sir William
Milbourne: b.1881; Commander 1913; Captain 1918; Rear-
Admiral 19Z9; Vice-Admiral 1933; Admiral 1938; Director
of RN Staff College 19Z5-l926; Naval assistant to the First
Sea Lord, 1928; commander battle cruiser squadron, 1932-
1934; DCNS 1935-1938; C. -in-C. Portsmouth 1939-1942;
Chief of Naval Information, 1943-1944.
2. Troup, Vice-Admiral Sir James Andrew Gardiner: b. 1883;
Commander 1916; Captain 1922; Rear-Admiral 1935;
DNI 1935-1939; Vice-Admiral 1939; retired 1939.
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built in the north, and an 0.1. C. teleprinter system set up, so
as to allow instant communication with the stations, Coastal Command
Headquarters, local naval units, coastal watchers, and agents' signals.
It was located in the Citadel under Horse Guards Parade, where it was
dI...j ôfrh
hoped it could survive a direct bomb hit. Denni ng' s"hard work had its
reward at the time of Munich, when his 0.1. C. had aU German ships
plotted. What	 aimed for with b& 0.1. C. was a
resemblance of the enemy's operations room. 1 In January, 1938
0.1. C. had acquired Room 30 in the Admiralty.
The slack of the years 1920-1935 was quickly taken up during
the last four years of peace, and the momentum gained after Jutland,
during the height of the Hall era, and lost in 1918, was continued, such
that by 1939 three basic, but very important concepts of intelligence
had been established: firstly, the 0.I.C. could "interpret" intelligence
data, and secondly, linked to this, the Operations Division could no
longer just ask for bare facts, and thirdly, N.I.D. was provided with
full details of the Fleet, which would assist it in its interpretation of
1.	 Details of the improvements made in the N.I.D. communi-
cations system between 1935 and 1939 are to be found in
Adm. 116, 4080. For example, the institution of a tele-
printer service between the Code and Cypher School and
the Royal Navy' s VT. T. stations at Flowerdown and Scar-
borough is detailed.
66.
raw intelligence. At long last naval intelligence had been integrated
with the Plans and Operations Divisions. Donald Macl.achlan writes:
the Naval Staff, in September, 1939, found themselves ready
to go into action with a highly trained organisation for centralised
control of the war at sea. 	 Later in the war Italian and Japanese
0.1. C. sub-sections were set up. Perhaps not as spectacular as
Admiral Hall's N.L.D. the department of the Godfrey, (D.N.I. 1939-
1943)2 and Rushbrooke, (D.N.I. 1943-l946) era was to be character..
ised by cool and well planned professionalism, and not indulging in
anything like the same amount of private espionage that Hall. delighted
in. The arrival of Godfrey in office was to mark a total change in
tone in the N.I.D. just as Hall's arrival had in 1914.
One of the outstanding failures of naval personnel adminis-
tration during the inter-war period must remain the Admiralty's
1. Donald Macch1An: Room 39. P. 59.
2. Godfrey, Admiral John Henry: 1888-1971; Captain 1928;
Rear-Admiral 1939; Vice-Admiral 1942; Admiral 1945;
Deputy Director, Plans Division, Admiralty, 1933-1935;
Captain HMS Repulse, 1936-1939; DNI 1939-1943; Flag
officer commanding Royal Indian Navy, 1943-1946.
3. Rushbrooke, Vice-Admiral Edmund Gerard Noel: b 1892;
Commander 1918; Captain 1936; Chief of the Intelligence
staff, China station, 1937; Captain HMS Guardian 1939;
EMS Argus 1940; EMS Eagle 1941; DNI 1942-1946; Reais
Admiral 1.945; retired 1947; Vice-Admiral on the retired
list 1948.
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failure to select an intelligence-trained specialist for the task of
DN.I., and then allow their nominee to hold the job for only a few
years. This led to many errors; for example, as early as 1936
German cryptanalysts had penetrated the wireless security of British
ships in the Red Sea and this failure in naval security was not com-
pletely overcome until the middle of 1943. Perhaps its worst effects
were felt in the disastrous Norwegian campaign of 1940. The D.N.I.
remained responsible for naval censorship and security, and he
delegated these responsibilities to subordinate sections and heads.
The Joint Intelligence Committee
The greatest advance in intelligence organisation between
the wars was the formation of the Joint Intelligence Committee, (3.1. C.)
The idea of such a committee had first been mooted in the Churchill
Committee of 1922, but it did not make any real headway until the
Chiefs of Staff Committee began discussions on the topic during
1935-1936, and eventually submitted a proposal to the Committee of
Imperial Defence. On the 30th January 1936, the Joint Intelligence
Committee was forrne d as a sub-committee of the Committee of
Imperial Defence. Within six months a formal link was established
between the J.I.C. and the Joint Planning Committee (J.P.c.). This
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was the first move towards an overall intelligence appreciation being
conducted by a single body whose main concern was strictly concerned
with intelligence data, rather than the much broader responsibilities
of the Committee of Imperial Defence. It reflects a fundamental
change in viewing the significance of intelligence data, and what
conclusions could be drawn at varying levels. This is borne out by
events - the J.I. C. became concerned with the long range foretasting
and strategic planning in global terms, whereas 0.1. C. was imrnediat
concerned with, for example, day-to-day U-boat hunts. What the
J.I.C. did too was to reduce inter-service rivalries and created a
joint service objective appraisal of common problems. Immediately
after World War II began the J.I.C. was made responsible to the
Chiefs of Staff Committee, and it soon became very powerful - no
Chief of Staff could ignore it. In the event of a J.I.C. disagreement
the matter in question could be referred to the War Cabinet. Admiral
Godfrey wrote in his memoirs: "Working under the Chiefs of Staff
Committee, the J.I.C. issued intelligence summaries, and directed
the policy of various sub-committees .... It dealt with administrative
and other questions concerning the topography, prisoner of war
interrogation, and photographic interpretation centres.
1.	 Godfrey Memoirs: Vol. 5. Part 2. P. 215.
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The J.I. C. had direct links with all the British Intelligence
bodies and, although there were setbacks, the British were able to
avoid the outstanding weaknesses of German intelligence, notably their
failure to realise that the collection and judgment of material by four
or five organisations working independently, continually preyed on
by the jealousies of rival services and watched suspiciously by the
party and its security machine, was bound to be inefficient. Moreover,
the British were aware of the need to communicate a limited amount
of intelligence to service personnel. In the spring of 1939 the
Information Section of the N.I.D. was formed, (N.I.D.19) - this
informed all service personnel of the progress of the war, under proper
security conditions, through weekly intelligence reports.
When examining the progress towards final service
integration, of which "Overlord" must be taken as one of the major
points in time to take atock, (when in fact integration was virtually
complete), there were quite clear stages when this was halted. For
example, Godfrey's early efforts to form a joint service topographical
intelligence sub-committee of the J.I.C. were frustrated. The R.A.F.
and Army were against the idea, arguing that each service should
cope with its own individual problems. However, the obvious
demands for such an organisation became so apparent that by February,
70.
1941 Godfrey had won the day with the founding of the topographical
section of the LI. C., under N.I.D. control. Internally within the
Admiralty and the N.I.D. Godfrey strove to facilitate integration of
functions. Godfrey' s great success stemmed from this ability to see
the problem, and how it could be solved within a complexity of service
hierarchies, and institutional prejudices. In his unpublished "Memoir
he states, with reference to the last months of 1939: "The incidence
of responsibility between the operational, planning, trade, and anti-
submarine divisions was as yet ill-defined. 	 He was a man, who,
having defined relationships and organisationa]. structures, could set
about giving them practical expression.
At times though Godfrey felt that he may perhaps have
pushed through integration too rigorously, at the expense of the
N. I.D's operational efficiency. For example, in March, 1942 it
became known that the Germans were installing radar on Spanish soil
near Gibraltar. Godfrey wished to act quickly, but found himself
restricted by the system of joint consultation he had developed.
Admiral Hall would have organised a purely N.I.D. private venture.
1.	 Memoirs of Admiral Godfrey: typescript in the National
Maritime Museum, Greenwich, and the Ministry of Defence
(Naval) Library, Empress State Building, London. Several
parts of Admiral Godfrey' s Memoirs, unavailable in these
two libraries, were loaned to the author by Vice-Admiral
Sir N.E.Denning, KBE, GB.
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The D.N.I. could no longer practise counter-intelligence on his
own authority, but merely recommend a course of action as the Naval
Staff member responsible.
British Naval Intelligence gained the tremendous lead it had
over the enemy and allies because Godfrey rapidly implemented the
need to establish an organisation to link operational intelligence,
(O.LC.), Plans, and Operations. As early as February, 1939 Godfrey
had a Captain, R.N. running this vital section of N.I.D. Despite the
uncertainties and failures of 1939 "and early 1940 in the N.I.D.
Godfrey had created in 0.1. C. an organisation that allowed progressiv€
expansion and change. At the heart of this system lay efficient
communications, the responsibilities of the Signals Division of the
Naval Staff, though communication security was the D.N.I.'s
responsibility. The 0.1G. had direct telephone and teleprinter
links with all operational headquarters of C-in-C's at home, the
headquarters of Coastal and Fighter Commands, and the area
Combined headquarters. Within 0.1. C. there were liaison officers
from Coastal and Fighter Commands.
Before making any evaluation of the effectiveness of the
org anis ation which Godfrey and Rushbrooke commanded during
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World War II one must establish acceptable criteria for such a
measure. The first of these must be the effect which the "hard"
intelligence work of the N.I.D. had on the outcome of the war, generally
and at crucial points during the progress of the war, as well as in
specific operations. It does not follow that because the N.I.D.'s work
was perhaps ineffective at times that its organisation was at fault.
Secondly, the work of the N.I.D. must be seen agairst the general
background of British intelligence work during World War II, and
thirdly, a comparison with enemy organisation is an indicator of
relative advance or otherwise within the N.I.D.
The Origins of Integration - Supreme Headquarters Intelligence Staff.
Perhaps the best point at which to judge Naval intelligence
as an organisation during World War II is the period before and during
D-Day, By this stage the naval element in overall military intelligence
organisation was fully integrated with the other Services. The Supreme
Headquarters Intelligence Staff at Bushy Park was divided into two
divisions, one concerned with information about the enemy, and the
other with counter-intelligence. The former was directly modelled on
the pattern of the 0. I. C. and the latter reflected the experiences of the
security sections of the military intelligence departments as well as
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M.I. 5 and the American counterparts. This division waged a
ceaseless war against enemy agents and spies. General Strong des-
cribes the intelligence group gathered together at Bushy as "... perhaps
the best and most experienced operational intelligence staff ever
assembled. It included Navy, Army, and Air Force officers and it can
be said to have been the forerunner in many respects of the present
Defence Intelligence Staff in the British Ministry of Defence in London,
and perhaps of the similar United States organisation, the Defense
Intelligence Agency." N.I.D. cannot therefore be separated from
the new joint and combined organisation about which Strong writes.
What the D-Day intelligence machine reveals is the final recognition
to synthesise all intelligence data, and above all else it recognised
the need for forms of intelligence that hitherto were not considered
relevant to waging war. The D .-Day and post D-Day planners at last
recognised that the strength and possible actions of opponents cannot
be calculated solely in terms of the now obvious factors, such as the
number and disposition of ships, but in terms too of the more subtle
economic, geographic, psychological, and allied factors, and that it
is the judicious weighing of aU this evidence that will help predict
enemy movements. At this level intelligence had moved into the top
1.	 Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong: Intelligence at the Top
P. 131.
74.
flight of strategic decision-making. The later integrated Defence
Intelligence Staff which Britain acquired (1963) was the natural heir
to Eisenhower's organisation at Allied Headquarters. I
In General Strong' s opinion the break-up of the Allied HQ
joint British-American organisation in July, 1945, at British instig-
ation, was a great mistake, mainly because many of the post-war
intelligence problems concerning Germany might have been avoided,
and co-operation with the Russians might have been easier. Strong
writes: "The British had chafed too long under joint control and
were determined to free themselves from any hint of continued
subordination to American influence, and I think that even at that
stage American intelligence had determined to go its own way.
Certainly one can surmise and say that the British attitude prevented
what should have been the next logical step in the integration process
1. See Mr. Peter Thorneycroft's White Paper on the Central
Organisation of Defence, (Cmd. 2097): "... the staff as a
whole will be integrated. It will be responsible ... for
producing a defence intelligence point of view on matters
which are of interest to the Ministry of Defence."
2. Strong, P.217.
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of British intelligence, namely joint Anglo-American intelligence.
Regrettably Britain did tend to stand still. Despite the formation of
the Joint Intelligence Bureau in 1945, (with Strong as its first Director),
it was fifteen years before the vaiius departments concerned with
armed forces intelligence were finally combined in the Defence
Intelligence Staff, and this was achieved in the face of determined
opposition. Strong, who had a long wait before he fulfilled his
ambition to become the first Director General of Intelligence,
Ministry of Defence, writes that: "The main force behind the moves
for a new order was Lord lvlotintbatten, and the integration of intelli-
gence staffs to form a single Defence Intelligence Staff took place as
part of the general scheme. It is true that he received powerful
political support, but without his knowledge and prestige it would have
been impossible to make progress. " No doubt Lord Mountbatten's
great insight and drive had been mainly responsible for accomplishing
the final act, but it had to have an organisational. aid psychological
precursor. 2 It can be no mere coincidence that Vice-Admiral Sir
1. Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong: Intelligence at the Tops.
P. 225.
2. Mountbatten of Burna, First Earl, Admiral of the Fleet: b.1900
naval cadet 19l3;Commander 1932;Captain 1937;Rear-AdmiraJ
1946;Vice-Adrnirai. 1949;Admira]. 1953;Admiral of the Fleet,
1956; in command HMS Kelly and 5th Destroyer Flotilla 1939;
HMS illustrious 1941;Comniodore Combined Operations 1941-
1942;Chief of Combined Operations l942-1943;Suprem e Allied
Commander South-East Asia 1943-1946;Viceroy of India 1947;
Governor-General India 1947-1948; C. -in-C. Mediterranean
1952-1954;First Sea Lord 1955-1959;Chief of the DefenceStaff 1959-1965.
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Norman Denning became Mountbatten's and Strong's main support
in forming the Defence Intelligence Staff. As a head of the 0.I.C.
during World War II and later on as a D.N.I. Denni.ng had, no doubt,
realised very early on in his intelligence career that 0.1. C. was the
paradigm of the intelligence organisation the British Armed Forces
required as a whole. It took twenty five years to happen.
The tremendous strides N.I.D. and British military
intelligence made during World War II cannot be seen in isolation.
Its contribution, in terms of "hard" intelligence was far greater
than the purely non-military intelligence departments in Britain,
whose sources of data and aims assumed a more limited role, when
viewed against Eisenhower' s Supreme Headquarters intelligence
staff. Mt.r c	 was preoccupied with security, and
cannot sensibly be regarded as a major intelligence department, only
insofar as it provided very specific types of data. Similarly with the
Secret Intelligence Service, which, although it provided hard data,
this again was of a limited type for purely military purposes, though
much of the information from that source fitted into the overall mosaic
of military intelligence data, assisting in the long-range and more
immediate predictions to be made rather than being an end in itself.
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In 1tO the S.I.S. was very weak when Hitler made his
swift blitzkrieg across the continent, inflicting severe setbacks on
the British spy network; for example, The Hague spy network was
broken up by the Nazis. By the spring of 1940 Britain was left with
practically no effective intelligence service in Europe. The S.O.E.
never really succeeded either, and tended to become characterised
by amateurism. There seems to have been considerable negligence
in the selection of personnel, and the S.O.E. lay itself open to
penetration by traitors, notably Guy Burgess, who acquired infamy
later, an obvious homosexual and married to an Austrian communist,
as well as double agents, posing as refugees. It would be naive to
say it was just bad luck that the Abswhr succeeded in breaking the
S 0. E. radio network in Holland and eventually, through radio signals
from the U.K., built up a picture of the whole S.0.E. organisation
in Holland. Clandestine intelligence gathering of the SI. S. variety
is very limited, as are the economic warfare activities of an
organisation like the S. 0. E., and certainly as far as naval intelligence
was concerned in World War II, it would be quite misleading to
ascribe a dominant role to the agent. Harold Nicolson wrote, in an
uncannily accurate way: ".... in diplomacy, at least, the part played
by intelligence, by which is often meant the Secret Service, is very
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small indeed. ,,1 Apart from diplomacy as such Nicolson's
comments apply to naval intelligence when assessing the value of
different sources of intelligence data. General Strong writes: "
my experiencesof military intelligence leads me to accord them
(spies) in general a fairly modest place in the hierarchy of sources
even though their courage, ingenuity and tenacity frequently stirred
profound admiration and clearly still rouses interests on account of the
human aspects.	 This viewpoint has been reinforced more recently
by the researches of Captain Stephen Roskill, in his work on the life
of Sir Maurice Hankey. In the first volume of his biography he
writes: " . .... the common illusion, fostered by the popular press
and by imaginative writers, that an Intelligence organisation depends
on sensational and daring coups, such as the rifling of the safe of a
foreign diplomat or the seduction of officers by beautiful but dissolute
women, is far from the truth. In fact such coups are extremely rare,
and when they are brought off their effects are often exaggerated.
Rather does successful intelligence work depend on the painstaking
collection of small pieces of information from scores of different
sources, on classifying them for reliability by comparative processes,
1. See Harold	 comments in Journey to Java.
2. Strong: Intelligence at the Top. P. 133.
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and on fitting the pieces together, as with a giant jig-saw puzzle,
until a broad and accurate picture finally emerges. Hankey's work
in the Mediterranean conformed very precisely to that pattern. H1
Comparisons with American and German Intelligence
The advances made by N.I.D. during the last three years
of peace and during World War II must be seen in the light of develop-
ments within the German and An-ie rican org anis ations. The Americans
quickly made up their losses after Pearl Harbour, but in 1939 they
were very much behind the British. Their equivalent to 0.1. C. was
very ineffectual and its close ties with the State Department inhibited
its main work. This situation was so bad that the members of the
O.N.I. (Office of Naval Intelligence) hesitated before asking the
State Department if it wohld put them in touch with American Naval
officers who had worked in American consular agencies as intelligence
workers. 2 American naval intelligence was symptomatic of the
1. Captain Stephen Roskill: Hankey. Man of Secrets. P. 81.
2. Donald Ma.cLachla.n has examined the American record.
He gives details of 0. N. 1.28 diminutive position. See
P.224, Room 39.
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general malaise in American military intelligence pre-1939. General
Eisenhower wrote: "The selected body of officers which had, between
the two World Wars, truly absorbed the teachings of our unexcelled
system of service schools was splendidly prepared, except in the field
of practical intelligence training, to carry on the vital task of
operational planning." Eisenhower's criticism is echoed in other
sources. The Navy Department, unlike the British Admiralty,
impeded all constructive planning in the intelligence field, a fault
which lay both within and outside the control of the formal American
defence structure. Certainly the American public always viewed
with repugnance everything that smacks of the spy; during the inter-
war period no funds were provided even to establish the basic
requirements of an efficient intelligence system - a body of fact-
finders. The only indication of active American naval intelligence
was the maintenance of attaches in most foreign capitals, but few
of these were familiar with the essentials of inteUigence work. The
lowliness in rank of those who worked in American naval inteUigence
pre-war is one indicator of the failure to emphasise the intelligence
function. Any intelligence information which did reach the naval
staff could not be satisfactorily handled as there were too few people
1.	 Dwight David Eisenhower: Crusade in Europ P. 41.
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adequately trained and capable of analysing such material.
Unlike its British counterpart the American Naval Intelligence
Division failed to develop a clear plan for its own organisation, nor
did it establish a workable scheme for classifying the type of
rnformation deemed necessary for determining the purposes and
capabilities of potential enemies. But this did not apply solely to
the U.S.N. The United States Army had problems too, as the official
history indicates: " ..... there were insufficient facts on which to
base strategic estimates; and there were no trained personnel for
either strategic or combat intelligence. 	 General Marshall
eventually came to grips with MILD.' s problems, but not until as
late as May, 1942, when he appointed Major-General George V.
Strong as head of the M.I.D. The solution of the U.S.N.'s dilemmas
will be dealt with later. In 1939 the N.I.D. in Britain outstripped the
Americans - it had created an organisational structure that enabled
it to perform several clearly defined functions and, equally important,
the structure of each individual's job in N.I.D. was such that it
allowed him to be able to improve his performance.
1.	 See a history of the Military Intelligence Division. MID,
WDGS, ML, 725/1, AGO.
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The advances made by N.I.D. appear even greater still
when compared with the German intelligence machine. After having
examined the German documents Donald MacLachian interviewed
Grand Admiral Donitz in November 1966. This is the impression he
obtained: "It seems likely that the working of operational intelligence
as understood in the Admiralty was not known to the German naval
staff. Donitz and his officers received their intelligence material in
digested form on the end of a teleprinter, they tried to combine in one
office the product of operations with the study of the enemy' s intentions
and forces; which is a very different thing from having intelligence
and operations working closely together but separated in command and
organisation." This somewhat chronic organisation soon showed
itself in German naval operations. On a purely inter-service basis
alone the teething troubles of N. I. D., in say, for example, trying to
achieve a satisfactory relationship with Coastal Command were mild
compared with the experience of Raeder and Donitz. Where in the
Third Reich did the causes originate?
There was never any German naval intelligence organisation
that, on immediate inspection, resembled the British and American
1.	 Donald MacLachl*zi: Room 39. P. 123.
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bodies. There were two intelligence agencies within the Nazi state -
the Abwehr, (German Secret Service), and the Sicherheitsdienst, (SD),
(the Gestapo Intelligence Service). Neither of these bodies had a
I
history comparable with the N.I.D.'s. During World War I the German,
had been fairly active in Spain, using it as a listening post for what
was happening in France, checking British warships in Gibraltar, and
supplying German U-boats and auxiliary cruisers in Spanish harbours
with intelligence provided by agents. Their activities were highly
restricted, and it was not until 1 January, 1935 that German intelligence
was born, with the appointment of Canaris (age 47) as Chief of
Intelligence. He was a brilliant and resourceful man. The Abswehr
under Canaris was perhaps the only body within the Nazi state that
offered an ideal refuge for manoeuvre against the regime, mainly
because its unique position rendered it immune to the spying of the
gestapo. In such a totalitarian state intelligence data could possibly
have acted as a sobering buffer between grandiose territorial plans
of expansion on the one hand and political and military realities on the
other. Canaris tried to do this, but he was always fettered by the
absence of sound political intelligence data, which remained the
domain of the S.D. However, Canaris was clever enough not to take
this situation too tragically. He recognised (as Hall had done), that
the boundary between political and military intelligence is a fluid one.
1. The Abwehr was separate from the German Naval Intelligence
organisation, which was integrated with the Operations
Division of the German Naval Staff. Officers were often
appointed to joint Operations and. Intelligence posts,
esreciallv in the Submarine Commend.
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Canaris was sure enough of himself to be certain that he could
manoeuvre with sufficient dexterity so as to ensure that not only he
himself should be well-informed on foreign political affairs but also
that, on occasions, he should be in a fosition to firnish his military
superiors with such news as might be of use to them. This is
supported by Canaris' most authoritative biographer, K.H.Abshagen:
"It was Canaris' ambition to be able, at all times, to lay before the
Wehrmacht leaders the fullest - or in any case the most realistic -
statement concerning military, political, and economic conditions
in any given country. 1. What is more Canaris was able to inform
the generals and admirals of the next moves of the SS and the gestapo,
a point emphasised by most historians of the Nazi era.
The two principal differences between N.I.D. and Abwehr
policy and organisation have become apparent; firstly there was
never any official recognition of the need for a dialogue between the
political decision-makers and the intelligence gatherers and
interpreters, and their masters - the military planners and command-
ers. Canaris attempted to cement this breach. However, secondly,
this was indicative of the general problem of the military in the Nazi
1.	 K.H.Abshagen: Canaris. P.105.
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state - Hitler had no real high regard for the professional expertise
of his Commanders-in-Chief, and it was part of his Weltanschau.ung
to disregard hard military facts when making political plans. What-
ever interpretation or school of thought one adheres to when examining
the causes of the Second World War there is no doubt that there was
a gulf between the me.omaniac Hitler on the one hand, and the more
rational miitarists and planners on the other who, whatever their
political sympathies and aspirations for Germany, viewed the situation
in terms of hard military facts and probabilities. This is seen, for
example, during the summer of 1938 when Canaris did not confine
his warnings to the generals and admirals. He overcame his personal
dislike of Ribbentrop and endeavoured to convince the Minister of
Foreign Affairs that there was danger of a general European war if
Czechoslovakia were openly attacked. This was of no avail. K.H.
Abshagen gives a lucid insight into the Abswehr's role when he writes:
"Officially the Abswehr knew nothing, or very little indeed, of the
real strategic plans. Canaris' department was much better informed
about the enemy and his plans. Thus the influence of the Abswehr
on operations was slight and, at best, of an indirect character. The
stories that represent Canaris as one of the prixne directors - or
even as the leading spirit - of the German war machine are as far
from the truth as the reports that, through the Abswehs treason,
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German plans of campaign reached the enemy' s hands. Of such plans,
save, possibly, in the merest outline, the Abswehr had no knowledge
at all.
On all fronts Canaris' work was checked, and often, for
professional reasons, he would refuse to perform certain tasks. To
illustrate the former point Hitler totally ignored Canaris' warnings
at the time of the Norwegian campaign, when the Abswehr predicted
that strong British naval forces would be waiting in Norwegian waters
for the German force invading Norway. In the event the British
were not there, and although Canaris' reasons were very sound, it
did not enhance his reputation with Hitler. (Canaris knew British
intelligence in neutral Sweden was highly efficient, and he quite
rightly assumed that Swedish captains who visited Stettin and the
other German Baltic harbours would report to British agents on their
return to Sweden the massive build-up of an invasion force. The
British did in fact receive such information). On the latter point
Canaris refused to allow the Abswehr to become an instrument of
clandestine warfare, just as the N.I.D. had lost this role alter World
War I. For example,on	 instructions the order of General
1.	 K.H.Abshagen: Canaris. P.159.
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Keitel to the Abswehr to plan and execute the assassination of the;
French general Weygand was disregarded. 1
In the light of American and German experiences one can
clearly see how N.I.D. had more fully conceptualised its role and
structured itself accordingly, albeit somewhat pragmatically at
times. NI.D. had defined its general purpose - set itself tasks,
acquired for itself authority, and inter-service political-military
relationships, and the standards it set itself, and the controls placed
upon it were well defined and understood. Admiral Godfrey knew
quite clearly to whom he was responsible, what discretionary powers
he had, and the limits he could go to before consulting his superiors.
By 1945 N.I.D. had clearly defined boundaries, preventing duplication
of effort and the political in-fighting that must ensue in any large
organisation as a result of trespassing on other departments t territory.
1.	 K.H.Abshagen: Canaris. P.19.
88.
CHAPTER TWO
A Critical Appraisal of the Role of Selected Personalities
Who Worked in Naval Intelligence.
89.
The various Directors of Naval Intelligence since 1882,
when Captain William Henry Hall became the first D. N.I., until
the last Director, Admiral Denning, ended the line of D.N.I.s in
1964, have varied immensely in the eighty-two years British naval
intelligence was a formal organisation. They have varied in their
general backgrounds and experiences, in the ways they viewed their
roles, the methods and personnel they selected, and above all, the
impact they had on war at sea.
In any analysis of the organisational development of N.I.D.
these principal dramatis personae cannot be seen just as the heads
of an increasingly more important department, but as men who
personally fashioned the detailed policies and growth of naval
intelligence in defence planning and operations. They were men who
had the opportunity to be intimately concerned with the minutiae of
their department' s work, and make day-to--day decisions which they
could see as perhaps being more
meaningful for the operational Navy than the work of many of their
naval staff colleagues. It was a post which, seized with vigour and
resolve, had greater potential than perhaps many of the other senior
staff appointments.
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The D. N. I. in Wartime and His Role
In war the D.N.I. assumed a far more significant and
powerful role. The two World Wars must therefore act as yardsticks
for assessing the achievements and advances of naval intelligence,
since only then could operational intelligence be applied in the full
war context. In every sense this was true. Unlike his opposite
numbers in the Army and the Air Force the D.N.I. was at the heart
of the struggle against Germany. The Admiralty, unlike the War
Office and the Air Ministry, was an operational headquarters,
controlling the fleet at sea - the D.N.I. was a central figure in this.
This is not to undervalue peacetime intelligence, far from it. Amongst
the many factors which historical interpretation attributes to Britain's
military dilemma in the last years of peace before World War U
must be the factor of poor intelligence information. That there was
not a Hall or Godfrey to give a fillip to the N. I. D. in the inter-war
period is a reflection of many factors - that men of their quality were
not easy to come by, that the D.N.I. appointment was not considered
a good career job for an Admiral in peacetime, that the work of the
N.I.D. was possibly misguided or lacked dynamism, and from this
one can surmise that the Navy was more fortunate to have men of
Hall's and Godfrey' s calibre available at the right moment in time.
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However, it was purely fortuitous that they were appointed, and not
someone else. This was especially true in Hall's case. Certainly
there was no pre-appointment training for the ID. N.I. By definition
he was of wide naval experience and fairly senior, but there was no
recognised career pattern for a future or existing D.N.I. The
worst thing possible was for the job to go to a man in his last naval
appointment before retirement. In retrospect it should always have
gone to a man with a real future, and someone who had had experience
of intelligence work previously. This rarely happened.
The Recruitment of Civilians to the N.I.D.
However, the D.N.I. above all else had to understand what
the men at sea wanted and needed, and they had to have the tactical
and strategic knowledge to judge what was in. the enemy's mind.
Few D.N.I.s were ever lacking in this. But there was nothing like
a modern job specification for the appointment of D.N.I. and certainly
no training system for him and his subordinates. As a result of this
the means by which personnel were acquired were unsystematic and
often largely dependent upon personal contacts. The needs of World
War I rapidly meant the recruitment of many civilians to the N.I.D.
This was mainly due to naval personnel not possessing the necessary
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aptitudes and skills for intelligence work, or was, at least, the
reason given fof the recruitment of so many civilians. Certainly the
conventional selection procedures for service officers did not pertain
to tasks performed by the N.I.D., as the skills required were so
different from those of normal career jobs. The point should be made
that the Service should have begun to formally train selected officers
in intelligence work, as indeed N.I.D. did later in its growth. Prince
Louis of Battenburg, (D.N.I. 1902_l905)1 was a firm advocate of a
specially trained intelligence staff, and be also saw the D.N.I. as
an Admiralty Board member, second only to the FirSt Sea Lord.
His son, Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Mountbatten of Burma, was to
become a firm protagonist in favour of service personnel populating
the key posts in naval intelligence. Certainly when he was in a position
to mould the future of Defence intelligence in Britain his emphasis was
on a service personnel hierarchy, save in the area of highly specialised
1.	 Battenburg, Prince Louis, Admiral of the Fleet: entered RN
1868; joint secretary naval and military committee on
defence, 1894; ADNI 1900; DNI 1902-1905; second in
command, Mediterranean 1907; C..-in-C. Atlantic 1908;
Second Sea Lord 1911; First Sea Lord 1912; resigned
October 1914.
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technical skills. That the service did resort to recruiting civilian
personnel on a large scale in both World Wars was as much due to the
pragmatic way intelligence was developing, and the way in which needs
tended to emerge, rather than the complete absence of skills in naval
personnel. It was far easier to acquire a barrister from civilian life,
familiar with assessing evidence and presenting it in a logically
digestible form, than to attempt to develop these skills in a naval
officer, who no doubt spent most of his career performing less academic
tasks. The N.I.D. was always sensible enough to navalise its civilians
as soon as possible and where professional naval knowledge was
required for tasks performed by civilians, naval personnel were
always on hand to give the necessary information and help with
interpretation.
There can be no doubt that the two doyens of British Naval
Intelligence during the period were Admiral Sir Reginald Hail, and
Admiral John Godfrey; a comparative examination of their work will
show how epochal their periods of office were, contrasting markedly
with the inter-war period, and it will also provide a means by which
to contrast the major developments in naval intelligence. Godfrey's
view of the inter-war D.N.I. s is summarised in this somewhat pointed
comment in his memoirs: "Four of the D.N.I. s were not more than
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average: one was an outstanding technical and gunnery specialist
but not a thruster .... one got on the wrong side of M. 1.5. Of the
eight, only one, Hall's successor, was of the calibre that could
establish a great department and had he held the office for five years
he might have achieved something worthwhile; but he was wanted for
another post, and lasted a year and a half, and was relieved by a
1
nonentity.
The era of Hall is a vanished world when compared with the
Defence Intelligence structure of today. Captain Roskill has emphasisec
this point: "Today, when the Foreign Office exerts a paramount
influence over all intelligence activities, it may seem extra-ordinary
that until about 1919 the D.N.I. should have held virtually all the
threads in his own hands, and should have decided on the time and
manner of using the knowledge that he possessed.
1,	 Godfrey Memoirs. Vol. 8. P. 156. On pages 157-158
Godfrey deals further with the collapse of the Hall tradition
and the organisational run-down in the 1920s and 1930s.
2.	 Captain S. Roskiil: Hankey. Man of Secrets. Vol. I.
P. 80.
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Admiral Hall's period of office marked a time of
identification for the N.I.D. This is not to say that the Department
had wasted time in the pre-1914 period. The founding of the Committee
of Imperial Defence drew out the activities of the N.I.D.; for example
Rear Admiral C.L.Ottley, the D.,N.I. 1905-1907, was deeply involved
in that committee's activities. 1 The C.I.D. gave impetus to the
N. I. D. s activities. In June, 1905, for example, following discussions
in the C. I. D., the War Office and Admiralty formed a joint committee
to review and make recommendations for the defence of the principal
navbl bases at home and overseas. In 1906 Lt. Colonel Maurice
Hankey, (who worked in the N.I.D. from 1902-1908) was sent on a
fact-finding mission of all the principal British bases abroad to
assess their fortifications, role, and powers to withstand attack.
The first seeds of strategic intelligence gathering were sown
in the last eight years before the Great War. In December, 1906 the
1. Ottley, Rear-Admiral Sir Cha1es: b. 1858; entered RN 1871;
Captain 1899; naval attache Washington, Rome, Tokyo, St.
Petersburg, and Paris, 1899-1904; on staff of the Committee
of Imperial Defence, 1904; DNI 1905; Secretary of the
C.I.D. 1907-1912.
2. See Captain RoskiU' s account of Hankey' 8 activities in the
N.LD. 1902-1908 in his: Hankey. Man of Secrets.
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Ballard Committee, the brainchild of the First Sea Lord, Fisher, set
to work.	 He had decided to form a small and select body to draft in
great secrecy naval war plans in the event of a war against Germany.
This committee immersed itself in the strategic problems which would
arise. In the light of the nature of the Great War it is more than ironic
to note how the ideas of the committee never caine to fruition, based as
they were, in the best traditions of the Elder Pitt, on a blue-water
strategy, and not, as developed, a European land-based strategy.
The N.I.D. appreciated the susceptibilities of Germany's economy
to blockade, and the ability the Navy possessed, in conjunction with
the Army, to strike at the enemy in overseas theatres at times and
places of British choice. These two factors were closely allied to the
need to protect Britain from invasion and to protect British merchant
shipping against a sustained attack. Mahan' s message had had a profou.nc
effect upon many members of the naval staff.
Hall's Review of the Main Intelligence Problem in 1914 and How He
Solved it.
Although much thorough, painstaking, and valuable work had
been done then before 1914 on the strategic deployment of British naval
I.	 See J.Ehrmann: Cabinet Government and War 1890.- 194Q.
(C.U.P. 1958).
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forces it was not until Hail came into office in November, 1914,
succeeding Rear Admiral H. F. Oliver, that attention was paid to
detailed intelligence gathering and interpretation. His appointment
was as much by chance as design. His health broke down whilst he
was Captain of H. M. S. Queen Mary at the same time as the D. N.I.
vacancy occurred. Hall was a very remarkable man, insofar as he
adapted from being a sea captain to developing into a great D.N.I.
He quickly defined the problem - he saw that although on 4 August,
1914 the British tleet was at the height of battle efficiency and at
its war bases there was still no means of obtaining intelligence of
the German fleet's movements, and without that intelligence the
British Navy would be almost powerless. It is true that Britain
possessed sound information on Germany's war potential, but the
problem of how to monitor satisfactorily the German fleet' s activities
had not been studied.
Central to Hall's success as D.N.I. was his development
and extensive use of the wireless tracking and decyphering skills
of Room 40. He quickly realised the potential of Ewing' s team -
that wireless traffic was the only ready method of collecting
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information of enemy movements. 1 The use of ships for observing
enemy ships in their harbours (as Nelson had done with the French)
was no longer possible with the advent of the submarine. A British
warship running the gauntlet off the Jade stood a very good chance
of being sunk by an enemy submarine. Wireless traffic became of
paramount importance. Signals could give the position of a ship,
its direction and speed, and from this information, might be deduced
the operation involved. Moreover, the message itself might be
decyphered, giving valuable information. Room 40' s directional
wireless plotting and signal decyphering became the keystone of
Hall's success. It supported virtually all of his areas of activity,
whether tracking German U-boats or helping to draw the United States
into the war against Germany.
Hall's Involvement with British Foreign Policy
The most marked contrast that separates the Hall and
Godfrey eras is Hall's involvement with British foreign policy. After
1.	 It should be noted that before Sir Alfred Ewing there was no
effective decoding service, and though Hall took great pains
to keep the work of Ewing' s small band highly secret, all
of the other great powers had been operating decyphering
departments in peacetime for several years. Admiral Sir
William James gives details of this in his book, The Eyes
of the Navy. He shows how especially efficient were the
Russian and French organisations.
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1919 the N.I.D. had its function strictly limited to naval affairs. The
Foreign Office felt that Hall had too often taken matters into his own
hands, as a result usually of Room 40 intercepting diplomatic messages
which should have been passed immediately to the Foreign Office.
After World War I it was decided that future D.N.I. s would never be
allowed to wield the power enjoyed by Hafl. 1 However, it was a
result of initiative and drive and the ability to develop and exploit a
situation that had enabled Hall to acquire the power he did. The
uniqueness of the events of war threw up the unpredictable situation
1.	 A committee, under the chairmanship of Rear-Admiral J.
C.Ley, was appointed to review the role and system of naval
intelligence. Its findings led to a re-definition of N.I.D.
responsibilities and organisation. Details of this are con-
tained in Adm. 137, 1630. At one stage in 1918 the D.N.I.
and D.D.N.I. titles were abolished, but were soon revived,
on 5th April, 1918, (see Adm. 137, 1630, P.78.) However,
it should not be assumed that Hall's system was radically
changed after 1918. Many of the reforms which Hall put
forward himself, as a result of wartime experiences, were
implemented. His recommendations for establishing base
intelligence officers, tightening-up the system for handling
and distributing intelligence data (on a "need to know" basis)
for security reasons, as well as improving operational
efficiency, and major improvements in the organisation of
the N.I.D. were all implemented. See Adm. 137, 1630 Ps.
12-14, 131-134, Public Record Office. The organisational
details of the N.I.D. in the first years after World War L
when the organisational and role adjustments had been made
after the Hall era are to be found in Adm. 116, 1842, Public
Record Office.
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which a man of Hail's character and calibre was able to successfully
exploit. Shortly before World War II began there were almost panic
moves to build up the N.I.D. by an infusion of new talent, not merely
because of the peacetime run-down, but also because there had been
a deliberate move to restrict the N.I.D.'s activities after the
experience of HaU' s regime. Why then did Hall acquire this reputation
and were the Hall critics justified? 1
Firstly, Hail' s political activities; he had a major hand
in secret negotiations with Turkey, whom he wanted to detach from
the Central Powers, and, he hoped, thereby preventing the need for
a Dardanelles Campaign. Through his agents he hoped to either
persuade Turkey to break with Germany and to promote revolution
against Enver Pasha and his "Young Turk" party then in power, or
at least persuade. the more moderate members of the party to make
peace with Britain. His agents were intercepting telegrams between
Germany and Turkey, and Room 40 was decyphering them. At one
stage Hail ordered his agents to offer £500, 000 for the complete
1.	 The most detailed documented account of Hall's time as
D.N.I. is still Admiral Sir Williams James': Tjyf
the Navy. He makes additional comments on Room s
activities in "Room 40", an tarticle in the Edinburgh Unir
versity Journal, XXII, Spring, 1965. P. 50-54. The papers
relating to Hall's political activities were destroyed at the
end of World War I. This was confirmed by the Head of the
Naval Historical Branch, Rear-Admiral P.N.Buckley, CB,
DSO.
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surrender of the Dardanelles and the removal of all mines, and he had
a plan to offer £4m. to the Turks if they joined the Allies. Fisher
himself intervened and stopped the talks. The critical point is that
Hall was bartering with public money without any form of official
approval. The Foreign Office had no knowledge of his activities.
Admiral James writes that he took this sort of responsibility on
himself because he considered that the essential point in all such
transactions was that they should be known to as few people as possible
Perhaps Hall' s greatest single piece of political intelligence
work was his handling of the Zimn-iermann Telegram, intercepted
and decyphered by Room 40. Its priceless contents told Hall the
Germans had made the great decision to begin unrestricted submarine
warfare and that they were preparing to bring Mexico into the war
on their side in the event of the United States joining the Allied side.
Retrospectively, Hall's handling of the situation was brilliant; his
sense of timing was perfect. Hall did not pass the telegram to the
Foreign Office because he felt that it might be handled by someone
who might be unfamiliar with Room 40's activities and who might
compromise part or all of its activities by revealing the telegram's
contents in the wrong way and at the wrong time, thus giving away
Room 40's secrets to the Germans. Hall personally handled the
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American Ambassador, Dr. Page, and had the impression created
throughout the world that the telegram had been obtained on Mexican
soil. What galled the Americans so much was the way the Germans
had used the American Embassy as an errand boy to transmit a
message that contained a plot against its own territorial integrity.
Admiral James comments: "This piece of effrontery can never have
been equalled in the history of political intrigue. ,,l The part the
telegram played in bringing the Americans into the war had been asses-.
sed elsewhere. 2 President Wilson told Congress that the irltrigu.e3 ôf
the German government had served to "convince us at last that that
government entertains no real frténdship for us and means to act
against our peace and security at its convenience." Hall had surely
done a great deal for Anglo-American relations, at the same time
preserving Room 40's secrecy and his own integrity. However, the
British Foreign Office was less pleased with Hall than Woodrow Wilson.
1. Admiral Sir William James: The Eyes of the Navy. P. 137.
2. Barbara Tuchmann in her, The Zimmermann Telegram,
gives a fully documented account of the political aspects of
the telegram. The most recent authoritative account of the
cryptographic details can be found in David Kahn's,
The Codebreakers, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966.)
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Admiral James quotes a letter from Dr. Page congratulating Hall on
being made a K. G.M.G., in which Page quotes from a letter he had
received from the President: "You will at an early time take some
private occasion to assure Admiral Hall of my very great appreciation
of what he had done and of the spirit in which he has done it."
Surely no greater compliment could have been paid to Hall?
The above example does illustrate the extent of Hall' s
influence; his position was never seriously challenged at the time.
The American Embassy in London was still fed by Room 40 with
information concerning the United States; the source was the Berlin-
Mexico, Berlin-Buenos Aires, Berlin-Madrid wireless traffic. As
a result of the Zimmermann Telegram there was a certain amount of
surprise, and resentment, that a Director of Naval Intelligence had
been handling affairs that were the sole concern of the Foreign Office.
In mitigation it may be said that as Hall' s staff was the only body in
existence who could work on cyphered messages and suspicious letters
and that, as Room 40 worked as a team, it was never practicable
to detach part of the staff to work in the Foreign Office. Hall's
decisions must surely stem from complete confidence in his own
judgment, and as the guardian of Room 40' s secrets he would not
take the risk involved in permitting messages in their original
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cyphered form to leave the Admiralty. Nonetheless he made critical
decisions which were never to confront Admiral Godfrey. Hall could
and did pass on to government departments, (in a form that did not
disclose the source) everything in. the decyphered messages that he
thought they should know. The few men holding responsible positions,
who knew how Hall was obtaining his information, trusted him implicitly
Hall's power was unique because there were no lines of
demarcation between the NI.D. and the Foreign Office. This
stemmed from the fact that the N.I.D.'s role, functions, and
responsibilities were ill-defined. Only the experiences of World War I
revealed these. The exigencies of war, throwing up daily crises and
emergencies called for decisions. Hall was prepared to make those
decisions on his own authority. Godfrey was never faced with this
predicament, because his boundaries were more clearly defined for him
The part Admiral Hall played in the Roger Casement affair
illustrates his deep involvement in non-naval matters. However, it
was Room 40 which again provided the basic information which enabled
Hall to act. Room 40 picked up signals indicating Casement' s
impending arrival in Ireland, and signs of a revolt planned for Easter
Day, and later postponed until the Easter Monday. As a result
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Casement was captured and interrogated by Hall and Sir Basil Thomson,
the head of the British counter-espionage service. 1 Hall was unoffi-
cially responsible for diverting sympathy from Casement when the appeal
against the death sentence was heard on 17 July, 1916. Hall released
to the Americans the notorious Casement diaries, indicating that he had
possibly had homosexual tendencies. This had a profound psychological
effect upon pro-Casement American public opinion. Whatever view is
taken of Hall's action, and most writers have been highly critical, the
point remains that Hall was in a good position, almost unassailable,
to become so involved.
Hall' s breadth of action is shown by the role his department
increasingly came to play in counter-espionage work. Hall hoped that
as a result N.I.D. would be more intimately related to another source
which might add to the ovei'all picture of the German position which
his department was attempting to produce. Under Hall the N.I.D.
worked hand-in-hand with Scotland Yard, M.I. 5., and the War Office
Intelligence department. On 5 August, 1914, 22 German agents were
1.	 Throughout the war the partnership of Hail and Thomson was
of incalculable value to the Allies. Both had a remarkable
flair for the strange tasks that so often confronted them; both
could quickly take the measure of a spy or traitor, and both
were adept at extracting information from prisoners. Sir
Basil Thomson gives details in his book: The Story of Scotland
Yard. Grayson and Grayson, London, 1935.
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arrested by Scotland Yard, who had been watching them for some time.
Only 3 German spies escaped back to Germany at this tIme. Hall
ensured that German spies were tried in secret, so that false in-
formation could be fed back via German agents In neutral countries to
Germany. After the Dogger Bank engagement for example, faked
photographs were sent to Germany of supposedly damaged British
warships. They were ostensibly sent by a German spy; somewhat
amusingly money was sent In return. Hall also persuaded the govern-
inent of the necessity of censoring all mail.
The German master spy, Franz von Rintelen, was tracked
down and arrested through Hall's organisation. Rintelen had recruited
saboteurs from amongst the German-Americans - these fomented
strikes in United States munitions factories supplying arms for the
Allied cause, and they had arranged for incendiary devices to be
placed in the holds of ships carrying munitions to Europe. Hall' s
man in Washington, the Naval Attache, Captain Guy Gaunt, R. N.,
eventually undermined the Rintelen organisation. On his return to
Europe von Rintelen's ship was stopped by a patrol boat off Raxnsg'ate
1.	 Roger Hilsrnan gives a detailed account of this in his:
Strategic Intefligencç. P. 20.
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and von Rintelen aTrested. He was interned for the duration of the
1
war.
Hall was not totally successful everywhere. In South America
his agents had great difficulty in countering the activities of German
agents because of the neutrality of the countries in which they worked.
German activity was centred on interfering with ships' cargoes bound
for Britain. Hall became gravely concerned with the sabotage of grain
ships. At best he was able to keep German activity to an acceptable
level.
Admiral Hall rapidly built up his own espionage service. He
realised the value of the agent, particularly in the principal neutral
countries - Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and Sweden. His development
of this form of intelligence collection was solely upon his own initiative
- there was no external control upon his activities. This was natural
1.	 A detailed account of von Rintelen's activities is given in his
autobiography: The Dark Invader. Peter Davies, London
1933. He pays a great personal tribute to Hall's skill and
organisation. Captain Gaunt's greatest success was to plant
some Czech agents in the Austrian Consulate-General in
New York, and they obtained for him copies of several critical
documents being sent by the Austrian Ambassador to Europe.
Gaunt's other main adversary in the U.S.A. was the German
Ambassador, Count BerZstorff, who was fomenting anti-
British feeling and openly supporting the pro-Irish
organisatioflS.
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enough as there was no central Defence organisation which could
monitor N. I. D.'s activities, in terms of evaluating the quality of
the data it produced.
On the espionage front, Hall again tended to become involved
in other than purely naval affairs. For example, he managed to
persuade Anthony Drexel, an American sportsman of some note, to
allow his yacht, the "Sayonara!', to be used for espionage purposes.
On one mission the yacht was used to link up with the Sinn Feiners
in Ireland and obtain details of their plans, and Hall hoped to find
out where Sir Roger Casement intended landing on his return to
Ireland from Germany, and prevent him from unifying the anti-
British Catholic element in southern Ireland. However, Hail's main
espionage effort was directed towards purely military targets.
From the moment he took charge of the N.I.D., he organised a net-
work of agents and local residents sympathetic to the British cause in
every quarter where sooner or later British forces might engage
the enemy. In July, 1915, for example, he set up an intelligence
service in Greece and the Levant, and his agents there reported
details of any troop movements and naval activities to Room 40. In
1915 the N.I.D. planned the relief of the Serbian Army from starvation.
The Royal Navy landed stores and food on the Dalmatian coast.
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Hall selected his agents with great care. One of his most
distinguished was the writer, A.E.W.Mason, who worked for Hail in
neutral Spain. He achieved some remarkable successes and repeatedly
destroyed the plans of German agents; he was able to win over to
N. I. D.'s services Juan March, the powerful head of a smuggling ring
operating in southern Spain. After World War I Mason managed to
persuade M.I.6 to keep the Gibraltar-Tangier network going, an
organisation which became very useful in World War II. 1
The contribution which the NI.D. made to the war at sea
was perhaps nowhere more self-evident than in the campaign against
the U-boats. Here Hall mustered every available source of inlormatia
and it was as a result of successes here that Hall was able to show
that Room 40 was not just a cryptographic bureau, but an intelligence
centre. 2 The staff of Room 40 became characterised by a flair for
linking together items of information which, at first sight, did not
appear to be inter-related. Every plan, and daily intelligence summar
paid close attention to minute detail.
1. A.E.W.Masorits work for N.I.D. is detailed in R.L.Green's
biography: A. E.W. Mason.
2. The confusion over signal intelligence at Jutland further
enhanced Ha1P s case.
110.
Against considerable internal opposition Hall' s organisation
held its own, although its successes and failures could never be publicly
aired. Public opinion never became aware of the part intelligence had
played in naval operations. For instance, on 15 December, 1914, the
Germans raided the east coast of England. Room 40 warned Operations
and a battle cruiser squadron was sent to intercept Hipper. Bad
weather prevented contact and the bombardment of Scarborough followed,
soon to be followed by a public outcry against the incompetence of the
Royal Navy. Sir Winston Churchill discusses the implications of this
action in his "World Crisis': "We could never admit for fear of
compromising our secret information, where our squadrons were, or
how near the German raiding cruisers had been to destruction."
The reputation which N.I.D. acquired depended on the quality
of its staff. Both Hall and Godfrey relied heavily on civilians from the
professional world for the main tasks of analysis and interpretation.
Even Sir Alfred Ewing's staff of code-breakers were civilians, mostly
academics from Osborne and Dartmouth Naval Colleges. A glance at
the backgrounds of the men who joined Hall and became N.I.D. leaders
gives a strong impression of the academic, analytically-oriented mind
Hall quickly realised was vital for successful intelligence work: Sir
Philip Baker Wilgraham, fellow of All Souls, Thomas Inskip, K. C.,
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later to become a Lord Chancellor, Harold Russell, a barrister,
Algernon Cecil, a distinguished historian, George Prothero, editor
of the "Quarterly Review", L. G. lNlckham-Legg, a fellow of New
College, Oxford, James Randall, a City wine merchant, Clau.d
Serocold, a City figure who became Hall's personal assistant, Lords
Herscheli and Abinger, and Ralph Vaughn Williams. Ewing made
George Young, (later Sir George Young) head of the diplomatic crypto
section.	 It was these men who sifted the information pouring into
Room 40, and produced the daily intelligence summaries. Hall
recruited three professors to prepare handbooks providing intelligence
appreciations of new territories as the scene of military operations
changed; these were professor Dickson of Reading University, professo:
Calder of Manchester, and professor Stevenson of Glasgow.
It took Hall some time to overcome the prejudices of the
Naval Staff against receiving information from civilians. Operations
Division were very much against accepting intelligence reports from
men without sufficient professional naval knowledge. They were highly
critical of their major role in the cryptanalyst section, where it was
claimed civilians could not possibly understand all the implications of
1.	 By October, 1914, Young informed Hall that he had details of
German plans to raise revolt against British rule in India and
Afghanistan, and about German sabotage in America and the
Far East.
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naval signals. Hall stood firm and eventually won the day because
Room 40's staff were able to prove themselves by sheer success.
In the process Hall made many enemies. However, his many friends
and subordinates realised what a great manager of staff Hall was. 1
When discussing the personnel shake-up in the Admiralty in 1917
Professor Arthur Marder writes: "Also kept on was Captain Reginald
Hall, the D.N.I. (promoted to Rear-Admiral in April, 1917), con-
sidered by many as one of the few great brains of the war, which,
indeed, he was.	 s words are eloquent testimony to
Hall's great contribution to the naval side of the Great War.
British naval intelligence, as with other aspects of Britain's
defence system, entered the doldrums during the inter-war periode
Rear-Admiral John Godfrey, (D.N.I. 1939-1942), the man who was
to re-vitalise naval intelligence at the crucial time, recalls in his
memoirs an assessment he made whilst Deputy Director of Plans at
1. In "Eyes of the Navy" Admiral James gives details of Hall's
staff and his staff problems, and his clashes with other
senior naval personnel and high-ranking civil servants.
Further details and a different viewpoint of N.I.D.'s staff
composition and the politics of naval intelligence are given
in A. W. Ewing's: The Man of Room 40. The Life of Sir
Alfred Ewing. Hutchinson. London, 1939.
2. Arthur J. Marder: From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow:
Vol. 4. P.61.
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the Admiralty, in 1934: "I was conscious of a certain lack of design
which we did our best to mitigate by creating a future of our own
devising, but one uncorrelated with politics and the temper of the
country, or with the personality of cabinets and. prime ministers
Thus the planners found themselves working in a strange atmosphere
in which past, present and future, facts, inferences, and wishful
thinking, became intermingled, and all sense of resolute purpose was
blurred. Again our prime ministers were peace-loving - pacifist
of passivist - and could not bear to think of war or the threat of war."1
Godfrey' s Re-organisation of N. I. D. and Some of His Staff.
When Godfrey took up his appointment on 3 February, 1939
he caine as a breath of fresh air to the N.I.D. He quickly assessed
the problem and sought immediate solutions, in marked contrast with
his predecessors as D. N. I., since the halcyon days of Admiral Hail,
perhaps the most notorious between 1919 and 1939 being Admiral Sir
Barry Domville, (D.N.I 1927-1930), a member of the sinister
pro-German organisation, the Link, who was arrested in 1940 under
1.	 Admiral John Godfrey: Memoirs
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Regulation 18b. Admiral Godfrey wtes in his memoirs of the
impression he quickly acquired of the place of intelligence in the
Admiralty, on assuming office in 1939: "None of the Assistant Chiefs
of Staff or Directors of operational divisions knew anything about
intelligence. I myself knew precious little. There was no particular
reason why we should have done, because the subject was swept out
of sight during the twenty years of peace. A half-hearted attempt
was made to establish an intelligence course at Greenwich alongside
the Staff College, but it petered out."2
In order to thrn the N.I.D. from a static peace-time
organisation to a dynamic war-time one Godfrey brought in civilians
of distinction and talent, men such as the young City stockbroker
Ian Fleming, (who became personal assistant to the D.N.I.), the
solicitor Edward Merret, (Godfreyts private secretary), Ewen
1. Domvile, Admiral Sir Barry Edward: 1878-1971; entered
RN 1892; Commander 1909; Captain 1916; Rear-Admiral
1927; Asst.Sec.C.I.D. 1912-1914; Director of Plans,
Admiralty, 1920-1922, DNI 1927-1930; Vice-Admiral
commanding third cruiser squadron, Mediterranean, 1931-




Montagu, Patrick Beesly, and the Oxford Don, Frederick Wells.
Godfrey quickly laid down that any intelligence data leaving the N. I. D.
must be strictly separated from opinion, so that it would retain its
authority and reliability. Initially therefore Room 	 1 tended to
concentrate on radio intelligence. 2
Godfrey rapidly organised his department on a section basis,
with. section heads directly responsible to him. The hierarchical
structure he created was a direct reflection of the developing fLctions
and techniques of the N.I.D., (see Appendix A for a diagrammatic
representation of the N.I.D. sectional structure during World War II).
The structure therefore was subject to considerable change, particularly
during the early years of the war. The various sections grew at very
different speeds, and some sections that were very prominent in
194311944 were hardly thought of in 1940/1. As a general description
1. This was the centre of N.I.D. during World War U, located
in the Admiralty, and the successor to the Room 40, of
Admiral Hall's day. Donald MacLacblan writes:".., legend
and performance both played a part in giving Room 39 its
reputation." Room 39, P. 4. He described it as "the bridge
of the N.ID. ship." Room 39, P. 10.
2. In 1941 British warships captured two German weather ships,
the Munchen and the Lauenburg, both yielding crucial German
naval cyphers.
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it would be true to say that N.I.D. was split into 20 sections,
N.I.D. 17 being the "co-ordinating" section, and N.I.D. 14 was the
secretariat of the D.N.I.
The organisation Godfrey left in 1943 was continued by
his successor as D.N.I., Rear-Admiral Rushbrooke, (D.NI. 1943-
1946). The initial kingpin of the N.I.D. was N.I.D. 8 - the Operational
Intelligence Centre; within this section the submarine tracking room
tended to dominate. In January, 1941 Commander Roger Winn,
R. N. V. R., (later Captain, C • B., R. N. V. R.) became its head. It
was Roger Winn who played the vital role of plotting the U-boats,
working in close conjunction with Commander Richard Hall, R. N.,
who was responsible for plotting the mass of allied shipping. Roger
Winn built up a biography of each U-boat, working in close liaison
with the Chief-of-Staff to the C. -in-C. Western Approaches in
Liverpool, the Chief-of-Staff to the A. 0. C. -in-C. Coastal Command
and with no. 15 Group, R.A.F, He also had a direct link with the
Director of anti-submarine warfare and the head of Operations
Division. Winn was assisted by Lieutenant-Commander Patrick
Beesley, R. N.Y. R., and Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp, R.N.,
the D/F expert in N.I.D.8. Winn was to prove himself an ace
detective - predicting a U-boat' s next move once it had given its
position away.
117.
As a result of brilliant successes V(inn's position increased
in strength, particularly in terms of O.I.C.'s relationship with
Operations Division. By 1943 Admiral Edeisten, the Assistant Chief
of Naval Staff, ruled that no ship or convoy was to be routed without
consulting Winn first and not to be routed against his advice. Once
Winn had made a decision he stuck by it. Donald MacLachian
describes the activity of the Citadel U-boat-merchant shipping plot
as "like watching a precious patient fighting hour-by-hour for life. 1
Perhaps one of the most outstanding pieces of routing during World
War U was the assembling of 400 ships off Gibraltar for the TorchIt
landings in 1942. The HaU-Winn organisation was given 36 hours
in which to plan the movement of the slow convoy from the Bristol
Channel and the fast one from the Clyde on a course for west of
Biscay to avoid the U-boats coming and going from their French
bases.
Like Hall, Godfrey chose his men well. Ian Fleming, who
1.	 Donald MacLachl.an: Room 39. P. 120.
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worked for Combined Operations as well as N.I.D., 1 had a gift
for jollying along senior officers, and getting the job done. For
example his no. 30 assault unit was a great success - nicknamed
"Fleming's private Navy" it began tentative operations in the Middle
East under the dual command of Dunstan Curtis, a Coastal Forces
officer, and Quentin Riley, a pre-war polar explorer, mainly
conducting beach reconnaissances and probing enemy territory.
Godfrey always used Fleming whenever an intermediary was
needed to perform a daring task which required an informal approach.
Perhaps the best example of this was Godfrey' s and Fleming' s visit
to Washington to persuade the Americans to establish an intelligence
organisation on N.LD. lines, and to foster Anglo-American
intelligence co-operation. The visit was a great success, in part
due to Fleming' s brilliant diplomacy. In his capacity as Admiral
Godfrey's first assistant he was the key man in ensuring that N.I.D.
1.	 It was some time before N.I.D. and Operations Division
realised the value that Combined Operations had for provid-
ing intelligence data. It is possible to surmise that a much
greater wealth of data could have been obtained much earlier
in the war, and might conceivably have shortened it, if
Combined Operations had been used more thoroughly. It
was Fleming who gave the N.I.D. the break-through in the
field. However, it is important to remember that Combined
Operations had a difficult enough time itself in its infancy -
there was a good deal of opposition to it and its first chief,
Admiral Sir Roger Keyes.
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ran smoothly - he was much less of an analyst, but rather an
organiser of the first order. Above all else he is remembered by
those who worked in the N.LD. as an R.N.V.R. officer who always
set high standards of judgment and behaviour; this was vital in a
Naval Stqff Department where civilians and "hostilities only" officers
were playing such a large part, and who were under constant scrutiny
by the rest of the Naval Staff, made up predominantly of career naval
officers.
Another of Godfrey's key men was the British naval attache
in Stockholm, Captain Denham, R.N. It was he who gave the first
reports that led to the chase of the Bismarck. 1 An Oxford Classics
Don, Frederick Wells, was brought in by Godfrey to head N.I.D.6 -
the Topographical Intelligence Section. He was a perfectionist who,
together with men like Lieutenant Commander George Gonin, R.N.,
(the key man behind the research into the beaches and tides for the D-
Day landings), scored brilliant successes. Denham and WeUs were
typical of both the uniformed and civilian staff Godfrey collected about
himself.
1.	 After the war Captain Denharn found in the German naval
archives a signal from Canaris, Chief of the Abwehr, to the
German Naval High Command, dated the morning following
his report to the Admiralty. It read: "Have positive proof
the British Admiralty have received report of outward pas-
sage of Bismarck and Prinz Eugen."
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Godfrey and the J.I.C.
Godfrey, unlike Hall, was involved in the activities of a
large, interservice, intelligence body, the Joint Intelligence Conimittee
(J.I.C.), whose range of activities, and authority, paralleled those
of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Godfrey played a prime role
in long-range strategic decision-making, as well as managing the
day-to-day affairs of the N.I.D. However, in many ways the N.I.D.
was to have a much more profound effect upon the outcome of the war
than the deliberations of the J.I, C. Prime Minister Churchill said
quite clearly from very early on in the war that he did not have full
confidence in J.I.C. reports, and in fact preferred to see agents'
reports personally before they went on to J.I.C. for analysis and
interpretation. On numerous occasions Churchill made major
decisions before J.I.C. could provide an answer, or, quite often,
totally against J.I. C.'s advice, (advice that more often than not had
to be tentative as hard intelligence data was lacking.) Churchill' s
attitude to J. I. C. naturally undermined its whole role and impact on
military and political policy-making. 1
1.	 For example, in early 1941 British agents reported German
troop movements in the Balkans. However, other evidence
suggested that Hitler and Stalin were uniting further rather
than Hitler preparing to stab Stalin in the back. The J.I. C.
based this assessment on several factors:- the continued
'a'.
The J.I.C. was faced with a great dilemma, one that never
disappeared - the dilemma of having to provide the policy-makers at
Cabinet level with information which would form the basis for a major
decision, yet at the same time never having sufficient factual data
available with which to make a totally decisive report, (which is what
Churchill always demanded), not because J.I. C. was incompetent,
but because more often than not it meant reading the minds of the
Soviet and Nazi leaders beyond the bounds of other prima fade
evidence. Fortunately the J.I. C. never committed professional
suicide for an intelligence committee by giving political and military
leaders an interpretation without conclusive evidence, even at the cost
of severe criticism from the top, particularly Churchill himself.
1. (contd.) Luftwaffe attacks on Britain (i.e. no reduction in the air
power used against Britain, and therefore no indication of any
likely intention to move squadrons to a possible eastern
front); supplies were still being sent in great quantities from
Russia to Germany (i. e. there was no indication of the hard-
ening of Russian attitudes or a forthcoming diplomatic
debacle); both were dedicated to breaking up the British
Empire, (J.I.C. reasoned that both Stalin and Hitler would
have the good sense to realise that together they would have
a much greater chance of accomplishing this.) Quite naturaU
3.1. C. could not come up with a firm answer to Churchill's
leading question - was Germany going to invade the Soyiet
Union, and when? It was not until 5 June, 1941 that 3.1. C.
began to have any real evidence in favour of Hitler' s move
eastwards, and it was not until 12 June that 3.1. C. felt its
evidence was conclusive. Churchill himself states in his, The
Second World War, Volume III, The Grand Alliance, P. 354-
361, that he had disagreed with J.I. C.'s early prognosis and
had in fact decided in March, 1941 that Hitler intended to
invade the Soviet Union.
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Besides the great responsibilities and worries of the N.LD. Godfrey
then was fighting political battles within the J.I.C. and, during the
early stages of the war, within the Admiralty itself. Godfrey was not
alone in his problems. Across the whole board of British intelligence
organisations there re the natu.ral. and almost predictable clashes
1between intelligence heads and their masters.
Unlike Hall's N.I.D., Godfrey's involvement in clandestine
1.	 The head of M.I. 6 himself, Colonel Stewart Menzies (he suc-
cedded Admiral Sinclair at the beginning of World War II as
the head of the British espionage service) was not separate
from these. Many of his plans, he stated after the war, were
thwarted in certain Foreign Office quarters for fear of offend-
ing the Russians, such as his plan to negotiate with the non-
Nazi military leaders to organise the removal of Hitler,
hoping thereby to shorten the war with a negotiated peace.
The "unconditional surrender" theme of the Casablanca Con-
ference sounded the death knell of such a plan. He came in
for much criticism from Churchill, or so he would have
posterity believe, because of 	 failure to produce the
goods afl of the time - a predictable occurrence since he had
inherited an organisation which was singularly ill-equipped
to collect and assess intelligence data from the Third Reich.
Churchill's success as a war leader in part stemmed from
his considerable ability to inspire and drive his subordinates -
this often meant chiding them to obtain the desired results.
That he did so was to Britain' s advantage and perhaps, one
can surmise, his subordinates may have felt unjustly treated
at times. Richard Deacon gives a vivid, documented account
of Menzies' problems in his: History of the British Secret
Service. Muller, 1969.
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intelligence collection and espionage was reduced very quickly to
zero; N.I.D. was not at all concerned by this. Much of the para-
pherna].ia of clandestinity was turned over to the Special Operations
Executive, (S.O.E.), formed in 1940. Prior to this all "irregular"
projects were performed by M. I. 6 initiated by the Directors of Naval
and Military Intelligence. This reflects quite strongly Godfrey' s
and the Defence administrators' attitudes to the functions of N.I.D.
when compared with Hall' s - the former saw N. I. D • s function
supplying the fleet with hard intelligence. However, before S.O.E.
was formed Godfrey, with Fleming in close support, organised a series
of clandestine operations, such as cutting off the Swedish iron ore
supplies to Germany, blocking the Danube, and crippling the Rumanian
oil refineries. Some of these projects could hardly be called naval,
and were surely in the best traditions of Admiral Hall. Godfrey
personally instigated many of these projects before Churchill issued
his order to "set Europe on fire". In his memoirs Godfrey recalls
how Churchill, when First Lord of the Admiralty, made only a few
incursions into clandestine activities, mainly because of the lack of
money and the restraints placed upon him by the Foreign Office.
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Hall and Godfrey - Comparisons and Contrasts
In surveying the British naval, intelligence scene from the
Hall to Godfrey eras one can see certain central points and landmarks
emerging. Firstly, by 1943, (when Godfrey left office) there was an
established intelligence doctrine within the N.LD., that is a body of
rules, principles, and procedures which have been well tried, such
as those to which a recruit to N.LD.'s staff would be introduced.
There was never a hint of the doctrinaire creeping in - these doctrines
were very much subject to modificalion as circumstances changed.
It was these doctrtnes which formed the basis for N.I.D.ts structural
organisation, (see Appendix A), though it was in part a dialectic
process between organisations, established doctrine, and the
demands of the times which produced change within the N. I. D.
There can be no doubt that by 1940 Britain possessed the most efficien
naval intelligence machine of all the powers. 1 That it suffered
1.	 Pearl Harbour was to prove the total absence within Ameri-
can intelligence as a whole, (let alone the Office of Naval
Intelligence itslef) of a central point where all the bits and
pieces of information could be fitted together into a cohereni
whole The role and efficiency of the 0. N. I. of the United
States Navy were poles apart from the N.I.D. in the Brit-
ish Admiralty. See Roger Hilsman: Strategic Intelligence
and National Decisions, 1956, P.23-3D, for a detailed,
fully documented account of O.N.I. pre Pearl Harbour, and
the official enquiry and findings into naval intelligence
following the disaster.
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a run-down during the inter-war period is true, and at times its
existence as a worthwhile, legitimate intelligence body is questionable,
yet despite the political-military debacles of the 1930s (see Ch.pters
Six and Seven for N.I..D.'s involvement in political-military decision-
making in the 1930s) it was able to retain its integrity and under
Godfrey's leadership, to reassert itself.
What Hall had succeeded in doing from the time of Jutland
onwards, and what Godfrey quickly re-inforced, was to impress on
the Naval Staff the tremendous need for intelligence, and intelligence
defined as "evaluated information" (a workable definition which has
its origins in the Jutland experience), and the independent, yet not
autonomous, organisation which was needed to produce such material. 1
1.	 A lengthier definition of intelligence is given by Donald
MacLachian in his: Room 39. Naval Intelligence in Action,
1939-1945. Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1968, P.XIII:
Intelligence, he writes, "..... should consist of details
tested as to source and balanced against the facts, reviewed
in the light of experience and the memory of a man or de-
partment, weighed and presented in the form of appreciation
defended and amended under criticism, finally distributed
or promulgated - as the Navy calls it - to bd acted on. It
is remarkably like the process of the law, beginning with
the clue that leads to arrest, passing to the charge, the
trial, the jury' a decision and the conviction. As such it
connotes the most painstaking and judicious brainwork."
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Admiral Hall realised too that if N.I.D. was to succeed, (i.e. its
functions be accepted and these functions be successfully implemented)
this would depend greatly on the "power" N.I.D. could wield, and also
the requests (or demands) it received from Plans and Operations
Divisions. Hall won most of the really i.rnportant political battles,
though in his desire to ensure N.I.D. made its mark he perhaps, at
times, overstretched himself. Herein lies the paramount difference
between Hall and Godfrey eras: the latter saw N.I.D.'s primary
roles as providing estimates and warnings, based on a fully documented
analysis, in report form, and providing day-to-day operational
intelligence, (N.I.D. t- Operational Intelligence Centre), whereas
Hall went far beyond this, seeing the D.N.I. role as a part policy-
making one (and at times taking the initiative himself). Hall' s
activities probably meant the permanent demise of this role, insofar
as after 1919 there were quite deliberate and stringent moves to
restrict D,N,I.'s activities. However, it is legitimate to surmise
that experience would have undoubtedly shown that intelligence and
policy-making cannot go hand-in-hand. One complements the other,
but they must be quite separate bodies. Why have policy-makers if
intelligence officials are performing their functions? But the crucial
argument must surely be that "good" intelligence never in fact can be
"good" if it is inhibited in its interpretilre. stages by a political end -
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the danger being that the intelligence might be twisted to fit the policy.
What Hall did very early on as D.N.I. was to make naval
intelligence into something more than just a body of assembled facts
and figures - naval intelligence under Hall became "evaluated infor-
mation" - the process of analysing and interpreting raw data, not the
mere collection of often unrelated and seemingly meaningless facts.
Admiral Godfrey and his staff continued, albeit perhaps more profes-.
sionally, the Hall tradition of naval intelligence workers being
scientific in their approach - establishing hypotheses and testing them
against a mass of raw data, and having a well-defined link with Plans
and Operations Division.
To accomplish both of these aims these two great D.N.I.'s
saw the necessity of recruiting civilians to perform tasks for which
both deemed naval officers were not trained, and skills they could not
acquire overnight, which the naval appointing system demanded. To
Godfrey an officer appointed to N.I.D. for two years without some
degree of background experience would be of little real use. However,
it was as professional advisers to the analysts and report-writers that
naval officers were invaluable. The Hafl-Winn partnership in the
Operational Intelligence Centre is sure proof of this. As a result of
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recruiting civilians both Hall and Godfrey suffered, initially,
considerable criticism. There was a natural feeling of resentment,
and indeed insult, that civilians should be filling posts some felt
were the preserve of uniformed officers. The basic argument
against the scholar-intelligence worker at the Admiralty stemmed froim
the premise that the kind of knowledge that is useful in solving
intelligence problems comes almost entirely from practical, first-
hand "experience", not from academic abstractions. There was
undoubtedly almost a ring of anti-intellectualism in the argument of
the more determined critics. What Hall and Godfrey realised, and
had the courage to state, was that the interpretation of uIexperiencet
requires scholarly analysis, and further proved that the judicious
combination of civilians (or civilians temporarily commis sioned for
the duration) and experienced naval officers working side-by-side
worked very well, and eventually destroyed their most vehement
critics' arguments.
Since the end of World War II there has been a swing away
from this system, not because of a reversal for Godfrey's ideas but,
somewhat paradoxically, because of the greater emphasis placed on
intelligence work in peacetime, and also because of the movement
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towards integration in the post-war period. It became easier to
structure intelligence work and careers so as to make greater demands
on uniformed personnel rather than civilians. At the time of writing
a review of the upper echelons of the United Kingdom Defence Intelli-
gence Staff showed only two civilians in critical positions, and these
technically-oriented ones - the Director of Scientific and Technical
Intelligence, and the Director of Economic Intelligence. In the
critical days of World Wars I and II both Hall and Godfrey had the
insight and determination to bring into the N.I.D. the best outsiders
they could muster.
In another vital area Godfrey re-introduced a principle
which Hall had fought to establish - that not only must the intelligence
organisation analyse and evaluate as well as collect raw data, and be
in a strong position to pass this to Plans and Operations with effect,
but that, in quite another sense, it must be totally independent,
separate from the masters it seeks to serve, so that the material
N.I.D. acquired and processed would not be distorted by the views
of those who make naval plans and direct naval operations. N.I.D.
always "guided", yet never became so involved so as to lose its
objectivity or integrity of judgment. In their desire to remain
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independent neither Hafl nor Godfrey forgot their main duty - to place
before the naval decision-makers the very best data, unvarnished and
unbiased, even though at times Hail may have become somewhat
autonomous. Both were dedicated quite unequivocally to a large-scale
operation of collection, analysis, and interpretation, and at the same
time developing and maintaining a dialogue with those who needed
information and were able to ask the right questions of the N.I.D.
As a result of this process British naval intelligence by
1945 had acquired a dominant position, but one which in no sense
was unbalanced. N.I.D. never claimed infallibility - it never claimed
anything other than the necessity to provide objectively based and
deeply considered information, to the utmost of its ability. World
War U witnessed the healthy separation of any direct relationship
between intelligence and policy-making. Admiral Godfrey' s era
saw the emergence of a doctrine of British naval intelligence which
is perhaps best characterised bySherxnan Kent, when he describes
the doctrines of the ideal intelligence organisation: "Its job is to
see that the doers are generally well-informed; its job is to stand
behind them with the book opened at the right page, to call their
attention to the stubborn fact that they be neglecting .... Intelligence
cannot serve if it does not know the doers' minds; it cannot serve
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if it has not their confidence; it cannot serve unless it can have
the kind of guidance any professional man must have from his client."1
That the N.I.D. in 1945 was markedly like the intelligence
organisation Kent describes must surely be the lasting testament
to Admiral Hall and Admiral Godfrey, and the Staffs who worked
under them.
1.	 Sherman Kent: Strategic Intelligence for American World
Policy. Princeton, N.J. 1949. P. 182.
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CHAPTER THREE
An Analysis of the Interaction between Naval Intelligence and
Genera]. Naval Policy, and Strategic and Tactical Practice at Sea.
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Naval Intelligence and Maritime Strategy
The primary roles of the Royal Navy between 1880 and
1945 did not change dramaticafly. Although the balance between the
major factors which affected Britain's role in the world and her
international relations changed, such as colonial commitments,
shifts in the world and European balance of power and political
ideologies, internal socio-economic changes, and major shifts in
the trade balance of the world, there was, nonetheless, a consistent
school of thought throughout the period as to how Britain could use
sea power. The validity of this policy, in relation to a hypothesised
view of what Britain's best interests were, is a major question, but
one which is seemingly impossible to answer if one considers the
totality of the major historical factors, the isolation of which would
itself be a most difficult task, and one open to the disagreements of
the historian, each wishing to emphasise his own interprdation.
What an analysis of the interaction between naval inteUigence
and general naval policy, and strategic and tactical practice at sea
will do is to reveal how the men who were responsible for providing
an appraisal of Britain's maritime position and how she should use
her Navy - the men of N.I.D., saw the problems, and possible
134.
solutions to them. It will show the relationship between those who
made plans and executed policy, and those who ovided the intelligence
In one sense it could be said that the student of war has a
ready-made eye-witness into the minds of those who made naval
history, that N.I.D. was the all-knowing seer, foretelling the shape
of things to come, giving Plans and Operations unequivocally accurate
reports upon which to base their decisions, and therefore, like the
historian, providing objectively based information, gleaned from
every relevant source, but, unlike the historian, contemporaneous
with the events themselves. N.I,D. was never able to fulfil this
idealised role, some of the reasons for which have already been
indicated, but one of the chief reasons lies in the nature of events
themselves, a factor totally outside the control of even the most
efficient intelligence organisation. Intelligence can give sound
predictions, or merely just hard data without interpretation, which
may be of use, but it can never give absolutely clear direction,
because of the inscrutable nature of events themselves, which is
their essence.
The N,I,D. was concerned with the Royal Navy in relation-
ship with those factors which N.I.D. isolated - it was a dialectic
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process between the intelligence man and his world. It is at this
point that it can be said that, ultimately, however scientific intelligence
is in its approach and methods; it can never escape from the innumer€b
able factors of which it is a product, so as to render itself separ.te
from events in time. The changing N.I.D. was as much a product
of dynamic change in time as the course of events it sought to influence.
Only the historian can attain a degree of uninhibited insight into events
denied to those who helped make them; only he, because of the benefit
of hindsight, can bring some degree of order from the apparent chaos
of past events. However, the historian, like the intelligence worker,
will tend to consider factors he considers important, but the means
by which he selects those factors will be measured by more concrete
criteria than those which were available to the intelligence worker -
events that have occurred, rather than events that might occur.
Captain S. W. Roskil has written: "The need for intimate
collaboration between Plans, Intelligence, and Operations will be
evident ..... it is no exaggeration to say that together they formed
the trinity on which the execution of our maritime strategy chiefly
rested. 1,1 Experience, the basis of Roskill's observation, has
1.	 Captain S. W. Roskil, R.N. : The War at Sea. Vol. I
P. 21.
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proven this statement to be true. The levels which are implicit in
this statement are what one might call levels two, three, four etc.
Level one consists of the basic aims of British maritime strategy.
These are the a priori aims upon which any naval policy and
operations, in war and in peace, must rest if naval forces are to
have a legitimate raison dtre. Throughout this period the Royal
Navy has been committed to several basic aims - to defend Britain
from invasion, to defeat aU enemy attempts to prevent merchant
shipping plying between Britain and countries from which essential
supplies are obtained, to prevent the enemy from using merchant
ships, and to be able to launch attacks from the sea on enemy or
enemy-held territory. All of these aims involved the need to deny
the use of the sea to the enemy, entailing therefore the ability to
seek out and destroy an enemy.
The levels below the basic aims will be the means by which
these aims can be achieved in peace and war. The validity of the basic
aims are major political-military decisions, and the means to achieve
them the responsibility of the Admiralty; both will be dependent upon
accurate information with which to make the necessary decisions -
making long and short-term plans, and how best to conduct naval
operations.
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Naval Intelligence in the Nuclear Age
The advent of the nuclear deterrent, under whose umbrella
any conventional war must now be fought, has upset this approach.
Professor L.W.Martin has written; "Weapons must henceforth be
exercised within a framework of nuclear deterrence and the limitations
that this imposes upon the weapons that may be employed in any
particular situation.	 He re-inforces this point later in his book:
the limitation of war in the nuclear age is imposed by the
necessity to avoid the general use of nuclear weapons. " In the
modern age a new single factor has thus been thrown into the inter-
national balance - nuclear weapon technology, moulding now all levels.
It is a unique situation, where weaponry is not only deciding
the feasibility of various types of warfare, but also controlling the
very premises upon which the very existence of maritime forces are
based. However, in the pre-1945 non-nuclear era there was a different
pattern of military logic to be applied to maritime strategy. This logic
1. L.W.Martin. : The Sea in Modern Strategy. P. 14.
2. Ibid.	 P.44.
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has, in part, been challenged. How valid, for example are such old
factors as surprise, (whether it be strategic or tactical supprise, or
the use of a new weapon), secrecy, concealment, deception, speed,
audacity, and the need to out-manoeuvre and, if possible, out-number?
How relevant is the concept of breaking an enemy's will to resist, one
of the explicit aims of global strategy? The new era has called for a
different pattern of intelligence, since the very nature, and cost, of
the nuclear threat has led to a very different approach to the predict-
ability of a future nuclear war, particularly one that might originate
in western Europe. The possibility of the nature of the war itself
is changing the whole pattern of maritime strategic thought, the
parallels with the past being mainly the planning for limited con-
ventional warfare in marginal territories and the traditional exercise
of diplomacy through the use of sea power. In the event of the
latter naval intelligence must play its traditional roles, such as, for
example, providing operations with intelligence appreciations, con-
sulting with commanders on the analysis of action reports, and
making recommendations for where transit patrols and area searches
should be conducted. In any limited war there would still be the need
to deploy specialised forces to defeat attacks on merchant shipping by
similar enemy units. Such deployment would require an intelligence
back-up, just as would any attempt to attack an enemy at his source
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or conduct a distant blockade, attack his merchant ships, both of which
might entail an intelligence appreciation of suitable strategic bases to
be used. In this sense there is strong continuity between the pre-nuclear
and nuclear ages.
Intelligence and Gaining the Initiative.
One of the paramount principles of naval strategy and tactics
is to gain the initiative. Once an enemy has the initiative intelligence
assessments become increasingly difficult, for the enemy is calling
the tune when to strike, in the way and place of his choosing; he has,
in other words, created conditions favourable to himself. Intelligence
is therefore always more reliable when one has the initiative and Is
launching the offensive, because the task is simpler. However, experi-
ence showed that it was the in-between stage in any naval war where
intelligence had an equally important role to play, that is the stage
before either side had shown its hand, and the offensive and initiative
had still to be decided. Similarly this applied to a period of stalemate,
following a period of intense activity. When will the enemy next take
the offensive, or when will it be advantageous to next hit the enemy?
In general it is true to say that any strategic deployment of naval forces,
without sound intelligence, can turn operations into nothing more than
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wild goose chases. For exmp1e, in 1939 and early 1940 Admiral
Forbes' Home Fleet was kept at sea without any concrete knowledge
of the whereabouts of the enemy or what his intentions might be.
There was, at this stage, no satisfactory data upon which successful
operational policy could be devised. The threat of invasion in 1940
made it absolutely necessary to have knowledge of what the enemy
might do, and plans for stalling that invasion hinged on the accuracy
of such intelligence. Similarly in World War I - in August, 1914,
Jellicoe established a line of cruiser patrols across the North Sea
to Norway. He had no precise information on enemy intentions, but
geography itself dictated to him the initial deployment.
The above applies to the tactical as well as the strategic
level, (such as the deployment of Forbes' fleet). How, for example
could minelaying operations be successful unless the routes of
enemy shipping were known? It took the N.I.D. some time before
its knowledge of German minelaying activities became known.
Conversely, how could Allied shipping be satisfactorily protected
against enemy mining?
Strategic and tactical intelligence, and the contingencies
this creates for naval planning and operations, in peace and war,
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has a strong political element, particularly in peacetime when, at
worst, naval activity (based upon intelligence reports) can precipitate
the very conflict that it was the original aim of statesmanship to avoid.
However, at that stage intelligence has passed from the hands of
those who collect, analyse, and write reports to those who act upon it.
The realisation of the great value of such intelligence was
not initially appreciated during the earlier part of the N.I.D. t s history.
For example, in the pre-l914 years there was no serious appraisal
.i	 I5 e	 is 'V. i:.
madeof the effects (strategic and tactical) of submarine warfare,
least of all the effects which a policy of unrestricted submarine war-
fare might have.
1.	 It was not until Hall came into office in 1914 that full-scale
a?praisals were made of German submarine policy. For
example on 3rd September, 1915, the N.I.D. reported that
there were no signs as yet that German submarine captains
were changing their tactics. Merchant ships were instructed
to carry out the policy originally promulgated by the Admi-
ralty. There was no concrete sign (just suspicion) of a
forthcoming policy of unrestricted U-boat warfare. This
report and supporting documents are in Adm. 137, 1100,
P. 170-173, Public Record Office.
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In 1914 British Naval Intelligence was not alone in its
unpreparedness for a naval conflict. The Germans were far less
concerned with gathering strategic or tactical intelligence, and were
concerned that Britain gave the appearance of great preparedness.
The German Naval Attache in London, Captain von Muller, reported
that England was prepared for full naval war, and was not sure which
way England would move in the event of certain hostilities by German
land forces, (presumably he referred to the violation of Belgian
neutrality). There was a good deal of dissatisfaction within the
German Navy of the lack of planning; Captain von Rintelen wrote in
his book: "The tactics now employed against England, of merely
waiting to deal with whatever move the enemy made, were not at
all to our liking". 1 Von Rintelen' s worst fears of the German Navy' s
lack of control were proven correct when hostilities began. At the
time of the Battle of Coronel and the Battle of the Falkiand Islands
the German Admiralty had no knowledge of Admiral von Spee' s where-.
abou.ts or intentions, or the nature of the British threat. Von Rintelen
wrote "O.ir hearts beat quickly when he (von Spee) destroyed a
British squadron off Coronel. We did not know whither he would turn
after the battle" ?2 and, "The unexpected news of the battle of the
1. Captain von Rintelen: The Dark Invader. P. 24.
2. Ibid. P.41e
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Falkiand Islands threw us into deep depression". 1
The Deployment of Forces
Von Rintelen' s comments highlight one of the major strategic
problems of World War I - the sound development of forces so as to
fulfil defensive and offensive roles in the light of knowledge of enemy
strengths and intentions. In this vital area the work of the N.I.D.,
and particularly Room 40, gave Britain the advantage. At no stage
during World War I could it be said that Scheert s intelligence sources
compared in efficiency with the British Admiralty's. For example,
on Zi April, 1915, the German High Seas Fleet put to sea in the belief
that Admiral Tyrwhitt' s Harwich force was about to attack the
Zeppelin sheds at Tondern, behind the island of Sylt. Room 40 was
able to give enough warning of this move for the Grand Fleet to be
ordered towards the Skaggerak. However, before they could arrive
1. Captain von Rintelen: The Dark Invader. P.42.
2. Tyrwhitt, Sir Reginald Yorke, First Barnet, Admiral of
the Fleet: 1870-1951; entered RN 1883; Commander 1903;
Captain 1908; Commodore Destroyer Flotillas 1914; Rear-
Admiral 1918; Vice-Admiral 1925; C. -in-C. China station
1927; Admiral 1929; Admiral of the Fleet 1934.
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on the 22nd, Scheer concluded that Tyrwhitt' s attack had been called
off and ordered his ships back to the Jade. Jellicoe held on towards
the Horns Reef, hoping to drew Scheer out, but had to withdraw
because of dense fog.
It was this prior warning of enemy movements that gave the
Royal Navy tactical advantage, and ultimately enabled it to dictate a
dominantly one-sided naval strategy for the duration of the war. More
often than not the Germans were operating in the dark, as is shown
by the following example. On 30 May, 1915, Hall' s men in Room 40
confirmed enemy movements. They had decyphered a signal from
Scheer to his fleet. It read:	 forces may proceed to sea";
this was followed by another signal ordering the High Seas Fleet to
be assembled in the outer Jade by 1900. (In fact these signals were
made more threatening to the Admiralty by a decyphering error: Room
40's version read: "German forces may proceed to sea".) During the
afternoon Room 40 supplied further information, and as a result of
this the Admiralty signafled Jellicoe and Beatty at 1740: "Germans
intend some operations commencing tomorrow via Horns Reef. You
should concentrate to eastward of Long. Forties ready for eventualities"
As a result of Room 40's inteUigence the Grand Fleet sailed four and
a half hours before the first units of the High Seas Fleet left the Jade.
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Admiral Scheer had no knowledge of the Grand Fleet' s movements.
On this occasion his submarines, on reconnaissance, failed to provide
him with the correct intelligence as to what was at sea and its possible
course. N.I.D.'s intelligence gave the initiative to the British fleet -
where the enemy could be attacked, and what his possible intentions
and strengths might be. In the knowledge that such intelligence was of a
consistent quality, and regularly available, the Admiralty was eventually
able to evolve a more rational strategy for bringing the major German
a1
units to battle, and in the event, gave thtA the great advantage of
tactical surprise. Nelsonian strategy would not have worked in this
era and, at worst, without intelligence, Jellicoe's forces could have
patrolled the North Sea on the off chance of a confrontation. N,I.D.
provided the timely warnings that made wild goose chases rare occurren-
ces. It was unfortunate for the Royal Navy that Germany's later strategy
did not allow it to optimise the benefits of intelligence1 and use this in
the full-scale battle many dreamed of. The Germans were not prepared
to run the risk of major losses to the High Seas Fleet in an. attempt to
damage the Grand Fleet to such an extent that the blockade would be
broken. Geoffrey Bennett summarises the situation thus: "When U-
boats had shown that they could do so much damage to Britain' s jugular
vein, the High Seas Fleet was kept in being to prevent a close blockade
of their U-boat bases, to occupy British destroyers which otherwise
would have been used to combat them, and to ensure that the Allies
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could not use their main elements of naval power for operations, such
as arnb.ibiou.s landings on the north-west coast, which would have
directly endangered the homeland. 1,1 It was not until the post-Jutland
period that Scheer evolved this strategy. Until 1916 he had hoped to
lure the Grand Fleet to sea for a pitched battle; his principal means
for achieving this were raids on English east coast towns. However,
there can be no doubt that intelligence played an important part in
giving tactical advantage, and ultimately strategic control. The Dogger
Bank action illustrates this well; intelligence gave the Royal Navy
tactical advantage, and from this came strategic control of the North
Sea, and therefore reduced the chances of the enemy being tempted to
chance further raids on the east coast.
German naval historians have not been loath to criticise
Scheer' s strategic policy, or the organisation of which it was a product.
Vice-Admiral Friedrich. Ruge, referring to World War I has written:
there had been no corresponding progress in strategic and
operational ideas or the employment of a powerful fleet, which posses-
sed not a single overseas base for refuelling its coal-burning ships,
1.	 Geoffrey Bennett: The Battle of Jutland.
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whose endurance never exceeded 5,000 miles." The N.I.D. was
not unaware of the latter facts. However, it did lack crucial infor-
mation about Germany's long-range strategic planning. ft did not
for example realise the significance of the absence of a German
operational war staff, or acquire data on German overall military
strategy, or political strategy, which events, if anything, proved to
be lacking too. As a result the High Seas Fleet waited in the Heligoland
Bight and the Grand Fleet at Scapa for the battle wh ich did not come.
In designing the High Seas Fleet Tirpitz had made the fundamental
error of designing a surface fleet whose ships, for want of the
necessary endurance, could not break out of the North Sea and operate
against trade. 2 Within the limitations of German strategy the N.LD.
was able to give the necessary warnings, but in a stalemate situation
this became of no avail if the enemy was not prepared to commit his
forces to battle.
British strategic thinking pre-1914 was, in general terms,
prepared for the German threat. Sir Julian Corbett gives erudite
testimony to the work of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the
1. Vice-Admiral Friedrich Ruge: Sea Warfare, 1939-1945. A
German Viewpoint. P. 15.
2. This was a lesson the Navy of the Third Reich was quick to
learn.
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N.I.D. pre-1914; " ..... the fundamental new problems had been fully
realised and provided for by unceasing study." The N.I.D. had
appreciated that for the first time the Royal Navy would be facing an
enemy north of the Dover defile. This would mean that the enemy had
the North Sea and Denmark Strait to break through if it was to cause
major damage, though it was realised the east coast ports and sea
routes were now vulnerable. In consequence it was realised that the
Grand Fleet would have to be located in Scottish waters. Hence the
choice of Scapa Flow. N.I.D. had accurate technical information about
the High Seas Fleet. Admiral Hall knew Britain outgunned and out-
numbered the Germans, though he knew too that they had far superior
armour. This information was fed to Plans and Operations for use in
strategic and tactical studies.
Locating and Identifying Forces
Where British naval intelligence failed badly in the last
months of peace in 1914 and early in the war was in identifying and
1.	 Sir Julian Corbett: Hisbry of the Great War based on official
documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the
Committee of Imperial Defence. Naval Operations.
Volume I. Chpt. I.
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Slocating German warships in distant waters. 	 This was to cause
considerable frustration for the operational planners. As late as
July, 1914, the whereabouts of the main German units on the China
Station were still unknown, (fortunately this was to be greatly im-
proved during the last weeks of peace). During that month the
Gneisenau was reported to have left Singapore. This information
was inaccurate. The Gneisenau. was mistaken for the gunboat Geier.
The other two light cruisers belonging to the German Pacific Squadror
Nu.rnberg and Leipzig, were believed to be somewhere on the west
coast of North America. Sir Julian Corbett gives this account:
"..... this ship (i. e. the Nurnberg), a sister of the Leipzig, had
left San Francisco on July 21 for Honolulu. She arrived on the
27th, and sailed again on the same day for an unknown destination.
She had, in fact, been ordered to join Admiral von Spee. This, of
course, was unknown to the Admiralty, and the prevailing impression
was that both the Leipzig and Nu.rnberg would operate along the trade
routes on the east coast of North America."	 The weakness of
Admiralty intelligence about the location of enemy forces and their
1. Compare this with the 0.1. 's performance at the time
of the Munich crisis and throughout 1939.
2. Corbett. Vol.1 P. 145.
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strengths found its nadir at the battle of Coronel. The British
force had divided itself into two inadequate squadrons, and in the
event found themselves facing superior odds. Along with the exploits
of the Karisruhe and Emden the battle of Coronel exposed British
command of the Atlantic to real menace. Where, if at all, had
intelligence failed? Admiral Craddock was surely right in pursuing
von Speets force. 1 He rendez-vou.sed his squadron off Cape Virgins.
On the way t Punta Arenas, where he hoped to obtain further
intelligence, he was continually intercepting call-signs between
German warships and merchantmen. These could not be decyphered.
On arriving at Punta Arenas the British Consul there told him the
Germans were probably using Orange Bay as a base. Craddock's
misfortune was as much a result of poor communications as lack of
intelligence, which, in this case, cannot really be separated. Links
with the south Atlantic were slow and uncertain. This is shown by
the fact that the Admiralty did warn Craddock on 30th September of
what the Germans might be about, but this never reached the Admiral.
This signal informed him that the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst had
bombarded Papiete and sunk the French ship Lelee on the 22nd, and
were last reported steering north-east.
1. Craddock, Vice-Admiral Sir Christopher G. T.M.: 1862-
1914; GB 1902; ivIVO 1903; commander training squadron
1912; Rear-Admiral 1910; KCVO 1912.
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After the disaster at Coronel the Admiralty were quick
to remedy the situation. 1 What the Battle of the Falkiands shows is
that the British Admiralty succeeded in bringing an overwhelming
superiority of forces, at the right time, in the right place, against
the enemy. This was based on sound intelligence, but intelligence
gleaned from Craddock's tragic action at Coronel. In strategic
terms the Battle of the Falkiands meant that command of the outer
seas had been won, and Britain was virtually free to throw practically
the whole weight of her Navy into the main theatre. 2
The location of enemy naval units was as much a major
1. After Coronel Admiral Sturdee was made C. -in-C. to seek
out and destroy the German force. His comma.nd was un-
precedented - embracing a wider stretch of sea than had
ever yet been committed to a single Admiral. He sailed as
Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic and Pacific.
Sturdee, Admiral Sir Frederick Charles Doveton: . 1859;
entered RN 1871; Captain 1899; Rear-Admiral 1908;
ADNI 1900-1902; Rear-Admiral First Battle squadron 1910;
Admiral 1917.
2. N.I.D. and the Naval planners were quick to deduce from
the two actions that "under modern conditions" the normal
result of an action between two unequal squadrons would
be that the one with inferior speed and gun-power would
be destroyed by the one which was faster and more
powerfully and, a conclusion which may now seem too
obvious and simple to have been drawn in the forceful way
it was.
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intelligence function in World War U as it was during the Great War.
However, in the interim, the development of air power brought an
additional means by which the enemy could be located - air reconnais-
sance.
Air Reconnaissance
This became essential for successful sea or air strikes
against an enemy which had now deployed his elf on a greater scale
and truly global basis. Without air reconnaissance, any air attacks,
operations against major enemy units in port, in transit, or in action,
would have been greatly thwarted, and the outcome of the war at sea
placed in jeopardy. This was patently true of the anti-U-boat campaign.
There was a direct link between N.I.D. (U-boat tracking room) and
H. Q. Coastal Command. The two worked hand-in-hand, and through
H.Q. Western Approaches the whole convoy organisation and anti-U-
boat war was dondcted.
1.	 From April, 1941 onwards the Royal Navy had operational con-
trol of Coastal Command. The action of the Fleet Air Arm
at Taranto had convinced Churchill of this. Events in both the
Atlantic and Mediterranean were to show that closely integra-
ted aviation was necessary to the Royal Navy if it was going
to control the sea. On this point of integrated sea and air
power in Britain pre-1939 and during World War II one dis-
tinguished American observer has written: "By establishing
an independent air force, the British government removed
from their battleships and cruisers the very officers who
153.
Admiral Cunningham was one of the first operational
commanders in World War II to realise the value of air reconnaissance
for accurate intelligence, though Beatty had certainly appreciated it
in his day. In the New Year of 1942 there were little or no aircraft
available for air reconnaissance in the eastern Mediterranean. At
the time of the evacuation of Crete the Admiralty had no idea of
German intentions. Cunningham suggested remedies. In "Sailor's
Odyssey" he wrote: "I emphasised again what we needed was better
air reconnaissance, which should allow us to keep our forces far
enough away by day to avoid serious loss pending the moment when
the enemy committed his convoys to thei'r sea voyage, and we went
in and destroyed them. I had not received the reinforcements of
1. (contd.) would have made their Navy air conscious, and denied
the fleet what it needed most, close co-operation between
surface and air, and a corps of aviators trained to fly
over long ocean stretches and to work in harmony with
the ships." Captain W.D.Puleston, U.S.N. The Influence
of Sea Power in World War IL P.21. The Battle of Taranto
was the first successful employment of carrier-based
torpedo planes against capital ships. Detailed accounts of
the role of air reconnaissance during World War II in
naval operations are given in three eminent books: Sir P.
B. Joubert de la Ferte: The Third Service. The Story
Behind the Royal Air Force; Sir J.Slessor: The Central
Blue. Recollections and Reflections. (both Joubert de la
Ferte and Slessor were sometime A. 0. C. -in-C. s, Coastal
Command, Slessor succeeding Joubert de la Ferte in
February, 1943). W,S.Chalmers: Max Horton and the
Western Approache.
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reconnaissance aircraft I had so correctly requested."1
The need to know, on a daily basis, the whereabouts and
strengths of hostile units, Cunningham saw as the primary goal of
operational intelligence. To this end regular aerial reconnaissance,
often providing photographic evidence, had a prime part to play.
It was the sort of "hard" intelligence from which could be deduced
1.	 Admiral of the Fleet Viscount A.B.Cunningham: A Sailor's
Odyssey. P. 375-376. Cunningham was highly critical of
British Intelligence in general; referring to the Italian
invasion of Albania and the criticism levelled at the Royal
Navy for not being widely disposed throughout the Adriatic
Cunningham wrote: "Mr. Churchill appears to have based
his assumption that the Italian project was known to us
beforehand on his belief, after twenty five years experience
in peace and war, that the British Intelligence Service
was the finest of its kind in the world ,...... In 1939 our
intelligence about anything inside Italy was sparse, almost
non-existent." P. 201-202.
Cunningham, of Hyrtdhope, First Viscount, Admiral of the
Fleet Andrew Browne: b. 1883; entered RN 1898; Rear-
Admiral (D) Destroyer Flotillas, Mediterranean Fleet
1933-1936; Vice-Admiral commanding battle cruiser
squadron and second in command Mediterranean, 1937-
1938; DCNS 1938-1939; C.-in-C. Mediterranean 1939-1942;
head of British naval delegation, Washington, 1942;
Admiral 1941; C. -in-C. Mediterranean 1943; Admiral of
the Fleet 1943; First Sea Lord 1943-1946.
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certain inalienable facts, and its efficacy increased as the range
and endurance of aircraft increased, particularly in the filling of
the mid-Atlantic gap, an area which, because of its distance from
Britain, was not patrolled by Coastal Command during the early
years of the war. Iceland was occupied in part to act as a vital
refuelling and air reconnaissance base. 1 It was air reconnaissance,
coupled with other data, particularly radio traffic, that enabled
Captain Winn, RNVR, to be so accurate in his predictions. Can-
ninghain, on returning to the Admiralty from his Mediterranean
Command, made this observation of 0.1. C.'s anti-U-boat activity;
"The organisation for keeping track of the U-boats, analysing the
intelligence and checking and cross checking all the information
that came in, was centred in a large room under the Citadel . .....
In charge of the organisation was Captain R.B.Winn, R.N.V.R., a
barrister in private life, and his knowledge of U-boats, their corn-
manders, and almost what they were thinking about, was uncanny
every submarine leaving an enemy harbour was tracked and plotted,
and at any moment Captain Wmnn could give the numbers, likely
positions and movements of all the U-boats at sea. His prescience
was amazing ..... the task of translating his knowledge into the
1.	 The long-range reconnaissance aircraft were Sunderland
and Catalina flying boats and by the end of 1941 Coastal
Command were operating American Liberators.
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appropriate counter-action on our part fell principally onto the
broad shoulders of the C. -in-C., Western Approaches, Admiral
Sir Max Horton, from his headquarters at Liverpool"' Winn had a
direct link with H.Q. Coastal Command and he was provided with
every piece of aerial intelligence as it came in. As a result H.Q.
Western Approaches were able to develop accurate plans for convoy
compositions and routes. Tactics were developed as a result of other
sources revealing enemy methods, as well as being controlled of
course by the anti-submarine weaponry available to the Royal Navy.
Strategic plans for the Atlantic battle stemmed largely from recon-
naissance and wireless intelligence, and from the tactical reports
of commanders on the spot, when they had engaged or sighted. the
enemy. In this sense tactical and strategic intelligence are insepar-
able, since it is the minute details of the former which help to
build up an overafl picture for the latter.
In the tactical situation aerial intelligence was to prove
invaluable, and in some cases, its absence was to prove disastrous.
The loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse off Malaya on December
1.	 A. B. Cunningham: A Sailor's Odysse y. P.579. Horton
succeeded Admiral Noble as C. -in-C., Western Approaches
in November, 1942.
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10, 1941, attempting to attack invading Japanese transports, was
partially due to Admiral Phillips not having air reconnaissance
available, as well of course as "air cover", to forewarn him of
impending Japanese air strikes. Perhaps he did not wish to break
radio silence, and consequently did not call for air support. We
shall never know. 1 Air intelligence provided the Admiralty with
daily information as to whether the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and
Prince Eugen were still in Brest in February, 1942. Their escape
shows how the absence of such intelligence could have completely
confounded British attempts to locate the enemy and hence make
effective plans, or take precautions, to counter him. In this
particular instance it was not until 11. 30 a. m. on 12th February,
when the ships were actually off Bologne, that all British commands
were made aware of their presence. 2 Air intelligence was to be
invaluable in giving tactical commanders on the spot, and Operations
in the Admiralty, vital information in the Bismarck, and later in the
1. The details of this are in Admiral Layton's article in the
London Gazette, February 26, 1948.
2. The official Report on the Escape of the Scharnhorst,




Scharnhorst operations. 1 Throughou.t the Battle of the Atlantic,
the Russian convoys, and the Mediterranean campaign, air intelligence
was paramount in determining strategic planning and tactical
procedure, (details of which will be given later). For example, in
early 1942, the Russian convoys were threatened by the Tirpitz,
Scheer, Hipper, and Lutzow. Only continuos aerial reconnaissance
of the Norwegian ports could tell Operations the location of the
enemy, and whether there were signs of movement, or actual
departures. 2 It is appropriate to comment that in the war at sea
in the Pacific, air and radio inteUigence gave the Americans the
tactical advantage, or looked at from the other side, its absence
in the Japanese fleet gave them a decided disadvantage. Within a
few days of the Battle of the Coral Sea, 8th May 1942, intercepted
radio messages indicated that the enemy's next thrust would be
against Midway Island, 1,200 miles, W.N.W. of Pearl Harbour.
1. Full details are contained in R4 F. Jesei4 The Bismarck
Operation. The German Aspect. R.U.SII. lecture, November
19, 1952; Admiral Tovey: Sinking of the Bismarck, May 1941.
London Gazette, June 23, 1948; Admiral Fraser. Sinking of
the Scharnhorst, December 1943. London Gazette, August 7,
1947.
2. I.M.R. Campbell gives details in his R.U.S.I. Lecture of
16th January, 1946; Russian Convoys; 1941-1945, as does
Air Vice-Marshall A.BEllwood in his: Coastal Command
in the Victory of Europe, R.U.S.I. Lecture, 16th April,
1947.
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Aerial reports confirmed this, and American carriers delivered
their blows first and at a time when their opponents were most
vulnerable. Somewhat ironicafly, the Battle of the Philippine Sea,
June 19th, 1942, although an important victory, was not a pre-eminent
victory because more could have been gained. Admiral Spruance
played safe, and rightly so. He stood on the defensive, refusing to lay
open the Saipon operations to a thrust from the southward, and the
reason was his uncertainty about Japanese movements. His air
reconnaissance was inadequate, having too few Catalin.as at his
disposal; additionally he did not recive information that two U.S.
submarines had sunk two major Japanese fleet carriers, Taiho and
Shokaku. With further knowledge he m4i have, in consequence,
advanced to the westward during part of the night of l8thul9th June,
1942, and so brought the enemy to action the next day. The Battle
of the Philippine Sea would, in all probability, have ranked with the
great naval battles of history. Admiral Halsey was to face the
same problem at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Z4thfZ5th October 1944 - he
had no adequate information on Japanese movements, or of what their
attacking groips consisted. Even his general information about the
1.	 See Admiral Spruance' s own appraisal of the situation in
his R.U.S.I. lecture The Victory in the Pacific. 30th
October 1946.
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number of ships fit for service was by no means precise. 1
Whatever the shortcomings of British and American air
reconnaissance there is no doubt that the Germans fell far short of
them in this field. Goering' s maritime air policy was very much
a secondary consideration to the main deployment of the Luftwaffe.
The Kriegsmarine did have control of air reconnaissance over the
sea, as well as tactical air operations during contact between naval
forces, but it was never able to develop forces similar to Britain's
Coastal Command, and Goering did his utmost to forestall aircraft
being under direct naval control. Admiral Ruge makes this comment
in his book: "In December 1940 Donitz therefore made a further
emphatic appeal to higher authority, arguing that whereas every
other weapon of war was provided with its own reconnaissance, the
U-boat' $ capacity for destroying shipping was being largely wasted
for lack of air support, without which they could neither find nor
concentrate on the worthwhile targets. And if, having contacted a
convoy, a shadowing U-boat was driven off by the escorts, as frequentl3
happened, then the problem of regaining contact would be much less
1.	 See C. Vann Woodward: The Battle for Leyte Gulf, P. 84
and J.A.Field' s observations of the various moves and
reasons in his: The Japanese at Leyte Gulf. The Sho
Operations.
161.
difficult if aircraft were available for guiding it back to the target'."
Intelligence and German Naval Strategy in World War I
What analyses of World War I strategic thinking have
revealed was the absence on the German side of pre-war appraisals
similar to those made by the Committee of Imperial Defence. The
German High Command certainly believed the war would be a short
one, too short for any blockade by the Royal Navy to make itself felt.
It was always assumed that the massive pre-1914 German naval
re-armament programme and their naval exercises were geared to
a confrontation with the British fLeet as soon as circumstances allowed,
in the event of war. All British naval planning and re-org anisation
had this in mind. 2 Neither the N.I.D. nor the operational staff of
1. Vice-Admiral Freidrich Ruge: Sea Warfare, 1939-1945.
A German Viewpoint. P. 123.
2. From October, 1904 onwards, when Fisher became First Sea
Lord, his major reforms were directed towards this goal.
There was a wholesale scrapping of obsolete warships, radi-
cal reorganisation of the reserve fleet, a re-distribution of
the fleets and squadrons to provide an interlocking system
of reinforcement in any threatened area, and the new design
of capital ships - the Dreadnoughts and battlecruisers, revo-
lutionary ships which gave Britain a two-year start on other
nations in the modernisation of her Navy. He created an
Atlantic Fleet, based on Gibraltar, which was to reinforce
the Mediterranean and Channel fleets as required, though
the principal aim was to make certain that the main
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the Royal Navy anticipated the somewhat inept use of the German
naval resources, which in turn was a result of a lack of thorough
German naval intelligence and planning. Somewhat ironically though
this ineptitude did bring dividends, but not major ones. The High
Seas Fleet was simply kept in being while the British fleets were
harassed and their command disputed by every means of minor
attack. This was opportunist rather than the result of any long-
range naval planning by the German High Command. However,
their successes were indeed significant, and the Germans were
quick to realise that by enormously increasing their power of
minor attack they could at least hope to reduce the Royal Navy's
margin of supriority, perhaps so low as to eventually warrant
the High Seas Fleet taking the offensive. The C. -in-C. Grand
1. (contd.) concentration of sea power was always within easy
steaming distance of the North Sea. The formation of
the Home Fleet in 1907 was created as the prime weapon
to face a possible German challenge. By 1910, when
Fisher was forced from office, the Royal Navy was
already highly tuned and trained for battle. In 1914
Britain possessed 29 Dreadnoughts and battle-cruisers,
with 20 more on the stocks; Germany had 20 and 7
respectively.
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Fleet, Admiral Jellicoe, unable to pursue a policy of blockade, 1
was dedicated to a major fleet action, but one he was determined to
restrict to the northern half of the North Sea, where the Germans
could not rely on having submarines and minelayers to assist in a
fleet action. Thus the variables which each side imposed on each
other tended towards stalemate, rather than action, the very anti-
thesis of the strategy the Naval Staff had so assiduously planned.
Instead of steaming northwards to meet the Grand Fleet the High
Seas Fleet, or a considerable part of it, was occupied in covering the
coastwise transport of troops and supplies to East Prussia. It
was this great shift in the use of the German fleet from that which
the N.I.D. and Naval Staff had anticipated that rendered not so much
strategic naval intelligence in World War I obsolete rather than the
limited uses to which Britain's major fleet units could be put.
Moreover the N.I.D. could not have been expected to foresee somethin
which was to have a major effect upon the British naval effort, and
indeed the outcome of the war, namely Gerrnany s total disregard for
This in itself was a major departure from traditional
strategy, necessitated by the advent of mine and submarine
warfare, and the fact that the amount of coal that could be
carried for ships' coal-fired boilers restricted the time
that ships could remain on blockade and patrol.
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solemn international agreements, such as the violation of the
Hague Conference of 1907, regarding mine warfare, and their later
policy of unrestricted submarine warfare.
11, can be seen that what may appear to be the obvious naval
intentions of an enemy do not always work out in practice. This was
never more true than of the German High Seas Fleet. Although great
emphasis was to be placed on the U-boat campaign, this was the
result of war experience, and not of any pre-planned strategy. The
Germans never intended to use the High Seas Fleet against British
commerce, and, save for the earlier stages of the war it could
never have been employed as such even if the Germans had changed
their minds.	 It is certainly true that Germany changed her naval
strategy in the Nazi era, and the nature of her forces enabled N.I.D.
and the J.I.C. to give more accurate predictions of how Raeder
would use his major naval forces. Their forecasts were accurate -
the major German fleet units were deployed to attack neutral and
hostile merchantmen bringing essential foodstuffs and raw materials
1.	 Other units were used for attacking British commerce.
For example between 10th September.. 28th October 1914,
the Emden, (Captain von Muiler) sank 23 merchant vessels.
The Emden was eventuaUy caught by the light cruiser
Sydney.
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to Britain. In the event the fate of the Graf Spee and the Bismarck
were to prove the futility of commerce destroying alone as a means of
winning a naval war. Both Raeder and Donitz appreciated this before
1939. In his memoirs Grand Admiral Donitz bitterly complains that
Hitler had not anticipated war with Great Britain and had neglected
the Navy. 1
The sudden emergence of a new method of conducting a
war at sea, against accepted traditional codes and international
law, temporarily threw the Naval Staff off balance in World War I,
and Admiral HalVe men were equally unprepared. Intelligence was
totally unknowledgeable of the new German minelaying policy, and
the Admiralty was stunned for some ime, not having suitable
methods of counter-attack immediately available. Corbett describes
the situation thus: "The loss of the Audacious in one of the great
highways of the Atlantic trade naturally forced to the front the
necessity of dealing firmly with the increasing disregard with which
Germany was treating the accepted limitations of naval warfare.
Regardless alike of civilian and neutral life, she was sowing mines
1. See K. Donitz: iviemoirs - Ten Years and Twenty Days
translated by R.H. Stevens in collaboration with David
Woodward.
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brdcast and surreptitiously in the highways of the world -
and sowing them, as was then believed, under neutral flags. Even
without this last aggravation, so rhthless a stretch of legitimate
belligerent action could not be met within the old canons of war; that
was clear.' To many senior British Naval officers German methods
were distasteful; to the N.I.D. it became clear that the niceties of
the old naval code would have to be abandoned; to N.I.D., and
Jellicoe concurred, the policy Germany was adopting was the proper
one for a belligerent in her position, in order to weaken the British
battleline before the main action was fought. However, this tended
to restrict the activities of the Grand Fleet. Jellicoe said that his
policy, as a result of German methods, would be to resist all temp .-
tation to activities which entailed undue risks to major units, and the
Navy would devote itself to strangling enemy trade and destroying
his submarines. He went so far as to say: "If Germany uses fishing
craft, let us do the same. " Although the anticipated battles did not
come in the way Jellicoe had hoped, he did, nonetheless, achieve
one of the primary objectives of British strategy - containing German
1. Corbett: Naval Operations. Volume I P. 246.
2. Jellicoe, in his "The Crisis of the Naval War", records
his thoughts at the time and his assessment in the light
of the passage of time.
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naval power, except for the U-boats, by keeping it hemmed f.n the
North Sea, and not allowing it to break through the Denmark Strait.
It was an objective achieved in part through stalemate. Room 40
was constantly waiting for signs that this was changing.
It is a truism to say that in both wars N.t.D.'s greatest
operational successes were scored in the war against the U-boat,
measured in terms of the consistency of effort employed, the mag-
nitude of the problem and its significance - that in. both wars the U-.
boats had to be defeated. N.I.D.'s fight against the U-hoats was not
encouraged or enhanced by any peculiar feature of the submarine or
submarine warfare which lent itself to intelligence work, though of
course it is true to say that the whole range of N.LD.'s intelligence
facilities were required to fight the U-boats. It was simply that
in both wars, after early unsuccessful actions by large surface units,
the German Navy soon realised it could best cripple Britain by U-
boat attacks on merchant ships. In World War U the higher echelons
of the German Naval Staff appreciated this more than their pre-
decessors had in World War I, when the full use and effects of un-
restricted attacks on merchantmen was not realised until much later
in the war. It was very much still an unknown quantity to the Germans
in 1914. However, Donitz and his supporters had urged Hitler to
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build more U-boats long before 1939.
Intelligence and the Unpredictable
In 1939 N.I.D. was unable to predict how British naval
strategy should evolve; intelligence can account for some u.npredict..
able variables by creating contingency models, using hypothetical
situations, but it cannot look into a crystal ball. For example, in
June 1940, three facts changed radically British naval thinking:-
firstly, the fall of France, making the possibility of invasion greater;
secondly, the availability of French Atlantic coast ports for German
naval bases - the traditional role of Scapa Flow as a base for prevent..
ing a break-out into the Atlantic was m undermined, the Western
Approaches were now severely threatened, and convoys in mid-Atlantic
(out of range of anti-submarine patrols) were now in even greater
danger from Donitz's wolf packs, aided by Focke-Wulfe aircraft
from Bordeaux; thirdly, on 10th June, Italy entered the war, up-
setting the balance of capital ships, and naval balance in the Medit-.
erranean - routes were closed, and shipping had to come via the Cape.
These factors could perhaps have been foreseen, but their timing,
and nature would make any intelligence appreciation for formulating
strategy based on these assumptions so hypothetical as to render
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them valueless for the present, and it was perhaps far more
valuable to rely upon other sources of enemr strengths and intentions
for strategic planning rather than assumptions about what the enemy
might achieve. Major enemy successes, or failures, will naturally
modify strategic thinking, but only after the event can intelligence
make sound appraisals. This does not mean that N.I.D. did not
work on certain assumptions at times, but rather that it placed
greater emphasis on that which is, rather than that which might be.
The Dardanelles.
As already emphasised the taking of the initiative in any
strategic enterprise gives considerable advantage. This was perhaps
nowhere more apparent than in the great amphibious landings of
World War II. In World War I the Dardanelles Campaign illustrates
well the application of strategic intelligence - using command of the
sea to strike at a point with great military and political advantage,
based on sound intelligence appraisals. The idea had full support
of the N.LD, and whatever the eventual failings of that campaign,
one of which was the very poor collection of more detailed intelligence,
the basic reasons for its inception were very sound, based as they wer
on wide-ranging intelligence, thorough and painstaking in their
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content. 1 Admiral Hall's views were those which are now seen
as the classic reasons for the Dardanelles and, in essence, few naval
historians have questioned their validity. Hall saw that in one stroke
Britain could remove all dangers to Egypt, secure the Balkan states,
win the wavering respect of the Arabs, put an end to the hesitation
of Italy, and open the back door into Europe. Hall was advocating
a move to surround the Central Powers with a ring of enemies and to
cut them off, just as Napoleon had been cut off by British naval and
combined operations in the Mediterranean, and prevented from
spreading the war beyond the confines of Europe. To Hail and his
staff Turkey was placed in an intolerable position on the main lateral
line of communication between the Western Powers and Russia, and
until that obstruction was removed a real combined effort such as
was needed to crush so great a military power as Germany was
impossible. The Dardanelles illustrates how sound strategic
intelligence fails if the minutiae of intelligence, the hard data
1.	 The Dardanelles reveals tragic weaknesses in on the spot
British intelligence work. For example, accurate know-
ledge of Turkish armament and defences was lacking, as
was topographical intelligence. During the period 19-21
March 1915, following bombardment of the Turkish positions
little was known of any damage done, or the state of
Turkish ammunition. See Adm. 137, 713 Public Record
Office.
171.
necessary to carry out operations, is collected and or interpreted
badly. Its consequence can be epochal - the breakdown of the second
attempt to force the Turkish defences at Gallipoli constituted a
definite landmark in World War I. The hope of rapidly completing
the investment of the Central Powers and opening up direct communi-
cations with Russia was at an end. This will be seen later when a
marked contrast will be made with the rigorous intelligence operations
that preceded the amphibious landings of World War II.
In the years preceding the outbreak of World War I the
C.I.D., together with N.I.D. and Naval Plans had considered
the possible implications of a possible German invasion threat.
As early as October, 1913, the Admiralty had set up dispositions
for the defence of the Channel. The N.I.D. worked on the assumption
that Germany would be threatening British shores with all her naval
power, and considered the various ways in which such a threat could
be made. As the last days of peace ran out the N.I.D. busied
itself determining what exact naval movements Germany intended
making and what signs there were of an invasion threat. Intelligence
1.	 With Hall in office the whole process of intelligence
collection and assessment was intensified. He quickly
obtained as much data as possible from Germany before
war was declared. For example, in June 1914, a vast
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showed that the Germans seemed to be more concerned with repelling
a threat than actually making one - their destroyers ,and submarines
were spread fifty miles north and south of the Elbe and entrances to
their North Sea ports had been mined and lightships removed, while
the High Seas Fleet hurried back to port from exercises1 The night
before war was declared	 intelligence showed that the Germans
meant to get a number of commerce destroyers to sea before the
outbreak of war, and at 0400 on 4th August 1914, the Grand Fleet
received orders to carry out a movement in force to intercept them.
British naval forces were strategically deployed and ready for such
contingencies, and "hard" intelligence determined how such long-range
plans would be implemented in the immediate tactical situations.
The overall need was to prevent invasion, and strategy was
evolved to meet that need. The particular ways in which that need was
met could only be decided in the light of events themselves. In this
sense long-range strategic intelligence is very general, and decisions
1. (contd.) quantity of invaluable data was obtained in Kiel and went
straight to N.I.D. for analysis. This is to be found in
Adm. 137, 1013, Ps. 101-155, Public Record Office. N.I.D.
set to work to make assessments of German intentions - see
Adm. 137, 1013, P. 76-86, (assessment of German Naya]. Plans
23rd August - 5th September 1914) and Adm. 137, 1013,
P. 282-288 (German Plans for an attack on the British Fleet,
23rd Septeinber-8th October, 1914). Technical intelligence was
stepped up too. For example, between th and 16th October
1914, a committee sat to analyse German naval gunnery
capabzlities, (Adm.137,1013,.309-3Z5).
173.
made in the light of it should be as flexible as possible so as to
allow for changed circumstances. For example, pre-1914, the
N,I.D. could not have predicted that the battle of Mons would occur
and that its outcome might seriously affect naval plans. Corbett
records the effects of this particular battle on naval operations thus:
"•, .... Admiral Jellicoe was informed of the serious consequences
which seemed to be developing out of the Battle of Mons, and warned
to consider the possibility of having to fix a new position for the Grand
Fleet should the Germans get control of Calais and the adjacent
French coast - that is, in fact, if they succeeded in breaking into the
Dover defile."
However this sort of stTategic problem does not preclude
specific actions; for example, as a result of what appeared in early
October 1914 to be a deteriorating military position, (due to extensive
reinforcement reaching the German right), it was felt at the time
that if the situation was to be saved something had to be done to
secure for the Army its indispensable sea communications. The
spectre of invasion arose with the possible threat of German control
of Allied ports. The decision was quickly taken to extensively mine
1.	 Corbett: Naval Operations. Volume I, P. 94.
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the entrances to the German ports as a further means to threaten
movements of major German naval units. Again during World War
II, the strategic plans for a blockade against Germany were rapidly
put into operation.
The Norwegian Campaign
N.I.D. and J.I.C. had planned before war, for example,
on a blockade against the iron ore supplies from Narvik to Germany,
although initially there were difficulties since most of the iron ore' s
journey was through neutral territorial waters. This altered after
9th April 1940, with the German invasion of Norway. Any long-range
strategic blockade requires an overall appraisal of the enemy's
economy, raw material and trade sources and routes. From such
intelligence operational plans can be evolved. In the event of war
more detailed inthiligence will reveal precisely where the enemy
can be hit hardest. Norway illustrates this well - the growing need
to capture Norway became more apparent as 1940 dawned, for
strategic as well as economic reasons. It was realised a German
occupation of Norway would increase the difficulty of maintaining
sup1Jemacy over the northern exits to the Atlantic. Captain Warburton.
Lee's attack on Narvik on 9th April and the eventual landings from
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assault ships on 28th May 1940, were aimed at securing the country,
and more particularly the crucial ports. The fail of Norway was to
reveal, in part, weaknesses in intelligence appraisals, not least of
all the prime question of the probable chances of success of severely
weakened ground and air forces (caused by the crisis in France) and
the effects that the lines of sea communication would have on the out-
come of the Norwegian campaign, (it is 800 miles from Scapa Flow
to Narvik). 1 In the Pacific war there was a similar recognition of
the need to cut off the enemy's supply lines and hit his sources of
raw materials at source. After the formation of the British Pacific
Fleet (Admiral Fraser) and British East Indies Fleet (Admiral Power)
intelligence soon recommended intensive attacks on. the Japanese
supply line to Burma in the Malacca Straits, mainly by submarines,
and air strikes against critical Japanese centres, particularly the
great oil dumps. On 19th April 1944, air strikes from H.M.S.
Illustrious and the U.S.S. Saratoga were made on the port of Sabang
and on 17th May against Surabaya. On June 2 1st, Port Blair in the
1.	 Although initially a disaster Hitler was forced in January
1942, to send the Tirpitz, Scheer, Lutzow, Prinz Eugen,
Hipper, Koin and five destroyers to Norway for fear of an
Allied invasion of northern Norway, thus using up
valuable naval units at a time when the Allies had no such
intention.
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Andamans was attacked. On 24th and 29th January 1945, the Fleet
Air Arm launched its highly successful attack on the Japanese oil
refineries at Palembang. These attacks were the result of highly
successful Anglo-American intelligence co-operation, without which
long range Allied strategic planning 'could have been impossible.
General Eisenhower made this comment on British intelligence
revelations to the Americans whilst the early plans for an invasion
of Europe were being made: "We gained access to all the British
intelligence and learned the exact strength and commitments of
British land, sea, and air force."
Intelligence and Tactics, and Tacital Situations
In the tactical situation intelligence is equally important.
Before conflict a detailed study of enemy ship capabilities and tqctical
procedures can facilitate tactical planning, and preparations and
exercises can take place along these lines. 2 Intelligence appraisals
1. Dwight D. Eisenhower: Crusade in Europe. P. 76.
2. Throughout both World Wars such appraisals were being
continuously made. An example of this is Adm. 137, 1080,
P.27-30, N.I.D. report of 19th January 1915 - a
comparison of the Grand and High Seas Fleets.
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following actions, giving insight into possible future enemy moves
and ones own mistakes, gives more reliable guidelines, since they
are based on what has occurred rather than what might occur. This
was especially true in the post-Jutland period when assessment
studies soon revealed the weaknesses of British tactical procedures,
(as well of course, of the chronic lack of co-operation between Room
40 and the War Room). The classical tactical errors of Jutland are
well-known and were already deeply rooted in the Grand Fleet before
it went into action. Besides signalling errors, Jelljcoe's under-
standable caution, (he could have "lost all in an afternoon" as
Churchill said) and fear of U-boat and torpedo attacks, and deficien-
cies in gunnery and ship and shell design, there were perhaps more
important aspects of tactical errors that emerge. Jellicoe adapted
the line-ahead broadside when he would have done well to have
practised "divided" tactics. The Grand Fleet was under top much
central control and written orders. Save for some destroyer captains
most captains were not given enough scope to display initiative.
Moreover, when the time came several captains failed to make enemy
reports at critical times. The N.I.D. never attempted to tell
Plans and Operations their business, and nor was it N.I.D's task
to initiate tactical studies and analysis, and because of the often
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delicate balance between the roles of the various departments of the
Naval Staff it never made great inroads in tactical intelligence
studies as a matter of routine.
Where N.I.D. made its contribution was in providing
Operations and therefore operational commanders with the vital
information that enabled them to design or change tactical procedure.
This was particularly true of convoy escort policy for Atlantic
convoys during World War II, which was radically altered after
the successful U-boat attacks of 1940. The N.I.D. gained a great
deal for the Service by the analysis of tactical errors or bad planning,
which, when analysed, provided valuable insights and data for
future operations. For example, the disastrous raid on Dieppe,
19th August 1942, gave valuable information to the N.I.D., (as
well as to Combined Operations) on how an amphibious operation should
be mounted, and more particularly for N.I.D,, what intelligence
data was required. In a memorandum of 7 November, 1942 Admiral
Godfrey was able to write: "I believe this is excellent now that
Intelligence and Operations occupy adjacent tables in the 0.1. C. with
no wall in between.
1.	 Godfrey Memoirs: Vol. 5 Part 2. P. 216.
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Tactical intelligence was vital for helping to determine or
reinforce decisions made by commanders at sea. However, there
arose occasions when the possession of intelligence gave the
command ashore a better informed picture than the man-on-the-spot,
and consequently tighter operational command was exercised from
ashore. In the event of action at sea the commander stiU stood on
his own, and it was his immediate decisions which determined the
outcome of conflict, other than in highly detailed pre-planned
operations, where to a lesser extent the need for instant decisions
was demanded. The constant up-dating of intelligence for ships at
sea required a constant dialogue between N.I.D. and Operations.
During World War II this was not lacking. There were occasions
though when Operations made decisions and gave orders to commandeii
at sea on the basis of insufficient intelligence. There was nothing
N.I.D. could do to alter such decisions. Perhaps the most out-
standing example of this was the loss of the ill-fated convoy, PQ17,
which illustrates how scanty intUigence was misinterpreted, and
formed the basis of a decision to scatter, made from headquarters,
instead of leaving the decision to the man on the spot The convoy
consisted of 33 merchant ships, 3 rescue ships, and 1 tanker. The
escort consisted of 21 vessels with a covering force of 2 battleships,
1 aircraft carrier, 7 cruisers, and some 20 destroyers. The
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intelligence report was that the Tirpitz and 8 destroyers had put to sea.
Intelligence is vital in the area of weaponry - detecting the
development of new enemy weapons and assessing th.e impact these
might have on war at sea. Equally important is the need to assess
the impact that one's own developments will have upon tactical pro-
cedures, and more especially what advantages thus will give over the
enemy. This was particularly true of the development of radar which,
although only still in its infancy in the autumn of 1938, would,
according to J.I. C. and N.I.D. assessments be vital. It helped
turn the tide in the Mediterranean especially as an air-raid warning
2device, and in the Atlantic battle against the U-boats, (although its
detection capabilities were reduced by the German development of
the "schnorkel" technique, which in turn though reduced the speed of
the U-boats), and was invaluable in other major naval actioàs - the
sinking of the Scharnhorst was, for example, due in part to superior
British radar. Throughout World War II one of the German& main
troubles was their inability to detect the radar transmissions of Allied
ships and aircraft and their consequent vulnerability to surprise.
1. Only two ships were then fitted with it, the Rodney and the
Sheffield. Their trials with it were very successful.
2. See Cunningham: A Sailor's Odyssey. Ps.272 and 369.
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The development of the British centrimetric radar set gave the
initiative to the Allies in all weather, day and night.
N.I.D. was able to keep Plans and Operations well-informed
of the development and. possible effects of weapon technology on both
sides. From the early part of the twentieth century the N.I.D.
prepared technical intelligence reports oniaU manner of subjects, and
this involved constant surveillance of other powers' weapon and
ship design and operating techniques. For example, after the
Russo-Japanese War the N.I.D. produced a series of reports on
technical subjects relating to Russian and Japanese methods, such
as the ways in which they maintained their ships' hulls, boilers, and
machinery in the theatre of war without resort to dockyard facilities,
their methods of raising and repairing sunken warships, and the
effects of shot and shell, torpedo and mine explosions upon hulls,
boilers and machinery. 1 These reports went hand in hand with
operational analysis reports mentioned above. In the case of the
Russo-Japanese war an analysis was made ofboth sides' operational
2
methods. Later in World War II it was realised many U-boats
1.	 See N.I,D. report no. 835, June 1908, a copy of which is
in the Library of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich
2.	 See N.I.D, report no. 944, Janu'ary 1914, a copy of which is
in the Library of the Nationa].Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
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were escaping destruction from depth charge patterns when in fact
it was felt they should have been destroyed. It was eventually deduced,
(and later confirmed by the capture of a U-boat) that U.-boat design
must have been improved so as to permit them to dive to a greater
depth, in fact to a maximum of 600 feet, hitherto considered
.mpossible. To counter this, escorts were instructed to set depth
charges to explode at greater depths and to release them in greatly
increased numbers. N.I.D. was quick to measure the effects of
other enemy weapon developments and initiate appropriate action to
counter these, such as the development of asdic decoys, improved
magnetic torpedo pistols, acoustic and zig-zag running torpedoes,
and the high-calibre AA guns fitted to U-boats to counter surface
attacks by Coastal Command aircraft.
To give the advantage of tactical surprise and to know
possible enemy strengths and intentions are two of the prime roles
of intelligence from the viewpoint of the operational planner or the
commander. Prior to the D-Day landings the joint Anglo-American
intelligence staff executed a complex plan to deceive the Germans
into thinking the landings would be in the Calais region. It is now
known that the Germans gave extraordinary credence to these
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deceptions. 1 Before the Allied landings at Salerno joint intelligence
reported that the Italian garrison in the Salerno Bay area was being
rep1acd by the best of the German troops available. Intelligence
further predicted a bitthr battle in the beach-head culminating in
a strong counter-attack somewhere between the fourth and sixth
day after the landing. 2 These predictions were to be proven very
accurate. Admiral Fraser was to be very grateful to the N.I.D.
1. See Field Marshal Montgomery: Normandy to the Baltic.
Ps. 36 and 37. The decision to invade N. W. Europe was
in fact made in the summer of 1942. In close conjunction
with the intelligence departments the Allied planners
decided that the initial landings must be somewhere between
Cherboarg and the mouth of the Seine. This area provided
beaches sufficiently wide for the assault and suitable terrain
for airfield construction and manoeuvring after the forces
ashore had been built up to full strength. Furthermore they
were not too distant for fighter cover from England and not
too bristling with coast and beach defences. In the event
the Allies achieved tactical surprise. German air recon-
naissance was bad and they had no usable radar. Even
after the invasion, into July 1944, the Germans still thought
a second landing in the Pas de Calais region was in the
offing, and they retained strong forces in that area.
2. See General Eisenhower's account of this in: Crusade in
Europe. P. 205 and 206.
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during 25th and 26th December 1943, when flying his flag in the new
battleship Duke of York, (10 14" guns) he was warned by the Admiralty
that the Scharrthorst was at large. 1 At the Battle of Midway Admiral
Nimitz was to be equafly grateful to radio intelligence, which had
deduced from Japanese signals that their objective was Midway. As
a result of this intelligence Nimitz, like Fraser, made a momentous
decision - he accepted the challenge and prepared for action, knowing
the intention, and lâter the whereabouts too, of the enemy. At Midway
American flying boats made reconnaissance flights covering an area
up to seven hundred miles around Midway, thus providing Admiral
Nimitz with a timely picture of the enemy' s positions. The Japanese
carrier fleet neglected all reconnaissance. 2 Locating the enemy is
in itself invaluable. Whatever the method it uses, as long as it is
reliable, intelligence has a prime responsibility to locate the enemy.
The attack on the Tirpitz in Alten fiord by midget submarines on 22nd
September 1943, could not have been reliably planned but for continuous
intelligence reports. As has already been shown mining can be point-
less unless one can be sure of enemy movements. Intelligence located
1. Admiral Bey had transmitted a signal to the effect that the
weather was unsuitable for destroyers. This signal was
intercepted.
2. See L.B.Kirkpatrick: Captains Without Eyes, and Midway
the Battle that doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy' s story,
by Mitsuo Fuchida and Masutake Okumiyu.
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the U-boat work-up areas in the Baltic for example. These were
strewn with mines. This had the desired effect. In early 1944 Donitz
reported that the mine situation was a cause of deep anxiety, and
that the ore imports from Sweden were seriously threatened. 1 In his
"Sea Warfare, 1939-1945" Captain J. Creswell, R.N. says this of the
effects of British mining policy:" •. ... . some 400 merchant ships and
100 minesweepers were sunk by British mines and many more were
damaged. Most of them were sunk in the western Baltic and the
southeastern North Sea in 1943 and 1944, and about 80% fell to mines
laid by aircraft." Without inteiligence of where mines could be
most profitably sown these totals would never have been achieved.
Politics and Strategy
Whatever the strength of strategic and tactical intelligence,
both in peace and wartime, and the ability of naval forces to perform
certain tasks, there can be no doubt that political rather than naval
decision-making will, in the last resort, decide the fate of large
scale naval forces. This is a factor that will be dealt with in detail
later, but it is appropriate to recognise this dichotomy at this stage,
1.	 See K. Donitz: Memoirs - Ten Years and Twenty Days.
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between what often appeared as the obvious courses of action to
N.I.D. and the planners on the one hand, and decisions different
to their views made by politicians on the other hand. This is apparent
when reviewing the degree of influence strategic intelligence played
in moulding grand strategy vis-a-vis the Royal Navy during the Great
War.
Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart concluded in one of his
works, "History of the First World War", that Britain had shown
.... tacit acceptance of acting as an appendix to the French left
wing and away from her historic exploitation of the mobility given
to her by sea power." He cites the landing of a naval division to
reinforce the defence of Antwerp and of the 7th Infantry and 3rd
Cavalry Divisions at Ostend and Zeebrugge 1
 as tIthe first and last
effort to make use of British amphibious power." The critical point
is why was this so. Why was it that the grand strategic naval
designs of the Committee of Imperial Defence fell on stony ground
when war came? Why was it that the official military historian of
1.	 This in fact was somewhat ironic, as it was done on
Churchill's insistence, in fact a political decision forced
against military and naval advice.
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World War I, General Edmunds, was able to write of the Battle of
the Marne, to choose but one example: "Had some of the 14 British
Territorial Divisions and 14 Mounted Brigades, with the 6th Division
still in England, been landed at the Channel coast ports to fall on the
German communications and rear, a decisive tactical result might
have been obtained and the war finishedit? Political-military
decisions will be examined later, but the p2int remains here nenp-
- theless that a divertgence can occur between carefully worked out
war plans and strategic concepts, based on unrelenting intelligence
reports, and the later execution of policy in war. 1 However, it has
already been recorded as a major principle of intelligence, that, if
it is to retain its integrity and authority, it cannot cross the bridge
linking the intelligence organisation and those who make plans and
operational decision. The forcefulness with which intelligence is
given, and indeed the standing of those who give it, is of course
though another matter.
1.	 The records of the Committee of Imperial Defence for before
World War I, when compared with the war record revealed
in the official histories and the more distinguished commen-
taries, show a disparity that would surely have been un-
believable to the pre-war D.N.I.s and their colleagues on
the C.I.D. See the List of the Papers of the Committee of
Imperial Defence to 1914, H.M.S.O. 1964, for the refer-
ences, many of the ideas of which are discussed in N.H.
Gibbs' book on pre-1914 strategic thinking: The Origins
ofImperialDefenc. O.U.P. 1955.
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What World War I shows is not the complete collapse of
C.I.D. and N.I.D. grand naval strategy, but the missing of crucial
opportunities, and the conspicuous pursuit of inept campaigns on
land, and nor was intelligence completely blameless for those
campaigns which, though faulty in execution, were sound in con-
ception. The Dardanelles must faU into this category. Britain
did establish early command of the sea and did implement, for
example, her design to seize German colonies which were invaluable
assets to bargain with, and indeed Liddell Hart reaches this con-
clusion in the Epilogue of his book. "..... if the historian
has to select one day as decisive for the outcome of the World War
I] he will probably choose August 2 1914 ... when Mr. Winston
Churchill, at 1. 25 a. m. sent the order to mobiise the British Navy
For the Navy was the instrument of the blockade, and as
the fog of war disperses in the clearer light of these post-war years
that blockade is seen to assume larger and larger proportions, to
be more and more clearly the decisive agency in the struggle .....
It was the stranglehold of the British Navy which ..... constrained
Germany to carry out that feb de se offensive of 1918. She was
dogged by the spectre of slow enfeeblement, ending in eventual coll-
apse." As Liddell Hart says, Britain had exercised sea power in
Mahan terms; that it was not extended and exploited in depth is
another matter. The roots for this policy lay in the work of the
189.
C.I.D., the N.I.D., and the planners of the Naval Staff. Certainly
by 1939 major lessons had been learnt, and fortunately too, since the
threat of invasion was greater. After the withdrawal from France
seapower was paramount, as the Allies were able to transport their
armies to areas where they could land and engage the enemy at points
most favourable to the development of their strategy, and before the
great amphibious landings it is quite clear that British seapower was
the decisive influence on the outcome of the war in that critical year
June 1940 to June 1941 when Britain obtained and maintained control
of the sea, and control of the air over certain strategic areas, such
as the Dover Straits, the English Channel, and the waters around
Malta. In Mahan-like phrase domination of the sea was to bring
domination of the land.
The Degree of Flexibility of Intelligence and Naval Policy
A military organisation is not as ideally flexible as perhaps
one imagines it ought to be. Its sinews may be strong, but its reflexes
may not be as quick as desirable. This is apparent after a prolonged
period of peace. Intelligence can always help to keep a service on its
toes, provided it is given the wherewithal to operate effectively.
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Admiral Godfrey makes this cogent comment in his mernoirs
"Intelligence deals with the enemy and the potential enemy. When
there is no enemy it languishes and its importance is forgotten.
Its strategic functions are only vaguely appreciated by those - and
this includes the real talent of the Navy - who have no personal
experience of intelligence in war. 1 His comment applied to the
inter-war period, and perhaps no one more than. John Godfrey saw
in the early and mid nineteen thirties how low the N.LD. had been
run down. During his time as Deputy Director Plans Godfrey
witnessed the hardening of the Navy's arteries caused, in part, by
a failure to assess naval requirements, coupled to other major
factors, not least of all the move towards an arms ran-down and the
national anti-war feeling and the sense of false security engendered
by Fascist and Nazi blandishments, a situation that has been well
summarised by Admiral of the Fleet the Viscount Cunningham:
there were still gaps in our armour after years of unenlightened
popular belief in the efficacy of collective security under a League of
Nations which did not include the United States, and unilateral
disarmament which caused many of our still useful ships to be scrappec
1.	 Admiral J.H.Godrey: typescript memoirs. Vol.V. Part I.
P. 2. Copy used is in the Manuscript department of the
National Maritime Muse urn, Greenwich.
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while permitting other nations to build. A succession of naval
treaties which could only be considered disastrous in. their effect
had caused the Navy to be whittled to the bone, particularly in its
building and replacement programmes and the number of its
personnel.
Even before World War I there were major errors made in
assessing possible shifts in enemy policy caused by reasonably
predictable wartime events. This was particularly true of German
U-boat policy. Until March 1915, Britain continued to believe that
Germany, like herself, would continue to use submarines solely for
naval objectives, whereas it became clearer week by week, as
further losses were reported, that the Germans were devoting their
main energy to the development of their commercial blockade.
N.I.D. had reported early in the war, on numerous occasions, how
it saw German policy developing and that counter-measures should be
developed QWLc ldy. As Corbett recalls in the official history:
• .•. intelligence indicated that in the near future it (German sub-
marine warfare) would increase in intensity as it was increasing in
1.	 Cunningham: Sailor's Odyssey. P. 193.
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barbarity.	 In the last years of peace, 1912-1913, during the
Jackson-Oliver tenureship of the D.N.I. appointment, N.I.D. had
foretold that the Germans would not scruple to use the new weapon
against merchant ships, both belligerent and neutral, but the general
belief among many senior members of the Naval Staff and government
was that the Germans were too sound strategists to risk raising
fresh enemies against themselves by so flagrant a violation of the
traditions of sea warfare. Even in Germany this ostensibly saner
view was held by many, bat under the pressure, and some Germans
argued, provocation, of the severe British blockade a more reckless
submarine policy was needed. Hail' s men in Room 40 were to
dramatically prove how devastatingly wrong were some of the views
of certain sections of the naval planning staff and political decision-
makers.
There were many lessons learnt from World War I that
were useful for World War II operations, but by 1939 there were new
factors which were to revolutionise sea warfare, but several of these,
even if appreciated, were not always acted upon, mainly for political
reasons. The role of the aircraft, as a substitute for the big gun,
1.	 Corbett: Vol. I P.288.
193.
was to come into its own, and it was carrier-borne and not
shore-based aircraft that were to prove themselves of prime
importance, the unknown quantity, radar, revolutionised naval
operations, and the ability to replenish and refuel at sea, reaching
its zenith in the great fleet trains of the Pacific fleets, changed the
pattern of planning and operations, as did the range and firepower
of the submarines. Central to World War 11 maritime operations and
ultimate victory were the great amphibious assaults, preceded by a
series of smaller combined operations and the development of a
welter of amphibious craft. These operations, especially in the
Pacific, showed how seapower could be so overwhelmingly exerted
at so great a distance from home bases. It is 6, 000 miles from
Pearl Harbour to Singapore, and 3, 200 to Japan, and none of the
other American Pacific bases were particularly satisfactory, Manila
Bay and Subic Bay in the Philippines we poor bases, and Wake
island and Guam were untenable, being too near to the Japanese
Mariana islands and Iwo Jima.
It is a truism to say that the pace of weapon development,
strategic and tactical practices, as well as the other host of naval
business, recruitment, training, manpower deployment and so forth
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changes with the exigencies of war, and it is natural therefore to
find Britain, in 1939, not in an ideal position as her policy was
unagreesive and she was attempting to gain momentum for what
seemed to be an inevitable war. For these reasons N.I.D. could not
have given accurate predictions for Naval Plans and Operations of
how things would go. During the late thirties it comptently collected
most of the vital statistics about the German Navy, allowing for the
absence of certain technical data. This is pertinent when compared
with the Aniericans t position. The latter did not realise how the
Japanese valued carrier-borne air power and how they were way
behind Japan in attack techniques, especially in the use of torpedo
and dive-bomb attacks, and the development of their long-range
high explosive torpedo for their destroyers. 1. Ironically, the
Americans never examined the precursor to 7th December 1941,
namely the surprise Japanese attack on the Russian Fleet in Port
Arthur in 1904, (nor for that matter did Britain see Scapa Flow,
pre-1939, in such a light). Politically there were some major
errors in Anglo-American naval relations, the hallmark of which
1.	 As early as 1927 the N.I.D. began continuous studies for
providing defence for ships and installations against air
attacks and ways of obtaining intelligence to give such
warnings. See Adm. 116, 2519. From 1936 until war the
N.I.D. made intelligence appraisals for a naval air policy -
no. of aircraft needed, type, weaponry and tactics. See
Adm. 116, 4030.
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was unco-operativeness. Throughout the nineteen thirties the bitter
feeling between the British and American navies increased and until
1937 this was skilfully utiised by Japan to strengthen her own fleet.
The Americans projection into the Formos a- Philippine s-Singapore
triangl.e was greatly reduced, leaving the western Pacific open.
Later in the war the Navy Department in Washington was to be against
a British fleet going to the Pacific. They thought the United States
should go it alone and would have done but for Admiral Chester W.
Nimitz, C. -in-C. Pacific, who welcomed the idea of a British
Pacific Fleet. Political factors such as these were beyond the scope
of the N.I.D.
Where the N.I.D. scored before the war was in very
specific areas, 2 and in relating the German Navy's strength - numbers,
1. It is chastening to note that Germany probably made a great
diplomatic mistake by not persuading Japan to enter the war
in 1940, without declaring war on the United States. This
would have taxed British resources beyond their capabilities.
2. N.I.D, had investigated, for example, the prospect of
mining German river mouths from the air, in addition to
submarines, destroyers and minelayers, and the Admiralty
and the Air Ministry worked on this, producing eventually
suitable mines for the task.
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weapons, and endurances, to the Royal Navy's capability. 1 More.-
over the N.LD. was able to show what many members of the Naval
Staff and certain politicians and sections of the public knew and
feared, but not in detail - British naval weaknesses and how these
would probably show themselves in the first stages of a war with
Germany. It was known, for example, that there were nowhere
enough cruisers to give protection to convoys against major surface
attacks, particularly if the Germans waited until the Tirpitz was
completed, and patrolled this, Bismarck, and the battlecruisers,
together. This sort of fact, placed alongside the known German
naval building plan had alarming implications, (Raeder' s so-.caUed
Z-Plan of naval construction allowed in the long term for 4 aircraft
carriers of 40, 000 tons.) However, it should never be forgotten that
the process was two-way - the Germans had no precise information
as to the efficiency of British anti-submarine techniques and Hitler
had a pathological fear of committing his major fleet units to a
full action.
1.	 See Appendix B for the type of information N.I.D. was able
to present, giving the radius of action of some types of
German warships, outward and homeward passage, allowing
20% reserve for fuel consumed in a battle. It was assu.mdd
pre-1939, before the later fall of France, that U-boats woukl
pass south of Iceland. The occupation of the French Biscay
ports was to give the boats a greater range of action.
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As stressed earlier there can never be any accurate
prediction of what actual war will produce. Only intelligence in war
itself will give the better picture and in 1939-1945 the N.I.D. caine
into its own. Its assessments then had a life and death significance,
and above all it was to operate on a day-to-day, even hour-by-hour
(and often for an org anisation like Vtinn' s, minute-by-minute) basis,
feeding in the vital information. In wartime pre-war hypotheses change
and a situation crystallises. In 1939 the prospect of many surface
raiders in the Atlantic seemed daunting. Who could have foreseen
that Hitler would insist on withdrawing these from the west to help
cover the Norwegian situation, and who could have decided in 1939
that by crippling a dock in St. Nazaire by an old destroyer in March
1942, the Nazis would be deprived of the only major repair facility
for the Tirpitz and Bismarck on the French Atlantic coast? Similarly
with implementing generally accepted war principles: for example,
to conduct a blockade across the entrance to the Bay of Bis cay, (a
large area to be patrolled, and with only small forces available) there
was a primary need for intelligence of forthcoming movements of
enemy merchant ships, obtained by submarines and air reconnaissance,
agents' reports and by studying convoy cycles. In wartime the jig-
saw process of fitting together a mass of apparently disconnected
evidence begins in earnest.
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The critical value of air power rapidly became apparent
to N.I.D. The Norwegian campaign soon showed that in any
amphibious operation air cover was essential; Taranto, Cape Mata-
pan, and the Crete Campaign proved this point very quickly in the
Mediterranean. The Germans knew this too - nothing could be
achieved in the lvlediterranean without overwhelming strength in the
air.	 However, not all issues were as clear cut as this to the
N. I. D., and several had to wait for post-war analysis to unravel.
For example, N.I.D. never deduced that forces employed on area
searches sank fewer submarines, (proportionate to the effort involved)
than did similar forces on escort and close support operations.
1.	 Hence their desire to push their airfields even further
forward, hoping that they might diminish the area in which
British ships could operate, and eventually gain domination
of the Mediterranean. When, in July 1941, the Malta
convoys Were less harassed by German air power, because
of the all-out German efforts in the invasion of Russia, the
tide began to turn in Britain's favour.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A Survey and Critical Analysis o the Relationship between
Selected Naval Operations during the Period and Intelligence.
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The Beginnings of Operational Intelligence in World War I.
The acid test for any intelligence organisation must be the
demands which war makes, and it is during wartime that the operational
planners and commanders place a premium on intelligence. This is
not to devalue the importance of intelligence in peacetime, far from it.
Intelligence in itself may enable those who make major military
decisions, both politicians and senior officers, to prevent those
situations developing which lead to war. The records of the Committee
of Imperial Defence are testimony to the extent to which the British
government went in order to prepare for war contingencies. However,
the most detailed plans and well-accumulated intelligence data have
often proved inadequate once conflict has started. There can be no
precise prediction of the intentions of an enemy.
The Great War confronted the N.I.D. with its first major
challenge since its inception. Pre-1914 it had a hand in limited
operations, such as the trouble with the Mandi in the Sudan and the
expeditions to relieve Khartoum and rescue General Gordon. In 1914
the Naval Staff, despite the preparations of the C.I.D. and copious
N.I.D. reports, were worried about many aspects of a war with
Germany. The C. ..in-C. • Grand Fleet was very concerned about
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torpedo attacks by German destroyers, as well as meeting the High
Seas Fleet in a night action - N.I.D. knew the Germans had made a
special study of this and had trained accordingly. The Germans had
better starshells and searchlights, and they had trained to use them.
The British had yet to develop means to recognise friend from foe
at night. On the technical side the Royal Navy had shells of poor
design - they were not armour-piercing. Similarly with British
warships' armour plating - it was woefully lacking. To be totally
effective it should have been laid on the decks as well as the sides to
forestall the effects of long-range shells falling vertically. There
was a conspicuous failure by Britain to check the technical efficiency
of its ships. For example, the Royal Navy remained ignorant of a
ser)us defect in the turret design of all its Dreadnoughts. The
Germans were more observant. After the Dogger Bank action,
when the Germans nearly lost the Seyditz through poor turret design,
they were quick to make improvements.
On the tactical side the Naval Staff were worried as to how
the Germans might use their submarines, and no real thought was
given to the need for air reconniassance. During the Battle of Jutland
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only one air reconnaissance aircraft flew. 	 However, the N.ID,
responded immediately, once war seemed iniminent and had begun,to
gain information about German intentions and how, and where, and w1x
they would deploy their forces. 2 The N.I.D. was quick to make
recommendations based on pre-war plans. For example, U-boat
indicator nets were laid across the Dover Straits. These were
initially successful. U-boats were ordered not to use the Dover
Straits, thus lengthening their journey to and from the Irish Sea by
1,400 miles, and cutting their time on patrol by seven days. However,
as Professor Marder has shown, U-boats were eventually able to
find safe ways through the Dover barrage. He writes: "Dover
remained a difficult problem, as the Flanders U-boats continued to
1. The records speak of the very limited use made of naval
air reconnaissance throughout World War I. The following
contain surviving evidence of what naval reconnaissance was
done from the air: Adm. 137:- 146, 150, 157, 287, 290,
291, 292, 302, 333, 334, Public Record Office.
2. See Adm. 137, HS 1013 in the N.I.D. records in the Public
Record Office. Between August and September the N.I.D.
made accurate assessments of German naval plans, (see
Ps. 76-86) and the way they would probably attack the
British fleet (see Ps. 282-288). In June and July, 1914
N.I.D. busied itself collecting and assessing information
about the German units seaworthiness based at Kiel (see
Ps. 101-155).
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pass the Straits with ease and impunity, the mobile patrols and
explosive mine-net barrage notwithstanding. In the latter part of
the year (1917) the U-boats were sinking about twenty ships in the
Channel every month. The D.N.I. informed Keyes, then Director
of the Plans Division, in October that over 30 submarines were
passing through the Straits monthly. The statement came from a
German report on the passage of the mine-net barrage salved from
UC-44 (blown up on her own minefield off Waterford in October 1917).
It showed that 190 passages had been made between 23 December 1916
and 6 June 1917, chiefly at night and on the surface. There were only
eight reports of U-boats touching a net and eight reports of their being
forced to dive to avoid patrols. Clearly, the barrage was absolutely
ineffective in denying the passage of the Straits to the U-boats.'
2Similarly the N.I.D. was quick to assess German mining policy
and the use the Germans might make of Zeppelins and the extent to
which they were being built.
1. Arthur J. Marder: From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow.
Vol.4. P.316.
2. Adm. 137, HS1O13, Ps. 329-331 gives details of German minin
policy in Danish and Swedish channels.
3. Adm. 137, HS1O13, Ps 38-382, gives details of how between
17th October and 8th November 1914, N.I.D. obtained
details, and reported on Zeppelin construction and policy.
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Many things left undone in peacetime have to be rapidly
done in wartime. In some cases though no amount of improvisation,
however quickly done, can make up for precious time lost - this is
particularly true of an organisation needed to continuously monitor
the location (either at sea or in harbour), and deduce the possible
intentions, of enemy units. In this vital area the N.I.D. was not
found wanting in 1914. Room 40 was to play an increasingly important
role in determining the outcome of operations.
Radio Intelligence in World War I
The key to this role lay in possessing, or being able to
crack, enemy codes.	 From very earlyn the N.I.D. was able to
decypher enough German radio signals to give the Admiralty warning
of future German plans. It was learnt in December 1914, that a
further raid on the east coast of Britain had been ordered for 16th
December, (though it was not known that this raid was to be supported
by the whole German High Seas Fleet. )2 Throughout the whole of
1. The N.I.D. was greatly aided in this when copies of the
German Navy's Codes salvaged from the wrecked cruiser
Magdeburg, feU into its hands.
2. Beatty's four battlecruisers and Admiral Warrender' s eight
Dreadnoughts were in position and waiting to spring a trap
on Hipper's force. An unfortunate signal by the Lion,
Beatty's flagship, misled Goodenough into losing touch with
the ehemy.
Footnote: Captain S. W. Roskill showed the author a letter he had re-
ceived dated 2nd May 1963, from Sir Eugen Ma1lington-I?ake/conLd.
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the war the N.I.D. never ceased its vigil for enemy radio traffic.
On 22nd April 1918, the High Seas Fleet, unknown to NI.D. sortied
from the Jade as far north as Stavanger. Admiral Scheer lost the
convoy he sought and foolishly broke radio silence. The N.I.D.
tracking organisation picked this up and Beatty was ordered to sea.
Unfortunately Scheer reached port safely. Throughout the war N.I.D.
had given Operations timely warnings of the High Seas Fleet' s
movements. On 23rd January 1915, Hipper left the Jade to raid the
British Dogger Bank patrol. N. I. D. gave the Admiralty enough
warning to send Beatty southwards from Rosyth. Regrettably a major
chance for a British victory was misse4, in part due to faulty
signalling and fear of running into a submarine trap. The intelligence
had been first class. N.I.D. radio intelligence was critical at
Jutland. It could have turned the odds completely in favour of the
Royal Navy if it had been used properly.
In retrospect accurate intelligence was the only way the
two fleets could have met on the open seas, other than by chance, and
perhaps by mammoth round the clock sea and air searches, which
Footnote (contd.) who was present in September 1914, in the
British Embassy in St. Petersburg. Miilington-Drake
describes the furious activity as the Magdeburg's code was
copied out, ready for despatch to London.
206.
were well beyond the capabilities of Lhe Royal Navy. Such methods
also tend to reduce the capability to concentrate force in one point
very quickly. Britain began to rely heavily on radio intercepts, and
the Germans on submarine and Zeppelin reconnaissance. Jellicoe
and Beatty would never have known where the enemy was. On 14
December 1914 the Admiralty, using N.I.D. intelligence were able
to signal Jellicoe at 2130 that the Germans had sortied from the Jade.
The First Sea Lord decided the strength of the force to carry out
this operation, but left its disposition to the Commander-in-Chief.
Again on 23 January 1915 when Beatty and Tyrwhitt sailed from the
south to intercept Hipper they did so with he advantage of the N.I.D.'s
radio intelligence. Hipper, unsupported by the High Seas Fleet,
believed all British heavy ships were in harbour. 1 On 30 May 1916,
the Admiralty received sufficient warning of Hipper's sorties to
Norway from intercepted radio messages to send the Grand Fleet
to sea. That the Operations Division in Admiralty mis-interpreted
intelligence to the extent of informing Jellicoe and Beatty that Scheer
was still in the Jade when he was in fact at sea may seem incredible




1 During the night of 31st Mayllst June the Germans were
able to break through behind Jellicoe's formations and head for
their bases. None of those British ships 'thich actually engaged
the German heavy ships reported to Jellicoe that the enemy fleet
was breaking through. Even more extraordinary, some of the
battleships in the rear of Jellicoe' s night formation, and notably
the fifth battle squadron, sighted German battleships, yet failed
to report them to the C. -in-C. and took no action towards engaging
them. The Operations Division further contributed to the chaos
by failing to pass crucial signals to Jellicoe. During the night
three vital signals from Scheer were decyphered, each of them
indicating beyond doubt that the High Seas Fleet was making for the
Horns Reef. Jellicoe held his course to the southward; had he
received even one of them he could have altered course and brought
Scheer to action in the early morning of lst June 1916. At 0400 on
1.	 It is interesting to record on the question of the location
of the German C. -in-C. 8 signal code at Jutland that in a
letter to Captain S. W. RoskiU the late Donald 1v1*d.achlan
says how he had met Captain zur See Kppfer, who was the
head of the German B Dienst in both World Wars. Kupfer
told McLachlan that as well as transferring the C. -in-C. 'S
signal code ashore when he put to sea, in. order to deceive
the enemy, they also transferred his radio operator, so
that his signaUing touch would not be detected at sea.
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that day Jellicoe received, somewhat ironically, a signal from the
Admiralty, which said that Scheer was safe within the swept channel
beyond the Horns Reef. Any knowledge of the crucial N.I.D. signals
at Jutland is entirely due to W.F, Clarke, who worked in Ewing's
team in Room 40. He made and kept copies of all the vital signals.
He passed these to Captain S.W.RoskLU, who kindly allowed the
author to se these. Captain RoskiU also showed them to Professor
Arthur Marder, who used and quoted them in his 'From Dreadnought
to Scapa Flow'. Clarke's letters to Captain Roskill substantiate
statements made on the basis of other sources: in a letter dated
8.2. 1959 titled, 'Retrospect, 1916-1945', Clarke says that the
Operations Division never used N.I.D. signal intelligence to full
advantage. He puts this down in part to lack of cameraderie between
the two divisions; in a letter of 28. 8. 1951 he describes the reforms
made after Jutland, especially the establishment of the daily intelli-
gence summaries for the C. -in-C. Grand Fleet. These reports
were based almost entirely on wireless intelligence, and in order
to maintain security (and in particular to guard the fact that the
British possessed the German codes) only the First and Second Sea
Lords, the D.N.I., Room 40's cryptanalysts, A.J.Balfour, and the
C. -in-C, and his senior staff ever knew of these reports or saw
their content. In his letter of 8. 2. 1959, Clarke graphically describes
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having dinner with Beatty on board the Queen Elizabeth after Jutland.
Beatty was interested in Room 40 and Clarke explained to him the
nature of its activities. Beatty then felt he should show Clarke the
C. -in-C. 's signal pack for the Battle of Jutland - Clarke was
astonished to find that the Operations Division had obviously never
passed vital signals at all, or had sent them in part, or too late to
be of use. After talking to Beatty it became obvious to Clarke that
there had not been any analysis made of N.I.D.s and the Operations
Division' s relationship before and during Ju.t].and. In other words
it had not occurred to anyone that this was vital to the understanding
of the outcome of the battle and the role intelligence can play if
used properly. It was not until 1922, with the Naval Staff Appreciation
of Jutland (CB 0938) that this was done. Captain Roskill allowed
the author to examine this document. Despite Clarke's very valid
criticisms the point nonetheless remains that wireless intelligence
was the main source in World War I and without it there would have
been no Dogger Bank or Jutland. In an undated letter to Captain
Roskifl, Admiral Sir William James emphasises these points. In
W.S. Chalmers' edited Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty, this
comment by Beatty emphasises N.LD.'s significance at Jutland:
"It is creditable to Admiralty intelligence that their information
should have been in time to enable the Grand Fleet to get we)l into
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the North Sea before the High Seas Fleet had left harbour, and it
also speaks well for the vigilance of British coast patrols that only
two of a large number of enemy submarines were able to sight units
of the British Fleet." He goes on to say: "Admiralty intelligence,
however, was silent during the morning of the 31st. Scheer, on the
other hand, had received reports from the two submarines already
mentioned, misleading him to believe that only detached units of the
British Fleet were at sea, which would have suited his plans
admirably1"
Several aspects of Jutland intelligence are quite clear - it
was accurate, so accurate that it enabled the Grand Fleet to beat
Scheer to his destination. The latter' s U-boat trap could not be
sprung and, whatever the validity of Jellicoe's battle plan, the fact
nonetheless remains that he was given ample time to formulate one
and to engage on his own terms. Jellicoe and his fleet may not have
made the most of their advantage, but at least Scheer was denied the
advantage of tactical surprise.
1.	 See Chalmers. P.223.
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The Battles of Coronel and the Falkiand Islands
This is in marked contrast with the earlier battle of
Coronel when the Admiralty had no precise information regarding
the nature and location of the enemy. After Craddocks defeat the
Admiralty responded by sending strong reinforcements to every
area to which von Spee might go. Once Sturdee deduced von Spee
was in the Fafldâ.nd Islands he was able to obtain more precise
information from local sources. Without this Sturdee had intended
to go through the Magellan Straits in search of von Spee off the
Chilean coast. In other words he was going to rely on chance
patrolling to locate von Spee. Without intelligence Sturdee would
never have brought von Spee to action at the Battle of the Falklands.
Let us look at this more closely. Between 4 and 13 November 1914
there was no sound intelligence from the south Atlantic, save for
some indefinite consuls reports. Then, on 13 November the N.I.D.
received definite news that the Dresden and the Leipzig had arrived
at Valparaiso and would not be allowed to coal. They sailed at
0100 on the 14th, and this was reported, along with the news that
the German squadron was waiting for them outside. The N.I.D.
now knew that a fortnight after Coronel von Spee was still off the
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Chilean coast and this information was passed to Sturdee. More
intelligence came into the N.I.D., from the consul at Coronel on
19 November, and the Consul-General at Valparaiso on 21 November.
When Sturdee arrived at Abroihos Rocks on 26 November he was sent
a full intelligence report from the N.I.D., and he received further
intelligence reports from the naval intelligence officers at Montevideo
via the Port Stanley W/T station on 7 December. The N.I.D. had
been able to furnish Sturdee with as much data as possible on the
location, nature, and pos sible intentions of von Spee' s force. The
final action was left to the commander on the spot. 1
After 1916 an attempt was made to remedy the inconclusive-
ness of naval action by an acceptance and heavy reliance on intelligence
unfortunately to no avail in terms of an overwhelming British victory.
In. the autumn of 1917 naval intelligence reported that Scheer intended
in future to use battleships to cover minesweeping activities in the
Heligoland Bight, (mainly because the Harwich force had successfully
damaged German destroyer escorts). On 16th November 1917, with
plenty of warning, and fully prepared, Beatty put to sea to combat
this force. Once again the British were to be hamstrung. An
1.	 Naval Staff Monographs for World War I. Vol. 1.
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inconclusive struggle followed, The Germans could not be drawn from
the protection of their minefields. The naval war continued in this vein
until the end, each side ineffectively trying to draw the other in
advantageous circumstances, (Beatty hoping, for example, to tempt the
Germans by the Dreadnought protection given to the Lerwick-Bergen
convoys). It was a little unfortunate that Room 40 failed to detect the
last German sortie of the war. The duty Officer in Room 40 mis-read
the word "Spannkraftt ' (full force). He thought this was a word from an
incomplete signal.
Zeebrugge; the Baltic (1919).
From an intelligence point of view the Zeebrugge Raid was
not a great success, although at the time Room 40 thought it was.
The objective of the raid was to block the enrrances to Zeebrugge at all
states of the tide, thus prohibiting its use as a submarine base. In
a letter of 16.5.1958, W.F.Clarke, who was working in Room 40 et
the time, told Captain S. W. Ros kill how they had all drawn the wrong
conclusions from the available evidence. In fact the entrances were
blocked at low water only. This was later confirmed in. volume seven
of the official German Naval History of the War at Sea, 1914-1918.
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By the end of the Great War Hall's N.I.D. was consulted
about every major operation. This became very evident in the
Kronstadt Raid. 1 Captain Augustus Agar, V. C., D. S. 0., R. N.,
gives a full account of this operation in his book, Baltic Episode. 2
Agar was involved in further clandestine activity in the Baltic.
Through Commander Golf of the N.I.D. the British Secret Service
briefed Agar to carry out the escape of the famous British agent
STZ5 (Sir Paul Dukes) from Russia. Dukes held valuable information,
and his return to Britain was blocked when the Bolsheviks suddenly
arrested the British-paid couriers. Agar landed fresh agents destined
for Petrograd, and made contact with British agents in Sweden,
Finland, Russia and the Baltic States. The Kronstadt raid and
1. A flotilla of Coastal Motor Boats, commanded by Lieutenant
Augustus Agar, V. C.,D.S.0.,Royal Navy, carried out an
attack on the Russian submarine and warship base in Kronstad
harbour on 19 August 1919, supported by an aerial attack by
the RAF. Agar's C.M.B.s sank two Russian battleships, one
destroyer, and seriously damaged one cruiser. The C. -in-C.
Baltic, Admiral Sir Walter Cowan, planned the attack, called
operation RK after Admiral Sir Roger Keyes of Zeebrugge
fame. Cowan did not want a repetition of the Dardanelles
when the Turks knew in advance that the Britith were coming.
Complete surprise was achieved.
2. Hodder and Stoughton, 1963, Agar won his V. C. for destroying
the Bolshevik cruiser Oleg nu 17th June 1919, in C.M.B.4.
3. Details of Agar's activities and N.I.D. intelligence penetratioi
in the Baltic, and particularly at Kronstadt, can be seen in
Adm. 137, 3060, 2060, Public Record Office.
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Agar's espionage successes are testimony to the system Admiral
Sir Reginald Hall created. 1
In general Britain failed to learn many lessons from World
War 1. To implement necessary changes in the political and socio-
economic climate of the 1920s and 1930s indeed would have been
difficult. However, the recognition of a need to innovate in crucial
areas, even if impossible in practical terms, was lacking, and the
record of the N.I.D. in pressing for such innovations is undistinguishec
Major reforms which were made seem to have originated from other
sources. N.I.D. sowed few seeds compared with the dynamic eras
of Hall in World War I or Godlrey in World War II.
The Intelligence Position 1939-1940.
N. I. D. maintained its normal channels of information,
1.	 As are the intelligence packs pertaining to the Grand
Fleet, 1914-1918, Adm. 137, 174-203, a vast collection
of N.LD. data revealing how well Hail's men fed the
C. -in-C. with every available piece of intelligence
they had acquired and digested, especially after the
clarification of N.LD.'s role in the post-Jutland period.
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yet did not use them to either naval or political effect. 1 Hamstrung
by lack of funds and a policy of non-rearmament on a large scale
the Admiralty's position was difficult. N.I.D. was able to provide
most of the necessary figures, and its assessments of German
intentions in general were sound, in retrospect, but where NI.D.
failed was in not digesting the results of World War I - the failure
of the big gun and the effects of extensive, unrestricted U-boat
warfare. 2 There was a blithe over-confidence in asdic and at no
time does any body within N.I.D. appear to record and stress to the
appropriate authorities that the greatest U-boat damage was done at
night, on the surface, when the U-boat presented a low silhouette,
almost invisible to the eye, and undetectable by asdic. 	 A similar
1. Despite the restrictions placed on Germany by the Treaty of
Versailles, secret German naval re-armament went on,
especially research and training in U-boat warfare. Eventual.
ly Britain was forced to recognise this, in the 1935 Anglo-
German Naval Agreement, before political capital could be
made of it. At the time it seemed to many a satisfactory
agreement for Britain, in terms of the overall balance of
European naval power, though it contained no mutual inspec-
tion clause. Each country agreed to declare to the other the
size and armament of all new naval building. In the event,
both in battleships and cruisers, Germany built much larger
and more heavily armed ships than she actually declared.
2. Most of the large fleet manoeuvres and exercises of the 1920s
and 1930s were still centred round the large fleet battle and
the gun as the primary weapon, not protecting trade and
anti-submarine warfare.
3. Very r1y in World War II the U-boats were to show their
paces, with the sinking of the Royal Oak in Scapa Flow, the
carrier Courageous in the Western Approaches, and the
damaging of the battleship Barham.
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vacuum existed with regard to the torpedo, particularly the aerieal
torpedo. No real survey was made of the use of maritime air power -
the use of the torpedo bomb, and aerial patrols to counter U-boat
attacks. The R.A.F. resisted the return of the Naval Air Service,
resulting in the non-emergence of a strategic and tactical doctrine of
naval flying. When the Fleet Al r Arm did return it had an urgent need
for its own naval aircraft and weapons. Only one carrier was fully
operational in September 1939, flying Gladiators, Swordfish, Fly-
catchers, and Skuas, no match for the German aircraft. 1 It was in
the general area of strategic and tactical appreciations of possible
future conflict at sea that the N.I.D. fell down badly in the inter-war
period. Most service organisations and government quickly adapted
themselves to the problems of war in 1939. N.I.D. did not fail here. 2
However, N.I.D. could not make up overnight for twenty years of
1. It is true that in 1939 Britain pçpsessed superior surface
forces to Germany - the U-boat menace was a different matter.
On 3 September 1939 Germany only had two pocket battle-
ships, Graf Spee and the Deutschland, and five light cruisers,
operational. Britain was quickly able to deploy seven battle-
ships, three battlecruisers, four aircraft carriers, and
thirty-five cruisers.
2. For example, in 1939 and 1940 it was crucial to prevent the
enemy from becoming aware of the strength of British forces,
and to conceal troop movements, especially those moving
overseas, to places such as the Middle East. N.LD. was
quickly able to adapt here and prevent the Nazis knowing too
much, a task not made easier by the vast number of refugees
and persons of all nationalities who collected in Britain.
218.
lassitude in other major areas. 1 Even in specific areas British
intelligence was heavily criticised for its poor quality in 1940, and
it was not until 1942 that it can be said that the British gained the
upper hand over the Germans. For example, N.I.D. was able to
help a lot in the re-routing of convoys (to avoid U-boats and raiders),
though this was impossible at certain points, such as the entrance
to the Straits of Dover, and the Straits of Gibraltar. However, uni.
known to the N.I.D., the Germans, when they captured the French
Navy's signal school at Brest in 1940, and were able to study the
records of British convoy diversion orders (based on the fixes of
U-boats' positions), they were able to assess the techniques and
1.	 N. I. D, t s greatest faux pas must remain its failure to
detect Admiral Donitz' a techniques, practised extensively
before the war - the wolf pack, on the surface, at night.
The effect could have been, and nearly was, calamitous.
By 1942 British shipping losses were indeed gloomy.
Unless the battle of the Atlantic was won Hitler could not be
defeated in Europe. Before 1939 the Admiralty never
thought Germany would again wage unrestricted U-boat
warfare, in case it drew the U.S.A. into a war. Few
seemed to have remembered or studied Admiral Hall's
experiences. June-October 1940, was a disastrous time
for British shipping, even though Donitz had only sixty
operational U-boats, with not more than eight actually
attacking the Atlantic convoys at any one time. In 1939
convoy escorts were poor. It was not until 1942, when
anti-submarine frigates joined the anti-submarine
corvettes that convoys had any real surface protection.
In April 1942, when R.A.F. Coastal Command was put
under Admiralty operational control, it still had no
long-range strike aircraft.
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accuracy of British naval intelligence methods very early on, in
stark comparison with the great success of British intelligence at
the time of D-Day, when the Germans were deceived into thinking
Calais, not Normandy, was the main landing area, a point well-
commented on by General Strong: "Whatever mistakes Ailied
intelligence may have made in the war none can possibly equal this
1,2,3
unparalleled blunder by the Germans and their failure to realise it."
Faulty Intelligence
Throughout 1939 and 1940 there were several cases of
faulty operational intelligence leading to increased tension in a very
1. Strong: Intelligence at the Top. P. 141.
2. The Fall of France had cost Britain dearly - she had given,
for example, many of her electronic secrets to her French
allies. When France was overrun, instead of blowing up
their radar installations, the French handed them over
to the Germans - a disaster of the first order. Britain
still managed to keep ahead. For example, in June 1942,
the Germans installed radar search receivers in their
U-boats to pick up the radar waves of R.A.F. Coastal
Command aircraft. These failed as the wave lengths of
British radar sets were simply reduced.
3. In vol. 8 of his Memoirs Admiral Godfrey, when discus s-
ing the value of the French as allies, wrote: "If you
give or lend them weapons it is wise to assume that they
may let them fall into the hands of the enemy as they did
air aalics etc., in 1940. They had plenty of time to
destroy the equipment." P.125.
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anxious period. Poor intelligence could easily lead to the mis-
direction and therefore the misuse of vital forces. Between 8th-lOth
October 1939, the German cruisers Gneisenau. and Koln, with nine
destroyers, sortied. Intelligence was slow and inaccurate. Admiral
Forbes" Home Fleet put to sea (in case the Germans made a break
for the Atlantic). No damage was done to the enemy (which had been
operating off the southern coast of Norway, hoping to entice the
Home Fleet towards the Skagerrak for U-boat and aerial attacks).
Between Zlst-27th November 1939, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
sortied (sinking H.M.S.. Rawalpindi), escaping Forbes' Home Fleet
and on 23rd November were in the Faroe s-Iceland Channel. 2
British Intelligence, regarding the movement of major enemy war-
ships, was gravely weak on this occasion, especially the deficiency
in the capability of patrolling aircraft. The official historian,
Captain S. 1W. Roskil writes: ttLack of regular visual and photographic
1. Forbes, Sir Charles Morton, Admiral of the Fleet: 1880-
1960; entered RN 1894; Commander 1912; Captain 1917;
Director of naval ordnance 1925-1928; Rear-Admiral 1928;
Vice-Admiral 1933; Admiral 1938; C.-in-C. Home Fleet,
April 1938 (flagship HMS Nelson); Admiral of the Fleet,
1940; C.-in-C. Portsmouth, 1941; retired 1943.
2. The sinking of the Rawalpindi was initially attributed to
the Deutschlancj.
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reconnaissance of the enemys main bases handicapped our forces
from the start, too sanguine pre .-war estimates of the effectiveness
of our North Sea air patrols greatly extended this handicap and,
finally, the use by the Home Fleet of temporary bases several
hundred additional miles from the "cutting off position" in the North
Sea all helped towards successful evasion by the enemy." As will be
seen later the Norwegian campaign emphasised poor intelligence.
The lack of reconnaissance at the time of Rear-Admiral Vivian' s
evacuation from Narvik led Admiral Forbes to write to the Admiralty
on 15th June 1940: "The quite unexpected appearance of enemy
forces ..... in the far north on 8th June, which led to the sinking
of the Glorious, two destroyers and a liner ..... shows that it is
absolutely essential that our scheme of air reconnaissance should be
overhauled ..... The enemy reconnoitre Scapa daily if they consider
it necessary. Our reconnaissance of the enemys main bases are
few and far between ..... It is most galling that the enemy should
know just where our ships always are, whereas we generally learn
where his major forces are when they sink one or more of our ships.
1.	 The Germans, by contrast, were being effective. The closely
guarded secret of the use of Loch Ewe as a temporary base
for the Home Fleet was known to them. Raeder recalls the
effectiveness of his intelligence in those early days in his
"Struggle for the Sea", a point supported by Roskill who,
when examining Raeder's reports to Hitler on the 1939 and
1940 operations, noted their intelligence accuracy.
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There were bound to be intelligence errors, some less
forgiveable than others, forgiveness perhaps being contingent upon
the magnitude of the effect such error might have. For example, on
19th April 1940, a false intelligence report came in that the Bismarck
had passed the Skaw, steering to the N.W. Cruiser patrols were
strengthened and the Hood diverted in support. On 22 April 1940, false
aerial reconnaissance firmly identified one heavy and two light
cruisers in Narvik. They were in fact transport and patrol vessels.
Throughout June and July 1940, No. 18 Group, Coastal Command,
made several highly faulty reconnaissance missions of German ships
in Trondheini • None of these affected the outcome of the war.
However, on 11th and 12th November, 1940, accurate and timely
long-range air intelligence helped swing the balance in the Mediterran-.
ean - Glen Martin aircraft from Malta took photographs of the Italian
fleet at Taranto - these were flown to H.M.S. Illustrious, a strike
carrier, from which aerial torpedo attacks were launched against
the Italian fleet in Taranto harbour - the new battleship Littorio and
two older ones were sunk.
Siccessfu1. Intelligence
It would be entirely falso to paint a picture of continuous
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intelligence errors during the first two years of war. This would
be far from true. However, it is accurate to say that N.I.D. was
improving its techniques and contributions to operations at sea
throughout the war, and it is the intention throughout the remainder
of this chapter to develop this theme. Where tragedy occurred to
British Naval forces they were usually way beyond the scope of the
N.I.D., and this was not peculiar to the earlier period of the war.
Indeed one can see where judicious intelligence work swayed the
balance in 1939, yet, in latei94,was unable to have any effect in
the Far East theatre for instance, because of factors way beyond
its control. On 30th Septehiber 1939, the Graf Spee (Captain Lang s-
dorf) sank the SS Clement off Pernambuco. A signal from the stricken
mertthantman alerted the Admiralty, and Commodore Harewood, and
the latter went in pursuit. The Admiralty formed eight hunting groups
and, with advice from Britain, Harewood correctly deduced that the
Graf Spee would run for Montevideo. On 15th ecember 1939, the
Battle of the River Plate took place. Later, in Montevideo, Langsdorf
was to be fed false intelligence from British sources. On 17th
December he scuttled his ship, and on 20th December committed
suicide. A timely piece of information, well used by the Admiralty
and a force commander at sea, brought about a notable and vital
British victory, and wry early on in the war. By way of contrast
224.
the tragedy of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, attacked and
destroyed by Japanese torpedo bombers off Singapore in December 1941,
was equally caused by a lack of air support and reconnaissance and an
absence of sound inteUigence; as was the battle of the Java Sea a
few months later, on 27th February 1942. The question remains, of
course, should such forces venture forth at all, possessing no know-
ledge of enemy strengths and intentions, in an already desperate
situation, (Singapore had fallen to the Japanese on 15th February 1942)?
Furthermore, it may seem somewhat incredible, in retrospect, that
Britain had not learnt a very quick and salutary lesson from Japanese
maritime air tactics at Pearl Harbour (7th December 1941).
On the question of the sinking of the Prince of Wales and
Repulse the recently released War Cabinet papers for World War I
(New Year 1972) substantiate what Richard Hough had already said
on the basis of other sources in his The Hunting of Force Z, namely
that: "He (Churchill) and he alone had been finally responsible for
sending the battlefleet to Singapore at this dangerous time and against
the strong pleas of those whose task it was to manage Britain's
maritime affairs. He selected the ships and even the Commander-in-
Chief (Tom Phillips). If direct blame for the catastrophe has to be
attached to one man, then Winston Churchill must accept it." This
1.	 The Hunting of Force Z P. 238.
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does omit one salient point, which certainly does not emerge in the
docunients - the weakness, and failing health, of the First Sea Lord,
Admiral Sir Dudley Pound. In his memoirs John God.frey is very
critical of Pound, mainly for his inability to control some of
Churchill1 s madcap ideas. He graphically describes the weekly
meetings of the three Service intelligence chiefs with the Chiefs of
Staff and how, invariably, Admiral Pound was dozing (as a result
of the terminal brain tumour from which he was ailing). Godfrey
writes: "What does all this boil down to. That for the last two
years of the greatest war in history, the Head of the Navy was a sick
man and should have stepped aside, or been relieved not later than
the end of 1941.,,1
The Role of Technical Intelligence
Before investigating specific naval operations it is
imperative to remember the continuous process of technical
intelligence that went on throughout the war, an area that was a
crucial back-up facility for all operations at sea. This covered
1.	 Godfrey Memoirs: Vol.5. Part 2. P. 311. Godfrey is
equally critical of Pound for concurring with ChurchiWs
figures, and not the N.I.D.'s, on the number of U-boats
in existence, in building, and destroyed in 1939-1940.
P. 268-269.
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devising counter-measures for known enemy techniques as well as
developing new, improved offensive and defensive techniques inde-
pendent of enemy actions. On the latter point, for example, the
Admiralty developed "plastic" armour to prevent armour-piercing
machine-gun and cannon bullets killing merchant ships' crews,
and Dr Alwyn Crow, working at the rocket research station,
Aberporth, developed rockets for use by landing craft, and the
rocket bomb, designed to penetrate shelters with thick, reinforced
concrete protection, which the R.A.F. "Tallboy" bombs had failed
to destroy. N.I.D. selected targets for the rocket bombs - the
U.- and E-boat pens at Bergen, Narvik, and Trondheim in Norway,
Hamburg, Kiel, and Heligoland in Germany, and Brest, Lorient,
St. Nazaire, Bordeaux and La Pallice in France.
Radar was undoubtedly the greatest technical development
of the war, with its multi-purpose roles - aircraft and U-boat
warning and detection, in all weather, day and night, from the sea
or air, and as a vital aid to gunnery, (for examples, radar directed
gunnery greatly contributed to British successes at Cape Matapan in
1..	 See Captain Edward Terrell's book, Admiralty Brief,
Harrap 1958, for avery full account of Admiralty activity
in this area, and N.I.D.'s involvement.
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1941, and in the sinking of the Scharnhorst in 1944. 1 German
scientists did not think that Britain had overcome the difficulties
of centrimetric radar.
The "snowflake" was developed to counter U-boat pack
tactics, as were better depth charges, (more deeply set, and with
greater explosive power), developed to counter the deep-diving
U-boats. 2 In September 1943, the Germans used the accoustic
homing torpedo for the first time. The "foxer" was developed as
the antidote - a noise-making device towed aft of ships, (it attracted
the torpedo to it, instead of to the ship's propellers). By February
1944, a better "foxer" was in use, which did not slow the ship
down (the first development did), or affect its asdic.
It was fortunate that the German schnorkel device came
into use after D-Day 3 for it might well have upset dramatically
1. Pending the arrival of a more efficient radar receiver,
able to detect transmissions from British centrimetric
sets, Donitz's U-boats were forced to rely on a radar
decoy device.
2. See Herbert A. Werner's book, Iron Coffin, for a full
account of British technical developments in World War II
to counter the U-boat.
3. It enabled a U-boat to travel underwater on its diesel
engines, instead of batteries, and thus greatly increased its
speed to some eighteen knots beneath the surface.
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the pattern and success rate of allied anti-submarine techniques.
One aspect of technical development which perpetually
concerned the Admiralty was the integrity of British cyphers. By
early 1942 the Germans were still able to read cyphered convoy con-
trol signals (even though they had been changed in August 1940), and
it was not until the end of 1942 that British counter-measures took
place, and not until May 1943, that the German cypher-breakers
were finally defeated. 2 For example, the German cypher experts,
via their wireless intelligence service, were able to tell Naval H.Q.
of the intentions of convoy PQ18 - where the outward and homeward
convoys would cross and the escort would change over. The Germans
sent U-boats and destroyers to wait, and an auxiliarl minelayer to
saturate with mines the entrance to the White Sea and the waters of
Novaya Zemla. Fortunately only one Russian tanker was sunk.
By 12th November 1943, a memorandum of Donitz's staff read:
"The enemy knows all our secrets, and we know none of theirs",
1. The Admiralty quickly made thorough plans for possible
attacks against British Coastal routes by U-boats fitted with
the new device.
2. See Captain S W.Roskill NThe War at Sea. Vol.11, Ps.
112, 207, 208, 364.
3. Ibid. Ps. 279, and see also P. 266.
229.
eloquent testimony to British intelligence. This remained true, in
general, throughout the rest of the war. 1
The Invasion Threat, 1940.
One of the greatest problems facing the Admiralty, the
Prime Minister, and the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee in 1940 was the
degree of preparedness and state of readiness necessary for a German
invasion. A great deal hinged on sound intelligence. The Navy was
to provide information about sea movements - the strength and timing
of a potential assault, and the Army and R.A.F. built up their pictures
too. 2 Air intelligence was critical, and the losses of aircraft and
crew were heavy, but it had to go on. The Admiralty had to have
warning so that escorts could be withdrawn from convoys, and so
that forces could be moved from Scapa, the Forth and Clyde, in time.
Admiral Forbes' Home Fleet had to be ready to deter invasion at a
moment's notice. Many said at the time, and since, that the Admiralty
1. For example, the German use of the one-man, electrically-
driven torpedo, the	 in April 1944, off Anzio, was
known to Allied inteliigence very early on.
2. A special invasion warning committee was set up under the
chairmanship of Commander Colpoys, assisted by Lt. Cdr.
N.E.Denning, (who was to become D.N.I. in 1960). They
ordered twice-daily air reconnaissance, which provided
excellent photographs of the ports from which the Germans
might invade.
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and Prime Minister were overcautiou.s in keeping extensive forces
on the ready in the south and did not show enough confidence in the
intelligence servic& s ability to give adequate warning which would
enable an invasion force to be defeated on passage. The criticism
stemmed mainly from the heavy shipping losses resulting from
escorts of the Home and Western Approaches Commands being taken
away. Two things are certain - Prime Minister Churchill was not
prepared to take any chances, and the intelligence he was given was
first class.
The Norwegian Campaign
This was in marked contrast with intelligence during the
Norwegian campaign. Furthermore, the Admiralty was slow to
act on the information it did receive. On 7th April 1940, Sir Dudley
Pound, the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, failed to act
on the suggestion that the Home Fleet should be deployed in the
central North Sea, (so as to be ready for a German move towards
Norway). The First Sea Lord regarded this as a diversion from
the Royal Navyt s main role at that time, of protecting Atlantic
shipping and preventing a break-out into the Atlantic. The N. I. D.
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ended its intelligence report that day with the conclusion: "all the
reports are of doubtful value, and may well be only a further move
in the war of nerves." In the event the British were too slow -
Bomber Command struck the German force off the entrance to the
Skagerrak, steering N.W. at 1.25 p.m. They had no success. At
5. 27 p. m. Forbes slipped and proceeded to intercept. He was too
late - there had been a complete failure to realise the significance of
the available intelligence and to take all the necessary counter-action.
The only bold action taken was by British submarines - they did some
damage, but not enough, 2 and the heroic ramming of the Hipper by
.
H.M.SS Glow-Worm. By 9th April the Germans had taken all the
major Norwegian ports. However, it should be said that the Home
Fleet could have done little without air support. Forbes needed fleet
carriers. The value of air power was shown on 10th April when two
squadrons of Skua dive bombers based on the Orknies attacked Bergen,
1. The N.LD., and Godfrey more than anyone else, were in a
very difficult position - he could only recommend action when
he was absolutely sure, and if he took a risk, and recommen-.
ded a course of action based on insufficient evidence, though
perhaps sound reasoning and intuitive knowledge, he might
seriously jeopardise the whole British operational position,
and compromise his own and N.I.D.'s professional integrity.
2. }LM.S. Truant sank the Karlsruhe, H.M.S. Spearfish put
Lutzow out of action for twelve months, and several transports
were sunk. The British lost two submarines.
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sinking the cruiser Knigsberg, and, in a negative sense, when the
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Hipper were able to return to Wilhelms-
haven without hindrance because of the absence of British air
reconnaissance, (just as Captain Warburton-Lee's attack on Narvik
was overshadowed by the surprise his force received when they
found ten destroyers, not the six expected, lying in the fiord). The
absence of adequate air support was to characterise the later
amphibious landings on 17th and 18th April 1940, and subsequent
evacuation on 27th April, and the second attack on Narvik on 28th
May. The coup de grace was delivered when the carrier Glorious
was sunk, u.nwarned and unprepared, on 8th June, returning home,
by the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.
Other Naval Operations and Intelligence in World War II.
1940 taught the N.I.D. and the other intelligence services
many lessons, especially regarding the accuracy of intelligence and
the speed with which it should be disseminated. The Dakar campaign
in August 1940, 1 showed how delays in receiving inteUigence could
1.	 The aim was to install the Free French in the West African
port to prevent it being used by enemy ships and aircraft,
thus threatening the convoy routes. Although it failed as a
combined operation, the Germans never did use Dakar
as a base.
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affect operations - accurate intelligence regarding the state of
French feeling in Senegal and of the defences of Dakar reached London
too late. The security of "Operation Menace" was poor too - the Vichy
French knew it was about to happen. As a result all surprise was
lost.
1941 and 1942 saw a radical change in the situation. On
23rd January 1941, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. sailed from Kiel -
intelligence soon knew that they had passed the Great Belt, and Admiral
Tovey went in pursuit. For the first time accurate intelligence had
enabled the Home Fleet to take up a favourable position in good time. 1
The Bismarck operation showed how much N.I.D. 1 s efficiency had
improved - as soon as the Bismarck slipped from Korsfiord on 22nd
May 1942, Godfrey's men knew. Tovey was soon in pursuit. When,
on 25th May, Lutjens lost Tovy, the N.I.D. detected the fatal radio
signal which enabled the Admiralty to fix her position. At 1030, 26th
May, R.A.F. reconnaissance aircraft picked her up.
On 10th June 1941, Coastal Command reported that the
1.	 Admiral Tovey appreciated the value of air reconnaissance.
He called for continuous air reconnaissance of the
Skagerrak and its approaches.
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Lutzow with two light cruisers, the Emden and Leipzig, had left
the Baltic. The Lutzow was attacked by Coastal Command torpedoes
and sufficiently damaged to keep her in dock until January 1942. 1
This pattern continued (despite the unfortunate circumstances which
surrounded the escape of the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau. and Prinz
Eugen from Brest). The Tirpitz's sortie to the Arctic in March
1942, was monitored by N.I. D., and her position relayed to Admiral
Tovey, without which he would have been operating in a vacuum,
indicating too the reliability now placed on intelligence - the Admiral-
ty felt it could give orders to a C. -in-C. afloat about the conduct of
operations. 2 By the end of 1943 British intelligence was far
1. The German account of this attack shows great concern at
the speed and accuracy with which British intelligence had
worked.
2. As already mentioned this was carried to tragic extremes
in the case of convoy PQ17 to Russia, but not solely because
precise intelligence was unavailable. The decision to
scatter was based on limited intelligence, but that which
was available was thoroughly reliable. It was a case of a
very bad decision, and on the part of the First Sea Lord
himself. Donald Max.Lachlan gives a full account of what
happened in the Citadel in the Admiralty on that day: "When
Clayton (head of the Operational Intelligence Centre) re-
turned downstairs (to the Citadel) and told his officers of
the decision, Denning was amazed and angry that his
assurances that any move of the Tirpitz would be known had
not been accepted. He begged Clayton to go back to Pound' s
room and stressed Uie strongly-held intelligence view that
the German big ships were not yet at sea." Room 39.
P. 288. The signal had gone. It was too late in any case
I contd.
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superior to that of the Germans. The movement of the Lutzow from
Norway to the Baltic, between 23rd - 26th September 1943, illustrates
this well. N.LD. worked quickly - sources showed that enemy
fighters had been sent to Bodo, and the stationing of others near
Bergen implied the run might be to the Baltic. A tanker was also
known to have arrived at Altenfiord from Kiel. On 23rd September
Lutzow left Altenfiord. Between 24th and 26th she was at anchor
near Narvik. On 26th she sailed for Gdynia, confirmed first by a
British agent' s report and verified by Coastal Command reconnais-
sance. The end of 1943 saw a great catch for the N.I.D. - the
Scharnhorst. At 7 p.m. on Christmas Day 1943, she slipped.
At 3. 30 a. m. on the 26th December the Admiralty were able to
signal Admiral Fraser that she was at sea, giving details. The
N.I.D. had worked fast and accurately.
The expertise of the N.I.D. is nowhere more apparent
2. (contd.) for Pound to change his mind. The First Sea Lord had
totally disregarded Denning's assurances that the Tirpitz
had not left Altenfiord. In mitigation for Pound MaLachlan
writes: "It seems fair to say •......that Pound's worries
about the general situation at sea made him incapable of
understanding the caution of the Germans, of recalling,
for example, how the Tirpitz had recently had a narrow
escape in a surprise attack by the torpedo bombers of the
Victorious." Room 3'. P.283.
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than in the raid on St. Nazaire on 18th March 1942. 1 The idea
originated in N.I.D.'s French section (headed by Lt. Cdr. George
Gonin, RN.). From aerial photographs a model was made in
conjunction with Combined Operations. The O.I.C I of N.I.D.
gave Admiral Mountbatten' s staff valuable data for the raid -
details of swept channels and German naval movements. The
really priceless piece of information N.I.D. secured was the
identification signal for the destroyer Camperdown, with which
she was able to answer the German shore batteries when challenged.
In the event this gained vital time before the Germans opened fire.
St. Nazaire, along with other similar raids, such as
2Dieppe and the capture of Madagascar, gave N.I.D. and Combined
Operations the experience in planning for the great amphibious
landings which caine later in North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio,
Normandy and the south of France. The two bodies became
1. The aim of the raid was to destroy its large dry dock, to
prevent the Tirpitz using it, and therefore reducing the
possibility of successful Atlantic sorties from a French
port.
2. On 5th May 1942, Madagascar was seized in case the
Japanese threatened it, thus dramatically affecting the
Cape route to North Africa, and the British Army there.
3. After Dunkirk a Combined Operations H.Q. was set up in
London to study the problems of amphibious operations and
assault from the sea.
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involved in assessing every conceivable piece of data for these
operations - details of beaches, water depths, defences, how to secure
surprise, what the enemy expected, deceptions to keep the enemy
guessing as to the time and place of the landings and so on.
The German Operational Naval Intelligence Position 1943-1944.
The efficacy of British naval intelligence in World War U
is in marked contrast with that of the Germans, who never ceased
to marvel at British accuracy. This was true not just of naval
intelligence, but equally so of British military intelligence. 	 By
early 1943, the German naval high command was so disturbed by
the N. I. D.,'s obvious successes that a full investigation was ordered
of the sources from which it was presumed to derive its intelligence
regarding U-boat movements and dispositions. It was concluded
that there was no internal treachery and that cyphers were still
secure. British success was put down to radar and constant air
patrols. At the end of May 1943, the British introduced new
cyphers and thereafter (save for a short period at the end of the year)
1.	 See Decisive Battles of World War U, edited by H.A.
Jacobson and J.Rohwer, Ps. 35, 115, 117-119, 224, for
illustrations of where German. military intelligence
blundered incredibly badly.
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the Germans were deprived of what had been their most valuable
source of intelligence. This, together with the German failure to
detect Allied use of centrimetric radar, rendered German naval
intelligence inept. At the end of August 1943, Donitz thought the
U-boats were being detected by emissions from his boats' search
receivers, and not from the development of centrimetric radar.
It was not until the beginning of 1944 that the Germans found that
the British were working on the 10 centimetre wave band. Certainly
the Germans gained a good deal from wireless traffic, especially
regarding convoy movements, 1 and some information from aerial
reconnaissance, and agents' reports. 2
Without accurate intelligence the Royal Navy could not
possibly have improved its position so strongly and consistently as it
did throughout the war. It was, indeed, one of the Trinity, as Captain
Roskil has written, which led to the British victory at sea.
1. U-boats often carried specialists to listen in and interpret
such messages. The Germans were further led astray by
a captured Coastal Command pilot who told his German cap-
tors that the British "homed" on the German search re-
ceivers. He was believed, and the Germans concentrated on
trying to reduce the radiation from their search receivers
instead of seeking the wave lengths of the new Allied radar
sets.
2. This was notably true in Iceland. For example, a convoy JW
56A, orr'passage to Russia from Loch Ewe, and diverted to
Iceland because of bad weather, lost 3 ships on 12th January
1944, as a result of an agent's report.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Methodology and Techniques of Naval Intelligence.
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Basic Method and Sources
The growth of the N.I.D., and its impact upon naval
policy-making, both long and short term, was dependent upon
successful techniques for gathering, analysing, and interpreting
data. Without extensive and continuous raw data, the lifeblood of
an intelligence organisation, the N.I. D. could not have had any
legitimate impact upon naval affairs. The techniques which it
came to employ were naturally closely related to the development
of the numerous sources of intelligence, each of which in themselves
demanded highly specialised interpretive skills, and it was towards
the "mosaic" or "jig-saw" concept of intelligence that the N.I.D.
gravitated - the collection of data from as many sources as possible
and assembling this to give an accurate and coherent picture within
the constraints which circumstances might from time to time impose.
From this stemmed the watchwords of the N.I.D. -
reliability and accuracy, that is the source of information, be it
human or mechanical, and the content, should be reliably collected,
and then accurately interpreted by N.I.D. staff.	 There was always
1.	 Admiral Godfrey developed a classification system, on a
scale Al to D5, the initial indicating source reliability, and
the number the probable reliability of the source's infor-
mation.
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a strong subjective element within N.I.D.'s work - the intelligence
worker was forced to make value judgments, especially the initial
grading of intelligence material. Hence the need for, and reliance
upon, as many different sources of information as possible when a
picture was being built up, thus lessening the degree of subjectivity
which tended to accompany limited, and initial, information. Unless
absolutely Al, no single piece of information could, for instance, be
s.tisfactorily used. To pass on to planners and those who conduct
operations, either ashore or afloat, scanty, inconclusive intelligence
is the beginning of the end for an intelligence organisation. It was
imperative therefore that the N.L.D. should never give way to the
pressure of events, and release low quality intelligence. The 0.1. C.
(Operational Intelligence Centre) in World War II never sent Al
intelligence regarding enemy intentions in its raw form to H. M.
ships at sea. This might be picked up by the enemy, who would then
deduce that their codes had been broken, as well as giving away the
fact that such knowledge was now possessed. During the chase of
the Bismarck, when it was to become known to the 0.1. C. that she
was running for Brest (0.1. C. had intercepted Athens-Berlin
diplomatic signals which had bean decyphered, giving the vital
information), the 0.1. C. advised the Admiralty to signal Tovey,
"act on the assumption Bismarck will proceed to Brest", thus
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giving Tovey his orders (based on Al intelligence) but not revealing
to the Germans in the event of that signal being picked up and de-
cyphered, anything more or less than what might appear as good
British naval logic, and possibly a certain amount of luck. The
Battle of Jutland and Convoy PQ17 illustrate the chronic misuse of
Al intelligence, as will be seen shortly.
Technological and World Political Changes
N.I.D.'s methods were contingent upon many factors, not
merely the apparent demands of the Service, or what those who
directed N.I.D,'s work thought it ought to be doing. Technological
change, notably in communications, affected the whole pattern of
intelligence collection and distribution to those who needed it. World
change places constraints upon intelligence collection. Pre-l93a
Europe, for example, was still "open", certainly when compared
with the contemporary world, when it is clearly divided. This has
affected the West' s intelligence capability and its reliance upon
different methods of collection, in keeping with technological develop-
ments. In World War I Holland, Denmark and Norway were neutral
I.	 These facts and points emerged during a discussion with
Captain S. W. Roskill on 7th July 1971.
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and they provided a no-man's land between the belligerents. Others,
though not formally aligned, had allegiances: Sweden with strong
commercial ties with Germany, tended to be pro-German; the
South American republics were not unsympathetic towards Germany,
until the German declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare, and
Spain, although neutral, was quite amenable to giving assistance
to U-boats in Spanish ports. Political sympathies, whether
ostensibly neutral or otherwise,wexe to have a major effect upon
the pattern of intelligence collection.
Intelligence in Peace and War
The scope and range of intelligence techniques varded a
great deal between peace and wartime. In the inter-war period one
sees a drastic reduction in intelligence activity. In peacetime
intelligence should be one of the main bases for planning (operational
and technical, tactical and strategic) and training. No exercise in
peacetime can be thoroughly useful unless it is set against the known
or estimated capabilities and techniques of potential enemies. The
commander in peacetime must have a clear idea of how his future
enemy might behave, and this is dependent upon a judiciously
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well-balanced intelligence picture, which neither exaggerates or
under-estimates. For this reason, peacetime intelligence is more
demanding, as well as equally vital. General Strong recalls an
incident when it was inferred intelligence had overstated the case:
"Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham said to me in North Africa on some
occasion when I suggested that the Germans would act rather more
rapidly than he thought: 'the trouble with you fellows is that when
you come to speak of the Germans, all the roads to Berlin are uphill
1
and all the roads from Berlin are downhill' •" In peacetime the
fears of Cunningham about intelligence' s credibility are equally
great. In wartime the strengths, weapon capabilities, endurances,
location, tactics, and general policy of enemy naval forces assume
greater urgency. Peacetime intelligence cannot predict specific
enemy wartime operations, and its work embraces much more the
world of probability and imponderables. To acquire technical
information, observe enemy exercises, compute enemy ranges and
hitting power, how long he can stay at sea, how he might deploy him-.
self, and so on, is the duty of intelligence in peacetime, so that
should war start at least the odds are well known, even though they
may not be favourable. In peacetime too, of course, certain
1.	 Strong: Intelligence at the Top. P. 78.
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information is easily available, which is not so of wartime.	 The
dynamic of war produces rapid change, and intelligence must intensify
its vigil to detect enemy changes - it is given a fillip to its role, and
the whole rationality of naval policy, and ultimately the successful
conclusion of war, may depend on several cogent intelligence reports. 2
Techniques and the overall methodology of collection, analysis, and
interpretation then become critical.
A close examination of the techniques of intelligence will
reveal how N.I.D.'s early struggles to gain standing within the
hierarchy of the Naval Staff was greatly dependent upon its ability
to give accurate and timely intelligence to those who often least
demanded it, though needed it most. The perfecting of successful
techniques brought with it increasing dependence upon the work of the
N.I.D,, and an acceptance of it that reflected both the quality of its
work and expertise of its staff.
1. Between 1936-1939 Britain regularly supplied to Germany
forecasts of British naval strengths, under the terms of the
Anglo-German Naval Agreexnent, 1935. See Adm. 116, 3929,
in marked contrast with the strength comparisons belliger-
ents made of one another in wartime, such as that made by
the N.I.D., dated 19th January 1915 - comparison of Grand
and High Seas Fleet. Adm. 137, 1080. P.27-30, N.I.D.01OO7
2. For example, N.I.D., throughout the latter part of 1915,
was constantly looking for a possible change in German sub-
marine policy. See Adrn. 137, 1100, Ps. 170-173, for such
a report.
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Radio Intelligence and Cryptanalysis
This becomes nowhere more apparent than in the developmen
of wireless intelligence. In the pre-wireless era the enemy had
ambushed despatch carriers. With the advent of wireless the enemy t S
wireless traffic could be ambushed - since ignals could be inter-
cepted there developed a need for cyphers. For this reason radio
and cypher intelligence are very much inter-related. In both World
Wars intercepted enemy signals were the major source of intelligence,
measured in terms of their effects upon operations at sea. 1 The
main reason was that it constituted, usually, Al information. A plain
language or cyphered signal, or a fix derived from HF/DF intercepts
gave conclusive evidence, with one qualification - a signal can be
deliberately sent to give a wrong impression. In some cases the
possession of the enemy's cypher was not even necessary to deduce
certain valuable facts .. a rapid increase in radio traffic from a ship,
force, or shore command, might give, for example, indications of
1.	 In World War I, during Hall's era, naval radio intelligence
was to play a major political role, as was revealed in
1925, with the release of all the political intercepts, to
assist American lawyers acting for the companies whose
property had been destroyed by German saboteurs before
America entered the war.
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impending movements. 1
In wartime, radio was the only means by which quick
communication could be made. 2 In so doing the enemy gave away
his location, nature, intentions and so forth; a picture of enemy
dispositions could be built up. The stricken merchantman, sending
his last, desperate signal, might give away the presence of a U-boat
or surface raider. In both World Wars the tracking rooms were to
become the heart of the N. I. D. - information coming into the
Admiralty from Directional Wireless stations, signals being assessed,
and information being fed to the command organisations, (the liaison
which the N.I.D. developed in World War II with HQ Western
Approaches in Liverpool must surely stand as the classic illustration
of the degree to which intelligence and operations can fruitfully
operate if roles and responsibilities are clearly defined).
1. The only way to avoid a radio fix was to maintain radio
silence, The identification of a ship's radio call-sign, or
the recognition of a radio-operator's "fist", or character-
istic way of sending morse code could give a ship away.
2. In the Great War, on 5th August 1914, Germany's trans-
atlantic cables were cut by the British cableship "Telconia".
Thus to communicate outside of Europe Germany had to use
radio or cables controlled by her enemies, via neutrals.
Hence the urgent need which Rear-Admiral H.F. Oliver
(D.N.I.1913-1914) saw for the establishment of a cypher
department, to be headed, initially, by the then DNEdS,
Sir Alfred Ewing.
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Like every technique N.I.D. developed, radio intelligence
and associated cryptanalysis had their teething troubles. Ewing's
1D25 (based in Room 40 of the Old Admiralty Building) failed to
decypher one of the early and highly critical messages - at 0135 on
4th August 1914, the German naval High Command transmitted to
the C. -in-C. Mediterranean: "Alliance with Turkey concluded 3rd
August. Proceed at once to Constantinople." The Royal Navy
assumed the Germans would proceed westwards to break through
the Straits of Gibraltar. In fact they steamed into the Dardanelles,
the G'ben bombing the Russian Black Sea ports. The cryptanalysts
soonbecame experts. At 1025 on 23rd January 1915, Ewing's
men were able to issue the following decoded German signal: "Signal
to Rear Admiral Franz von Hipper. First and second scouting
groups, senior officer of destroyers, and two flotillas to be selected
by the senior officer scouting forces are to reconnoitre the Dogger
Bank. They are to leave harbour this evening after dark and to return
tomorrow evening after dark." Beatty intercepted and the Battle of
the Dogger Bank ensued. David Kahn estimates that between October
1914 and February 1919, Room 40 intercepted and solved 15, 000
German secret communications. 1
1.	 David Kahn: The Codebreakers. P.274. Kahn gives exten-
sive biographical details of all the main cryptanalysts in
Room 40.
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To possess an enemy code was the greatest catch ever
for the N.I.D. Hall never released to anyone, (including Britain's
French allies), except for those who worked in Room 40, or who
were closely attached, the details of the "Magdeburg's" codes. With
such information, and power, Hail was able to switch Room 4Øt
emphasis from the tactical to the strategic, and furthermore to
international decryptments. 1 On 17th January 1917, the Rev. William
Montgomery and Nigel de Gr.&y presented Admiral Hall with a crypto-
gram, consisting of 1000 numerical codegroups, dated Berlin, 16th
January 1917; it was from the German Foreign Minister Arthur
Zimmermann, to the German Ambassador in Washington, von
Bernstorff. 2 Not only was this symptomatic of Room 40' s excellence,
1. Hail's men read the Berlin-Madrid diplomatic messages, in
both the Spanish and German codes. Room 40 intercepted
the German naval Attache' s in Madrid signals asking for
funds and instructions for agent H21 - this was Mata Han,
who was to be caught and executed by the French.
Footnote: In World War I the Royal Navy had a series of D/F stations
sited in key locations throughout the world - the main ones
were at the Cape, Freetown, Gibraltar, Newfoundland, and
the Orkneys. D/F fixing was greatly augmented by Amenics
entry into the war, her stations thus becoming available.
2. Room 40 found the Zimmermanu Telegram in an American
Cable. It had been delivered to the American Embassy at
1500 on 16th January 1917, and the Americans despatched
it via Copenhagen and London. Von Bernstorff had per-
s uaded President Wils on that American-German relations
could be improved i he could communicate more directly
with Berlin. Wilson agreed to let the Germans use the
American cable.
250.
it also revealed Hail's consummate skill in using such intelligence
for both naval and non-naval purposes, and his brilliance in maintain-
ing N.I.D.'s security and integrity. At the same time no other
single piece of cryptanalysis has ever had such enormous consequence
- all turned upon the solution of a simple message.
As 1918 dawned Room 40's efficacy decreased. German
W/T signalling was noticeably decreasing, and they were also
changing their signal book more frequently. It was quite obvious
that the Germans had become suspicious of British activity. The
N.I,D. did not dishearten at this. It felt itself more than fortunate
that it had been able to acquire so much radio intelligence
surreptitiously since 1914. In 1918 N.I.D. began to rely on other
sources for monitoring German naval movements. British sub-
marines, fitted with new and powerful transmitters, began long
1.	 Hall realised that if he released the telegram, or the
British government revealed N.I.D. as its source, the
Germans would know the N.I.D. had their codes, the
Americans and others would know the British were moni-
toring neutral telegrams, and the telegram itself might
lose credibility if it was known a D.N.I. had issued it
to the world. One of Hall's agents in Mexico City obtained
from the Mexico City telegraph office a copy of the mess-
age which Bernstorff had sent to Eckhardt, the German
ambassador in Mexico, via Western Union. The American
ambassador in London was to be given the telegram, and
a series of half truths - the Americans might have begun
to wonder whether Britain was rea&ig their coded messages
as well.
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patrols off the Heligoland Bight. It should be remembered too
that other overt signs of possible German moves - such as mine-
sweeping or Zeppelin reconnaissance, had been observed throughout
the war. It was, indeed, unfortunate that Room 40 missed the last
major sortie of the High Seas Fleet on 24/25 April, 1918, because
one signal (and in fact one word, Spannkraft - full force) was mis-
interpreted amongst a welter of general signal traffic. Somewhat
unfairly both Beatty and Wemyss became disillusioned with Room
40's value after the April, 1918 incident. Professor Marder quotes
from the Wemyss manuscript on this topic. 1
Alter World War I the N.I.D.'s cypher organisation was
run down, and in 1922 received the coup de grace when responsibility
for cypher matters was passed from N.I.D. to civilian control.
This led to a slackening of security matters, such that by the early
thirties, when Europe witnessed the first signs of a threat to the
Versailles order, there was a chronic need for the Navy, and what
should have been N.I.D.'s preserve, to re-establish a cryptanalysis
organisation, to check the Fleet's signal security and educate naval
personnel in the ways of enemy tracking organisations. Unknown to
1.	 Arthur J.Marder: From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow.
Vol.5. P. 168. (He quotes Wemyss to Beatty, letter dated
15 August, 191.8, Wemyss MSS.)
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the N.I.D. the B Dienst of the German naval Intelligence Division
possessed British cyphers and codes, and as early as the Abyssinian
crisis. They were able to monitor the activities of the British
Mediterranean Fleet, which itself was attempting to monitor the
activity of the Italians prior to and during the invasion of Abyssinia.
No real progress was made in the thirties with cryptanalytic
technology. Louis Mountbbtten urged for research and experimentation
The only trials done were with cypher machines and these were
dropped)
It was not until the summer of 1943 that this incredible
disadvantage was overcome. From its H.Q. in Berlin the B Dienst
had tracked British naval operations. In 1940 the Germans knew
virtually every move made, or about to be made, by the British in
Norway. Canaris men were able to locate all the major units of
the Home Fleet, and although in August, 1940, the Royal Navy
changed its administrative code and operational cypher the Germans
were able to crack these. In June 1943, the Admiralty had, at last,
an unbreakable cypher. Somewhat ironically, the B Dienst were
1.	 There was no joint service cryptanalysis research done,
or even signs of co-.operation in the area. The problem was
never really recognised until war.
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able to observe what the 0.1. C, in the N.I.D. was thinking of
Donitz' s Submarine Command. This is not to say that the Germans
were decyphering every British signal. In November 1942, Oper-
ation Torch succeeded without cyphering problems and when the
Scharnhorst was sunk in December 1943, the Germans were not
able to penetrate the British cyphers, and therefore be aware of
British intentions.
The combined tracking and decyphering skills of N.IJ
in World War II were a major reason for the eventual defeat of the
U-boats. They intercepted, tracked and read the wireless signals
passed between U-boat H.Q. and the boats at sea, and the homing
signals a shadowing U-boat would send to call her comrades to a
convoy. The Germans were employing the same technique - listen-
ing to wireless signals sent by the C. -in-C. Western Approaches
to divert convoys from danger zones. They were therefore able to
deploy the boats accordingly. 1
1.	 The passage of convoy SC42 well illustrates both sides
of the sbry. It left Sydney, Cape Breton Island on 30th
August 1940, passing the southern tip of Greenland. The
direction-finding stations tracked a pack of U-boats
gathering about the convoy. Alternative orders were given1
At the same time the U-boat Command knew of British
penetration and counter-action. In afl 17 U-boats were
called in for the attack.
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The Foreign Office and Naval Attaches
Continuous and efficient sources of intelligence, in both
peace and war, were British diplomatic and Foreign Office channels,
and the Royal Navy' s own system of Naval Attaches, the former
feeding information either to the latter, or direct to the N.I.D. in
London via the Foreign Office. The relationship between the two
was not easy, since a Naval Attache was expected to serve two
masters, the ambassador on whose staff he served, and also the
D.N.I. in London. In a time of disagreement this could, and was,
fraught with difficulties, as will be seen in the next chapter. 1
Naval Attaches' tasks involved maintaining regular contact
with the forces of the country to which they were appointed, obtaining
information from every available source, 2 such as the public press,
1. For example, all of the British military attaches in Berlin
in the late thirties were at loggerheads with the policy of
the British embassy, under Sir Neville Henderson, whose
reports seemed at total variance with the military infor-
mation they had available. On receiving such information
the D.N.I. was faced with a major political, let alone
naval, problem.
2. Naval Attaches were not ailowed to deal in espionage.
Much material, inevitably, came from the ChanceUory
and commercial departments of an embassy.
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observing exercises and manoeuvres, the state of training and
methods, the character and qu.alities of commanders (a Navy will
train in peace as it will act in war), analysing the economic state
of a country, (and in relation to its defence policy), financial
commitments to naval resources, general naval policy, capabilities,
technical developments and so on. A Naval Attache must be very
well versed in a multitude of naval subjects, and be able to produce
clear, concise, analytical reports, as well as probably having to be
a competent linguist. He must be a good public relations man, and
be able to make worthwhile, reliable contacts, such as correspond-
ents from the British and American learned press, and news agencies
such as the ]3.B.C. and the C.B.S., (people who are often allowed
to travel wherever they wish without restriction or observation).
illustrations from World War I will show how N.I.D.
gained a wealth of information from Foreign Office sources, and
this pattern persisted in World War II. On 31st December 1914,
the British Consul at Bergen gained information from two Norwegians,
(who had just returned from a visit to Hamburg) of an intended
german attack on the east coast of Britain. By 2nd January 1915,
the Foreign Office had submitted a fill report to the D.N.L 1 On
1.	 Adm. 137, 1080, Ps. 9-10.
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17th January 1915, the Foreign Office submitted a report to N.I.D.
on German Zeppelin airships. The source was H. M. Ambassador in
Rome. 1	 20th December 1916, the Foreigii Office produced an
invaluable report for N.I. D., on the particulars of German submarines
how many, what type, where they were, seaworthiness, state of
operational readiness and so on, 2 and on the 23rd December, a report
on the submarine blockade of the United Kingdom. In January 1917
the British Embassy in neutral B erne acquired information about
future plans for the German submarine campaign. The source was an
influential neutral who had been in conversation with high-ranking
Germans. 4 On 29th June 1918, a report on German submarine
construction was passed on to the N.I.D. The source was the
British legation in Copenhagen, which had obtained its information
from a German deserter. These are but a few selected examples
of several hundred major Foreign Office reports which reveal the
significance of this throughout this period.
1. Adm.137, 1080, Ps.20-24.
2. N.LD. 011246, Adm. 137, 1629, Ps. 179-182.
3. N.I.D. 011351, Adm. 137, 1629.
4. N,I.D. 61164, Adm.137,1629. Ps.2l0-214. Headed, For-
eign Office Report, dated 27th January 1917.
5. N.I.D. 31248, Adm.137, 1630, Ps.223-231.
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The Naval Attaches sent in their reports in much the same
way. On 11th May 1915, for example, the Naval Attache in Petrograd
reported on German naval losses in the Baltic, 1 and in early 1917,
the Naval Attache in Norway, acting on information received from a
neutral source who had visited Germany, reported in detail on
increased German submarine activity. 2 	 Diplomatic and attaches'
reports were invaluable because they called upon a great variety of
sources. In peace or war the neutral or non-aligned countries were
the centres of greatest activity, where enemy and ally met. In
World War II Stockho]m was undoubtedly the best centre with its
proximity to occupied Norway and Denmark, and the Baltic region in
general, and Madrid, Ankara, and Istanbul coming close behind, the
former acting as an observation post for Gibraltar, the western
Mediterranean, and North Africa. All were centres of gosip and a
certain amount of intrigue, just as Rome, Berlin and Tokyo were
pre1939. Paris was virtually useless during World War II as a
source for naval intelligence. Stockholm became the most effective
centre - money flowed in for Captain Henry Denham' s use, the
1. N.LD. 769. Adm. 137, 1080 Ps. 272-276.
2. NI.D, 010162, Adm. 137, 1629, Ps. 153-155.
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brilliant naval attache.
In Madrid in World War II the attache, Commander
Hillgarth, was mainly engaged in counter-espionage activities. 2
Hillgartli occupied a central role in the deceptions played before the
"Torch" landings in North Africa. 	 His behaviour was to convince
the Germans that the body they found washed up carrying important
plans was in. fact genuine. Operation "Torch" went through with
1. It was a message from Stockholm on 20th May 1941, which
started the hunt for the Bismarck, and the British govern-
ment's protest to the Swedish government of 15th February
1943, stemmed from the Denham report to the N.I.D. But
not all of his information was listened to - Norwegian
agents inforn d him of anti-torpedo nets in Altenfiord
protecting the Tirpitz. N.I.D. never got to know of this -
on ZZnd/23rd September 1943, one of the X-craft in the
midget submarine attack on the Tirpitz was to become en-
tangled in a net. However, N.I.D. did receive Denham's
report of 16th February 1943, indicating that smoke-making
apparatus surrounded the Tirpitz in Trondheim. In the
R.A.F. Bomber Command raid of April 1942, seven air-
craft were to be lost, the leader later claiming that it was
due to effective AA fire, due in turn to his squadron's un-
awareness of a smoke screen possibly being set up.
2. Mainly persuading the Spaniards that they should not
allow the Germans to abuse their neutrality.
3. See Ewen Montagu' s book: The Man Who Never Was.
Evans Brothers, 1953.
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complete surprises The G rman ambassador in Madrid, Dr.
Stohrer, was recalled in disgrace. On each side of the Straits of
Gibraltar, the Germans set up observation posts, maintaining radio
contact with Berlin and Madrid. In March 1942, the N.I.D. detected
German plans for a radar station to be built on Spanish soil, near
Gibraltar. Via the D.N.I., then the J.I.C., the Admiralty, the
Chiefs-of-Staff Committee the problem reached. the War Cabinet,
who directed the British Ambassador in Madrid to see General
Franco. Within a month Franco had interviewed Canaris and told
him to remove his agents and end his plans for a radar station.
This is a good example of how effectively intelligence and diplomacy
could work together.
1.	 The D.NSI. was also responsible for liaising with foreign
naval attaches both in London and those dealing with his
own attaches abroad. His greatest problem here was
security, and somewhat ironically, what information
could be safely given to friendly or allied powers.
Donald McLach1an summarises the position thus:
"One problem that was never far from the front of the
D.NI.'s mind was the possibility that a friendly foreign
naval attache, to whom he had given important infor-
mation. might pass it to his government in a cypher or
code which would be read by unfriendly governments.
There were cases in which the D.N.I. knew that the
communications of the government in question were
insecure. He would then have to find ways of either
delicately drawing his attention to the fact or of suggesting
that a cable or letter would be safer, or even that British
communications might be used." Room 39. P.403.
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The value attached to Commander Hillgarth ii shown by
Godfrey's comments In Volume 8 of his memoirs: "Hillgarth was
rather a super-attache for several reasons: (a) I encouraged him,
during his periodic visits to London, to report direct to the Prime
Minister after seeing me. (b) I had an Al source in Spain whom I
kept In contact with, through him and Goxnez Bears. (c) Hillgarth
was uniquely the co-ordinating authority in Spain for S. S. and
S.O.E., as well as N.I.D. (d) Hillgarth was the only member of
the Embassy staff who knew Spain and had many contacts in high
places, political and social. Don Gomea Bears linked up with
commerce and could go anywhere as he looked like a Spaniard,
(actually a Gibraltarlan). 1
It Is not the intention of this chapter to discuss the degree
of influence exerted by Naval attaches on the outcome of naval and
political events, and the influence their reports had In particular
on naval and general defence policy ..'making. In a period of relative
international tranquility or disarmament, they often provided the
only constant and reliable source of intelligence. In the twenties
and early thirties, with the run-down of the N.I.D. as a whole,
1.	 Godfrey Memoirs. Vol. 8. P. 123.
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attaches provikled the continuity which ensured the survival of a
fully professional British naval intelligence organisation.
In the thirties, with the advent of Nazi, Fascist, and
Japanese aggression, attaches' reports read, in retrospect, like
alarm bells which, with other conclusive sources, should have
awakened the slumbers of successive British governments.
Reference to a few of these will illustrate the point. The Naval
attache in Berlin, Captain Densch, forwarded reports to the N.I.D.
and the Foreign Office on 9th, 10th and 11th April 1934 and 6th,
7th May 1934, in which he gave the first official indications of a
deliberate re-awakening in the German public mind by the Nazi
government of the need for an expanded German Navy, and especially
of the submarine ae.rvice. Denscb. commented on his conversations
with Raeder, which had been dominated by a discussion on Germany's
need for increased naval forces to provide security in the Baltic.
Somewhat naively Densch tried to explain away the increased German
naval estimates for 1934/1935 by the urgent work that was needed
to maintain, repair, and refit German warships. 1
1.	 Cabinet Papers 29/148. Naval attache, Berlin, correspon-
dencewithN.I.D. andF.O, April/May, 1934.
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Later that year, on 2nd November 1934, the British Naval
attache in Paris, reported that he had received an inconclusive
report from the French Deuxieme Bureau that the Germans had five
sumarines building at Krupps yard at Kiel. 	 This crucial report
made the Admiralty become dissatisfied with the reliability of
information being sent to them regarding new constructions,
especially the dates on which ships were laid down. The Berlin
attache was immediately instructed to investigate and report.
On 7th, 14th and 22nd January 1935, the Berlin attache
sent his reports to the D.N.I. and to the Foreign Office. He made
it quite clear that the Nazis were deliberately hiding from the public
the fact that the last two Deutschland class ships (to become the
Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau) had been laid down in October and
December 1934. The attache surmised, quite accurately, that
they must be over the Treaty .iimits.
Following the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935,
the Berlin attache's duties intensified. He became one of the main
1. Foreign Office Papers 371/17765(C4727/2134/18). Naval
attache, Paris, correspondence with N.I.D. and F. 0.
November, 1934.
2. Foreign Office Papers 371/18860. Naval attache, Berlin,
correspondence with the N.I.D. and F.O. January, 1935.
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link-men in Anglo-German affairs. On 12th April 1935, for example,
Captain Muirhead-Gould, the attache, was asked to attend the
Marineleitung, to be given information about the German building
programme for 1935, (this comprised recomniencement of work on
ships D and E, and the building of 2 new cruisers, 16 destroyers,
but no submarines). He was expected by the D.N.I. to keep his
ear to the ground so as to pick up any signs that might affect
Britain's naval policy or position. On 11th July 1935, Muirhead-
Gould reported from Berlin that, following the signing of the Anglo-
German Naval Agreement, opinion in Latvia and Lithuania strongly
condemned it, as it was thought to encourage a naval race between
Germany and Russia. 1
British naval attaches' reports often formed the main, and
sometimes the only basis for N.I.D. reports, (which were then
channelled through the J.I.C., the C.O.S., and the C.I.D. to the
Cabinet itself if need be). For example, the N.I,D. report of
15th October 1934, dealing with the high scale of naval preparations
being undertaken by Japan (modernisation of capital ships, increase
1. Foreign Office Papers 371/18738 (A6432122145).
2. Foreign Office Papers 371/17600 (A83l3/1938/45)
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in personnel, development of the Air Arm, the increased import
of raw materials, and an increase in naval estimates) was based
solely on the attache's reports.
The D.N.I. and his staff were always able to obtain
su.bstantial and generally very reliable information from foreign
naval attaches credited to embassies in London, whether they were
friendly or regarded as being a potential foe. In 1935 for example
the D.N,I. was anxious to know what the German reaction would be,
and what the German naval building programme would be like in the
event of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement falling through. The
German attache, Captain Erwin VTassner, visited the N.I.D. to
discuss these problems with Commander G.M. RSchwerdt. The
talks endorsed what the N.I.D. thought already - that by 1942 the
Germans would probably attain a 35 per cent ratio in any case
(assuming that their yards worked at full pressure). 	 This particular
document heightens the point that relations with successive German
naval attaches in London between the wars were good, symptomatic
of the cordial relations that existed in general between the British
and German navies. This was not true of the Luftwaffe and the
1.	 Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series C, Volume
3, No.541.
265.
R.A.F. German air attaches in London had a very different
1
reception.
Capturing and Salvaging Enemy Ships
The capturing of enemy ships, both warships and merchant-
men, often revealed to N.I.D. a wealth of data When U450 was
sunk off the Durham coast in 1918, and later salvaged, her wreck
disgorged a valuable log book, signal codes, charts, and orders.
NI.D. dried and chemically treated these. They were decyphered
and revealed the effects of British anti-submarine tactics, and
details of newly planted German minefields, nets and the like.
U450 had drawings of the silhouettes of the whole German fleet.
Copies were made and circulated to ships of the Royal Navy. Above
all else the submarine revealed the tracks used by the other U-boats
to enable them to proceed safely to the Atlantic. N.I.D. passed
this on to operations. Within an eleven week period five U-boats
were destroyed in the areas shown by the documentation from the
wrecked U450. In addition the Germans had revealed their thinking
1.	 See Von Schweppenbiirg: The Critical Years. Wingate,
1952. He was himself a German air attache on the staff
of the embassy in London.
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procedures, and complete technical details of a U-boat. 1 In World
War II the Royal Navy captured two valuable prizes relatively early
in the war, UllO on 9th May 1941, and U570 on 27th August 1941,
south of Iceland. The latter was to be commissioned as H.M.S./m.
Graph. In 1941 Britain was still ignorant of the technical details of
German U-boats - basic factors such as speeds on the surface and
submerged, turning capacity under water, endurance, and the design
of the pressure hull (whether they had riveted plates or a welded hull).
Such information was vital for determining successful anti-submarine
tactics. Pressure hull design would, for example, determine the
area in which British depth charges would prove lethal, and would
also indicate the maximum depth to which a U-boat cou1d dive. 2 As
a result of the information N.I. D. was able to obtain and deduce from
the U570, Captain Edward Terrell, R.NVR., and Vice-Admiral
Usborne, (a former D.N.,I., 1930-1932, and now personal assistant
to the FL rst Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound) were able to design a course
1. See R.M.Grant: U-boat Intelligence, 1914-1918. Hampden,
Connecticutt, 1969.
2. At one stage the Director of Naval Construction in Bath
staunchly maintained that an all-welded pressure hull was
impossible to produce. The capture of U570 proved how
wrong he was. See Captain Edward Terrell: Admiralty
Brief. P.139.
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for British convoy commanding officers in anti-submarine warfare,
run by Captain J.H.Roberts, R.N. What U570 gave to the British too
was the German cypher machine, standard equipment in all U-boats.
Many merchant ships were captured by both sides during
the two World Wars, and they revealed merchant Navy codes,
Admiralty instructions to merchant ships, dispositions, convoy
procedures, rendez-vous points for escorts and re-fuelling, and so on.
Prisoners-of-War, Deserters, Refugees, Resistance Groups,
Friendly or Neutral Observers.
In each World War a collective group embracing prisoners-
of-war, deserters, refugees, resistance groups and friendly or
neutral observers, supplied the N.I.D. with vital. intelligence. To
deal with most of these the N.I.D. had its own group of trained
interrogators. To be optimally effective an interrogator has to be
fully briefed with background details so that he can put his interrogation
in the right context. As a single source interrogation material was
never taken as Al in its own right. As a result a valuable piece of
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data might not be acted on, but it was a risk considered worth
taking when offset against the wild goose chases which might have
ensued.
Selected illustrations will show the scope and nature of
N.I.D.'s activity in this area. Deserters were always fairly forth-
coming - in 1916 the N.I.D. was given details of minefields laid
by the Germans in Heligoland - the exact location, and the types of
mines used, 2 and later in that year a deserter gave extensive
technical details of German destroyers, torpedoes, submarines, and
3the latest German losses.	 P.O. W.s / survivors proved a valuable
source too - in 1918 the Belgian Army General Staff H.Q. handed
1.	 The Naval Staff in World War II, for example, would not
accept the results of N.LD. 1 s interrogators regarding the
maximum depth to which U-boats could dive. Interrogation
had established 600 feet as the maximum. It was not until
after the capture of U570 that this was proven true. Dr.
D.B.Welbourne of Cambridge University was one of N.I.D.'
main interrogators of U-boat P. 0.111. 15 As well as being
an engineer he had a good command of German. (N.I.D.s
chief U-boat P.O.W. interrogator was Captain Trench,
Royal Marines, who, it will be remembered, was captured
and tried in 1911 by the Germans for spying on their
Frisian defences. See page 43 ).
2. Adm. 137, 1629, N,I.D. 5346, Ps. 113-116.
3. Adrn.137, 1629, N.I.D.Q16600, P.156-167.
269.
over to the N.I.D. a German prisoner who was able to give valuable
information on the state of the German fleet. 1 U-boat survivors
were particularly vulnerable to sound interrogation as the N.I.D.
records show. 2 In World War II interrogation of U-boat survivors
provided the N.I.D. with detailed knowledge of the "Pillenwerfer",
a gadget designed to produce a submarine bubble target, and above
all else, of the search receiver specially designed to give U-boat
warning of radar contact by aircraft or ships. After D-Day the
N. I. D set up a Forward Intelligence Unit which advanced with the
van of the Allied forces as they advanced across Europe. Under Lt.
Cdr. R. Izzard, R.N.V.R., one of its prime tasks was to inter-
rogate P. O.W.s in the ports.
Friendly observers gave N.I.D. sound data in both wars.
From very early on in World War I data poured into the N.I.D.
from a variety of sources day after day. Let us take 26 August, 1914
as one such day. At 1244 the N.I.D. received a signal from the
1. Adm. 137, 1630, N.LD. xf11955/19]8. Ps.204-223.
2. Adm. 137, 1100, N,I.D. 10591, 18th September 1915.
Ps. 208-217, for details of the information stcured
from the survivors of U6, Adm. 137, 3060, contains
further details of interrogation of survivors from
captured or sunk German U-boats.
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naval intelligence officer at Grinisby. The master of the trawler
"Elmira" had reported seeing two German destroyers at 1533, 25
August, 120 miles N.E.N. of Spurn Head, one destroyer coming
alongside and questioning him, but left again suddenly towards
flashes on the horizon, which events revealed as two large men-of-
war, apparently German steamers, W.N.W. and last seen at 1700.
At 1940 a signal was received by N.LD. from the Consul-General
in Rotterdam. He had learned from a reliable source that a Nor-
wegian vessel just arrived in Rotterdam had been stopped 951 N.W.
of Heligoland by five German cruisers and eight small craft,
either torpedo boats, or torpedo boat destroyers, at 1830 on 24
August. This volume and quality of data continued throughout the
war. 
1 On 29th July 1915, the N.I.D. issued a report, based on
the information received from the master of the SS Llama, on
U-boat design. This friendly merchantman, who had made contact
with U58, sent his data to the N.I.D. in London via the Admiralty
2port officer at Kirkwa].].. 	 In like manner the captain and crew of
a Dutch steam trawler provided the N.I. D. with certain information
about the position of German defensive minefields. In World War
1. Naval Staff Monographs for World War I. Vol. 1. Appendix
A. Intercepted Signals and Reports.
2. Adrn137, 1100, Ps. 120-123.
3. Adm.137, 1629, N.I.D. 32055, Ps.127-131.
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U refugees and resistance workers were able to give information
about such things as the fighting shape of ships in the dockyards,
morale amongst sailors, and logistical data such as the maintenance
and repair facilities, fuel supplies, and damage done to dockyards
and ships by R.A.F. bombing. Most of this type of information
came to the N.I.D. second hand from other intelligence bodies. For
example, M119 screened and interrogated all refugees arriving in
Britain in World War II. Such data was obviously of equal value to
the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Special Operations executive,
(especially for training agents - it was essential to have the latest
detail4 of German daily life, communications, and so forth.)
Clande stifle Intelligence
In wartime the agent or spy assumed greater significance,
and could be employed more legitimately than in peacetime when
detection or capture often exacerbated relations. 	 Where reconnais-
sance proved difficult or impossible the N.I.D. depended on agents'
1.	 On 7th December 1911, there began in Leipzig the trial of
five alleged British agents. All were found guilty and sen-
tenced to penal servitude for various numbers of years.
The information they were supposed to have secured was
virtually useless, their cases being de1iberat1y magnified
out of all proportion to the offences committed.
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reports for details of the location and strengths of enemy forces.
Communication presented the greatest problem - relaying infor-
mation accurately and quickly without detection. In World War I,
even though British cryptanalysts had decyphered the German signal
codes, only the agent could send details of the progress of German
naval building, repair work in hand in the dockyards, and the
state of morale.
The N.I.D. in the inter-war period and during World War
II never controlled agents. This was the responsibility of the
British Secret Service. The D.N.I. maintained close contact, and
N.LD. briefed many agents, but never controlled their movements.
Peacetime espionage and wartime sabotage were never the briefs
of the N.I.D. The agents of the S.O.E., mainly committed to
sabotage operations and organising resistance, were seldom used
for intelligence collection. Different skills were required. As
with the N.ID. interrogators, agents had to have a good idea of
1. After the Battle of Jutland a British-paid agent in Wilhelms-
haven gave the N.I.D. full and accurate reports of the dam-
age received by practically every ship in the dockyard there.
The Germans tended to be less well organised, as has a.l-
ready been discussed. On 18th October 191.8, U116 tried to
enter Scapa Flow. This U-boat had not been informed that
the Grand Fleet had been moved to the Firth of Forth. Simi-
larly the Germans were not aware of Scapa' s detection in-
stallations - U116 was sunk by mines. By 1939 the German
naval intelligence organisation had learnt certain lessons.
In October 1939 HMS Royal Oak was sunk by a U-boat inScapa Flow. A äerman spy in Kirkwail in the Orkneys had
done his work well.
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what was already known in the N.I.D. so that he could be selective
in his collection.
The British Secret Service took two years to recover from
the effects of the Nazi's overrunning Europe in 1940, and re-establish
agent organisations. The greatest problem was solving communi-
cation problems in occupied countries. It is generally acknowledged
in all reliable narratives that alternative forms of intelligence gave
equally valuable results. However, in several major instances,
agents' reports were critical, such as the reports about German
ships in Norwegian and other European ports such as Brest. 2
Aerial Reconnaissance and Aerial Photography
The development of the technique of aerial reconnaissance
and aerial photography led. to precision in plotting enemy locations,
1. See, for example, Adm. 137, 1629,N.I.D. 011064, an
agent' s report which came via the Foreign Office on 15th
December 1916, giving details of ship-building at Kiel
and Wilhelmshaven.
2. A Norwegian agent in Altenfiord gave the N.I.D., and
thence the Fleet Air Arm invaluable information in February
1944, for the attack on the Tirpitz, such as details of
German radar installations, high tension cable, and flak.
Just before the raid took place he provided intelligence,
including two-hourly weather reports.
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movements, and concentrations, thus helping in analysing tactical
and strategic situations, and selecting targets for sea and air attacks.
It had certain limitations - although regular photographic reconnais-
sance of the enemy's bases conferred inestimable advantages, it often
led to the exaggeration of the importance of any movement by a major
warship. It could not therefore eliminate the need for intelligence
about the enemy's intentions derived from other sources. A photo-
graph will show numbers, and condition, (damage, seaworthiness,
state of readiness etc.) of major units, and give-away information
such as petrol barges, minesweepers, and tankers, - the support
units for a major force.
Photographic reconnaissance did not come into its own
until World War U, and indeed it was as late as 1942 that the
Operational Intelligence Centre in the N.I.D. began to receive
high quality pictures. However, on 4 November, 1939 the first full.
aerial reconnaissance photographs of the Tirpitz revealed for the
first time Tirpitz's dimensions, and how the Germans had obviously
cheated.	 The Germans were particularly lacking in this area.
1.	 This emerged in conversation with Vice-Admiral Sir N.E.
Denning cn 11 January 1972.
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Regular photographic reconnaissance of the major British ports
alone would have rendered impossible the surprise element in the
Allied invasion of Normandy in Jane 1944. Visual sightings from
the air proved equally valuable. It was a Coastal Command aircraft
which detected that the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had slipped from
their Norwegian lair, and later on it was a Catalina reconnaissance
flying boat which sighted the Bismarck after she had given her
pursuers the slip. 1 In the Mediterranean in 194]. it was a Fleet
Air Arpi reconnaissance pilot who sighted the Vittorio Veneto.
This example illustrates well that a pilot had to be trained to
recognise ships' silhouettes and assess types, especially in bad
weather, or when being shot at. A false sighting might prove
disastrous, as indeed it did to the Germans when the Scharnhorst
was sunk. A German reconnaissance pilot mistook British ships
for German escort destroyers. It was too late by the time German
naval intelligence realised their error.
1.	 The Germans, on the contrary, were without eyes in
the air - German intelligence, and certainly Admiral
Lutjens, had no idea that Admiral Tovey was bringing
the Hood, Prince of Wales, King George V, the carrier
Victorious, and Force H to bear.
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Commanding Officers' Reports and De-briefing
Any form of eye-witness report had to be carefully handled
by the N.I.D. Survivors, and especially masters of merchantmen
who had lost their ships, might give such details as the date, position,
and nature of the enemy, (armament, appearance, tactics). Inter-
viewing had to be carefully done so that distorted impressions were
not given. This was equally true of interrogation of Royal Navy
commanding officers and crews. They often had valuable tactical
feedback to give, and also technical information, which was then fed
to the scientists. For example, therreports of the U-boat pack tactics
made it clear that the U-boats must be seen somehow at night, and be
deterred from surfacing. A new illumination was invented - the
It snowflake 11 , which exploded at 1000 feet, illuminating a wide area
for several minutes, thus revealing any surfaced U-boats, within
striking distance of a convoy.
In war and peace the press and radio may be used to
collect intelligence, to deceive, or for propaganda purposes. To
illustrate the first of these, an article appeared in the "Dresdener
Anzeiger", on 20th May 1915, "First Three Months of the Submarine
Campaign", by Vice-Admiral Kircihoff, which was passed to the
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N.I.D. and translated. It provided an invaluable insight into how a
very senior German naval officer saw the impact of the submarine
campaign on the Allies. 1 In peacetime the press may reveal a wealth
of information about governments' policies, strengths, deployment,
morale, as well as, in many journals, even sufficient technical data
from which reasonably accurate scientific deductions may be made.
In wartime press statements have to be carefully released. The
Admiralty took special pains in both World Wars when it released
news of losses, damage and successes. They may deliberately
deceive too - in a special edition of the Daily Mail of 12th September
1916, Admiral Hall had the Northcliffe Press (where he had many
friends and contacts) give the impression that a British expedition
was shortly to be landed on the Belgian coast, the aim being to relieve
pressure on the Belgian flank. It worked. The Germans moved troops
to the Belgian coast.
The Press and Radio
In the totalitarian states the press and radio distorted
information. In Germany Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry deceived
1.	 Adni.137, 1080, Ps.210-214.
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the Germans more than the British, and from propaganda broadcasts,
(such as the interviews with U-boat commanders and crews) the
N.I.D. deduced a great deal about German morale. In both democratic
and non-democratic societies mail censorship was rigorously employed
in both wars.
World War II witnessed, as was seen in Chapter Three, a
good deal of inter-service co-operation and integration. The R.A.F.'s
intelligence service, for example, kept the N.I.D. informed of all
significant Luftwaffe movements which might affect the Royal Navy,
(i. e. those from which it might be deduced that enemy naval movements
were afoot). Likewise R.A.F. mining operations, for example,
depended on N.I.D. information about swept channels and convoy
routes. In the field of intelligence techniques inter-service co-
operation reached its zenith with joint service topographical intelligence.
Topographical Intelligence and the I.S.T.D.
After the disaster in Norway (and indeed Gailipoli too, where
landings were launched without any topographical intelligence whatse'p
it was soon realised by the Admiralty that detailed topographical
intelligence was going to be vital for the forthcoming amphibious assaults
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The N.I.D. led the way. Admiral Godfrey virtually took over the
Geography Department at Oxford. The leader in this field was Mr.
A,F.Wells, the Oxford Classics Don, who collected experts and
sources from all over the world to work for him. He organised a
working relationship between the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit
and the I.S.T.D, and visited R.A.F. Medmenharn and R.A.F. Benson
once or twice a week. 1 The topographical intelligence given by
the N.I.D. to the planners was excellent. An operation on a much
smaller scale, but one nonetheless where topographical intelligence
was essential, will suffice to illustrate the excellent quality of
N.I.D.'s topographical intelligence service - for the attack on the
Tirpitz in Altenfiord by midget submarines to be successful details
of the fiord's terrain was vital. The topographical experts provided
the attack's planners and the X-craft commanders with exact and
detailed information, such as that relating to the numerous smafl
islands in the approaches to the fiord, which would provide cover,
thus enabling the X-craft to surface in order to re-charge their
batteries. N.I.D.'s men also briefed the crews on their best escape
route into neutral Sweden after they had scuttled their craft.
1.	 Godfrey Memoirs: Vol. 8. P.131.
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During peacetime the role of the N.I.D. was very much
different from its role in both World Wars, when a premium was
naturally placed on operational intelligence. The limits placed on
N. I. D. t s activities after 1918, and the political and economic
problems of the twenties and thirties, in a period when the ideas of
re-armament and defence planning were anathema to many, combined
to minimise the part which the N.I.D, could, and ought, to have
played in the inter-war period. in peacetime the emphasis of
intelligence tends to shift towards assessment, with a view to
long-range planning, rather than the day-to-day operational crises
which is the essence of any wartime intelligence organisation.
From 1919 until the beginning of the more blatant and
overt acts of Nazi, Fascist, and Japanese aggression the N.I.D.
contributed little to the composition and deployment of the fleet and
the tactical and strategic factors involved in naval policy-making.
The reasons for this will bear analysis in Chapter Six. Within the
Naval Staff hierarchy the N.I,D. lost its prime place, and one
sees evolving very quickly after VersaiUes, and through to 1936, a
system of planning, policy-making, and operational control and
evaluation based upon the triumvirate of the other Naval Staff
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departments, (mainly Plans and Operations), the Admiralty Board,
and the Committee of Imperial Defence. 1 The C.LD. had direct
links with the Cabinet. The N.I.D. played a minor role in the great
controversies and decisions of the period. The decline of naval
intelligence was symptomatic of the lack of direction in several
areas of British Defence thinking from 1919 to 1939. This situation
therefore had a direct effect upon the techniques which N.I.D. had
so assiduously developed and the organisation which supported them.
When Admiral Godfrey took over in 1939 he was faced with a major
task of reconstruction, (as if time had stood still since Admiral Hall
had left the N.I.D.) and re-vitalisation.
The Inter-War N.I.D. and Peacetime Intelligence
Where the N.I.D. should have shone during the inter-war
period was as the main adviser to the Naval Staff, and through them
to the Board, the C.I.D., and thence the government of the day,
since in theory it was the only repository of data and the independent
1. From February 1921, until the outbreak of World War II
the C.I.D. resumed its original function as the principal
adviser to the government on all matters of defence.
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and objective commentator, and if need be, critic of and for naval
policy. This was not to be. Hence many of the decisions made at
all these levels, were often based on little or no sound data, un-
tested hypotheses, and inaccurately analysed findings of past naval
actions, some of which were irrelevant to the present, and certainly
the future, in any case, (Jutland was still hanging over Naval
thinking twenty years later). Moreover there was no body staffed
with the sort of personnel Hall had recruited in World War I and
Godfrey recruited in World War II to cope with the material N.I..D.
should have been collecting if policy had been different, that is the
intensification on a wide-ranging scale of the collection and analysis
functions. In mitigation, it is true to say that it was considered by
many sufficient for a body such as the C.LD. to deal with the sort
of information N.I.D. could have provided. However, it is also
true that the C.I.D. was, administratively speaking, incapable of
dealing with the minutiae of data which an efft!i4në intelligence
body needs for its work to be worthwhile. As a result, C.I.D.
tended to dismiss crucial facts with the sweep of the pen, which no
intelligence body would have so blatantly written off as irrelevant.
1.	 For example, as early as October 1921, the C.I.D. re-
ceived a warning from the Control Commission that para-
military organisations were forming in certain parts of
Germany. The C.I.D. dismissed the idea. In December
1926, Britain and France disbanded the Control Commissia
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The Royal Navy tended not to help itself during the inter-war period
too, and often the real issues at stake became entangled with political
and misconceived strategic issues which had no real bearing on
actual problems. This was nowhere more true than in the naval
aviation controversy. N.I.D. evidence and analysis might have
provided scientific evidence Lo decide the issue.
Without a clear directive to become involved the professional
expertise of the N.I.D. waned. The methodology of intelligence, the
hard-won techniques which it had accumulated, were run down, and
defence thinking in the twenty years of peace moved at worst into the
realms of misguided fantasy and, at best, into the realms of informed
1.	 Admiral Beatty said himself, somewhat precipitously, to
the Naval Ship-building Sub-Committee of the C. I. D. - the
Bonar Law Committee, 7th December 1 9 2 0, instituted to
investigate the question of "naval strength", - " . .
the Admiralty are of the opinion that there is nothing in
the present offensive qualities of aircraft which render
them a menace to the capital ship." Beatty had no real
evidence for this statement. The N.I.D. was not
consulted. This is even more poignant in the light of
the communication of the Director of the gunnery Division
to the Board, dated 24th June 1922: "As time goes on it
becomes more and more evident that the greatest menace
H. M. ships have to fear ..... is attack by low-flying
planes attacking with torpedoes, poison gas, machine
guns and close bombs." Adm. 1/8646 - 207/23.
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and well-intentioned opinion. 1 Within the Naval Staff itself the
N.I.D. was no longer in the front line. 2 One of the overriding pieces
of evidence against the N.I.D.'s efficacy, and therefore against
those who demoted intelligence, and should have insisted on a high-
powered intelligence body to provide high-grade and timely intelligence
must be the total failure by British naval intelligence, and the other
British intelligence organisations, to detect Germany's secret plans
in the 1920s to revive its Navy (and particularly the U-boat service),
in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the spirit of Locarno.
This was not discovered until the German naval archives became
available on Germany' s defeat in 1945.
1. One of the few signs of hope was to be found in the report of
Mr. Churchill's Committee of 1922, which sowed the seeds
of starting a Joint-Planning and a Joint-Intelligence Sub-
Committee of the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee. This report
was the genesis too of the Imperial Defence College, which
started its first course in January 1927, with Admiral Sir
Herbert Richmond as its Commandant.
2. In May 1923, the Naval Staff discussed the factors involved
in the defence of the Singapore Base. The ideas emerging
were not those of the clinical, objective intelligence organi-
sation, whose judgments should have been in the forefront.
Adm.116, 2416.
3. See S. W Roskill: Naval Policy Between the Wars. Vol.1
P.440-441, The War at Sea, Vol.1. P. 51-52; Erich Eyck:
A History of the Weimar Republic. Vol.11, P. 397-400; Alan
Bullock: Hitler, A Study in Tyranny. P. 185-214.
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In the field of defence appreciation, the N.LD. lost out to
the C.I. D. In the great political battle for Trenchard' s "unified air1'
concept on the one hand, and the survival and growth of the Fleet Air
Arm on the other, intelligence was never invited to have a real say
in the deliberations.	 There were the Royal Navy' s firm protagonists,
men like Admiral Dreyer, a great Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, and the
R.A.F. had theirs too - the prolonged dispute was based on anything
but sound evidence, rather, inter-service rivalry, and a certain
amount of jealousy. It almost led to disaster. Captain RoskiU
writes: "In dive-bombing the U. S. Navy achieved an early and marked
2
ascendancy over both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force,"
and, "a curious feature of the British and American attitude towards
the Japanese ..... that they were •.... rather inferior copyists.
That false ju.dgnent was ohly eliminated . a... in Pearl Harbour
and by the quick and efficient despatch. of the Prince of Wales and
Repulse. " In the development of strategic and tactical thought
1. See Lord Chatfield: It Might Happen Again. P.102-110, for
a description of the victory of the "unified air" doctrine,
and the failure of the Navy to win the day.
2. S.W.Roskil: Naval Policy Between the Wars. Vol.1. P. 525.
3. Ibid. P.531.
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(based on exercise reports in large measure) the N.I.D. played
but a minor role, when in fact it should have been paramount -
relating enemy capaibiity, and possible intentions, to the British
side (developing doctrine, and helping in the formation of plans and
exercises, and assessment of these). 1 There is no direct evidence
for a causal relationship between the decline of the N.I.D. in the
1920s and the sterility of tactical thinking. However this does not
negate the argument that a high-powered N. I. D. might have more
adequately performed some of the functions of the Staff College and
the Tactical School. 2 Little or no attention was paid in the 1920s
1. The official records of the Royal Navy's strategic and
tactical exercises between 1919 and 1937, lodged in the
R. N. Staff College Library at Greenwich, were destroyed
by enemy bombing in World War II.
Footnote: Besides the unfortunate loss of the exercise reports
mentioned above, another sad blow to the researcher was
the destruction of the 1924 Fighting Instructions, and
associated documents. These were the first issued in the
post-war period, by Admirals Oliver arid Brock. No
evidence survives of any N.I.D. involvement in the
tactical re-appraisals after World War I.
2. Both of these bodies analysed World War I policy and oper-
ations, especially Jutland. The Grand Fleet Battle Orders
were examined and certain changes introduced. The Navâ
Staff came down against the night action idea, the value of
destroyers for both night and day attacks was enhanced, and
"divided" tactics were introduced. However, the main con-
cept remained - that a major victory at sea could only be
gained by two great fleets shelling each other at long range
on parallel tracks In a private letter to Captain S. W. Ros-
kilJof 4th d uly 194, Admiral Troup wrote;' As late as 1935
great effor-t was given to extracting the utmost guidance
from Jutland."
287.
to the tactical and strategic role of naval air power, and tragically,
between 1919 and 1939 the Royal Navy did not conduct one extensive
exercise in the protection of a convoy against air and submarine
attacks, allowing for all the experiences of World War I, and the
extreme contingencies a future war might bring. 	 The situation
did improve slightly in the 1930s with the Chatfield-Fisher era
in the Mediterranean Command, when they realised the value of
air strikes. 2 In 1933, when Hitler came to po've r, carrier-borne
strike forces had been finally recognised as invaluable by the
Admiralty.	 What it did not recognise, until war came, was that the
1. There were no joint exercises with the Submarine Service.
The Naval Staff considered that asdic developments had
minimised the capability of submarines. Ironically too,
those exercises carried out in the Mediterranean, simulating
Japanese attacks on Singapore, minimised the role of air
power.
2. 1929 had been the turning-point fcr the U.S.Navy, when the
carriers Lexington and Saratoga played dominant roles in
their Fleet exercises. See A.D. Turnbull and C. L. Lord:
History of U. S.Naval Aviation. P.270-283.
3. However, the Royal Navy's position seems less acceptable
when compared with American advances. Roskill has mad
this summation: ". .. . . the U. S. Navy was far ahead in the
application of carrier-borne air power, in the defence of
slow convoy against submarine attack, and in the problems
involved in supplying a fleet which had to operate far from
any fixed base. In the pra4ice of combined operations there
was not much to choose between the two services." Naval
Policy Between the Wars. P. 543. On the latter point the
Royal Navy conducted no exercises in amphibious warfare
pre-1939, although it had been a subject of much discussion
at the Staff College. In April, 1939, Britain's first landing
craft were ordered.
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greatest threat to trade would come not from surface raiders, but
from submarines. British fleet exercises were geared to the former
contingency. What N.I.D. could have done, and indeed ought to have
done, are purely speculative questions, but the point must hold eod
that, in retrospect, there was throughout the inter-war period a
continuous need for a separate and influential body, well-organised
and thoroughly professional, to properly assess those far-reaching
questions with which neither the Naval Staff, nor the C.I.D. were
well-equipped to deal.
Pre-1914 N.I.D. Work
We have seen that in peacetime an intelligence body must
deal with hypotheses, testing these against hard facts, and creating
models, and trying these out in exercises, and analysing the results,
in close conjunction with the Plans and Operations Divisions. One
sees this system operating on a limited scale in the pre-l9l4 era,
from the time Admiral Custance became the D.N.I. (1899-1902)
through to Hall's time, (1914-1919), followed by the decline of the
N.I.D., some aspects of which have been indicated above. An
examination of selected aspects of N.I.D.'s work during this
fifteen year period will show the general methodology of a peacetime
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intelligence organisation at its best, in ironic contrast with the inter-
war period. Two levels will be investigated - the involvement of the
N.LD. in the secondary contingencies of a possible war and the more
immediate aspects of general naval policy, and then the higher level
issues of long-range strategic naval planning, and the relationship
of this to British p'plitical policy.
One thing is certain about the
	 work in this
particular period, (irrespective of any action following from it) - it
was of a very high quality. A thorough examination of the records
shows this.
From June 1898, the British government became acutely
aware of the effects war might have on the supply of food and raw
materials, so much that a Royal Commission was set up. (In 1898
Britain was thinking in terms of a possible war against France and
Russia). The N.I.D, became intimately involved in the work of
this commission, especially concerning the means by which an enemy
might deny food to Britain in time of war, and the means by which
1.	 The major source for the above contention is the Baddeley
Papers, Adm. 1, 7734, presented to the Public Record
°ffice in August 1935, by Sir Vincent Baddeley.
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the Royal Navy might counter these. The N.I.D. investigated
every aspect of the problem, issuing several interim reports.
In a preliminary to such a report, dated 15th July 1901, Custance,
the D.N.I., state& "The question of whether the food supply of
this country can be relied upon in time of war with France and
Russia depends on:
1. The sources from which it comes.
2. The protection which can be afforded by the Navy.
3. The attitude of neutral nations.
N.I.D. findings and proposals were then given in detail. Prince
Louis of Battenburg, (D.N.I. 1902-1905) continued the good work.
In 1904 the C.I.D. asked the Admiralty Board to comment
on the scheme for making the Tyne a major 'naval base. The Board
immediately consulted the N.LD. and the Hydrographer, and called
for reports. On the basis of N.I.D.'s report the Naval Staff
1.	 See Louis Battenburg's report dated 31st October 1904,
Baddeley Papers; also the letter from Selborne to Balfour,
dated 2nd November 1904, congratulating the N.I.D.
and Battenburg on their work. Appendix A to these
papers contains the correspondence of the Admiralty
Board on this question, and shows how infLuential N. I. D. 8
work was.
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rejected the idea. In an appended letter, dated 4th August 1904,
the D.N.I., Battenburg, added: "It may not be amiss to point
out to the Tyne Improvement Commissioners that the mere deepening
of the Channel will not (as stated on page 3) turn the Tyne into an
important Naval Base. The Hydrographer clearly shows its
limitations as regards water space, besides which a port requires
a good deal more than a dry dock and machine shop before it can
be called a Naval Base. The establishment of a real Naval Base
at Rosyth will largely discount the value of the Tyne as regards
strategic placement." These papers show the extent to which the
N.I.D. was involved in general naval policy, and how it was able to
generate its own lines of investigation. Throughout there is a cool,
detached, analytical approach, with an obvious desire to retain
independent action and its own professional integrity. 1
1.	 See the Baddeley Papers - N.I.D.'s involvement with the
work of the Admiralty' s Machinery Design Committee,
Minutes and Journals of Proceedings, June 1904 - January
1906. One of the many problems N.I.D. tried to solve was,
for example, the loss of water in H. M. ships caused by
condenser failure. See Adm.116,886B for many more in-
stances of N.I.D.'s activities and quality of work, reveal-
ing the analytical method. As examples it was concerned
with:- Australian Naval questions, especially an "Austral-
ian Naval Agreement" - see the correspondence between
the Colonial Office and the N.I.D., 1ay-July 1897, par-
ticularly the D.N.I.'s letter (Beaumont) of 1st July 1897:
the Conference of Colonial Premiers, 1897; establishment
of a Colonial R.N.R.: and even rates of pay to Colonial
Contingents in South Africa, 189 9-1902.
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At the higher level the N.I.D. t s work was critical to
British defence policy-making. 	 N. I.D.'s work in this area was
never again, before 1945, to be surpassed. 2 As early as July 1904,
the N.I.D. was planning for a war against Germany. in 1905
Fisher asked Ottley, (D.N.I. 1905-1907) for his department's views
on the readiness of the fleet for a war against Germany. D.N.I.
gave a full report, concurring in general with his predecessor,
Prince Louis of Battenburg; in addition to the latter' s plan to
close the German North Sea ports, he envisaged penetrating the Baltic
and blockading the coastline. Marder shows how Ottley was against
1. The main sources for this contention are: the Slade Papers,
lodged at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, a
series of letters, memoranda, and Slade' s diary, which he
was encouraged to keep by Corbett himself; D.M.Schurman:
The Education of a Navy: the Development of British naval
strategic thought, 1867-1914; A.J.Marder: The Anatomy
of British Sea Power, a History of British Naval Policy in
the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905, London, 1964;
Adrn.116, 866B, Naval Staff Memoranda, 1889-1914; P.K.
Kemp: The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, Vol. II,
Navy Records Society, London 1964; and an unpublished
London University Ph.D. thesis (1970), N.W.Summerton,
Department of War Studies, King's College: The Develop-
ment of British Military Planning for a war against
Germany, 1904-1914.
2. Save for when its views were solicited, in a very limited
way, over such issues as the amendments to the Covenant




the idea of combined operations 1 - he foresaw administrative and
organisational difficulties involved in amphibious assaults, 2 and
the N.I.D. also calculated that the extensive navigational difficulties
3
and fortifications would inhibit such landings. 	 However, the N.I.D.
did not rule out the concept of a highly mobile expeditionary force,
able to threaten German weak points to advantage. Via the Board,
the C.I.D., and thence the Cabinet, the N.I.D., through a ruthlessly
methodological approach to strategic planning, was to influence the
future course of the Great War. Summerton makes this incisive
comment about N.I.D. 1 s influence on the C.I.D., and more
particularly the Army's thinking, over military planning" ".... the
General Staff rejected the idea of conducting a war against Germany
1..	 Marder, P.550-568.
2.	 See also Ottley's memos., Adm. 116, 866B, referring to
combined military operations in war,, with notes by Sir
George Clarke, Secretary of the C.I.D., dated July 1905.
3.	 Summerton's thesis, P.36-39. He quotes a memo. of
the D.D.N.I., Captain Ballard to the Army's Director
of Operations, dated 2nd August 1905, in which he states
that the only contingency worth considering was that of
a war in alliance with France against Germany. He
postulated that Britain, single-handedly, could not
attempt any operations against the German seaboard.
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in the manner previously envisaged for a war against France and
Russia, by maritime warfare and the capture of overseas naval
bases and colonies. By the autumn of 1905, the General Staff were
strongly attracted to the idea of concentrating an expeditionary force
in the main theatre of a Franco-German war."
The power and influence of the D.N.I. and the N.I.D. in
general is shown by Slade's term of office (1907_].909).2 Above
all it shows how the N LD. methodology was sufficiently flexible,
totally uninhibited, and free from external pressures. Slade was
courageous enough to reverse the Ottley theses; he also became
very friendly towards the Army - N. I. D.'s relationship with D. M. 0.
(Director of Military Operations) became free, frank and worthwhile.
It was also cordial. Some have claimed Slade was dismissed by
Fisher because of his overfriendliness with the military. The idea
1. Sun-imerton thesis. P.49. See also P. 51 for his comments
on Army-Navy politics.
2. Slade, Admiral Sir Edmond John Warre: 1859-1928; entered
RN 1872; Commander 1894; Captain 1899; served in EMS
Hecla during the Egyptian war 1882; May 1904 Director of
Senior Officers War Course, RNC, Greenwich; DNI Nov.
1907-March 1909; C.-in-C. East Indies 1909-1912; retired
1917; Director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
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of "combined ops." against Germany returned. Moreover he thought
the Baltic was vital, and therefore Denmark, connecting the entrances
to the sea, was fundamental to his hypothesis. N.I.D. and D.M.O.
saw combined operations as part of a general naval offensive in the
Baltic. Slade argued the case with Fisher. 1 His arguments reflect
the precision of N.I.D. thinking. A crucial diary entry of Slad& s
must surely be: "Sir John Fisher agreed that the best form of defence
would be to send an. Army to sea. It would paralyse all German
initiative and tie up a large portion of their forces on the sea coast.
Slade furthered N. I. D. t s cause by having the R.N. War College and
the Foreign Office study the implications of his amphibious strategy.
The N.I.D. and the War College drew up detailed plans.
Dr. Summerton's thesis gives a detailed account of the
relationship between N.LD. I the Admiralty Board, the C.I.D., and
the Cabinet, and the inter-service relationship. He throws great
light on the politics of defence planning. It is sufficient to say here
1. See the Slade IVISS, the file headed, "Summary of the Papers
written by Admiral Slade for submission to the First Lord
or First Sea Lord between November 1907 and March 1908"
for details of this.
2. Ibid. Diary entry, dated 25th January 1908.
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that N. I. D. t s work was regarded as invaluable. With regard to the
war plans the N.I.D. drew uphe makes this comment: ".....they
were probably the only plans which existed and, if war had threatened
the Admiralty would have pressed for their adoption. ,
Whatever the eventual outcome of the Great War, the point
must surely stand that the N.I.D. had exerted for many years the
dominant influence from within the Naval Staff on naval war planning.
Its influence was felt throughout the upper echelons of British defence
policy-making. That the Slade-Ballard school did not, in the event,
win the day, and, instead of an amphibious attack on the German
right flank, Britain moved from 1911-1914 towards a European
orientation in foreign policy and defence planning, committing itself
to a N.W. Europe land war, backed by colonial troops, remains a
political - military is sue which it is not within the scope of this
chapter to examine. The Corbett-Jellicoe concept of drawing the
High Seas Fleet out so as to expose itself to being struck by the
Grand Fleet in waters unfavourable to itself in a great set-piece
battle in the classical tradition won the day.
1.	 Sumrnerton. P. 264. His views are substantiated throughout
the sources. See P.K.Kernp. P. 3 18-468, details of the
formation of the Ballard Committee in 1906, set up by
Fisher, to investigate the provision of naval war plans.
297.
The pre-1914 era in the N.I.D. was marked by a growing
professionalism, and initiative, originality, and a dedication to naval
war planning which was based on a departmental strength which was
to be found so patently wanting during the high years of appeasement.
Its heart was a rigorous methodology.
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CHAPTER SIX
Aspects of Naval Intelligence and Political Decision-Making.
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The British System of Politico-Military Decision-Making and its
Relationship with Naval Intelligence.
Before we can begin a thorough examination of the relation-
ship between naval intelligence and political decision-making in this
period it is important to establish two bases. Firstly, the rationale
behind the system of politico-military decision-making which under-
lined the contribution which intelligence could make to this side of
British defence must be made clear, and secondly, indication must
be made of the politico-military structure within which N.I.D.
developed and operated at the several levels.
Throughout this period one sees emerging a logical approach
to defence planning, characterised above all else by the work of the
Committee of Imperial Defence, which with and through the Cabinet
and the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee, came to review defence in terms
of how the national interests could be best secured, requiring reviews
and analyses of the forces required to achieve this, and how much it
would all cost. On the latter point government began to clinicafly
weigh the costs against the value of the interests to the country as
a whole. Any reduction in expenditure invariably meant a reduction
in military capability, and herein lay the dichotomy, and stubling
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block for many governments (especially during the depression) - can
a government legitimately make such reductions without parallel
reductions in political defence commitments ? Even at a time of
relatively prolonged world stability, military run-down may have the
attendant dangers of losing-out in the technological and personnel
training fields to those who are less inclined to diminish manpower
and military hardware.
The naval strength of one's potential adversaries, whatever
the world and internal politico-economic situations is therefore
paramount. Constant review of their capabilities, as well as their
possible intentions, must be an essential role of an intelligence
organisation. Comparisons of relative strengths is as critical as
a review of defence commitments, and the two are by nature closely
inter-related. At both the political and the military level intelligence
can be the arbiter, not an infallible one, but one at least based upon a
reasoned exposition of well-ascertained facts - Parliament rightly
demands to know why and how money is being spent on defence, and
1.	 See Mr. Denis Healy's R.U.S.I. lecture of 22nd October l969
in which he discusses these problems when he was Secretary
of State for Defence.
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whether or not the defence organisation is satisfactory, 1 and the
Services must have a basis for their strategic policies, and more
particularly for when they cannot agree. Without accurate data
defence can become a willy-nilly process of expediency, and the
worst consequences of which might be what George Canning described
thus in 1803: "We might have been strong with advantage, and
were then cowardly that our enemies became peremptory; and the
coming of war was owing, therefore, to our weakness and not to our
strength and courage."
1 juF,( 44 * Sd,t.3L ('"	 that without intelligence
this logical approach to defence planning and organisation may well
malfunction - if one starts from the premise that defence policy is
basical ly a two-way arrangement, with the political leadership on
the one side laying down objectives, and the military on the other
preparing plans and proposals with costs, (with the Cabinet making
final decisions on what can be afforded politically and diplomatically,
in terms of the greatest value for the least expenditure) then it is
absolutely necessary for the Naval Staff to have all the necessary
factual information at their disposal if they are to draw up plans
1.	 As early as 1889 such questions in the House led to the
Hartington Commission.
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for any contingency given in government directives. From the
immediate viewpoint of conducting naval warfare, both t the tactical
and strategic levels, the absence of such data can have a deadening
effect upon naval planning and training to such an extent that when
hostilities occur the Royal Navy may either fail to apply its resources
in the correct manner, or, at worst, be in a total quandary as to
what should be best done. 1 On the level of the donduct of naval
operations the Navy may be in a dominating position relative to the
political arm, by sheer weight of professional competence and involve-
ment, but on the level of political decision-making, where senior naval
officers might well be as equally well-versed in the totality of factors
embracing any particular defence posture, the role of naval intelligence
bears careful examination. It is certainly true that many senior
naval staffs in the last fifty years have witnessed either several major
1.	 This was seen at the outbreak of World War II, when the
little planning that had been done in peacetime to ensure an
immediate commencement of convoy protection soon showed
itself in Merchant ship losses, the victims of German U-
boats, which the Admiralty did not regard as a serious
menace pre-1939. The Navy's lack of insight into the use
of aircraft carriers in the early days of war was shown by
the way they were restricted solely for ocean searches for
German surface raiders.
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run-downs or the maintenance of equilibrium within the Royal Navy
when potential aggressors have been building up, and this poses
the question of how far naval intelligence, as a factor within the Navy
as a single unit, and within the politico-military structure as a whole,
has interacted withthe other major factors, particularly economic,
to influence the development of policy. The dilemma, and indeed
paradox, which, at all costs, should be avoided in this position
Allen Dulles thus described when discussing World War I: "The
Great Powers of Europe entered World War I with intelligence
services which in no way were commensurate with the might of their
armed forces or equipped to cope with the complexity of the conflict
to come". 1
In the contemporary context, despite any margfnal advantage
which technological superiority in warning systems might give,
government must surely depend on intelligence to provide some long-
range warning that a strategic attack is possible. The present con-
sequences of a politico-military decision-making breakdown are,
therefore, much more costly in theory. Hence the need for the right
data and those who can satisfactorily handle it. However, in a
1.	 Allen Dulles: The Craft of Intelligence. P. 32.
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democracy, those beat able to use military information through
their knowledge and experience do not necessarily hold the right
political seats. Good intelligence in the wrong hands might either
be wasted or misused. There is no better illustration of this than
the appointment, on 9th March 1936, of Sir Thomas Inskip as
Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defence. 	 Churchill himself
probably describes better than anyone else the feeling this engendered
in certain quarters of the politico-military leadership in and out of
office: "On the 9th Mr. Baldwin selected Sir Thomas Inskip, an
able lawyer, who had the advantages of being little known himself
and knowing nothing about military subjects. The Prime Minister' s
choice was received with astonishment by Press and Public. To me
this definite and as it seemed final exclusion from all share in our
preparations for defence was a heavy blow. " 	 Caustic, and a little
sarcastic, but Churchill' s words echo a fundamental point - decisions
1. Inskip, Thomas, Viscount Caldecote: 1876-1947; born in
Bristol, son of a solicitor; ed. Clifton, King's Cambridge.
Called to the bar, practised on the western circuit. KC 1914
MP(Con.) 1918rl939 Solicitor-General 19Z2; Minister for
the Co-ordination of Defence, 1936. On the outbreak of war
he received a peerage and became Lord Chancellor. May,
1940, Minister for the Dominions. October, 1940, Lord
Chief Justice.
2. W,S. Churchill: The Second World War: Volume I. P.156.
305.
can only be as good as those who ae in a position to make them, not
the data upon which such decisions might be based.
Let us now look at the structure of defence within which
N.I.D. developed. Before the first committee on colonial defence
at the end of the nineteenth century there was no regular central
machinery for defence policy-making and planning. The Board of
Admiralty provided some form of centralisation (and became a model
for the reform of the War Office recommended by several bodies
between 1890 and l904 but there was no organisation especially for
strategic thought. The emergent Naval Staff re8ponded well to the
material, hardware problems of the Service, but not to the tattical
and strategic problems of war. Professor Arthur Marder quotes
Lord Selborne, First Lord in 1903, 1 thus: "We have been shamefully
unenthusiastic in the way we have treated questions of national
2defence." In the previous year, 1902, a breakthrough had come,
following the colonial conference, with the founding by Balfour of the
Committee of Imperial Defence.
1. Selborne, William, Second Earl: 1859-1 942;MP(Lib.) 1885;
Lib. Unionist from 1886; succeeded to title 1895; Under-
Secretary for the Colonies 1895-1900; First Lord of the
Admiralty 1900-1905.
2. Arthur Marder: British Naval Policy. 1880-1905. P.417.
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As an informal committee of the Prime Minister's it acted
solely in an advisory capacity, and membership was by invitation.
Even by 1914 the C.I.D.'s position was still equivocal, both on grounds
of its professional usefulness and its political desirability. However,
what is significant is that at its first meeting, on 18th December 1902,
there were present Balfour, the Lord President (Devonshire), the
First Sea Lord, the C. -in-C. of the Army, the Director of Military
Intelligence, and Prince Louis of Battenburg, the then Director of
Naval Intelligence. 1 The D.N.I. was invited because the Prime
Minister desired his presence and advice. Pre-1914, during the
high summer of the Fisher era, the N.I.D. played a major role in
the formulation of naval war plans (as was seen in Chapter Five) -
regrettably though some of those plans were never given the review
by the C.I.D. or the Cabinet they deserved because of Fisher's
unwarranted wish to maintä.in his own and the Naval Staff s autonomy.
1..	 The forerunner to the CI.D. was the Colonial Defence
Committee, of which the D.N.I. was a member. The Com-
mittee offered suggestions on broad imperial defence
problems, leaving local authorities to provide details of
planning and execution. This committee had no staff
for research or planning. Between 1885 and 1892 it had
58 meetings, dealing with 478 agenda items, from which it
drew up 61 cdonial defence plans and made 151 detailed
recommendations.
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In 1906, when. the C.I.D. asked the First Sea Lord for his plans, he
actually refused to reveal them. At the same time he said the Royal
Navy could not guarantee the passage of an expeditionary force across
the Channel. Since the Prime Minister did not intervene, the C. I. D.,
with no statutory authority, could not challenge Fisher. In 1907
Haldane eventually persuaded Camphell-Bannerman to demand that he
produce the Admiralty's war plans. This he did, but it was only a
technical victory for the C.ID., since there was no attempt to
integrate these plans with those of the Army or assurances given
that the Admiralty would be more co-operative. The critical point
is that whatever the value of N. I. D. 's role and the quality of its
work, which was high at this stage, the higher politico-military
relationships prevented the production of integrated war plans, which
would have to stand the test of combined scrutiny from the Admiralty
and Army Boards and the C.I.D. In this sense it is not unjust to say
that Fisher did the Service and the country immeasurable harm, both
upwards and downwards 1 in the Navy, and when the time came for
1.	 In 1908, the Secretary of the C.I.D., Captain Ottley, who
had been the D.N.I. 1907-1907, wrote, "not one naval
officer out of fifty has any knowledge what a British fleet
will have to do in war, or how it will do it."
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serious commitment to a given strategy the naval concepts lost the
day to a large military presence in N. VT. Europe. N.I.D. had
produced ideas and plans which countered this policy. The blue-water
school of the N.I.D. never had chance to fight its case. Fisher's
attitudes are nowhere more obvious than in his reluctance to form,
and expand (as the C.I.D. were always encouraging him to do) a
Naval Staff. The heart, and senior echelon of this staff was the
N.I.D.
The price was indeed paid in World War I. Despite an
expanded Naval Staff, disagreement at the top, the seeds of which had
been sown before 1914, prohibited joint staff work and the provision
of informed staff thought for the Cabinet on high matters of strategy.
Fisher' s idea of the Army as "a projectile to be fired by the Navy"2
1. One example will suffice to illustrate the consequences of
such an organisation; pre-war both the N.I.D. and the M.I.
D. had produced reports for the C.I.D. on the effects 16
inch naval guns and Army howitzers had on shore defences,
especially heavily protected gun emplacements - they hardly
made a mark. These reports were fed through the staff
channels to the C,I.D., and were filed for future reference.
When the Dardanelles committee laid down initial plans for
that campaign these reports were totally ignored.
2. Lord Fisher: Memoirs. P. 171.
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was lost in the mud of Flanders, and he could blame no one more than
himself. 1 Fisher had just not used the C.I.D. the way he should -
N.I.D. and the M.I.D. forwarded data to the C.I.D. Secretariat,
and it was this body which tended to interpret and explain such data to
ministers. Through his D.N.I. and the C.I.D. Fisher could have
exerted more influence than, in effect, he did. 2 However, it is im-
portant to remember the climate in which these events occurred, which
has been described by Lord Hankey himself: "Given the circumstances
of the day - a hundred years without a great war, the inexperience of
statesmen and soldiers alike of war on the grand scale, a government
busy on a great programme of social reform, a policy directed above
all to the maintenance of peace - given all this, our defensive arrange-
ments were not ineffective.
1. The C.I.D.'s early work was very Navy-oriented. It centred
on the reliance of British sea power defence against invasion
and t1 dence of India. It ws the perfect vehicle for the
D.N.I. to express his staff's ideas, as well as an arena for
developing a unified strategy for the Dominions.
2. There seems to be no doubt among scholars that the C.I.D.
was the most influential body on government policy - pre-l914
Its Secretariat, whose functions were defined in Balfour's
Treasury Minute of 4th May 1904, became very powerful -
Parliament never questioned its working, or the state of
British preparedness.
3. Lord Hankey: Diplomacy by Conference. P. 54.
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The C.I.D. went into abeyance during World War I, to be
revived after the war as an absolute necessity to ensure that the
Cabinet's organisation functioned effectively. In 1923 a sub-committee
was set up under Lord Salisbury to review the central defence machin-
ery. It proposed a Chiefs-of-Staff Committee, to be chaired by the
Prime Minister or his deputy - "with an individual and collective
responsibility for advising on defence policy as a whole. 	 The
C.O.S. (Chiefs-of-Staff) was born (1923). Together with the C.I.D.
the C.O.S. organisation. became the Cabinet's strategic authority.
In 1928 Baldwin told the House of Commons: ".....the C.I.D, now
receive collective advice on all General Staff questions instead of
receiving, as in the past, separate and even contradictory advice
from three different quarters." Chamberlain made very similar
remarks in 1938.
The D.N.I. was not a member of the post-war C.LD.
Nothing is more indicative of the deliberate policy to reduce the
power of the D. N. I. and the scope of the work of the N. I. D 1 after
the Hail era. In its subordinate role it was to lose the pace and
involvement so assiduously nurtured by Hall, such that by the
1.	 Cmd. 2029. P.18.
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mid-thirties it was indeed in the doldrums. 1 The D.N.I. made
his representations through the First Sea Lord to the C.O.S. and
the C.I.D. and thence the Cabinet. Further indication of the malaise
into which defence intelligence slipped as a whole is shown by the
fact that the Joint Intelligence Committee (J.i. C., consisting of the
three service directors of intelligence or their deputies), was not
established until as late as 30th January 1936. It was chaired by
a representative from the Foreign Office, and was attended by a
member of the Department of Overseas Trade, and other departments
as necessary. It is significant that the C.O.S. had established their
1.	 In his "My Naval Life, 1906-1929", Stephen King-Hall
gives some graphic accounts of his work in the N.I.D. in the
mid twenties. [n 1925, before joining the staff of the C. -in-
c. Mediterranean, as principal intelligence officer, King-
Hall was briefed in the N.I.D. He writes: "L spent some
weeks at the Admiralty attached to the Naval Intelligence
Department and formed a very poor opinion of the organi-
sation as it was. It may be better now. (1951). I hope
so. At this time all the officers in the I.D. were on their
way out, that is to say they had been passed over for
promotion, and had no prospects. They were soldiering
on for a pension and most of them were dead from the neck
up.	 P. 215. King-Hall writes that no useful intelligence
at all emerged from the Mediterranean Fleet during 1925-
1926. P.223. (At this time the N,I.D.'s main source in
the Mediterranean consisted of the ports' consuls and the
ships' intelligence officers usually Royal Marines, filling
in N.I.D. questionnaires, and usually with data quite
easily available in major public sources.
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own joint Planning Sub-Committee as early as 1926, but no regard
was paid to intelligence.
From 1926 the C.O.S. prepared for the C.I.D. their own
annual strategic report, relying upon, to a large extent, the Foreign
Office annual surveys of the international situation, including "threats
to peace", and to a lesser extent the intelligence reports of the three
service intelligence departments. Both the C.O.S. and the C.LD.
were dynamic in themselves. In 1932 the C.O.S. pressed and
succeeded in ending the Ten Year Rule, and in November 1934, the
C.I.D. told the defence planners to plan on the assumption of a
possible war with Germany within five years. 1
In World War II Churchill formed a War Cabinet, the
C.I.D. went into temporary abeyance again, and the C.O.S.'s position
was strengthened. The three Service ministers were not members of
the War Cabinet or the C. O.S., (only as invited by the Prime Minister).
This is significant - these ministers had acess to Churchill, and
were kept informed as members of the Defence Committee, but they
did not guide military operations or participate in formulating strategy,
1.	 Unlike C OS. the C.I.D. was not at all Services dominated -
only one out of more than fifty sub-committees of the C.I.D.
was confined to representatives of the Services a-lone.
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though they were responsible for the organisation and the administration
of each service. With the establishment of the Combined Chiefs-of-
Staff (Brftish and American), responsible for overall Allied military
planning and operations, four Combined C. O,S. sub-committees were
established, of which one was the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee,
represented on the British side by the D.N.I., the D.M.I,, D.A.I.,
and representatives of the Foreign Office and the security services.
Churchill also created a separate inteUigence and military operations
sub-committee of the War Cabinet, the Joint Intelligence Staff, (3. I.S.)
The Politico-Military Structure Within Which N.I.D. Operated.
The main, underlyng principle of this structure was the
one which has guided British political-military relationships since
Cromwell' s time - that military forces shall be firmly controlled by
the political, civilian leadership, that although the Armed Services
are the main instrument by which the safety of the British people and
security of the state are maintained against external aggression, the
major decisions regarding their composition and use rests entirely
in the hands of the government of the day. However, there is some
antithesis here, since the Royal Navy for instance, by its very
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professionalism - of organisation, of training, of discipline, and
the possession of weapons themselves, and above all, by the
traditionally highly structured, hierarchical nature of its personnel
relationships and deployment exhibits certain characte ris tics which
could not be described as democratic, yet it has to function, and be
seen to function, in a democratic system of government. If this
factor is coupled to the world events which determine the role and
composition of the Royal Navy (and this is just as true in the con-
temporary world, with increasingly more destructive weapons
available, and the threat of strategic nuclear attack), particularly
those which are patently antithetical to the British way of life and
interests, one sees circumstances calling for responses which the
principles of British democratic government do not necessarily always
permit. The alternatives may be total inertia, or inaction, or limited,
ineffective action, or the use of military force in such a way or with
such consequences, as to be contrary to public opinion. Is there a
means for reconciling these divergent factors? It is one of the
hypotheses of this thesis that a body, such as the N.LD., (and on
higher levels the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Chiefs-of-
Staff Committee), was able to fulfil, admittedly with varying degrees
of intensity and success, the vital functions of providing both necessary
professional intelligence, and was, in itself, an objective basis for
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politico-military decision-making, and all that this entailed, in terms
of the legitimate use of British naval power. Naval intelligence as
such, as a microcosmic part of the overall British intelligence
commitment in this period, fulfilled, therefore, a role within the
state that went beyond the scope that any superficial analysis might
reveal. It is now one of the objectives of this chapter to examine this
standpoint in depth.
The Varying Emphasis Placed on N.I.D.'s Wbrk Throughout the Period
The value attached to intelligence in peace and war during
this period has varied as much through administrative and internal
political changes as through what might be considered to be the more
important controlling factors - such as the world situation, its
stability or otherwise, the state of knowledge of the military capabilities
and intentions of other powers, and the relationship of Britaints own
naval resources and their strengths and capabilities to the latter point.
As has already been demonstrated naval intelligence did not grow in a
logical way. Before the Great War the D.N.I., as principal assistant
to the First Sea Lord, and the kingpin of the Naval Staff, held sway.
Whatever the state of the intelligence art, in terms of methods, and it
316.
was pretty primitive at times, 1 the fact remains that the N.I.D.
played the dominant part in the creation and the evaluation of Naval
strategic and tactical polity, and, to a large extent, was intimately
2, 3
concerned with the day-to-day running of the Royal Navy. 	 By
1. See Admiral Sir Barry Domvile's book: By and Large.
Hutchinson, 1936. As a newly promoted Commander Domvlle
joined the N.I.D. in 1909. He wrote this about his work
there: "Naval intelligence was in the early stages of develop-
ment and our work consisted largely of scanning the Foreign
Press, and snipping and pasting In its literary yield into
various scrap books." P. 39. In 1927 Domvile was promoted
to Flag rank and made D.N.I. (1927-1930).
2. In Fisher's Naval Necessities of 1905/1906 this revealing
comment is made: "In the report of the Special Committee
presided over by the late Director of Naval Intelligence
(Prince Louis of Battenburg), it was recommended that
England should maintain a superiority in battleships of at
least 10%, and 2:1 in armoured cruisers, over each of the
two combinations, viz:- (a) Germany and Russia, (b) France
and Russia." The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, Vol.
2, ed. by P. K. Kemp. P. 60-69. Nothin illustrates better
the position, responsibility, and influence of the D.N.I.
in the early period.
3. See Mark Kerr: Prince Louis of Battenburg. Longmans.
1934. Kerr quotes a letter from Battenburg to Admiral Sir
John Fisher, dated 11 February, 1902: ".,,..Since the
present D.N.I. Captain Custance (D.N.I. 1899-1902)
assumed office it has made great strides; with irresistible,
yet hardly perceptible force, it has backed up the Naval
Lords; invaded every department of the Admiralty, and it
is no exaggeration to say now - that no question of any
greater importance than the, say, change of an article of
uniform, is decided upon without the N.I.D. having had its
say." P.165. Battenburg was D.N.I. 1902-1905. Supported
by Lord Selborne, the First Lord, and his D. D. N. I., Cap-
tain Inglefield, Battenburg built up a professional body of
intelligence workers. During his tenureship Battenburg was
very much the First Sea Lord's right hand man.
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the time Slade became D.N.I. in 1907 the early hopes of those 'who
had been primarily involved in the creation of the Foreign Intelligence
Committee and the later N.I.D. were realised. 1 The Papers of
Admiral Slade reveal the incredible scope of the N.I.D. in its early
period. 2
In the Great War, with the rapid shift from static to
operational intelligence, N.I.D. improved the whole range and
quality of its intelligence activity, especially its methods. From 1919
until 1936 there came near disaster for the N.I.D. with the wholesale
axing of its functions. D.N.I. was a shadow of his former self.
As will be seen later the Chiefs-of-Staff Joint Planning Sub-Committee
tended to fulfil those functions which should rightfully have been
performed by the Service's professional intelligence department -
the N.I.D. The golden age of the eleven pre-war D.N.I. s and their
doyen during the war itself, Reginald Hall, was not recaptured until
1. As we have seen some of the main moves for the creation
of an intelligence department had come from the R.U.S.I.,
and particularly 3. C. R. Colomb, who had led a group in the
early eighties which advocated the creation of an N.I.D.,
where relevant strategic assessments could be made so war
plans could be "realistically drawn up." See 3. R. C. Colomb:
Naval Intelligence and Protection of Commerce in War.
R.L.J.S.I, Journal (1881). P.553-78.
2. Slade Mss., National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
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Troupt s tenure, (D.N.I. 1935-1939), with a slow, but systematic
build-up of N.LD.'s activities before war began, and to the time when
Godfrey took over. The latter soon re-captured the influence of the
pre-1919 era. He writes inhis unpublishedmemors: t.....both
Admirals Backhouse and Pound were alive to the need of an emergency
audience for DN.I. and invariably listened to all I had to say with
patience and appreciation. Hi
In a period of peace, such as 1919-1929, when there were no
apparent enemies to challenge Britain, strategic planning and tactical
evaluations are more difficult, particularly if there is no immediate
war experience to call upon - the developing strategy of the Royal Air
Force in the twenties and thirties had not been tested in war, just as
in the contemporary world planning or strategic and tactical nuclear
warfare has no foundation in experience. Coupled to this difficulty is
the tendency to ignore or under-rate intelligence, one of the sure signs
of wishful thinking of those who direct defence. There can be no doubt
that a strong nation must be prepared, even during an ostensibly quiet
period in world affairs, for a potential enemy to take an unwise or
1.	 Admiral Godfrey's unpublished typescript memoirs.
Mss. 66/104. Vol.5, part 1, P. 45, National Maritime
Museum, Greenwich.
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unremu.nerative course of action. Before Japan's intentions in the
Far East became fairly obvious Britain' s knowledge of Japanese naval
developments, other than straight forward paper strengths and so
forth, was flimsy in the extreme, and, although the Americans were
to acquire some valuable data pre-Pearl Harbour and develop their
"magics" to effect, 1 some vital pieces of information about Japanese
naval air capabilities went undetected which, coupled to organisational
problems, rendered much intelligence ineffectual. Admiral Godfrey
has written this: "Japan, behind an inpenetrable security wall, had
built up a fighting machine about whose composition and intentions
we knew very little. Both we and the Americans erred, and there is
2hardly anyone who is entitled to say: "I told you so." 	 That Britain
did eventually tackle this Japanese and other intelligence problems
before it was too late does not alter the chronic all-round failure of
British naval intelligence in the twenties and the early years of
appeasement, a failure whose surmounting might have produced more
realistic planning and even prevented warlike situations
1. The word "magics" was used to describe the decyphered,
Japanese radio signals, and the process whereby they had
been decyphered.
2. Godfrey MSS, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
Vol.5, Part 1. P.77.
320.
developing.
Naval intelligence in the Far East was org ai,i qed through a
joint services body, the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB). It
was based in Hong Kong until August, 1939, yhen it moved to Singapore
On the purely naval side there was established an O.I.C. type organi-
sation on the London model, and similar to the one established in
Malta for the Mediterranean. In November and December 94l
"operational" intelligence in the Far East was very good. Aerial
reconnaissance, HFIDF fixes, and cryptanalysis revealed the moves
of major Japanese units in SE.Asia. However, there was a British
intelligence "blind spot" in the central Pacific area. This was
considered an American responsibility and one, in any event, seemingl)
not directly affecting British interests. Before Pearl Harbour it is
true to say that J.I. C. appraisals in 1941 (based on FECB reports)
of Japanese intentions were sound in fact and reasoning. However, it
1.	 As far as Japan was concerned N.I.D. did not intensify its
activities until 1938. See, for example, Adm. 1/9589: Japan-.
ese landing operations in the Yangtse Delta - report N.I.D.
01333/1938. P.R. 0., and Adm. 1/9587: Military information
on the fighting in China and appreciation of Japan's military
capabilities. N.I.D. soon realised the dangers of the tor-.
pedo in Japanese hands - see Adm. 1/9649 - Foreign develop-
ment of the torpedo as an. air weapon. N.I.D. 0520/1938.
It also intensified activity to find better ways of resisting
possible aerial attacks, from Japan or Germany - see Adn-i.
1/9713 - control of anti-aircraft guns and searchlights by
infra-red cell radiation: report onUS experiments. N.I.D.
031/ 1938.
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is well known that the British government and the C. 0. S. feared the
consequences of a two-theatre war, which, materially, Britain was
incapable of fighting. Above all she feared a Japanese attack on
British possessions which would not necessarily provoke the Ameri-
cans and therefore not bring them into the war on the British side.
The argument that there was little Britain could do in any case
(despite, for example, excellent intelligence reports) must have
considerable credence. If criticism is really seriously to be levelled
then it must surely be aimed at the tragic circumstances surrounding
the fall of Singapore. Since June, 1937 the N.I.D. in London had
indicated that there was a strong possibility of a Japanese attack on
Hong Kong and Singapore within the next few years.
On the question of the threat to Singapore ample evidence
was afforded of a positive Japanese capability to attack and take
Singapore from the landward. The signs were there in 1940 in
abundance. On 22 September 1940 the Vichy government in France
signed an agreement with the Japanese over Indo-China. Within six
days they had begun to move in. By July, 1941 the Japanese occupied
Saigon, 600 miles from Singapore. Where British intelligence slipped
up was in its assessment of the Japanese mentality - its ability to do
the irrational. In February and March 1941 the results of combined
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British, American, and Dutch talks show that all three powers believed
Japan would not attack because this was mad - she would be taking on
far more than she could possibly handle. Of course this was true.
It was also as much a subject of debate in Tokyo as it was in FECB
in Singapore and the J.I. C. in London. There was a strong faction
in Tokyo which considered it a rash move to make a bid for S.E.Asia.
On the straightforward question of intelligence there can be
little doubt that the real failure in the Far East lay in the American
camp, not so much at Pearl Harbour, but in Washington itself. As
late as the summer of 1941 (when N.LD. sent a delegation to Washing-
ton) the 0. NI. had no proper 0.1. C., and certainly not one which had
full and direct liaison with the Operations Division of the U. S.Naval
Staff. Admiral Godfrey noted how much the Americans were against
setting up an 0.1. C., and he attributed this to a complete inability
on the American Naval Staffs part to co-operate with one another.
The rift between O.N.I. and Operations was indeed similar to that
between N.I.D. and the Operations Division of the British Admiralty
at the time of the Battle of Jutland. The point here is that a better
organised, more efficnt American 0.1. C. would undoubtedly have
prevented Pearl Harbour. How far this would have affected Japanese
plans for S.E.Asia is too speculative to seriously entertain, but it is
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certainly true that the less aggressive, more cautious faction in
Tokyo would have had more of a case with an American fleet seemingly
alert and invulnerable to a pre-emptive attack and, therefore, a
possible ally for the British and the Dutch in the very early, and
crucial, days of Japanese strikes in S.E. Asia.
Peacetime inteUigence is more vulnerable to the vagaries
of politics than in wartime, when military objectives are more clear-
cut and the professional naval staff have a greater say in events.
At the very worst, of course, there is some danger to the security
of the nation - intelligence may be used (or not used as the case may
be) in a totally unobjective way, or the very failure to ensure sufficient
intelligence is collected may jeopardise Britain's defence.
	 In the
1.	 A comparison of the area intelligence reports before, and
immediately after the Great War, with the sparse data
coming into the N.I.D., particularly from Germany, in
the thirties soon reveals a lack of political direction. These
reflect the run-down in the N.I.D. organisation. For N.I.D.
intelligence regarding Germany before and during the Great
War see Adin. 137/108-111, 302. An examination of the
public records pre-1936 reveals a complete absence of the
high quality area intelligence reports which flowed into
N.I.D. pre-1920. For the early period see Adm. 137/2026 -
intelligence in the Baltic, Adm., 137/ 2090, 498 - intelligence
in the Crimea, Adm. 13 7/382 482 - intelligence in the Black
Sea, for good and typical examples of N.LD.'s work.
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event of hostilities without the direction, without the organisation, the
great risk of defeat is run. For example, Donald 1vIaLachlan has this
to say on the chase of the Bismarck and British warships' capabilities
of defeating her in a running battle: "Wishful thinking, that ever
lurldng temptation for politicians dealing with military affairs, and
for serving officers involved in politics - is even more conspicuous
in this episode than in that of the U-boat sinkings."
The position in 1939 is in marked contrast with that in 1914.
For example, between 1912-1914 N.I.D. intensified its work in the
Mediterranean - what it produced for the political decision-makers was
first class. At a meeting of the C.LD. on 4th July 1912, to discuss
the "Strategical Position in the Mediterranean" Churchill produced
the N.I.D. data.	 He made these comments: "In addition to this
diagram, members would find on the table a comparative statement
prepared by the Naval Intelligence Department at the request of Lord
Morley (Lord President of the Council) showing the strength of these
powers in armoured ships of all kinds at the present time ......",
and so he goes on to discuss strategic implications, all in marked
1. Donald MmLachlan. Room 39. P. 135.
2. Cab. 38/20.21.
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contrast with the state of affairs two years before World War II
began. 1 N.t.D.'s technical intelligence pre-1914 was excellent
too - it had details of every major German unit, a situation which
would have embarrassed the N.I.D. of the late thirties, particularly
in the light of M&Lachlan's comments on the Bisniarck above. 2
Intelligence can only be as good as the organisation which
collects, analyses and interprets it. The onus must be divided
between both naval and political authorities to ensure that a satisfactory
organisation exists. In 1914, although certain techniques were still
in their infancy, especially the use of HF/DF and cryptographic
intelligence, there was a world-wide network of intelligence
1. For the Mediterranean see Adm. 119564, Mediterranean
Intelligence Report No.7. N.I.D. 0986/1938. This reveals
the comparatively low standard of intelligence reports in
1938.
2. See Policy and Operations in the Mediterranean 1912-1914,
Ed. E.W.R.Luniby, for the Navy Records Society, 1970:
P.353-55 - N.I.D. technical intelligence was submitted in
evidence at the Court of Enquiry and Court Martial of Rear-
Admiral Troubridge, 7th September - 9th November, 1914,
following the escape of the Breslau and Goeben. The data
from the NI.D, files was excellent, especially regarding
the fire-control systems, and range-finders of the German
ships.
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officers.	 Despite the N.I. D. s failure to locate certain German
units in 1914, intelligence on the whole worked well. When war broke
out for example, naval intelligence on the China station worked like
clockwork. Admiral Jerram, as a result of HF/DF fixes and port
intelligence reports from his intelligence officers and British and
Australian consuls knew the general whereabouts of most major
German units. 2 In the last two years bre World War U there was
a headlong rush to establish some resemblance of an effective
operational intelligence organisation. As already mentioned in
Chapter One its heart became the O.I.C. (Operational Intelligence
Centre).	 Its establishment was followed by a welter of other
1. In the pre-1914 period the N.I.D. had divided the world into
intelligence areas, corresponding approximately, but by no
means exactly, to the limits of the naval stations. Each area
naval intelligence officer worked in close harmony with
Foreign Office officials and the principal officials in British
ports. In time of war port intelligence officers also had to
control merchant shipping. Before war this duty was envis-
aged as offering suggestions to ship& masters as regards
their route and procedure and the precautions they should
take to lessen the chances of capture. They could close trade
routes if they deemed them unsafe. Each area naval intelli-.
gence officer was under the command of the Admiral
commanding the station.
2. See the Naval Staff Monographs for World War L Vol. 5.
P. 41-43. Naval Library, Empress State building, Earl's
Court.
3. See Adru. 1/10226 - Development of the Operational Intelli-.
gence Centre at the Admiralty, N.I.D. 004/1939.
327.
sections and the development of plans for an expanded N.I.D.
Throughotit the world the N.I.D. was having to streamline its organi-
sation and prepare its elf for the inevitable war. 2
This sudden impetus which had to be given to the whole
N.I.D. machine reflects the total lack of political and naval foresight
as to the great necessity and value of long-range, and immediate,
operational intelligence. However, the Americans were not even as
well off as the British - Godfrey himself, with Ian Fleming, went to
Washington as the representative of the Chiefs-of-Staff and the Joint
InteUigence Committee to persuade them to establish an American
1. See Adm. 1/9792 - Naval Intelligence in Wartime. N.I.D.
89/1939, and Adm. 1/ 10218 - Re-organisationof the N.I.D.
to meet wartime conditions. Adm. 1/10224, N,I.D. 01113/
1939 gives details of the formation of the N.I.D.'s Infor-
mation Section, Adm. 1/9525, N.I.D. 001410/1938 deals
with the establishment of HF/DF stations covering the
important trade routes in the South Atlantic, Adm. 1/10465
covers the appointment of an additional D. D. N.I., and
Adm. 1/10471 and Adm. 1/10014 detail the organisation of
the N.I.D.ts press and publicity section, and the institution
of a press division, and the relationship between this and the
Ministry of Information; the increase in personnel in N.I.D.
in 1939 and 1940, and the granting of R.N.V.R. commissions
(Special Branch) are detailed in Adm. 1/10946.
2. See, for example, Adm. 1/9567 which deals with the re-
organisation of N. ILD. 's intelligence staff in Cape Town.
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0.1. C. and foster co-operation. 1 Fortunately for the later Allied
cause President Roosevelt listened to Godfrey.
Some Political Ramifications and Aspects of the Role and Work of
Naval Intelligence
Intelligence in the Royal Navy always faced the probeim of
finding the right level at which to aim its data, irrespective of any
qualitative analysis of the data. The latter was a problem in itself -
the apparently trivial piece of intelligence one day might be the key to
a major policy decision the next. The recognition of this was the
less difficult of the two. The Americans found this at Pearl Harbour.
Placing information in the right hands so that the right action is taken
calls not only for accurate perception that must by nature be intuitive
and speculative, rather than logical and grounded in reality, but also
1.	 The Senate enquiry following the disaster at Pearl Harbour
was to reveal the confusion over the handling of vital
intelligence, which in terms of the quality of coUection
revealed the excellence of Captain Kirk's 0.N.I. - despite
the competitiveness and the lack of a unified government
policy for G2 (military intelligence), 0.N.I. and the F.B.I.,
and the antagonism shown by the United States Navy's
Operations Division, (very reminiscent of N.I.D. at the
time of Jutland), it had managed to produce some first
class data.
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for the kind of political organisation which easily becomes sensitive
to well-timed intelligence. If it is neither accurate, relevant, or
well-timed the loss of credibility reduces intelligence to the level of
crystal-gazing. In the pre-1914 period, when the D.N.I. was the
heart of the growing Naval Stall one can perceive within naval
intelligence an obvious ability always to gain a hearing, at the
appropriate level, dependent upon the value of the information, whether
it was well-ascertained fact or the current opinion of the D.N.I.
on British foreign and defence policy. In the absece of administrative
and hierarchical constraints from within the Service, the Civil Service
and government, the pre-1914 N.I.D. found its own levels of operation
and usefulness. Under Hall the N.I.D. had full reign, and one of the
major reasons why it was able to have such a great influence on the
war at sea was that it was unfettered by a bureaucratic machine, part
of which might offer a challenge to its own autonomy.
With the proliferation of defence organisations which came
in the wake of peace, rather than as the forerunners t4 war, the N.I,D.
with diminished power and staff, found it increasingly more difficult
to hit the right chords at the right time. The result was the almost
total absence of good intelligence, or the recognition of the need to
acquire it, in the major political-military decisions affecting the Royal
Navy in the inter-war period.
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This problem is highlighted by such questions as the role
of the Royal Navy in the Far East in the 1920s and the position of
Singapore. As early as 1921 the C.I.D. had far-sightedly reviewed
the possibility of war in the Far East, and they decided Singapore
should be used as a naval base. Within ten years they were to be
proven correct with Japan's invasion of Manchuria on 18th September
1931. Singapore, offering facilities as a fuelling and repair base,
would be the centre of any concentration of naval power in the Far
East. Certain general facts could be ascertained by the sub-
committees of the C.LD. without expert knowledge, such as it would
take the Fleet four to six weeks to reach the Far East in an emergency.
Assuming Britain could not permanently keep a large Fleet on station
in the Far East, and that the Japanese would try to eliminate Singapore
once war broke out, some measure of security had to be provided in
the western Pacific before Britain could muster stronger forces -
C.I.D.'s answer was the stationing of fast light cruisers and large
submarines, with great endurance, on the station. So the C. I. D.
continued in its speculations and deliberations, the Singapore issue
being reviewed annually from 1925 onwards.
	 They made estimates
of the number of shore-based maritime aircraft which would be
1.	 See Adm. 1l6/241b - the 199 meeting of the C.I.D., 2nd
April, 1925.
331.
needed in a war in the Far East.
What is significant is the complete absence of intelligence
appreciations to support C.I.D. decision-making. Committees such
as the C.I.D. could surely draw sound conclusions, made up as it
was of distinguished professionals, but despite this, without sound
intelligence, it could not justifiably rely on experience and military
logic and probabilities, when further data, often quite easily available,
would leave no one in doubt, not least of all the politicians. Even
when firmly entrenched in the political arena the fate of intelligence,
whatever its qulaity, will always remain in the balance.
In the mid thirties intelligence estimated that each year
Hitler was spending as much on armaments as the whole British
budget, though between November, 1936, and February 1938, there
were major delays in re-armament. Some, such as Eden, thought
re-armament would frighten Hitler. Others disagreed. Intelligence
may be accurate, and pertinent, but it does not mean at all that it
will influence events. While the Far Eastern War waged between
November 1936, and January 1938, with British and American ships
being sunk in the Yangtse in December 1937, Britain's re-armament
remained moribund, even though years previous the C.I.D., N.I.D.,
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and any reasonable man with an informed knowledge of British and
Japanese naval strengths, might have predicted that Britain just could
not afford to send major fleet units to the Far East in the event of
disaster. However, could intelligence have made allowances for the
e,dent of Japanese fanaticism, or the peculiar quality of Hitler' s mind?
Furthermore, some facts, even though ascertainable to intelligence,
must by nature pose dangerous questions for the politician. It is now
known that at the time of Munich Hitler was concerned about the
mobilisation of the British Fleet. Raeder visited him and warned
him about the implications of this. How far such information, in the
hands of the democracies, could have swayed things, must remain
in the realms of historical conjecture. What would seem certain is
that such information would have made Chamberlai&s task more
difficult than it was, in terms of his own outlook and policy towards
Germany, rather than those of his opponents. Chamberlain might
have been no better off than the modern historians who still debate
the nature of Hitler's power and the German state under the Nazis,
such as the interpretations of A. 3. P. Taylor, Hugh Trevor-Roper,
Elizabeth Wiskemann, and Alan Bullock. The politician, faced with
realities, and the necessity to make decisions, uses intelligence as
he sees fit. In late 1940 Admiral Godfrey was able to tell Churchill
quite unequivocally that a German invasion was off. Churchill,
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nonetheless, continued to publicly state it was still highly probable -
he hoped to keep British morale high, by the threat of a German
invasion, and to help persuade the Americans that Britain dearly
needed American help.
The timing of intelligence is vital. At a meeting of the
C.I.D. on 23rd August, 1911, the decision was made to use a
continental strategy at the beginning of the war, with the despatch of
the B.E.F. N.I.D. could offer nothing to counter this. By 1915/
1916 not only had the shortcomings of that policy been recognised,
but also the reckless abandonment of pre-war strategic appraisals
was finally realised, but regrettably too late to affect Britain' s
commitment in N. W. Europe.	 Even if the timing of intelligence is
1.	 See the papers of Admiral Sir Frederick Tower Hamilton -
intelligence reports, secret and confidential, including
summaries of the international situation by the N. I. D.
HTN/122(c), nos. 12-23, 1915/1916, National Maritime
Museum, Greenwich.
Tower-Hamilton, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick b. 1856;
entered RN 1869; Commander 1892; Captain 1898; Rear-
Admiral 1907; commanded fifth cruiser squadron Atlantic
Fleet 1909-1911; second and third fleets 1911-1913;
Second Sea Lord 1914.
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good others may win the day. On the question of the capture of
Iceland in World War It (10th May 1940) the N.I.D. won the day.
Although neutral Admiral Godfrey considered its possession by the
Allies a strategic necessity. The Foreign Office opposed him, arguing
that it was too violent a breach of international law. The D.N.I.
convinced Churchill. Irrespective of such controversy the worst
fate for intelligence is the total disregard by the politicians of the
need to keep intelligence well-informed of their next move, or those
of their allies. The N.I.D. was never badly ignored, unlike their
German counterparts. The Abwehr and the German High Command
were given no warning, for instance, of Japan' s impending attack
on Pearl Harbour, 7th December, 1941.
It may now seem a truism to say that it is absolutely
essential for the politician to have intelligence to help him make
political - military decisions. It was not so in the pre-1945 era.
One statesman, Harry S. Truman, has written: "The war taught
us this lesson - that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that
would make the information available where it was needed and when
it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form. If it is not
intelligent and understandable, it is useless.Itt British inteUlgence
1.	 Harry S. Truman: Memoirs. Doubleday and Co., 1958.
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in the thirties was not merely woefully lacking in itself, but the
political arm failed to make demands upon it, and worst still, when
presented with intelligence, does not appear to have acted upon it.
At the time of the Italian invasion of Albania Churchill bitterly
complained of the dispositions of the Mediterranean Fleet, and on
13th April, 1939, he challenged the government in the House of
Commons: "After 25 years experience in peace and war, I believe
the British Intelligence to be the finest of its kind in the world. Yet
we have seen, both in the subjugation of Bohemia and on the occasion
of the invasion of Albania, that Ministers of the Crown had no inkling,
or at any rate no conviction, of what was coming. I cannot believe
that this was the fault of the British Secret Service."
Whatever Churchill' s motives, or the weight of his comments
in terms of their accuracy, he raises the fundamental issues - the
availability or otherwise of intelligence, and the use or misuse to
which intelligence mar be put by politicians. In the same Commons
speech Churchill made this further critical point: "It seems to me
that Ministers run the most tremendous risks if they allow the
information collected by the Intelligence Department and sent to them,
I am sure, in good time, to be sifted and coloured and reduced in
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consequence and importance, and if they ever get themselves into
a mood of attaching weight only to those pieces of information which
accord with their earnest and honourable desire that the peace of
the world should remain unbroken." 1
 Churchill's words echo the
pitfalls for a nation, and the frustrations for the military, if
intelligence is abused or ignored. Churchill seldom erred on this
point. His "Plan Catherine", designed to gain control of the Baltic,
frightened the C. O.S. and the Admiralty in particular. Intelligence
soon led Churchill to scuttle his plans - Britain could not operate
from any Baltic port (Sweden was neutral), and the menace from
German U-boats and mines, and the Luftwaffe, were too threatening
to hazard British naval units. 2
Throughout the twenties and thirties there can be seen an
apparent failure in the dialogue between intelligence and those in
power. No government, (made aware of the tactical and strategic
advantages of maritime air power, and possessing data on Japanese
air capabilities and intentions and despite the Air Ministry-Admiralty
disputes, Treasury economy, and government changes) could have
1. This speech is recorded in W.S.Churchil: The Secon4
World War. Vol. I. P. 2 75-277.
2. Ibid. P. 363, 551.
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delayed the re-equipping and expansion of the Fleet Air Arm.
Similarly with the naval treaties and conferences. Captain Roskill
has made this pertinent point about the Geneva Conference: " .
neither the State Department nor the Foreign Office seems to have
made a thorough study of the basic strategy which was bound to
condition the other nation' s outlook and attitude when their representa-
tives met at the conference table. Thus the immediate head-on
collision at Geneva apparently took both departments by surprise."
There was, in effect, a total absence of intelligence appreciations.
The public records do not challenge this conclusion. Pre-1914 the
D.N.I. had given, and was expected to give, professional advice and
data on all major issues. In December, 1908, Slade represented
the Admiralty at the International Maritime Conference in London
In a memo to the First Lord and the First Sea Lord on 16th July,
1908, Slade wrote: "It is not safe to embark on any line of action
on supposition only, we must have actual knowledge before we can
act effectively. Therefore one of the most important developments
that we must make in our organisation is that of the Intelligence
service, with special reference to the trade of the country and to
the occurrences which are taking place on the trade routes.
1. S. 1W. Roskifl: Naval Policy between the Wars. P. 514-515.
2. The Slade MSS, Reel 3, National Maritime Museum, Green-
wich.
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Twenty years later, and beyond, Slade' s demand was still so patently
relevant, but was, after ten years of peace, to be found wanting.
The politician has, by the sheer possession of intelligence,
or by, at least, the possession of an intelligence organisation known to
be efficient, a political weapon in his hands when dealing with either
actual allies, potential allies, or possible enemies. The Americans
were greatly impressed with the N.I.D.'s Operational Intelligence
Centre in 1940. Admiral Godfrey, assisted by Ian Fleming, played
a central role in wooing the Americans before they came into the war.
He met Roosevelt, having convinced Churchill and the Admiralty
that if there was to be intelligence co-operation between Britain and
the U. S.A., it would be necessary to reveal to Roosevelt and his
intelligence staff British naval secrets and methods. Godfrey saw
]his as an informal way of cementing Anglo-American relations and
making them more effective allies when they must, eventually, ente r
the war. He felt a working relationship had to be started as soon as
possible. Naval intelligence co-operation provided a common ground -
the American and British naval staffs were linked, via their attaches,
by a shrewd diplomatic game played by the N.I.D. Godfrey was able
to convert Colonel William Donovan, the founder of the 0. S. S., to
N.I.D.'s way of thinking and organisation. In the summer of 1941
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Donovan presented to the President his first draft for an intelligence
organisation incorporating political warfare, sabotage and guerila
warfare, with a special section inspired by what he had seen of the
British commandos.
Intelligence between allies will tend to be two-way, bt
definition. A strong alliance will yield a free and total transfer of
information - Godfrey realised this. When he led the mission to
Washington in June 1941, he went with the object in mind of complete
co-operation between the N.I.D. and the United States Office of
Naval Intelligence (O.N.I.), and not just liaison. Godfrey knew that
the American cypher experts had cracked the Japanese signals, and
equally important, he realised that with America still neutral her
agents could continue to collect information in enemy-occupied Europe.
He aimed at a free exchange, with no "trading tt in intelligence. There
is no doubt that Godfrey's visit was one of the forerunners to formal
alliance and the first stage in the process towards allied integrated
intelligence, which was to reach its zenith in Eisenhower' s Supreme
Headquarters Intelligence Staff. Indirectly Godfrey inspired the
creation of the O.S.S., from which grew in 1947 the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, (the C.I.A.).
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Intelligence which is known to be strong by a possible
aggressor may, in itself, deter. Not only is it an insurance against
surprise, but the knowledge that a nation has an effective warning
system must also remove from the enemy's hand an ace card. The
fact that accurate intelligence is possessed does not guarantee a
particular course of action. At worst it may be married to a
current political viewpoint, or it may be ignored, as with the
warnings of the impending attack on Pearl Harbour.
The way in which the political arm uses intelligence, as
with any other defence data, is ultimately outside of the direct
influence of the military authorities. What a Naval Staff may
consider disastrous, either in the form of a political decision, or
political change, either of party or policy, cannot gain legitimate
or legal expression. The totalitarian states found this to be equally
true as the democracies. Naval intelligence and a Naval Staff may
see things in far different colours that their political masters. This
was nowhere more true than with Raeder's Kriegsrnarine. Raeder
knew what the Royal Navy' s capabilities were, its roles in a future
war, its deployment, and how he could hit it hardest. His intelligence
and planners were well-tuned to how the Third Reich could best hit
Great Britain at sea: "Britain imported about 50m. tons of goods
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annually and her very existence depended on the keeping open of her
overseas supply lines. An effective attack on Britain's overseas
supplies therefore had to be the main aim of any German naval
building programme. For this purpose we needed powerful surface
craft capable of operating in the Atlantic ..... because of our tin-
favourable geographical position, and our lack of overseas bases,
in addition to submarines and cruisers, task forces consisting
of battle cruisers and ordinary cruisers were to be used against
Britain's overseas supply lines. In this way the British Navy would
have to provide stronger escorts for convoys than the usuallight naval
forces which were sufficient protection against submarines and
auxiliary cruisers. Powerful ships would have to be used and this
would mean that Britain's heavy naval units would be spread out".
A sound prognosis, retrospectively, based upon 'rhat is now known to
have been accurate German Naval intelligence data. What Raeder
quickj discovered was that his plan for attacking the Royal Navy would
have to fit into Hitler' $ time scale and his wider conceptions and plans
for a war in the west. As such, Raeder' 8 intelligence and short and
long term plans, would be thrown to the winds - the type of data
which previously had enabled Raeder to soundly advise Hitler and
1.	 Grand Adniiral. Raeder Struggle for the Sea. P. 127-128.
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von Ribbentrop on the terms of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement,
was ignored. "I was never drawn into matters of home or foreign
policy except when the interests of the Navy were directly concerned,
and not always then, as in 1939 when relations with Britain became
critical." Raeder's plans for independent naval air power, 2 and
his timing for a naval war against Britain, in terms of the German
building programme (1945 or 1946, certainly not 939)3 were ignored.
The sound reasoning, derived from some basic, but accurate and
very relevant, intelligence, about Britain's naval capabilities, and
probable policy, were considered irrelevant by Hitler.
For the senior officer, and particularly the head of an
intelligence organisation, such as the N.I.D., bad political decisions
must pose the great problem of keeping themselves and the Service
clear of all political disputes and upheavals, yet at the same time
keeping the Service going along lines which might be totally anathema
to them. At worst therefore, the Armed Services, with their own
knowledge, must be party, constitutionally, to a policy which may
prove to be completely detrimental to the interests of the state.
1.	 Ibid. P.98.
2. Ibid. P. 89-90.
3. Ibid. P. 124-126.
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tn a system of alliances the worst aspects of bad political -
military decision-making may be avoided. Intelligence can stand on
its own, in Godfrey's phrase	 to resist the temptation .... of.....
allowing .. ..... the truth to be bent by what people would like to hear
of what fits in with a policy to which we are committed or a pet project
The strength of an allied intelligence committee, or many.. . ...
other committees for that matter, lay in its ability to withstand brow-
beating and hierarchical pressures (perhaps stemming from the rank
structure of the Services and the need to obey senior officers) and to
maintain therefore in the critical atmosphere of a group of intelligent
men an independent viewpoint.
On the topic of Allied intelligence co-operation in World War
II one distinguished intelligence worker, the American Allen Dulles,
has written: "On the Allied side, in opposition to the common enemy,
there was a collaboration between intelligence services that is without
paxallel in history and which had a most welcome outcome". 2 John
1. Memoirs of Admiral JH. Godrey MS 66/104, Vol. 5, part I,
P. 40, The National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
2. Allen Dulles: The Craft of InteUigence, P.4.
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Godfrey was the architect of this. As early as January, 1939, he had
visited the French D.N.I., Admiral de Vilaire, and both had agreed
to exchange information about intelligence centres abroad and to devise
a sim4ile method of communication. Godfrey writes: "We were both
naturally interested in the movements of German, Italian, and Japanese
men of war and merchant ships. This involved revealing to the French
our reporting system in foreign ports - a system of which they must hav
been conscious for many years." 1 Other emissaries which Godfrey
sent from the N.I.D. were equally successful, particularly at
convincing the Americans. Godfrey has this to 8ay about the genius
of the U-boat tracking room, Roger Winn, whom he sent to the United
States: "So successful was he that it seemed only natural, when the
United States became an ally, that he should go to Washington to
induce the American Navy to adopt an organisation similar to ours.
This he did with remarkable success. He had the redoubtable Ernie
King eating out of his hand, and was actually asked by King to go to
New York to persuade the American Admiral there to fall in with our
ideas. This mission he also brought to a successful conclusion.
1. Memoirs of Admiral J.Hjodfrey. MSS 66/104. Vol.5.
Part I, P. 15, the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
2. Ibid. P. 12.
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Just as in World War I, when most of the results of Room 40's work
were conveyed to the French, Russians and Italians, so too in World
War II the interchange of intelligence had a strong binding political
force. Churchill, for instance, was well aware of the need to exchange
intelligence - he knew the Ame ricans could provide Britain with
timely data, and vice-versa. He writes: "From the end of 1940 the
Americans had pierced the vital Japanese cyphers, and were decoding
large numbers of their military and diplomatic telegrams. In the
secret American circles they were referred to as "magics". The
"magics' t were repeated to us, but there was an inevitable delay -
sometimes of two or three days - before we got them. We did not
know therefore at any given moment all that the President or Mr.
Hull knew. I made no complaint of this. " Fortunately for the
United States and Great Britain the U.S. Navy and Army had studied
the problems of cryptanalysis since the late 1920s, with particular
emphasis on Japan. By 1941, the year of Pearl Harbour, the
important Japanese naval and diplomatic codes and cyphers had been
broken. As a result the U.S.N. and later the Intelligence Staff of
Admiral Mountbatten' s S. E, Asian Command, (Colonel Lamplough,
Chief Staff Officer, Intelligence; formerly 0. -I. -C. the Far Eastern
Section in the N.I.D., and D.D.N.I., (foreign)), 2 and the
1. W,S,Churchjfl: The Second World War. Vol.3. P.532-533.
2. Godfrey, P. 14.
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intelligence staff of the British Pacific Fleet, formed much later in
the war, were frequently in possession of evidence of imminent
Japanese action in the Pacific theatre before it took place. Intelligence
co-operation called for a mutual trust and confidence which was, by the
very nature of the task and material used, fully demanding and binding
on the Anglo-American alliance.
Naval Intelligence and Politics in the Inter-War Period
Before a more detailed analysis is made of specific items
regarding political-military decisions and intelligence, it is important
that the position, role, and work of the N.I.D. in the crucial inter-
war period, (as they apply to political questions), are now made
clear, in addition to what has been said earlier on the general growth
of naval intelligetEe.
Naval intelligence, like every other aspect of defence from
the late twenties to the late thirties, suffered from the axe of economy,
wielded arbitrarily in the face of principles which had traditionally
governed British foreign and defence policies. The contrast with the
pre-1914 era is marked in the extreme. The warnings of men such
as Churchill and Hankey, and indeed a forthright First Sea Lord
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himself, Chatfield, were drowned in a sea of vacillation and military
half-measures. In the atmosphere which prevailed, where politicians
were prone to moralise rather than to take actions, which although
painful, were absolutely vital in a world going slowly mad, an
organisation such as the N.I.D., already decimated after World War I,
could not hope to influence until it both possessed the machinery, and
also until the need for thorough intelligence had been fully accepted
by those in power. The Staff College teaching appears to have been
intellectually lethargic, and largely irrelevant - nothing concrete
seems to have emerged from the courses, and co-operation between
the various Naval staff Departments never materialised. 1 In 1934
the D.N.I., Rear Admiral Dickens, suggested joint appreciations
between Plans and the N.I.D., (Godfrey was D.D.Plans, and Captain
G. A. Scott D.D.N.I. at the time), but the whole matter was dropped.
The tenor of Godfrey's memoirs for the 1930s is that the Naval Staff
just did not wish to be over-concerned with intelligence, insofar
as any data which might challenge current political appreciations and
naval strategy would not be handled effectively by Downing Street
or the Foreign Office. This was particularly true over possible
1.	 This is certainly the overaU impression left by Godfrey's
remarks on the Naval Staff College teaching in the inter-
war period in several of the volumes of his unpublished
Memoirs.
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German treachery regarding the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. 1
The N.I.D. was a backwater, until the real threat of a war
shook everyone into action. 2 It was not until the founding of the
O.I.C. that the N.LD. came to play a real role., 3 The N.I.D.
1. On 23rd December, 1936, Captain Troubridge, the Naval
Attache in Berlin, sent his annual report to he Foreign
Office, via his ambassador, Sir E. Phipps, who submitted
Troubridge's work as an enclosure to his own report to Mr.
Eden, dated 12th January, 1937. The DSN.L. and the C. -in-
c. Home Fleet received Trou.bridge's original report, (he
sent them individual copies), in which he said: "The Anglo-
German Naval Agreement was one of the master strokes of
policy which has characterised Germany's dealings with her
ex-enernies since the war. When the time is ripe, as history
shows, it will unquestionably go the same way as other
agreements: but the time is not yet." Phipps may well have
thought that his naval subordinate had overstretched him-
self, and should keep to naval matters, but whatever the
reason, he omitted, what in retrospect, were vital comments
from Troubridge's report to the Foreign Office. He may
surely have been right to censure Troubridge's report.
This would not have precluded Phipps drawing the same con-
clusions and including them in his own report. See Cab.
357/18.
2. As far as the N.I.D. was concerned this was confirmed in a
conversation with Vice-Admiral Sir N.E.Denning,KBE, GB,
on 11th August, 1971.
3. Captain Clayton's teamin the O.I.C. was first class. From
early on they plotted enemy submarines, surface craft, and
merchant ships. The consular shipping officers in the ports
throughout the world reported details of ships to the N.I.D.-
time of departure, destination, possible course, cargo, ship
capabilities, weapons, and so on. Hence the success of the
blockade very early on in World War LI. In 1945 the O.I.C.
War Diary was destroyed, on Admiralty orders - this emer-
ged in conversation with Captain S. W. Roskill on 7th July
1971.
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prepared, for instance, under Captain John Creswell's direction,
Convoy Instructions and handbobks for Merchant Navy masters and
officers in 1937/1938, in keeping with the C.I.D. t s Defence of Trade
Report, 2nd December, 1937. Unfortunately none of the former
documents seem to have survived. 1 Even so it was too late to re-
dress certain failures and deficiencies, the most serious of all
being the failure to continue the great work of Room 40 1 s crypt-
analysts.	 In 1939 Britain did not possess any of the crucial
German naval codes. There had been major failures pre-1914,
but none can really compare with the paucity of knowledge about
German naval codes in 1939.
1. This was confirmed by Captain Roskill.
2. See Adm. 116/3637 - intelligence deficiencies revealed
in the 1938 crisis.
3. HF/DF was still in its infancy in 1914. However, it was
rapidly developed, in conjunction with high quality
cryptanalysis. In 1914 there were no real plans for a
detailed convoy system, and convoy tactics - Hankey had
to force this upon the Admiralty, and no work had been
done on the use of asdic, or the use of air, sea, and shore
sightings in the hunt for U-boats.
4. This statement was fully endorsed in conversation with
both Admiral Denning and Captain Roskil.
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In the light of World War II, the meagre and low quality
intelligence the N.I.D. produced in the inter-war period, certainly
pre-1936! 1937, had, in any event, little influence upon naval policy,
and certainly none at all upon higher defence planning and foreign
policy. The last two years of peace, and then the immediate need
for operational intelligence when war came, witnessed an unprecedented
expansion of the N.I.D. Nothing like it had occurred before, even
in the halcyon daysof Admiral Hall. Reports began to flow, organi-
sation was expanded, and thought given to the intelligence requirements
2	 3
war would bring, and staff recruitment was expanded. 	 Furthermore
technical intelligence and liaison within N.I.D. mushroomed4 and
N.I.D. concern over any leakage of data, at whatever level, became
1. See, for example, Adrn. 1/9552 - N.I.D. report. Combined
Operations exercises, 516 July, 1938.
2. See Adm. 1/10212, N.I.D. 0827/1939 - the new intelligence
organisation for the Mediterranean station. Adm. 1/10220,
N.I.D. 03971 1939, N.I.D. reporting and control work in
South America; Adm. 1/10214, N.I.D. 0810/1939 - possi-
bility of N.I.D. establishing coast-watching and intelligence
organisation in Eire. With war imminent these documents
reflect the rush to fill large and obvious gaps.
3. See Adm. 1/9679, N.I.D. 001148/1939 - officers employed
on operational intelligence.
4. See as good examples of the score of areas N.I.D. began
to investigate: Adm. 1/10222, N.I.D. 02258/1939 - the use by
German submarines of a sonoperopb.on; Adm. 1/10176, N.I.D.
02137/1939 - N.I.D. investigation into the possible use of
midget submarines; and Adm. 1/9741, N.LD. 2057/1938 -
magnetic telephones in U.S. ships.
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acute, 1 and with this came an intensification of navl security
and the inevitable censorship which total war demanded. 2
All of these moves reflect the demands of a coming war.
They also show, relatively speaking, how inactive the N.I.D. had
been for many years. For the first time, since Hall's day, the
N.I.D. was being consuld over Fleet dispositions. 	 The documents
speak of a new zest, a feeling of purpose, and of the development of
an elan, so patently lacking for years, within the N.I.D. The data
began to pour in, in a manner and from sources reminiscent of
World War I. There were some early bulls scored by the N.I.D.4
Intelligence rapidly had operational successes. 	 N.I.D. began to
1. See, for example, Adm. 1/10227, N.LD. 00894/1939 -
Anglo-German Naval Conference; Singapore - leakage of
mb rm ation.
2. See Adrn. 1/10217, N.I.D. 0219/ 1939 - censorship of tele-
phone calls from the Forth and the Clyde areas to Ireland;
Adni.1/10066, N.I.D. 01897/1939, N.I.D.'s proposed
censorship of outgoing neutral mails.
3. See, for example, Adm. 1/9922, initial dispositions of the
Mediterranean Fleet in the event of war.
4. See Adm. 1/1.0228, N.LPD. 3844/1939 - a report of an inter-
view between Field Marshall H. Goring and the Swedish
Captain C. Florman; this came via Stockholm on 3rd Novem-
ber, 1939 to Rear-Admiral H. Boyes, the Attache in Oslo,
to the N.I.D,,; and Adm. 1/10958,N,I.D,45001l940, N.I.D.
interrogation of the crew of the German SS Schoke.
5. Adm.1/9759,N,I.D, 02356/1939, intelligence retarding the
Battle of the River Plate and the German Battle CruiserAdmiral Graf Spee' s refuge in Montevideo Harbour.
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exert an influence on all aspects of naval planning and operations,
as well as numerous joint Service committees and organisations.
In 1938 a joint Service committee was set up to work out an amphibious
warfare doctrine, and the types of landing craft that would be needed.
At this time amphibious operations were still undeveloped; the N.I.D.
had given no thought to them pre-1938. The spedre of the Dadanelles
and the possible use of air power to defeat such operations still hung
over such operations. N.I.D. helped in the formulation of a doctrine, 1
and an Inter-Service Training and Development Centre (I. S. T.D.C.),
led by ReftIAdmira1 I.E. H.Maund, conducted a number of t±ial
assaults, as well as lecturing to the staff colleges and senior officers
courses at Greenwich. Tenders were put out for the design and
construction of the various types of craft needed.
N.I.D. played no small part in the development of amphibious
warfare, just as it did in the founding of organisations such as the
1.	 In 1938 the doc&ine consisted of achieving tactical surprise
by small, fast landing craft, landed far off-shore, at night
or at dawn, to take and keep a beachhead, to be reinforced
by larger L. C. s, artillery and tanks, so as to secure the
hinterland, followed by a steady build-up from ships coming
close inshore. There was no mention of air cover, or
naval gunfire support.
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Future Operations Enemy Section (F,O.ES.), on 1st January, 1941.
This sprang from the dearth of enemy intelligence alter western
Europe was overrun in the summer of 1940. This was a joint Service
body with additional representation from the Foreign Office and the
Ministry of Economic Warfare (M.E.W.). One of its first tasks was
to provide a forecast from the German point of view of their strategy
for the spring of 1941. F.O.E.S. was later replaced by the Advanced
Planning Enemy Section (A.P.E.S.), consisting of the same members,
in which N.I.D. had a considerable stake.
Such then was the pace of change within the N.I.D. as
crisis alter crisis brewed in Europe and war finally came. Naval
intelligence emerged from the wilderness to re-assert itself, but
in a dominantly operational, rather than politica1-militar 4or quasi-
pDlitical way. Fortunately for the Allied cause Nazi intelligence was
following a diametrically opposed course to the N.LD.'s.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Naval Intelligence and Specific Political Decisions
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It is now commonplace for governments to be greatly
dependent upon their intelligence agencies for the supply of data
and appreciation to assist them in the formulation of foreign policy
and the contingencies this creates for defence planning. One of the
most marked contrasts between the N.I.D. of the pre-1919 era and
that of the inter-war period is the great influence the former had
upon high-level policy-making in the Admiralty, C. I. D., and the
Cabinet, and the almost non-existent influence it wielded during the
period of peace, appeasement, and the prelude to war. Let us
examine this contention in detail.
Foreign Policy, Strategy, and Naval Intelligence pre-1914.
Successive D.N.I.s and their staffs from Custance
(D.N.I. 1899-1902) until 1919 had a primary role in British policy-
making. In 1901, on the question of a Russian threat to the Mediter-
ranean, Custance argued to the First Lord and the First Sea Lord
that Britain would have to reconcile herself to Lacing the Russian
Black Sea Fleet in the Mediterranean, rather than blockading the
Straits, in order to maintain the route to India. In a memorandum
of 21st March, 1901, which reached Cabinet level, he wrote:
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"Great Britain alone, with France actively hostile or even doubtful
cannot at the present time prevent a Russian occupation of Constanti-
nople and the DardaneUes." Custance also firmly believed that
Austria and Italy would assist Britain against Russia, since they
had a mutual interest in ensuring the Russians did not occupy
Constantinople. 2 At the same time as diving Fisher all manner of
data and advice as his right hand man on the emergent Naval Staff,
Custance gave Selborne, the First Lord, data for the report he had
1. Adni. 116/86613.
2. This point was to be successfully argued by later D.N.I. s
until the international situation changed. On 7th February,
1903, the D.N.I., Prince Louis of Battenburg, (DN.I.
1902-1905) argued to the C.I.D. that whether Russia had
control of the Straits or whether she had not, she could
not hope "to effect anything serious, be it in Egypt or else-
where, until her fleet has fought and beaten our fleet."
Battenburg' s conclusions were unanimously accepted and
passed on to the Cabinet. Cab. 2/1 ZB.
3. For example, when Fisher required to know what would
be involved in the defence of Gibraltar should Spain
become hostile he turned to his D.N.I. for full details,
and a plan. Custance furnished it, based on 10, 000
troops. Adi. 1/7516.
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to submit to the Cabinet with regard to naval policy in the Far East
and the implications of an Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902). Selborne,
along with Fisher, and Custance, and then Battenburg, were able to
put up a strong case for the end of isolation and an Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, insofar as it would prevent Britain from being out-numbered
in battleship strength in the Far East. 1 Nothing is more indicative
than the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of the influence of the N.I.D. during
these years.
The N.I.D. became deeply involved in British policy
towards Morocco. In 1902 the Foreign Office became concerned
over the possibility of a German naval base at Tangiers. Neither
Battenburg, or his opposite number in the Army, Sir William
Nichol5on, the D. M. I., were alarmed. With considerable astuteness,
and influence, Battenburg wrote the Foreign Office: "It would seem to
be advantageous to this country that Germany should have an interest
1. The great fear for the Admiralty in 1902, as indeed in the
1930s, was the problem of providing reinforcements in the
Far East at the expense of the forces in European waters.
An Anglo-Japanese combination would, by contrast, have
a superiority of eleven to nine and might even allow Britain
to strengthen her home fleets. See Z.S.Steiner: Great
Britain and the Creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
Journal of Modern History. No. 31(1959).
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in the Fez-Tangier section of the railway, because she would act
as a counterpoise to France and, as against ourselves, her position
there would be weak because we should be between her force in the
North Sea and any detachment she might have in the Straits of
1Gibraltar."
During the Moroccan crisis, April-December, 1905 the
D.N.I., Ottley, (1905-1907) is still seen to be as influential,
although he has changed tack. On 1st May 1905, he told Fisher
that he was basing his strategic plans upon the expectation that when
peace came to be discussed there would be a confrontation between
Britain and Japan on the one side, and Russia, Germany and France
on the other. D.N.I. believed that Britain could well find herself
at war with the three continental powers by August. Lansdowne
allowed neither the fear of this nor the complications of the Moroccan
1.	 28th October 1902. F. 0. 99/400. In a memorandum of
7th August, 1903, Prince Louis further condemned
Lansdowne's Moroccan proposals: "An agreement which
would leave the future fate of Morocco in the hands of France
and Spain alone is not one which this country could contem-
plate with indifference, nor could the removal of subjects
of dispute between France and England in other parts of
the world, as is held out by M. Delcasse, be considered
as compensation."
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crisis to deter him. from pursuit of a renewed Japanese alliance. 1
On the question of German intentions and interests on the Moroccan
coast Ottley wrote to the Foreign Office on 10th May, 1905: "What
Germany 1rants is coaling stations and undoubtedly our interest is to
oppose tooth and nail any such stations being acquired by her. The
French should be told that we will support them to the last extremity
in resisting any such demands" 2 The Japanese alliance was
concluded in April-May, 1905. The Foreign Office consulted both
the C.I. D. and the N.I. D. on the naval implications. At the 70th
meeting of the C.I.D. on 12th April, 1905, Ottley said that if the
Treaty became operative against one power only, Russia would be
discouraged from re-building her fleet to try her hand against
Japan a second time. She might be able to out-build Japan; but if
she knew that Britain would come in against her in any case, she
could well decide that competition was hopeless.
1. Lansdowne, Fifth Marquess of: b. 1845; Lord of the Treasury
1869-1872; Under-Secretary for War 1872-1874; Under-
Secretary for India 1880; Governor-General of Canada
1883-1888; Governor-General of India 1888-1893; Secretary




The N.I.D., through its head, had a direct influence upon
almost every major political-military decision affecting the Royal
Navy or with maritime implications for the nation, pre-l914. For
example, from 1903/1904 onwards the N.I.D. furnished the C.I.D.
with ideas and plans regarding a possible invasion threat. On 31st
March 1903, and later that year, on 14th July, the D.N.I., Batten-
burg, submitted to the C.I.D. papers in which he said the Navy alone
could resist invasion. He demonstrated how - even if the battle fleet
was defeated, or away from home waters, Britain's enormous
superiority in cruisers and torpedo boats would be sufficient to do
this. 1 The N.I.D. made no concessions to the Army, (somewhat
ironic in view of the Admiralty' s later failure to enforce a maritime
strategy on the Cabinet before World War I began). In a memorandum
of 1st July, 1903, the N.I.D. refuted the Army's point that a force
of 90, 000 men was needed at home to resist invasion. 2 C.I.D.'s
deliberations on measures to deal with possible invasion always
contained well-demonstrated and reasoned evidence from the N.I.D.3
1. Cab. 3/1, hA, 16A.
2. Cab. 3/1, 14A.
3. See Cab. 17/22 - C.ID. plans for the defence of the United
Kingdom.
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Whether it was in the preparation of plans for combined naval and
military operations in the event of certain hypothetical war situations,
such as those surmised in 1905, or the many plans prepared between
21902-1912 for the protection of ocean trade in war, the N. 1. D.'s
involvement in C.LD. business was direct and influential, There can
be no doubt that the era of Custance, Battenburg, Ottley, King-Hall,
and Slade (1899-1909) was unique in N.I.D.'s pre-1945 history, in
terms of its active and fertile influence on naval and foreign affairs.
Slade' s tenu.reship bears careful study: he was a brilliant and
sophisticated D.N.I. His contingency plans for blockading Germany
and the treatment of neutrals and contraband were fully endorsed by
' the C.I.D. and the Cabinet, as was his paper dealing with possible
attacks on imperial territories. His conclusion on such. a threat was:
"Against a properly organised defence, based on adequate cruiser
squadrons, Germany can do nothing, unless she despatches regular
men-of-war from her home ports to support her vessels in distant
waters, and this it is the function of the Home Fleet to prevent.
1. See Cab. 17/5.
2. Cab. 17/3.
3. Slade MSS, Reel 3, P. 7, National Maritime Museum.
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On the question of German naval commitments in the Baltic he told
his political masters with dead accuracy: "The amount so held to the
Baltic would not in any case be more than would be demanded by a
strictly defensive attitude, and, until Russia has restored her Navy,
would probably consist merely of some of the older battleships and
the flotillas allocated to that coast. "	 Similarly, he pressed home to
the First Lord, First Sea Lord, and the C.t.D. the factors involved
in a trade war in distant waters: "Now no increase in the number of
battleships, and no victories in the North Sea will save us from the
danger which threatens our trade in distant waters. Our very
existence depends upon, not only the maintenance, but also the
increase of this trade in war, and if it is neglected we should fall
more certainly than if we lose in battle. 1,2
On every issue the N.LD. made major contributions - the
strategy necessary for a possible war against the United States, the
formation of an Australian Defence Force, the impact of wireless
telegraphy on naval strategy and tactics, the defence of commerce,
and so on, and along with the routine analyses the department made -
1.	 Slade MSS, Reel 3, P. 7, National Maritime Museum.
ibid.
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German cruiser strengths, or a break-down of the manoeuvres of
July 1908, or the implications of German possession of the Baltic.
On the latter is sue Slade wrote the First Sea Lord: "..... so we may
succeed in stopping their trade in the North Sea and in causing damage
and loss on the northern coasts, but as long as Germany has the exit
from the Baltic open to her and closed to us, which would be the case
if we did not attempt to force our way into that sea, she may refuse
to listen to overtures of peace until we bring further pressure to bear.
N.I.D.s influence on operational policy was pronounced - in October,
1908, for example, German cruisers were patrolling off the south-east
coast of South America, N.I.D. convinced the CI.D. and the Cabinet
this might constitute a possible threat to British trade. British cruisers
took up station there until the German presence ceased.
Foreign Policy, Strategy, and Naval Intelligence 1914-1939.
It is difficult to establish causal relationships between
intelligence and policy-making in peacetime. In wartime, when
operational intelligence is at a premium, real measures of effectiveness
and influence are available. In the period 1919/1920 - 1936 there is
virtually no evidence indicating any such relationships between naval
1.	 Slade MSS, Reel 3, P. 7, National Maritime Museum.
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intelligence and politico-military decision-making, especially on the
is sue of foreign affairs. During the classical period of inter-war
peace, epitomised by the Ten Year Rule, not only was the N.I.D. run
down to a painfully low level, so as to be virtually ineffective, but also
all defence bddies were obviously finding it difficult to make assess-
ments of possible targets. The pre-19l4 routine analyses ceased -
peace meant far more between 1919-1931 than it had pre-1914. The
significance of intelligence was forgotten, not ignored. There was
nothing wilful, or necessarily incompetent in this. Only hindsight
allowed Admiral Rufus L. Taylor to write in 1960: "We cannot
afford the luxury of leaders who do not understand the business of
getting information of the enemy. We must be sure that our
educational syem for high command does not permit an officer to
reach such command without having demonstrated a thorough knowledge
of intelligence." 1 The Foreign Office's post war attitude to the
N.I.D. was natural enough, it was neither politically loaded or
insidious. In retrospect, of course, it was tragic, knowing what we
do of the thirties, of the absence of machinery and personnel to
collect, process, and disseminate data to those who made policy.
The Naval Staff College's work in the twenties illustrates the profound
1.	 Admiral Rufus L. Taylor: Command and the Intelliece
Process: United States Naval Institute Proceedings. August,
1960. P.27-39.
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absence within the Admiralty and defence staff as a whole of concrete
objectives. 1, 2 It is not surprising therefore that intelligence was
relegated from the prime position within the naval hierarchy to that
of a poor relation. In theory it ought to have provided the basis for
all serious analysis and planning, merely proving that institutions,
however valuable, and well-tried, will survive in the naval hierarchy
only unless strong action to preserve continuity in all spheres is
taken.
The organisation of defence itself, centred on the C.I.D.,
the new C.D.S. and their sub-committees, particularly the Joint
Planning Sub-Committee - this, with the other factors, shifted the
1. See P. 347.
2. See also Cab. 53/14, no. 125. Report by the Commandant of
the first session of the Imperial Defence College, January-
December, 1927. Intelligence was not discussed, in terms
of its role in higher defence planning.
3. As late as 1957 two American scholars, John W.Masland and
Lawrence I. Redway, were able to write in their "Soldiers
and Statesmen" (Princeton University Press, 1957), about
higher military training in the United States; "study of the
fuU relationship of intelligence to security is neglected in the
War Colleges." P. 389. This comment is even more ironic,
in terms of the American experience, in the light of the
Report of the War Department Military Education Board on
an Educational System for officers of the Army - Washington,
D. C., 1946, This report had recommended the establishment
of an "Intelligence School." The parallels with Britain in
the twenties and thirties are striking.
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balance away from inteUigence. It may be argued too that
intelligence was in any case badly managed - that N.I.D. never
sold itself, or tried to evaluate the effectiveness of intelligence in
terms of feedback from the Naval Staff and the Fleet. This point
will bear review shortly.
The high period of appeasement witnessed a classical case of
intelligence failure - to be the unsleeping hammer of the sleeping,
to keep working as a result of its own conviction that it has certain
incontrovertible facts that must chailenge national policy. It is
now appropriate to be aware of the policy and atmosphere in which
naval intelligence had to operate during those vital four years.
There were those, such as Eden and Churchill, who
favoured re-armament in the light of Italian aggression in the
Mediterranean and the Red Sea, Japanese aggression in the Far
East, and the growing menace of Germany, indicated by the re-
occupation of the Rhineland, reL.armament, denunciation of the
European status quo, and the failure of the League of Nations to
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contain the Spanish Civil War. 	 Eden for one argued that British
re-armament would help the unemployment problem. 2 The 1935
White paper on re-armament revealed Baldwin's pacifism, dominated
as it was by inaccurate platitudes, such as "the bomber will always
1. On 9th March, 1935, Germany announced the formation ofjthe
Luftwaffe, forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. On 16th
March compulsory military service was introduced. The
1935 warnings of the British ambassador ilL Berlin, Sir
Horace Rumbol.d, of the growing Nazi evil, were ignored by
the Baldwin government. They now read like accurate
prophecies of doom. Hitler had also given £43m. aid to
Franco. In the autumn of 1936 10, 000 German troops arrived
in Spain. On 31st May 1937, Italy and Germany walked out
of the naval talks on non-intervention in the Mediterranean.
Italian attacks on English n-ierchantmen continued.
2. In 1937 there were 1km. unemployed in Britain. Certainly the





It was not known at the time that when Germany went to war in
1939 her margin of strength was, on paper at any rate, very
much less than seemed to be the case at the time. There was
certainly an assumption in Britain of Germany 1 s overwhelming
strength because of Hitler' s tremendous propagandist boast-
ings about his power, and partly because his violent diplomacy
suggested confidence based on strength, and this seemed to be
confirmed by brilliant German victories in 1939 and 1940.
Germany' s limitations and deficiencies only became public
knowledge in the official sarvey conducted by the British and
American economists immediately after the war. Itwas dis-
covered, for example, that her aircraft production in the
autumn of 1939 had been about 675 per month, no more than
that of Britain; her tank production was less, and she had
started the war with only three months supply of aviation fuel.
She had to treble her output of armaments and munitions after
February 1942, to meet the demands of war with Russia and
America. All these facts merely prove that in 1939 and 1940
Hitler took a calculated risk which brilliantly succeeded, even
though he miscalculated later. In Britain there was no such
data on the Third Reich's industrial capability.
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get through". In July 1936, a deputation from the Lords and Commons
visited Baldwin and pleaded for an irirease in defence expenditure.
They made no real impression. Chamberlain was even more emotion-
ally oriented - "all the savings of the old and young" wasted in war,
a simple philosophy based on the notion that arms cost money, which
is a waste, they lead to war, which is bad, and this cannot be
tolerated.
In June, 1937, Hitler issued his directive, Operation
Green, for aggression in the east, and on 5th November, 1937, in
the now infamous Hossbach Memorandum, to which Admiral Raeder
was a signatory, Hitler issued his plans for aggression in the west.
On 19th November, 1937, Halifax visited Bercb.tesgaden to propagate
Chamberlain's policy of peaceful evolution. In the same month, after
a warning from Eden in the Commons, Chamberlain advised him to
"go home and take an aspirin". Intelligence failed in general to
penetrate or piece together the weighty evidence indicating German
war plans. On the naval side the N.I.D. remained blissfully
ignorant of the major developments, (other than from the attaches'
1.	 See Keith Feiing's "Jaife of Neville Chamberlain" for a
detailed appraisal of the back-ground and rationale to
Chamberlain's appeasement. k.. (t;	 14	 Ni; 1112
Ch4La..	 P4.cMiUq,. I'c,tI.
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reports). The Edens, Churchils, and Duff Coopers were totally
unaware of the real magnitude of Hitler' s intentions and planning. 1
British public opinion was strongly pacifist - Churchill's argument that
Britain should say that she will fight if the Czechs fight (because
otherwise the Germans will gamble on Britain not helping the Czechs
and they will take the risk) fell on deaf ears. Furthermore there
would have been little support for independent French action over the
re-occupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss or Czechoslovakia.
Collective security and the naval applications of a blockade and
sanctions against Spain, and Italy in Abyssinia, failed. Why then had
there been an almost complete break-down in intelligence in the
Admiralty to present the C.I.D. and government with their view of
the naval intentions of the major aggressors and how this fitted into
the overall position?
1,	 That he was planning on a "lightning action after an incident"
in Czechoslovakia, or Hitler's directive of 30th May 1938,
calling for that country' s eradication. (D. G. F. P. Vol. 2,
no. 221). See the Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey,
1937-1940, ed. by John Harvey, Collins, 1970, for
conclusive evidence of how little the British government
knew of German intentions and capabilities. The so-
called warmongers made their deductions on fairly
conclusive, but very basic, prima facie evidence.
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At this point it is imperative to emphasise that it is not
the intention here to make comments on what "might have been".
Indeed it can be soundly argued, that, however more active and
influential the N.I.D. and the other intelligence bodies might have
been, there could not have been, and can never be, any guarantee
that politicians will make the sort of decisions only uninhibited
hindsight interpretations permit. It is surely probable that
Chamberlain would have been undeterred. Whether one examines
C.LD. papers, such as Cab. 16/153 - Foreign Policy and defence,
1936, or a speech of Chamberlain's on 24th March, 1938, following
the Anschluss on the 12th March, in which he said: "Where war and
peace are concerned, legal obligations are not alone involved", the
major factoremerges of the personal convictions of politicians.
In 1775 Edmund Burke wrote: "The concessions of the weak are the
concessions of fear". Chamberlain would have stoutly refuted this,
in the Munich context, just as he did Duff Cooper' s resignation speech
in the House of Commons on 3rd October, 1938, following Munich:
"It was not for Serbia that we fought in 1914. It was not even for
Belgium, although it occasionally suited some people to say so.
We were fighting then, as we should have been fighting last week,
in order that one great power should not be allc*iea,in disregard
of treaty obligations, of the laws of nations, and decrees of morality,
371.
to dominate by brutal force the continent of Europe ... .for that
principle we must ever be prepared to fight, for the day when we
are not prepared to fight for it we forfeit Empire, our liberties, and
our independence." Duff Cooper and Chamberlain represent two
diametrically opposed views. The question, would better intelligence
have altered things, remains an open, speculative question. Questions,
such as should Britain have fought in 1938, assuming better intelligence
are more meaningful. Intelligence would have shown that in certain
weapon systems and training Germany was two to three years ahead
of Britain. However, Britain would have had the initiative and the
resources of Czechoslovakia and Russia. Intelligence would have
stressed too the significance of a war on two fronts for Hitler in 1938,
at a time when his high command was worried and divided over his
plans. Excellent intelligence would have observed a few cold feet.
The Third Reich was to benefit more than the Allies from the Munich
"breathing space".
In the post World War I period there was neither the
intelligence machinery nor the personnel, other than the attaches and
a small headquarters N.LD. staff to provide the C.I.D. and the
Cabinet with detailed intelligence - there was a blithe obliviousness
to the value of intelligence in peacetime. As a result of this,
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intelligence never bcame strong enough to re-assert itself. The
Chiefs-of-Staff structure excluded the significant role intelligence
ought to have played. C. 0. S., and then the C.I.D., and ultimately
the Cabinet, came to place great dependence on the Joint Planning
Sub-Committee, (J. P.C.) of the Chiefs-of-Staff, and the three
individual Service Planning Staffs. Naval Plans, in one sense
throgh no fault of its own, gained an unwarranted primacy, since
it made plans for the Naval Staff on the flimsiest of intelligence data,
or no intelligence at all. Above all else was the attitude and
morale of the Naval Staff generally - it was far from healthy. It
was as if the N.LD. had served its function of bearing the infant
Naval Staff pre-1914, had done sterling work during the Great War
and now, during a period of prolonged peace in a world that could
not possibly contemplate total war again, it could safely be put out
to graze, and be quietly forgotten.
In the period before the foundation of the Joint Intelligence
Committee, (J. I. C.), and the re-surgence of "operational" intelligence
1.	 Admiral Godfrey wrote in his Memoirs: "Plans was concer-
ned with policy-making, with the future, with strategy, and
its effect on bases, depots, stores and administration, with
logistics (a new word borrowed from the USA) and with the
naval aspect of international affairs, treaties and agree-
ments. At a time when we were reorientating our policy
after the Kaiser war, and the abrogation of the Anglo-
Japanese alliance, Plans Division had a finger in every
pie." Vol.3 P.7.
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within the N.I.D. itself, the J.P.C. had the lion's say in every
major defence issue when C.O.S. called for advice, data, or a
second opinion, (as well, of course, as making plans). An examin-
ation of the records from 1926 to 1938 fully supports this view. A
review of some of these will illustrate the point.
In June, 1927, the C.O.S. called for data regarding the
Defence of the Suez Canal, and in October the factors involved in the
defence of Hong Kong, with emphasis on the possibility of a Japanese
attack. The J. P. C. and the Services' Planning Staffs were consulted.
N.I.D. was not consulted. 1 This pattern continued for the next
decade. In October 1936, C.O.S. was required to produce an overafl
appraisal in the event of war with Germany in 1939. In December
of the same year C.O.S. produced for the C.I.D. a report of the
implications for seaborne trade of a war with Germany, (it dealt
with the types, areas, and scales of possible German attacks, and
defence measures). The work for this was done through the J.P.C.
No intelligence evaluations were used. 2 Not surprisingly the 1936
report of the Commandant of the Imperial Defence College makes
no mention of intelligence. Its use was not discussed during the
1. Cab. 53/14, nos. 101, 1l7
2. See Cab. 53/29, nos. 513, 535.
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1
course.	 However, by late 1936, the tide began to turn. C.O.S.
awoke to the value of intelligence. In a report of the 5th January
l93 "Appreciations of the Situation in the event of war with Germany"
the Chiefs-of-Staff stated quite clearly in recommendation no. 55
"We draw attention, however, to the 15th and 16th recommendations
above, where we point out the need for intelligence arrangements by
the appropriate organisations, and we recommend that the Joint
Intelligence Sub-Committee and the Sub-Committee on Industrial
Intelligence in foreign countries should review the intelligence
arrangements for the contingency of war with Germany." (Recom-
mendation no. 15 emphasised the need for air reconnaissance of the
North Sea. )2 Although this document shows the incredibly limited
perspective the C. 0. S. had of intelligence it nonetheless helped
initiate the swing towards operational intelligence as the sands of
time were running out in Europe. By Z5th Qctober, 1938, the swing
was complete. In a signed memorandum headed, "Revision of
Appreciations", the three members of the Joint Planning Sub-Commit-
tee submitted, (somewhat ironically in view of the previous twelve
years) to the C.0.S. among several recommendations on the issue
1. See Cab. 53129, no. 539.
2. Cab. 53/29, no. 540.
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of intelligence, the following points: paragraph 8: "In order to
obtain an agreed political setting, we suggest that the Joint Intelligence
Sub-Committee should be instructed to produce a forecast of the
political setting in April, 1939, in collaboration with the Foreign
Office"; paragraph 9: "In addition, we suggest that the Joint Intelli-
gence Sub-Committee should again examine the strength of all the
Powers included in the political setting, and prepare a comparative
statement of their forces they could maintain in war. Signed V.H.
Danckwerts, J.N.Kennedy, J.C.Slessor." 1
 The die was cast.
The J.I.C. began to play a role similar to the pre-1914 N.I.D.2
How every D.N.I. from Custance to HaU would have agreed with
Troup and Godfrey that the J.I. C. should have existed when all the
momentous decisions of the twenties and thirties were made. There
was no Lord Charles Beresford to raise questions on Naval Policy,
whether it was the Singapore naval base, or the use of air power, or
the vulnerability of capital ships to air attack. In the thirties the
Naval Staff placed their faith in the development of asdic, and seemed
to believe that the terms and spirit of the Geneva Convention would be
1. Cab. 53/42, no.785.
2. The papers of the Joint Intelligence Committee, housed in
the Cabinet Office Library, have still to be released. There
is, therefore, no way of accurately assessing its work, and
impact on the preparations for war, and World War II.
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observed by enemy submarines in a future war, despite past
experiences As a result the surface threat was still regarded as
paramount. In 1937 the Naval Staff stated: "The submarine wouki
never again be able to present us with the problems we were faced
with in 1917.fh Hence the firm belief that Coastal Command's task
should consist solely of patrolling the North Sea for surface raiders
escaping from the German ports. Furthermore, no preparations
were made for enlarging the convoy escort force of 150 asdic-fitted
destroyers. Many of the latter were World War I vintage. In
September, 1939, R.A.F. Coastal Command had no aircraft designed,
and aircrews trained, for anti-submarine work. 2 As a result of
lack of intelligence, and "operational research", only bitter
experience in war brought change.
1. Churchill made the obvious point in his Second World War,
when discussing the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement:
"The Germans, of course, gave assurance that their U-
boats would never be used against merchant shipping. Why,
then, were they needed?"
2. It will be remembered that the N.LD. had not detected
Donitz's wolf-pack techhiques, and the great range and
increased performance of his U-boats.
3. In February, 1942, the Western Approaches Tactical Unit
was set up in Liverpool to train escort captains and group
commanders in convoy tactics. In March, 1943, experience
dictated an adjustment of the North Atlantic Convoy Cycle,
whereby fewer and larger convoys were sailed each day.
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The one thread which kept the N.I.D. going during its
period in the wilderness were the Naval Attaches - they were the
strongest link in the chain, but regrettably for British defence, a
chain is only as strong as its weakest link. They worked well at the
time of the Washington Naval Agreement (1922), the Geneva Naval
Talks (1927), the London Naval Talks (1930), and the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement (1935). As will be seen later the N.I.D,, and
the C.O.S. and government realised that the tonnage allowed Germany
would, in any case, stretch her resources to the full. The situation
was well summed up in a Foreign Office letter to Nevile Henderson
in August, 1938: "At the time of the Agreement the German governmen
were well aware that thirty-five per cent of our Navy was probably
the most they could hope to achieve for a considerable period." 1
In 1939 the N.I.D. knew Germany was below her allowed tonnage,
even in submarines. Although some 40, 000 tons of submarines had
been announced in their building programme by Germany and
communicated to the Admiralty, the N.I.D. knew Germany had only
30, 000 tons of complete submarines in 1939, which was below forty-
five per cent of the British tonnage. 2 Donitz himself wrote later:
1. F.O. to Henderson, l7thAugust, 1938. Adm.116/3378.
2. Data coming into the Admiralty about the German buildingprogramme can be found in Adm. 116/3369 and 3369. British
tonnge was 70 000 tons at the end of 1938. 45 per cent of
this Ligure is 3L 500 tons. The total projected submarine
tonnage at the end of 2938 was 32, 000 tons, and that is why
Germany had to claim submarine parity. She ould other-
wise have been unable to lay down any submarines in 1939.
Germany haçl only 55 submarines, (only 26 of which were
ocean-going) at the outbreak of war.
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"It was the lack of submarines which prevented Germany from
winning a rapid and decisive victory over the British Navy.
In other special areas the attaches played a passive, ineffective
role, such as at the time of the Abyssinian crisis, when a minority,
headed by Churchill, wanted the Mediterranean Fleet to stop Italy
by a fleet action to destroy their communications with Ethiopia.
Before we go on to examine some specific aspects of the
N.I.D.s work in relation to political decision-making one final
factor should be mentioned - the attitude and morale of the Naval
Staff in the thirties.
Even in the late thirties the Naval Staff gave the impression
of being reticent, almost tardy, in all their major business, and when
forced to act, even under the Chamberlain government, seem to be
dilatory. The C.O.S. as a bddy were certainly motivated by a
pessimism centred on a possible encounter with a united Germany,
Italy and Japan, with Britain being attacked without allies. There
were certainly no firm guarantees that the United States would come
to British assistance in the Far East. Chatfield himself was most
1.	 K. Donitz: Memoirs - Ten Years and Twenty Days.
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unco-operative on the question of staff talks with the French,
particularly on the issue of arranging air bases in France, (both
Chamberlain and Eden saw these as part of the fulfillment of Locarno
obligations). As late as March, 1938, the C.O.S. had no contingency
plans for the support of Czechoslovakia and France.	 The Admiralty
were still arguing in late April, 1938, that staff talks with the
French were unnecessary, as Fleet dispositions could be quickly
made at the last minute, almost Fisher-like in their attitude to
staff work.
Certainly the C. 0. S's attitude on the state of Britain' s
defence compared with Germany's, (which in retrospect is seen
to have been based upon incomplete intelligence reports) tended to
confirm the Chamberlain government in their belief that they should
not give military guarantees to France and Czechoslovakia.
25th March, 1938, Oliver Harvey wrote in his Diary: 'The General
Staffs are defeatist, especially Admiralty." Three days later, 28th
April, 1938, Harvey gave Sir Maurice Hankey a very cursory write-
up: "I cannot help feeling this is satisfactory, (Hankey had left the
C.I.D. and been granted a sinecure). Harikey, who has been running
1.	 Harvey Diaries, P.119.
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the C.I.D. since 1912, is tired and now only immersed in the
ramifications of his own machinery: he is out of touch and rather
reactionary." Even more significant Harvey wrote on 9th June,
1938: "Discussion in Hts (Halifax) room today about bombing in
Spain (attacks on British ships in Republican harbours) to discover
what we can do to stop it. Admiralty (Admiral Sir William James,
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, 1935-1938 and Rear-Admiral V.A.
Dankwerts, Director of Plans, Admiralty, 1938-1940) were present.
Admiralty as usual defeatist." In a letter to "The Times" dated 18th
July, 1970, Mr. John Harvey (Harvey's son), challenging Captain
S. W. Roskill' s rebuke of his father' s attack on C. 0. S. and Admiralty
attitudes, wrote: "Obviously the fundamental weakness was the
politicians' fault, but as the Diaries show, the Chiefs-of-Staff and
the C.I.D. under Hankey were as much the vigorous advocates in
the Cabinet debate for appeasement as Eden and the diplomats were
against it. Their influence upon the politicians was not negligible,
and they cannot really claim therefore that it was unfair to criticise
them." On this issue certain factors should be remembered - the
French Navy alone was larger than the Italian, the Foreign Office
was assuming American assistance in the Far East, (it was regarded
as their sphere of influence). The documents show that the Foreign
Office appreciation of the situation was that the menace of Mussolini
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was being exaggerated. The C. 0.5. did not agree, and they won
the day over the Foreign Office when it came to influencing Chamber-
lain. In the absence of J.I. C. evidence no assessment can be made
of the influence of intelligence. The argument that the C. 0. S., and
Admiralty in general, were "realistic" has some merit. The Royal
Navy had a very good idea of what a war on three fronts (and five
oceans) could mean for British naval resources, with many World
War I ships, badly defended bases, and insufficient personnel. What
they did not possess of course was the total picture, (not least of all.
the strength and willingness of the Czechs to fight, the strength and
position of the Luftwaffe, the probLems for Germany, and the internal
political risks for Hitler, of a two-fronted war, even if the Czechs
did last only three months, and so on), and this is where the
government must begin to bear total responsibility. That the C. 0. S.,
and indeed the government, were unaware of some fairly basic, but
critical facts about German capabilities, was a fault of the system
as a whole, not least of all the chronic state of intelligence.
It is patently true looking at the documents that are public
that the N.I.D. did not possess any real influence at C.O.S. level.
It provided basic facts and figures on fleet numbers and so on, but
that was all. Whatever the value of the many interpretations of
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British diplomacy the point must remain that the C.O.S. were
influential, and that influence, certainly from the naval side, had not
been backed by a continuous process of sound intelligence from 1935
onwards. The point here is not to argue cases, such as whether
Britain should have fought in September, 1938, to "keep Germans out
of Germany" 1 , but rather a question of the quality of the data avail-
able, and how it was handled. In a letter to The Times of 1st August,
1970, Mr. Peter Calvocoressi wrote: "The Cabinet's failure to do
the job of appraising (correct) military judgments against other
factors is seen too in its acceptance of the Admiralty view that it
would be fatal to get into war with Italy. While the Admiralty' s
fears may have been justly grounded in naval arithmetic, the
Cabinet forgot to ask itself whether the Italian state was, regardless
of the state of the Italian Navy, in a position to make war - which it
was not." There is no evidence to counter Calvocoressi's allegation
against the Chamberlain government, and everything points to its
self-evidence. What happened, besides the purely personal political
affiliations and interpretations, was partly therefore a straight-forward
communication failure. The Cabinet never saw the wood for the trees,
and the C.O.S, (and Admiralty in particular), seeing only part of the
wood were strong enough (and some would argue foolish enough) to
1.	 The Harvey Diaries. P. 182.
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convince the C.I.D. and Chamberlain, whenever they turned for
advice, or facts, that they were, in fact, looking at the whole wood.
Nothing could have been further from the truth. In this sense the
"realistic" epithet appended to the C.O.S.'s policy must lose some
credibility. A man cannot be properly described as "realistic" jf
he states opinions based only upon a limited number of the total
salient facts. He might, at very best, be described as well-meaning,
intelligent, pleasant, but completely misinformed. The C.O.S.
were surely in that position over several crucial issues.
The intelligence break-down of the inter-war period reaped
its bitter harvest in war. It was devastatingly apparent in the
German U-boat campaign, and in the absence of sufficient expert
naval air support. Let us look at the latter.
The role of maritime air power had never been satisfact-
only appraised by the N.I.D S 1 The long battle between the Royal
Air Force and the Royal Navy, (with Trenchard' s eventual victory
for a policy of "unified air") reflects the ever present political
1.	 Details of British Naval Air Policy: tactics, equipment,
types of aircraft, and the number of aircraft can be found
in Adm, 116/4030.
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content of such disputes, irrespective of strategic and tactical con-
siderations, which hindsight says should have formed the basis for all
such decisions. Whilst the United States Navy and the Japanese were
studying the results of air-sea exercises and developing a carrier
policy, Britain, from the earliest days, had other pre-occupations.
A sub-committee (Balfour) of the 1923 Salisbury Committee looked
into R,A,F. - Royal Navy relations. The Admiralty Board described
their findings as t•,,,• prejudicial to the efficiency of the Fleet in
time of peace, and will invite disaster in time of war.' 	 So it went on
until Britain was forced to fight a naval war with no real naval air
policy, and neither equipment or personael with which to adequately
fight.
The Crete campaign showed how the British government and
the C. OS. still thought that the island could be held by the Fleet,
without air support, even though Lhe air was dominated by more than
500 enemy bombers and dive bombers. Needless to say when Crete
was evacuated the Mediterranean Fleet suffered heavy casualties from
German air attacks. At home the C. 0. S. continued to believe that
the R.A.F. and Fleet should accept any losses to prevent German
1.	 Adm. 167/68. Board Minute no. 1750, 21st November, 1923.
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reinforcements arriving. As Cunningham aptly wrote later: "They
failed lamentably to appreciate the realities of the situation."
Pound summed up the two decades of inconclusiveness when he was
obliged to write Cunningham in the Mediterranean Fleet: "I am afraid
you are terribly short of "air", but ..... I do not see what can be
done because, as you. will realise, every available aircraft is wanted
in home waters. The one lesson we have learnt here is that it is
essential to have fighter protection over the Fleet whenever they
are within range of enemy bombers. You will be without such
protection, which is a very serious matter, but I do not see any
way of rectifying it." There is no evidence that the N.I.D. had
ever investigated, for instance, the variables involved in the
arrival of an enemy air force, (such as Fliegerkorps X's in Sicily)
within range of, say, the Mediterranean Fleet, let alone the offen-.
sive power naval aircraft would have given in a Crete campaign;
they are hypothetical case studies, but it is not unreasonable to say
that they should not have gone unnoticed in the exercise planning of
the l930s. The Americans and the Japanese were hard at it.
Let us now look at a more concrete area where the N.I.D.
was involved - the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.
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Whatever he political ramifications of the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement, and there were many, (such as it acknowledged the
right of Germany to re-arm, it overtly revised Versailles, and in-
directly and tacitly accepted any future violation of that Treaty;
furthermore it was undeniable evidence of intended German naval
expansion, and the possibility therefore of its use in war. Both in
their attitude to the Germans, and the Agreement itself, the British
Naval Staff, spearheaded by people such as Jellicoe in the Lords,
reveal themselves as a pertinent factor in the whole negotiations),
the role of intelligence, even if solely regarded at the lowliest level
as a purveyor of data, bears special analysis. In the immediate pre-
1935 period it is true to say there was a moderate and sympathetic
attitude towards Germany and her Navy in the Royal Navy, though
not approving, or often not aware, of Nazi machinations. This was
in part related to a firm view of the Anglo-German naval position -
that Britain could do little in any event to prevent German naval re-.
armament. On the diplomatic front the Washington Naval Agreement of
1922 was due to expire in 1936 in any case. Many saw an agreement
as a means of preventing an Anglo-German naval arms race beginning
again. Lord Beatty was quick to stress the latter point in his Lord&
speech of 26th June, 1935. German good faith was to be given some
credence later by her agreement, on 23rd September, 1936, to the
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1930 London Protocol, to abide by international law regarding submarine
attacks on merchant shipping.
Whatever political analysis shows, the British government was
deceived, partly as a result of the failure to listen to intelligence, and
partly as a result of the latter's inadequacy. It was known that all the
Agreement did was to allow German construction to go ahead at its very mc
imum that its yards could, in any case permit. In this sense there was no
practical limitation or restraint of any kind imposed upon German naval
expansion. They could build as fast as was physically possible. But they
could have, (and would have no doubt) done this whatever the efforts of
British diplomacy. On the positive side for Britain it would be a means of
knowing exactly what Germany would be doing in hard construction terms,
and the very nature of that construction would give some indication of
possible policy, (1. e. technical details of ships and submarines built).
What is more any positive evidence that all the data was not being revealed
would be a further indication of a shift in policy, and an obvious target for
clandestine intelligence collection. Compared with the Nazis the British
were far too generous with their data. 2 N.I,D. in particular was too gullible
1. See D. C. Watt: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An
Interim Judgment. Journal of Modern History. XXVII. No. 2, June,
1956: W.S. Churchill: The Second World War. Vol.1. P.107-110.
2. See Adm. J.l6/3929:Supply of forecasts of British naval strength to
Germany, under the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 1935, and
Adm.116/3368(upto 1937), and Adm.1l6/3369(up to 1939), gives
comparative Anglo-German data.
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Nonetheless some warning was given, but it fell, on deaf ears. In his
1936 annual report, dated 23rd December, 1936, the Naval Attache
in Berlin, Captain Troubridge wrote: "The Anglo-German Naval
Agreement was one of the master strokes of policy which have
characterised Germany's dealings with her ex-enemies since the war.
When the time is ripe, as history shows, it will unquestioningly go
the same way of other agreements, but the time is not yet." His
predecessor, Captain Mu.irhead-Gould, had written in the same vein
to the D.N.I. Their words were accurate indeed, but even Trou-
bridge was deceived by the Germans regarding the technical details
of battleship and U-boat construction. Raeder himself lied to
Troubridge. As a result a totally incorrect appreciation was made
of the Bisrnarck's tonnage and draft. This influenced adversely the
design of the King George V class, (King George V class had 14"
guns and, compared with the Bismarck, low endurance), and
certainly in 1936 the British conception of the Germans' naval
strategy, (Baltic oriented) and therefore, by implication, of her
overall policy. When war broke out very few ships of the British
1937 and 1938 programmes had been completed.
Much of the data exchanged was entirely accurate. More-
over there is no evidence that the C.I.D. challenged N.I.D. data
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or was suspicious. The D.N.I. t s verdicts, (Troupes) were firmly
accepted.	 The tragedy was that at the purely naval contact level,
Anglo-German naval relations were good. 2 What the N.ID. missed,
and it was no exception, was the overall significance for Hitler, not
Raeder, or any other outwardly friendly German naval officer for
that matter, of the new German Navy under construction.
Politics, the War, and Naval Intelligence 1939-1945
As a result of the N.I.Dc and Foreign Office failure to
acquire all technical data, and even strengths, particularly of the
1. See Adm. 116/ 3377 - Troup's letter of 9th March, 1936. He
firmly believes Raeder is telling the truth about German
naval strengths. See also Captain Tom Phillips t letter,
dated 7th December, 1936, Adm. 116/3378, in which he con-
siders that the Germans are showing total good faith. Troup
agrees and signs the Naval Staff pack, 18th December 1936.
Phillips was Director of Plans, Admiralty.
2. See for example, D. G. F. P., Series C, Vol. 3, no. 541 -
an interview between the German naval attache in London
and the N.I.D., and the brief prepared for Admiral Cunning-
ham before he visited Germany in 1938 for the Anglo-German
Naval staff conversations - D.BF. P., Third Series Vol.3,
nos.429, 438, 450, and appendix 7.
3. See Saul Friedlander: Prelude to DownfaU (Chatto and
Windus), and J. B. Compton: The Swastika and the Eagle,
(The Bodley Head, 1968), for two very clear accounts of
Hitler' s naval mentality.
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U-boat force, Britain was hard pressed when war was declared.
Churchill wrote: "My first Admiralty Minute was concerned with the
probable scale of the U-boat menace in the immediate future."
Hard, accurate data was lacking - Churchill had to ask for it. On
12th November, 1939, when the D.N.I. estimated 6 out of 66 U-boats
sunk the actual numbers were 6 out of 57. 2 It might be argued that
the N.I.D. had erred on the side of safety (i.e. in giving an over-
estimate) but it still came as a salutory shock to both the Admiralty
and the government to be given the probable strength of the long-
range, ocean-going U-boat force, and the use to which they would
obviously be put. The real point here is that the data was not there
before 3rd September, 1939. In a note dated 4th November, 1939,
Churchill wrote the D.N.I.: "Let me have a statement of the German
U-boat forces, actual arid prospective, for the next few months.
Please distinguish between ocean-going and small size U-boats.
Give the estimated radius of action in days and miles in each case."
1. W,S.Churchifl: The Second World War. Volume I. P.331.
2. Admiral Godfrey's Memoirs, Part 2 to Volume 5, National
Maritime MuseuM, Greenwich. Godfrey also writes how
Churchill, First Lord, and Pound, the First Sea Lord,
tended to exaggerate on the radio, not for propaganda
purposes, but because of intelligence inaccuracy. Churchill
said on the BBC: "The attack of the U-boats has been
"controlled" and they have paid a heavy toll."
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Churchill surely had his finger on the N.I.D. pulse immediately and
asked the right sort of questions. As the N.I.D. gained momentum
the First Lord was given the data he required. He wrote in Volume
I of his Second World War; "I was at once informed that the enemy
had sixty U-boats and that a hundred would be ready early in 1940.
A detailed answer was returned on the 5th, which should be studied.
The numbers of long-range endurance vessels were formidable and
revealed the intentions of the enemy to work far out in the oceans
as soon as possible. u
 Under the terms of the Agreement more data
could have been acquired, if need be by recourse to clandestine
methods. When the long-range ocean-going U-boats, in wolf packs,
etruck Allied convoys in the mid-Atlantic "air" gap the Lull failure
of earlier intelligence was realised.
In the Far East British intelligence was alert from 1938
onwards. This intensified once war with Germany had been declared.
Japanese pre-emptive strikes were detected by air reconnaissance,
coast watchers, and, to a lesser extent, the American "magics". The
British assessment of a Japanese attack on Siam, with amphibious
strikes against strategic points on the Kra Isthmus, were reported to
Washington. The possession of the "magics" did not prevent Pearl
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Harbour, even though they showed strength, disposition, and intention.
At Midway they gave the United States Navy tactical surprise over the
Imperial Japanese Navy. Before Pearl Harbour they were only of
ancilliary value to the British. The Americans themselves were
not using them properly.
Notwithstanding the "magics" value, the British commitment
in the Far East could at best be very limited - all available major units
were required in the European theatre. Port defences were poor - AA
guns alone were needed to defend Britain. The Prince of Wales and
the Repulse met an almost predictable end to those who had any
NOTE: On the question of public statements regarding submarine losse
Churchill's early statements on the BBC were due to faulty
assessment, but not by the N.I.D. His later statements into
1940 were in part due again to faulty inIormation, (which was
contrary to what the N.I.D. was saying), but also to Chur-.
chill's undoubted desire to make propaganda capital and to
raise morale amongst the British people. On 20th January
the First Lord broadcast the nation: "It seems pretty certain
bnight that half the U-boats with which Germany began the
war have been sunk, and that their new building has fallen
far behind what we expected." This was patently not true, and
N,I.D. knew so. It should be noted that it was not until
September, 1940 that the Submarine Assessment Book, corn-
piled by the Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare and the
Directorate of Naval Intelligence was shown to anyone else
other than the Prime Minister, First Lord, First Sea Lord,
Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Naval
Staff.* The N.I.D. was responsible for much of the propa-.
ganda to undermine and destroy the morale of the German
Navy. Some insight into this is given in Sefton Delmar's book:
Black Boomerang. Delrnar worked in the P.E.W. (Political
Warfare Executive).
* See Admiral Godfrey's Memoirs: Vol.1 Part 2 P.270.
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knowledge of Japanese naval air power, particularly the capabilities
of the Zero and the aerial torpedo. Paper strengths were well known
in the N.I.D. What happened was what had been feared for two decades.
The problem was not so much one of a paucity of intellignce 1 but more
the non-availability of weapons, (and modern ones), and a political will.
However, in mitigation, the Far East had been increasingly regarded as
an American sphere of influence. That they should bear most responsi-'
bility, and give mutual assistance, was accepted in Britain long before
Pearl Harbour. When the British Pacific Fleet was formed it went to the
Far East very much under American strategic control. This had always
been tacitly understood. If Japan attacked in full force Britain realised she
could offer little in a two-theatre war without 1the massive American
alliance. British naval intelligence felt therefore it had only a secondary
commitment in the Far East in terms of its more pressing responsibilities
in Europe. Britain came to rely on the O.N.I. in the Far East theatre,
1.	 In the 1939-1945 War the Australian Naval Intelligence Depart-
ment provided an excellent coast-watching service. In the 1914-
1918 War the R.A.N. had had a very smaU intelligence staff.
In common with the N.I.D. this began to be disbanded in 1918.
By January, 1919 only one officer remained, a soldier, who
acted as military censor. By 1921 there was no Intelligence
Department in the R.A.N. There was a temporary resurrection
of the D.N.I. appointment in 1922, but this quickly lapsed.
Between 1923-1936 there was no D,N.I,, or any intelligence as
such, in the R.A.N. From 1936-1939 the Assistant Chief of
Naval Staff acted as the D.N.I. too, with an Assistant D.N.I.
The R.A.N. N,I.D. made no major contribution to British or
American naval intelligence pre-1939. See G.H.Gill: Australia
in the War of 1939-1945. Royal Australian Nayy Volume I,
Canberra, 1957.
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and did so throughout the Second World War, save for in the South
East Asian Command, which acquired NSLDS trained personnel, and
when the British Pacific Fleet was formed a British intelligence staff
was created in Australia, headed by the former Madrid attache,
Captain Hiligarth, R.N.
Politically then the N.I.D. had little to offer the politicians
on the Far East. It had detected the measure of the Japanese threat -
its strength and capability, and probable attack points. The C. O.S.
and Cabinet knew though that Britain could offer little in retaliation.
Where the N.I.D. (and O.N.I.) fell down was in technical appreiiation,
though even this would have been of dubious value in hard terms,
assuming the government was unable to provide the degree of re-
equipment for the European theatre, let alone provide a carrier fleet,
and support groups for the Far East, (with naval aircraft, for example,
at least as good as the Zero).
The political pre-occupation was for European intelligence.
With the threat of invasion in 1940 both the J.I.C. and the N.I.D.
had their hands full. On 6th July, 1940, Prime Minister Churchill
wrote Colonel Jacob: Obtain a most careful report to-day from the
Joint Intelligence Staff of any further indication of enemy preparation
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for raid or invasion. Let me have this tonight. 1,1 The pressure was
on, and little regard could be paid to the Far East. On 11th July, 1940,
the Prime Minister wrote the Secretary of State for Air: "At the pres-
ent time a very heavy price may be paid (a) for information by
reconnaissance of the conditions in the German ports and German-
controlled ports and river mouths ••• • ." 	 in a time of crisis govern-
ment must have regard to immediate intelligence needs. Eventually
it paid dividends. Churchill was able to write: "Our excellent
intelligence confirmed that the operation "Sea Lion" had been definitely
ordered by Hitler and was in active preparation. " However, the
early assessments were not good. William L. Shirer summarised
the situation thus: "British intelligence of the German plans was
extremely faulty and for the first three months of the invasion threat
almost completely wrong. Throughout the summer, Churchill and his
military advisers remained convinced that the Germans would make
their main landing attempt on the east coast and it was here that the
bulk of the British land forces were concentrated until September.
1. W,S,Churchjfl: The Second World War. Volume 2. P.567.
2. Thi.
3. Ibid. P.261.
4. William L. Shirer: The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. P.914
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Churchill soon appreciated how woefully weak the British espionage
system was in crucial areas in Western Europe. On 6th June 1940,
he instructed General Ismay to improve British espionage and
1intelligence on the Danish, Dutch, and Belgian coasts. 	 On 23rd July
1940, he expressed concern about espionage in Europe, and what
M.E.W. was doing, and on 5th August 1940, Churchill was so concerz
and obviously dissatisfied with intelligence in Europe he wrote Ismay:
"I am not satisfied with the volume or quality of information received
from the unoccupied area of France. We seem to be as much cut off
from these territories as from Germany. I do not wish such reports
as are received to be sifted and digested by the various intelligence
authorities. For the present Major Morton will inspect them for me
and submit what he considers to be of major interest. He is to see
everything and submit authentic documents for me in their original
form. Further, I await proposals for improving and extending our
own information about France and for keeping a continued flow of
agents moving to and fro. For this purpose naval facilities can, if
necessary, be invoked, So far as the Vichy government is concerned,
it is not creditable that we have so little information. To what extent
are American, Swiss, and Spanish agents being used?" 2 Spurred
1. W.S.Churchill: The Second World War. Volume 2. P.217.
2. Ibid., p.278 and 572.
397.
on in part by Churchill the 3.1. C. must have improved dramatically,
such that by the time of the withdrawal from Crete he was able to
write laudatory minutes about the range and accuracy of 3. I. C.
prognoses, 1 though there were several major disagreements between
Churchill and the J.I.C. (as recorded by Churchill), such as that over
the estimates of the coastal defences of the Italian ports before Salerno;2
or that over the nature and future of Russo-German relations in l94l,
Churchill wrote that the "
	 Chiefs-of-Staff were ahead of theirI....
advisers (the J.I.C.), and more definite." In the absence of J.I.C.
evidence the various controversies cannot be untangled. However it
is certain, even on Churchill's evidence, the C.O.S. had exactly the
data the 3.I.C. had given them and no more. J.I.C. knew of rumours
in Europe of German plans, but were not prepared to commit them-
selves without further evidence. Churchill and the C.O.S. played a
hunch which came true.
Churchill's reliance upon intelligence for every major
military decision runs throughout his writings. It is in stark contrast
with all the major German comments in secondary sources, such as




General Westphal (Chief-of-Stall to Kesselring) who wrote in his
"Herr in Fessein": "On January 21st (1944) Admiral Canaris, Chief
of the German Intelligence, visited Army Group Headquarters, where
he was pressed to communicate any information he might have about
the enemy's intentions in regard to a landing. In particular we wanted
to know about the positions of aircraft carriers, battleships, and land-
ing craft. Canaris was unable to give us any details, but thought that
there was no need to fear a new landing in the near future. This was
certainly his view. Not only air reconnaissance, but also the German
counterespionage, was almost completely out of action at this time.
A few hours after the departure of Canaris the enemy landed at
Anzio." As we have already seen German intelligence reached its
nadir on D-Day, with the success of the brilliant British deceptions,
the failure of the Germans to detect the assembly of the assault
groups, and their over-estimation of the number of divisions and
the amount of suitable shipping available in England, (with the result-
ing fatal deduction that a second big landing was possible), let alone
the overconfidence placed in the bad weather on 516 June, 1944, to
deter an amphibious invasion. Hitler's failure to use naval intelligencE
I.	 Herr in Fessein. P.240.
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was symptomatic of his general abhorrence of naval advice. 1 In his
"The Struggle for Europe", Chester Wilmot quotes from Donitz's
Diary for 12th November, 1943: "The enemy holds every trump card,
covering all areas with long-range air patrols and using location
methods against which we still have no warning ..... The enemy knows
all our secrets and we know none of his. 1,2 Nothing could be in
greater contrast than this with the successes of British naval intelli-
gence by 1943.
In the United States the 0. Nt. went from strength to
strength after Pearl Harbour. The researches of Roberta Wohistetter
have shown conclusively that the O.N.I.'s collection had been excellent,
but that the system whereby intelligence was relegated to a dormant
1. After the Bad Godesburg Conference Raeder had pleaded
with Hitler not to go to war with Britain. Under the so-
called Z-Plan, promulgated at the end of 1938, German
naval strength would only begin to approach that of the
British by 1945. In the spring of 1939, Germany did not
possess the heavy ships to sink the British Navy, even by
a surprise attack. See also Fuhrer Conferences on Naval
Affairs - Summary records of Hitler 1 s Conferences with
the C. -in-C. of the German Navy. London, Admiralty,
1947. P. 81-82 - Hitler refuses to heed the advice of his
Naval Staff not to invade Britain on a wide front, as Raeder
claimed the Navy could only defend a narrow strip of coast.
2. P.152.
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position, revoking its right to evaluate and advise War Plans Depart-
ment and the Secretary of State' s Office, prevented the commander on
the spot receiving the vital data he needed. 1
The role of naval intelligence in influencing British foreign
policy in the thirties was negligible. There is no evidence in the
Admiralty, Chiefs-of-Staff, or Cabinet papers which suggests anything
which might be called "influential". The overall effect of the intelli-
gence bodies, with the NILD., is of course another matter. In the
absence of J.I. C. papers a speculative element must enter. However,
in the absence of cross references in the other public sources in the
open period to Major J.I. C. influences, particularly in the Chiefs-of-
Staff, it would seem reasonable to suppose that the J.I. C. did not
have the impact which might be anticipated, certainly not pre-1939. In
general it may be concluded that foreign policy tended to develop in
isolation, away from the intelligence evidence. Great Britain never
experienced a Pearl Harbour which would possibly have precipitated
a similar review of the organisation and role of naval intelligence, or
intelligence in general. What now be called the specific naval failures
of naval intelligence - the failure to acquire the German naval codes,
Donitz's wolf pack techniques, technital. details -of the
surface raider, the lack of topographical intelligence (found to be so
1.	 See Roberta Wohistetter: Pearl Harbour. Warning and
Decision. Stanford. 1962.
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wanting at Narvik early in the war), the need for naval air power in
offensive and defensive roles, reconnaissance, and the anti-submarine
roles, and most of all to pin-point every major German unit's location
and probable intention on 3rd September, 1939, and in the first months
of war. It is these which are more significant.
It is easy to exaggerate the role naval intelligence might have
played in the moulding of foreign policy. British diplomacy was
European centred, and related essentially to Nazi aggression, which wa
land dominated and, in the early years, primarily eastward-looking.
The maritime element was always played down. Hitler had no personal
regard for his Navy and its use in his grandiose designs for Lebens-
raum. He possessed a modern, well-equipped Navy, but one which in
1939 was unacceptable to Raeder and Donitz in terms of how they saw
Germany's naval role.	 This is not to underestimate the German
naval threat, but it was not one, unlike in 1914, which would lead to
prophecies of doom in Britain provided, and this was the crux, certain
fairly basic facts were known.
Where the N.I.D. had a real role to play was in its function
of providing intelligence which might forestall cerman aggression, both
in 1914 and 1939, that is by responding to the Kaiser's and Nazis'
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diplomatic and military moves by the traditional manipulation of
British sea power. In 1938 and 1939 for instance, it might have had the
salutory effect of unifying Europe in an effective military alliance
against Hitler, (France, Czechoslovakia, Russia, and Britain) and
possibly shaking Hitler's own internal political credibility. In this
context naval intelligence had (and stiU does) a real role to play in
framing foreign and defence policy. Naval intelligence has, further-
more, a major contribution to make to the total mosaic of intelligence.
Pre-1914 it most certainly did, nct so in the inter-war period, at least
not until the establishment of the J.I. C. (and even thereafter, until
war came, there is some equivocation). In both eras naval intelligence
came to play its main role in the t operationalt sphere. With the
decline of the blue-water school of strategy pre-l9l4 D.N.I.'s role,
along with the rest of the Naval Staff, declined. Ultimately it was
European territorial diplomacy, and a dominantly military strategy
in the early period of both wars which determined the majoT elements
of foreign po1icy
In fairness to the N.I.D. in the period before both wars it
suffered from the natural effects of periods of prolonged peace, most
of all the difficult task of assessing the effectiveness of ships and
weapons in situations of which it had no first hand experience in war.
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This very inscrutability of the possible course of enemy naval
action, and the nature of British policy, made the whole process very
arbitrary. This though is not meant as an argument against intensive
monitoring and analysis of all potential enemy naval developments,
exercises, movements, and so on.
On the question of how effective was intelligence in assisting
British naval power to maintain peace the answer is undoubtedly very
little, in fact virtually zero. Even on the issue of the naval agree-
merits intelligence did not either directly or indirectly affect the
various balances agreed, or the international stability it was hoped
would ensue. That the C.O.S. were laying plans in 1936 for a possible
war with Germany by the end of 1939 is an indication of some insight
and plitico-miitary will. As has been indicated the N.I.D, had
little say in these until war neared. In any event the political direction
as to how British naval power might be used in a non-belligerent
capacity to deter Fascist and Nazi aggression, (Abyssinia and the
Spanish Civil War are obvious cases, in retrospect, of the feeble use
of British sea power), and indeed would be used in war, was lacking
until the high point of appeasement was passed. For intelligence
to be really significant in this context it has to be given clear plans
of what onets own forces are doing, or planning to do. In both 1914
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and 1939, when the hour arrived, the Royal Navy assumed a less
significant role in the final stages before war was declared, and the
whole emphasis tended to swing to the soldiers (and airmen in 1939),
not the sailors. The dialectic between Naval intelligence, the defence
planners, and the political decision-makers had ceased to have a
profitable outcome for the Navy in the last few years before the Great
War, and in the pre-1939 N.I.D. it had never really existed at all.
Whatever the quality of intelligence, and the excellence of the
organisation which produces and disseminates it, intelligence workers
can only go so far in a democracy. In the 1939 and contemporary con-
texts Admiral Hall is judged to have gone beyond the pale in his day.
A D. N. I. had to have a clear picture of his role - Godfrey certainly
did. When he visited the French, and later on the AmeHcans, he
achieved positive political results, as much for a future lend-lease
agreement as Anglo-American intelligence co-operation, yet he did not
extend or maiiipulate his brief according to any personalised view of
naval intelligence. What is more no intelligence worker can expect,
or always hope, to influence politicians, whether one's own or those of
the enemy. The German naval attache in London, von Schwerin,
reported to Hitler and von Ribbentrop, how good the N.I.D. was. He
stressed too that Godfrey had made it clear to him that Britain would
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honour the Polish agreement if Germany invaded. 	 Neither took
any notice. Churchill was more receptive - Plan Catherine was
cancelled as a result of pressure from the D.N.I. and the Director
of Plans (Captain Charles Daniel), though he was particularly
stubborn over the Norwegian campaign1 and continued against the
DN,t.'s advice (particularly in the absence of detailed topographical
intelligence). 2 This was the same politician who was able to write
the First Lord and First Sea Lord on 22 November, 1940: "..... the
Japanese Navy is not likely to venture from its home bases so long
as a superior battle fleet is maintained at Singapore or at Honolulu.
The Japanese would neer attempt a siege of Singapore with a hostile,
superior American fleet in the Pacific." 3
 Wishfulness in a politician
1. Admiral Godfrey's unpublished Memoirs. Vol.5, part I,
Ps. 18-19.
2. As a result of the chronic lack of intelligence in Norway (the
result of which had been predicted by N.I.D. and the J.L C.)
the C.O.S. instructed the J.I.C. to investigate the state of
topographical intelligence on 14th May, 1940. The J. I. C.
decided the N.I.D. should have responsibility for this and,
in June 1940 N.I.D.6 - the Topographical Section, was
established. This was to have a close liaison with Combined
Operations HQ, established in Whitehall on 12th June, 1940.
In October, 1940 N.I.D,6 moved from London first to the
School of Geography, and then to Manchester College, at
Oxford. (See the Godfrey Memoirs. Vol. 5, part 2, Ps.
352_353).
3. W.S.Churchjfl: The Second World War. Vol.2, P.615.
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is an ever present danger, but in a democracy it must remain such or
be replaced by an intelligence system with all the attendant dangers of
covert political power. Those who opposed Churchill ran the risk of
dismissal. The Director of Plans, Danckwerts, opposed Churchill's
Norwegian plans (especially over the possibility of the Luftwaffe
devastating the Fleet), and he was sacrificed. 	 Godfrey wrote:
at the time we all felt uneasy that Mr. Churchill (still First
Lord of the Admiralty) was leading us into a strategical adventure that
might culminate in the defeat of the Allies." He does go on to say though:
"..... However, General Esmay said himself, 'No one was in any doubt,
in spite of the known hazards, we must do what we could to help poor
little Norway.' "	 The point remains that few, certainly not Pound,
were prepared to oppose Churchill, even knowing the lack of intelligence.
Oddly Tom Phillips (Vice Chief of Naval Staff) supported Churchill on
this occasion - he believed, like Churchill, that ships properly armed,
would be safe against air attack. Phillips was later removed from the
Naval Staff, mainly because he would not play up to Churchill over his
belief that an invasion was still possible in 1941.	 Churchill was an
exception, but the political
Lmentality which short circuited intelligence would naturally tend not to
1. Admiral Godfrey's unpublished Memoirs. Vol.7, part 2,
Ps. 228-229.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. Ps. 258-259.
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press for expansion and/pr improvements in the intelligence machinery.
Only in a crisis or war did politicians tend to awaken and press for
additional intelligence. Roosevelt saw the sense in Colonel William
Donovans case for O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services), just as
Churchill did for the I.S. T.D. (Inter-Service Topographical Department
run by the N,I.D., or a massive increase of photographic reconnais-
sance of enemy ships and instaUations, calling as it did for Royal
Navy-Royal Air Force co-operation. Senior officers are no less
likely to sidetrack intelligence than politicians. Godfrey recounts
this extraordinary incident, which highlights this point: "It was
agreed that after approval by the Chiefs of Staff, the abridged text
of J.I. C. appreciations shotild be telegraphed to C. -in-C. s abroad.
My subsequent experience in India where, as Flag officer Commanding
Indian Navy, I served on the C. O,S. (India) Committee has, however,
convinced me that, whatever may have gone out from the Chiefs of
Staff, London, the C.I. GS. informed C. -in-C. India, of his own
views, which were different from those of the J.I.C., although
approved by the Chiefs of Staff, of whom the C. I. G. S. was then
Chairman."
1.	 Godfrey, Vol. 5, part 1, P. 165.
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In defence politics during this period, whatever the history
of intelligence, certain inalienable facts must be remembered, when
assessing the impact of intelligence. Not least of these is the
inseparability of naval intelligence from the mainstream of British
political, economic and social life, insofar as it impinged upon
defence thinking and policy. Many well-meaning men laboured hard
in the inter-war period in pursuit of goals which were later explicit
in the aims and work of the N.I.D. A man like Hankey, a brilliant
doyen of all defence bureaucrats, working incessantly in the British
defence interest, exemplifies how politicians, their advisers, and
the whole paraphernalia of their supporting system, can labour with
the right goals in mind, in the right ways, yet still only achieve a
modicum of success. This must surely place intelligence in the
right perspective in this period - a much lower level system,
separate by nature and power from those who decided and executed
policy.
A question which must remain in part unanswered is who is
responsible for ensuring that an efficient intelligence organisation
exists. Who educates who in understanding the role of intelligence?
Certainly experience itself should make reasonably self-evident to
politicians some fairly clear-cut benefits which intelligence can
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provide, and how these can be acquired in terms of organisation,
staff, methods and so on. The political control, and means of
assessing the effectiveness of an intelligence organisation such as
the N.I.D. can only be determined in an ad hoc way. There can be
no absolute criteria for assessment. Furthermore, the N.I.D.
itself surely had a responsibility to explain to politicians (as well as
the Naval Staff, C.OS., or the C.I.D.), its position, and the role
and limitations of naval intelligence. It had an educative responsi-
bility. Politicians as a body (and it is important to remember that
they do not maintain the degree of continuity in office which career
service officers do) might then be in a position to put intelligence's
house in order should it begin to fall down, as it undoubtedly did in
the inter-war period, and, equaUy important, to maximise its use.
The cost-effectiveness of intelligence is something which only a
politician, fully aware of intelligence's capabilities and limitations,
and in the light of his country's overall commitments, can decide.
D.N.I. had a responsibility to make his and N.I.D.'s
position clear to his Naval Staff and political masters, especially
on the inter-dependence of operations and intelligence. An atmos-
phere had to be created in which this could occur, so that mutual
confidence would exist. Godfrey himself regrets that he never took
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everyone into his confidence as a body rather than dealing as he did,
with people individually. With several qualifications, he writes that
in 1942 the time was ripe '..... to sweep them aU into a sort of
alliance with D.N.I." On the question of operations and intelligence
he writes: "This would have made clear to them all the extent of
our resources and how, whether it is collateral intelligence, prisoners
of war, P. R. U. (Photographic Reconnaissance Unit), or topographical,
the flow of information from operations to the N. I. D. must be as
great, if not greater, than in the other direction. 1,1 The defence
politician had a responsibility to preserve this independence of
N.I.D. and the D.N.I., and, ifneedbe, protecthimandhis staff
from the hierarchical constraints of the Service, without of course
undermining authority or loosening the political control of intelligence.
The politician must be as free from bias as his intelligence
directors and staffs. Nor can he afford to show signs of ignoring
intelligence reports (however equivocal) wben they might run contrary
to current policy, or fail to give a fair hearing to intelligence heads
when they feel they have something important to say. Only the senior
politician can protect himself against the worst features of the political
1.	 Admiral Godfrey's unpublished Memoirs: Vol.5, part 2,
P. 123.
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manipulation or non-recognition of intelligence. Godfrey must have
been aware of this, although he does not say so, when he tried to
convince Churchill and Air Chief Marshall Harris that the "strategic
bombing" offensive was not having the desired results for the Navy.
Godfrey does say this: "My concern as D.N.I. was to assess the
effect on German ships, naval bases and installations using every
available means of discovering the truth. I am afraid my reports
must have been discouraging and the bombing of the German cities
was the declared policy of the government. My reports were not the
sort of reports that would give any pleasure to bomber headquarters
and, being factual, it was impossible and undesirable to dress them
up to look nice. It must have annoyed Harris and he had the ear of
the Prime Minister who frequently went over tb see Harris from
Chequers." 1
 The bomber offensive continued, and post-war research
has substantiated how it was less successful Than was thought at the
time. Whatever the impact of Godfrey's reports, and there is no
evidence available yet to assess this, the point remains that here is
a classic example of where a politician, and a senior officer, (C. -in-
C. Bomber Command) were faced with a contrary intelligence report.
The prima facie evidence is that it was ignored and that the strategy
continued.
1.	 Admiral Godfrey's Memoirs. Vol.5. part 1 P.107.
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When a Director of Naval Intelligence possessed information
such that it gave the N.I.D. a monopoly of influence with the
politicians, (either as a result of a request for information on a
subject or as a result of ideas or a problem being generated from
within the N.I.D.) then the political problems were reduced. Take,
for example, Admiral Godfreys concern about neutral Eire during
World War Two. A paper was produced within the N.I.D. and
presented, via the First Sea Lord, to the Cabinet, "Mr. Churchill
took the matter up vigorously and it was discussed in Cabinet on
23rd November, l939.1 Godfrey had discussed the problem under
three main headings: (1) How to neutralise enemy espionage
(2) How to prevent leakage (3) How to obtain information relating to
maritime events on the coast of Eire. The British government acted
swiftly and, if one accepts Godfrey's comments, this was solely due
to N.I.D.'s influence. The Irish government was very co-operative,
such that by September, 1940 a "cordon sanitaire" had been thrown
round Ireland. 2 N.I.D.' s activities in neutral Eire were completely
successful. These were spearheaded by Commander Slade, K. C.,
R.N.V.R., D.N.I.'s personal representative. Godfrey writes:
1. Admiral Godfrey's Memoirs. Vol.5 part 1, Ps. 1-2.
2. Ibid. Ps. 202-204.
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"As we now know from German records, no naval activities favourable
to the Germans took place in Eirean waters, and there is no evidence
of the Eirean coast being used for U-boat, or supply bases. Hempel,
the German Minister, was determined to remain quite neutral in spite
of proddings from Berlin. He never meant to return to Germany, and
in 1948 was keeping a small sweet shop in Dublin."
The example above again illustrates how in wartime it is
easier for intelligence to gain a satisfactory hearing from politicians,
either concerning org anis ational matters, or straightforward intelli-
gence/ operational affairs. Two further cases will suffice to ernphasise
this point. In 1939/1940 the N.I.D. and the other intelligence bodies
pressed for the creation of an organisation tasked with analysing the
enemy High Command' s thinking and what his next major moves might
be. The result was the creation in November, 1940, of the Future
Operations (Enemy) Section (F.O.E.S.), with Captain Troubridge,
Royal Navy, as 0. -hr-C. and Donald McLachlan as his assistant.
In March, 1941, F.O.E.S. became part of the J.I.C. organisation,
1. Admiral Godfrey's Memoirs. Vol. 5, Part 1, P. 205.
2. Late in 1941 Donald MaJ...achlan was to take corfrol of N.I.D.
propaganda and psychological warfare against enemy naval
personnel.
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(prior to this it had reported directly to the C. 0. S.).	 Churchill and
the Cabinet quickly appreciated the need for such an organisation,
just as they listened to and accepted the J. I. C. -J. I. S. initiative
for "Operation Torch" (the Allied landings in North Africa). Through
Captain Baker-Cresswell, Royal Navy (the chairman and driving force
in J.I.S. at the time) these two committees (using N.I.D. assessments
amongst others) were able to convincingly and successfully argue that
what the Germans feared most was an Allied landing in North Africa. 2
Certain pieces of intelligence, because of their highly
classified nature, must always remain the preserve of a few, perhaps
only the heads of the services, their chief intelligence advisers
(and subordinates involved), and the Prime Minister and those
ministers he wishes to involve. However, there is one great danger
here - if intelligence is only known to a few in a decision-making
capacity, then those who have to plan naval operations against an
enemy in war, or devise strategy and tactics, procure ships and
weapons and so on in peace, may well be denied vital information
1. Admiral Godfrey's Memoirs: Vol.5 part 1, Ps. 163-164. The
original members of the F.O.E.S. were: Royal Navy-Captain
Trou.bridge, Commander Chatwin; Army-Major-General
Mackesy; Royal Air Force-Air Commodore Vachell; Foreign
Office-Mr. Ivone Kirkpatrick; Ministry of Economic Warfare-
a representative.
2. Ibid. P. 165.
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which might otherwise affect their plans and decisions. This may
seem fairly obvious, but it will be remembered (see page 392 )
that the Submarine Assessment Book was withheld from all but a
selected few from November, 1939, to September, 1940, to the
detriment it may be speculated of several vital bodies, not least of
all Headquarters Western Approaches Command in Liverpool, and
the C. -in-C. Coastal Command, Royal Air Force. How can senior
stall officers plan operations, and commanders execute them, if
they are not given some indication of the strength of the enemy' s
forces? It is these sort of considerations a politician must have in
mind when he considers the implications of high-grade intelligence,
and it is the senior naval staff officer who must advise 1fihi. Herein
lies one of the great problems for the naval officer. How far can
he take the initiative in this politico-military sphere? Let us
examine this more closely.
The Naval Intelligence Officer and Politics
A senior officer, with intelligence training and experience,
should ensure that the politicians are aware of the extent, and limit-
ations, of the intelligence organisation. A politician not familiar
with naval organisation and operations could not be expected to
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appreciate without advice, the requirements of a naval intelligence
organisation. There must be, therefore, a meaningful dialogue so
that decisions can be made. In this sense the senior staff officer
(intelligence) has indeed the interests of the state and the security
of its people in his hands. No rules can be laid down. A flexibility
of mind and attitudes is required that enables workable solutions to
be found. In peacetime, without the concrete operational tasks which
war demands, this problem becomes paramount. A classic example,
drawn from Admiral Godfrey's experiences, in the inter-war period,
will illustrate.
In 1934 the D,NI., Rear-Admiral Dickens, and the
D.M. 0. and I, Major-General Dill, propounded the idea that the
Naval and Military Intelligence Departments should collaborate in
producing appreciations of what pittal enemies might do in certain
circumstances. The three general areas they had in mind were;
1.	 Dickens, Vice-Admiral Sir Gerald Charles: b. 1879; entered
RN 1894; Commander 1914; Captain 1919; Deputy Director
Plans Division, Admiralty, 1920-1922; Directing Staff,
Imperial Defence College, 1926-1929; Rear-Admiral, 1932;
DNI 1932-1935; commanding reserve fleet 1935-1937;
Vice-Admiral 1936; retired list 1938.
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(a) Enemy's possible course of action (b) Factors which might
influence the enemy in the selection of his course of action (c) Enemy t
 s
most probable course of action. At the time the Plans Division in
Admiralty (Captain King was Director, Godfrey was Deputy Director)
were responsible for all such appreciations - (a) to (c) inclusive.
Plans felt that the N.I.D. should begin to provide them with all the
data they both felt was necessary for such appreciations. Unfortunately
Admiral Dickens left office, and it was decided between Godfrey and
Captain G. A. Scott (D.D.N.I.) to drop the whole idea. It did lapse
until, as we have seen, C,O.S. pressed J.I.C. for data, and Godfrey
came to the N.I.D. as Director and revived everything. Nonetheless
a mistake had been made, of which he was fully cognizant.
	 It is
very easy to use the word "mistake" in retrospect, but this was un-
doubtedly a missed opportunity - to unite Intelligence and Plans in
achieving a common goal. In the absence of influence from other
sections of the Naval Staff (and one would surmise this was a move
which would have involved the First Sea Lord, Vice Chief of Naval
Staff and the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff) or the political arena
(Firat Lord) it is easy to see how organisational failures can, over a
1.	 Details of this can be seen in Admiral Godfrey's Memoirs:
Vol.5, part 1, P. 154-155.
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number of years, have substantial repercussions. If the political
arm had been involved there would have been at least a chance of
action being taken. However unlikely this may have been responsibility
for such a decision would have been rightfully shared between the naval
and political arms.
It is appropriate to conclude this chapter on a warning
note - of some of the false assumptions which can be made by defence
ministries, if the dialogue between intelligence and the political
decision-makers is out of joint in some shape or form, A brief
catalogue, taken from the experiences of Admiral Godfrey, will show
quite clearly how fundamental errors can be made quite unwittingly
and could have been avoided if a proper dialogue had existed between
intelligence and politicians. He claims that in 1939-1941 the British
military and political High Command made these errors of judgment
when deciding how to fight the war. By imputation he is saying that
intelligence may have helped forestall such errors:
(a) that the invasion of England was still on in late
1940 and 1941.
(b) that Germany had a hidden reserve of twenty or
so divisions.
(c) that strategic bombing was accurate and effective.
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(d) that AA guns, without fighters, could give ships
adequate air defence.
He says that in 1938-1939 British wartime planning wrongly assumed:
(e that the French Army and Air Force were efficient
and well equipped.
(f) that its morale was good.
He says that Germany successfully planted false information that led
Britain to believe:
(g) that U-boats were operating in the South Atlantic.
(h) that Britain had destroyed 40 U-boats when the
actual numbers did not exceed 8.
He states that after Japan joined the Axis at the end of 1941 Britain
assumed:	 (i) that Germany, Japan, and Italy were acting in
accordance with a co-ordinated plan, and this led
C.I.G,S. to believe:
(j) that India was threatened by a German-Japanese
"pince r" movement.
(k) that the appearance of two British capital ships
at Singapore would scare the Japanese and in
some vague sort of way act as a deterrent. 1
1.	 Admiral Godfrey's Memoirs: Vol.8.
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What Godfrey is saying is that it is very easy for politicians
and senior service officers to make wrong assumptions after a
series of hunches and wishful beliefs. To help lessen the degree of
possible error reference to intelligence is essential. For example,
in. (j) and (k) above, the J.I.C. was not consulted. Intelligence can
never be an infallible guide, but it nonetheless provides a critical




British Naval Intelligence - A Perspective
422.
Conditions for the Survival and Effectiveness of a Naval Intelligence
Organisation
The experience which British naval intelligence had acquired
in this period, 1880.4945, gave the post-l945 defence planners some
clear indications of the factors involved in creating, maintaining, and
adjusting the intelligence environment. In the age of "flexible response'
a flexible intelligence organisalion is desirable. Certain conditions
have emerged during this study which are absolutely essential for the
survival and effectiveness of a naval or any military intelligence
org anis ation.
Firstly, the need for centalisation at the very end of the
intelligence process. Intelligence is goal-centred - to produce
information on time for the right people in the right place. However
excellent the preliminaries, if intelligence is put across to those who
need it in a fragmentary, disordered way then the chances are they
will not draw the correct conclusions from it. On any issue there
must be no doubt that all the bits and pieces have been put together,
and presented in a palatable form to those who make decisions.
Communications must be carefully established and well tried.
Direct lines must exist between intelligence workers and those who
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need their work. As far as the purely physical side of communications
are concerned, these are always in danger from the enemy. There-
fore intelligence has a high responsibility for security. The disaster
at Pearl Harbour must surely be the classic case study on this point.
The Congressional Committee found that neither the C. -in-C.
Pacific (Admiral Kimmel), nor any of his senior staff had the
information possessed in Washington by the O.N.I., the Chief of
Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of
State. Various people possessed then Al intelligence of the Japanese
intention to launch a pre-ernptive attack somewhere in the Pacific,
yet no one suggested or ordered air reconnaissance, the Fleet to
sea, or took other precautions.
The N.I.D. at Jutland, and the O.N.I. at Pearl Harbour,
could have avoided this sort of problem if established working
relations had existed between intelligence and operations. For
intelligence to be good the morale of those who work in it must be
high - this can only be achieved if they know they are an integrated
part of the naval machine. Intelligence is produced after all by people,
not machines. They require recognition, continuity, and tradition,
just as the officers and men of a ship do. Integration must involve the
accepted right to evaluate data, (to test its accuracy and synthesise it
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into a coherent whole with conclusions) and then to pass it on in a
formal way as an estimate of probable developments or, for instance,
as ah hard piece of intelligence (e. g. the range of enemy ships, and
speed at fall power). To leave intelligence in the dark is to deny
its main function. However, its limits must be fully understood by
all concerned. Allen Dulles said that it is, in any case, impossible
to provide a system that will be proof against the universal human
frailty of intellectual stubborness. The limit he pl.c.s on
intelligence is . .. . . to see that we have created the best possible
mechanism to get the unvarnished facts before the policy-makers,
and to get it there in time."' This would seem to place intelligence
in its right perspective.
As Dulles says nothing can override intellectual stubborness
or stupidity in those who occupy high positions. If an intelligence
consumer has preconceptions, which he will not reject, then
intelligence's task is hopeless. One example of where a Service
allowed its own preconcpetions to work was the Royal Air Force in
1.	 See the paper by Allen W. Dulles: Memorandum respecting
Section 202 (Central Intelligence Agency) to the bill to
provide for a united defence establishment, 25 April, 1947.
Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United
States Senate, 80th Congress, 1st Session.
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the 1930s, when it would not accept that the Germans regarded the
Luftwaffe as ancillary to the Wehrmacht, because the R.A.F. saw
its own role as an)ndependent strategic force.	 Similarly,
intelligence can never afford to take things for granted - judgments
must always be constantly kept under review and, if need be,
revised. This then is the atmosphere in which intelligence must
exist. As to its ethics, they cannot be concerned with problems such
as reducing the number of casualties in war, or the rightness or
wrongness of particular policies, but more the goal-centredness,
and integrity, of individual pieces of intelligence work. Hence
the absolute necessity for senior naval staff and politicians to be
aware of their needs and to be able to assess intelligence's value.
[f in peacetime intelligence acts as an insurance - the antennae
through which a government receives information, and as a result
of which it may make certain decisions, then if that system is con-
sidered worthwhile, it must be given protection - against pressure
and prejudice, within and without the Service and government.
Admiral Godfrey' s intelligence staff could not afford to have the
same loyalties and masters as the Service and government they
served, in terms of policy. If objectivity in judgments was to be
1.	 See Strong: intelligence at the Top. P. 18.
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maintained no departmental allegiances were possible. At the same
time Godfrey and his heads of sections had to have a thorough knowledg€
of the decision-making process, to see where th& work fitted in and
could make a real contribution.
On. the question of objectivity one danger for the N.I.D.
staff, of which both Hall and Godfrey were conscious, was that their
staffs might inevitably form their own individual outlooks on particular
questions, and develop their own loyalty to the N.ID. point of view.
In both World Wars the NI.D. tried to build up a balanced staff to
help obviate the latter - a mixture of disciplines and experiences
academics, lawyers, financiers, journalists, scientists, and so on.
As a result the N.I.D. did avoid a "preponderance" of any one point
of view on its staff, and there was equal access to data on a "need to
know" basis, and plenty of scope for minority views. Whatever the
checks and balances within the N.I.D. itself po1itical control in
World War II was never lost, though, as we have seen, it was on
several occasions during World War I. Churchill became the
supreme arbiter of intelligence in World War II. He was, by inclina-
tion and temperament, suited to intelligence, (furthermore he had an
international historian, Professor Arnold Toynbee, preparing
intelligence summaries for him and the War Cabinet, from N.LD.,
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J.I.C., DM.I., D.A.I., S.O.E., M.E.W., F.O., and M.I.5 and
M.I.6 sources). Intelligence is not a particularly spectacular affair,
but rather prosaic, and its art, as Field Marshal Alexander wrote is
••••• to sift the wheat from the chaff" and produce " 	 a short,I,...
clear statement. 1,1
What the study of N.I.D. in the pre-19l4 period has
illustrated is how intelligence, when it is forniafly related to the
politico-military structure, can. act as the middle man between
those who decide policy and make plans and those who have to carry
them out, a clearing-house for ideas and information. As such the
N.I.D. had responsibility, and attendant authority and accountability,
but it was never completely autonomous, though in those early days
of a developing, pragmatic, Naval Staff organisation, it often had
no other option than to work virtually alone, because an ideal
situation could not be attained overnight. As was stressed earlier
N.I.D. could not set itself objectives until experience its elf dictated
what those objectives might be, and no one was or could be sufficiently
farsighted to draw up a blue-print for a full-scale naval intelligence
organisation which would deal with all peace and wartime contingencies
1.	 Field Marshal the Viscount Alexander of Tunis: Memoirs.
Cassell. 1962.
428.
In the post World War II era British Defence Intelligence has achieved
as a result, amongst other factors, of N.I.D.'s previous history, the
degree of integration and objective organisation necessary at all levels
for furnishing information for those who make and execute policy.
What NI.D.'s pre-1945 history indicates is how continuity and
organisation can easily be lost, and even if some decisions may at
the time seem reasonable and quite rational (such as N. I. D. 's run-
down after World War I), in a transient population such as the Naval
Staff there does not necessarily remain a facility for retaining skills,
experience, or even the basic professional outlook which would
always come out with questions such as, for example, "What does
N.I.D. think, why, are they right, how does this affect us, what
shall we recommend as a result?", and so on. It is this lack of
continuity which can become very dangerous because it means that
organisations lapse for the wrong reasons. The history of the N.I.D.
is a testimony to this danger. One insurnce against it must surely
be rigorous staff training and regular reappraisals of rôles and
org anis ation.
Naval Intelligence Personnel
The selection and training of intelligence personnel is
critical. During this period there was no systematisation in either
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of these areas and certainly no formal procedure for recruitment
in wartime. There is no trace of an intensive selection board.
Whether this was to the detriment of the effectiveness of the N.I.D.
is an impossible question to answer. Certainly both Hall and Godfrey
knew what sort of men they were looking for (implying that they
knew what the job demanded), and how to go about finding, interviewing
and deciding about them. Looking at the staff the N.I.D. acquired,
particula4y in the two World Wars, and the many functions they
performed at the various levels of responsibility, several general
points emerge.
Firstly, the high intelligence executive was expected to be
able to produce intelligence summaries, stating his views of the
general enemy, or potential enemy situation, and how his operations
were likely to develop. On this score alone, to reduce a vast amount
of data to manageable proportions and then to produce, in a few
words, a report, either written or verbal, for a senior officer,
required great skill. The best insurance for the N.lD.ts top staff
was to be sceptical, for in the changing situation of war, with new
information arriving every day, no sensible intelligence officer
would irrevocably commit himself, unless absolutely certain. The
N.IID. had to avoid being too alarmist (e.g. over the possible threat
430.
of invasion in 1940), since when they had a truly alarmist position to
report no one might pay enough attention to them.
The intelligence officer who lost his spirit of inquiry,
whatever the quality of his judgment, was in danger of jeopardising
the whole value of intelligence. He had to be prepared to assess a
vast amount of data, sift through it, and then discard most of it if it
did not appreciably alter the known or anticipated situation. Fortunately
one single man seldom made a decision - most work was done by groups,
and so each man' s work and judgment came under the critical eyes of
his colleagues and the final scrutiny of his head of section and the
D.N.I. Some writers (Lord Mountbatten for example) have criticised
the extensive use of civilians and reserve officers in naval intelligence
(mainly because they lack the understanding of the factors involved
in large-scale naval operations), but the group nature of intelligence won
tended to obviate this, where, in any case, a naval officer, usually a
Commander, was a head of section, and naturally had the necessary
links with the sea, the operational environment and specialist depart-
ments of the Admiralty. The presence of civilians, who were not
necessarily always impressed by senior naval officers, did, if anything,
tend to help the naval officers. 1 The judgment and independence of a
1.	 Donald MiLachlan recalls how a Commander, R.N.V.R. told a
newly appointed A. C. N. S. who entered the U-boat tracking
room, "Here Sir, we ascertain the facts first and do not let
the policy influence the intelligence." Few career naval
officers would have said this to an A.C.N.S.
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naval officer in intelligence may be somewhat undermined by the
necessity for him to obey his senior officers for most of the time.
His whole training, the structure and ethos of the Service may
inhibit total independent judgment. The question in the mind of a man
like Admiral Godfrey was could a naval officer be reasonably expected
to exhibit the same scrupulous, painstaking analysis and judgment
which a barrister or scholar from civilian life could? The answe r
was invariably no. This factor was a serious threat to the integrity
of intelligence, as were the career implications for a naval officer
appointed to the N.I.D. Most executive officers considered, quite
understandably so in one sense, that commanding ships and giving
orders was the most important thing, why they joined the Navy, and
by which they would be judged. As such many saw intelligence
appointments as a blockage to their careers. In the inter-war
period the whole concept of intelligerce disappeared in HM ships.
A ship's intelligence officer wasiusually detailed from amongst
either the navigating or instructor staff. They were presented with
the Manual of Intelligence, which mainly dealt with the security of
cyphers. This was the measure of intelligence in the eyes of most
naval officers. Little did most officers realise that in the pre-l9l4
period and in World War I, and eventually in World War II, senior
intelligence officers had and were to enjoy considerable influence and
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authority, with direct access to supreme commanders and politicians.
The pre-19l4 D.N.I.'s tended to reach the highest offices after this
appointment. General Strong makes this comment on his time as
Chief of Allied Intelligence: "As Chief of Intelligence I had the right
of direct access to Eisenhower and his Chief of Staff, and I could
approach them whenever I wished. Above all, under the American
system I was a member of the "inner circle", where policy was
decided and planning and other decisions taken. AU my experience
suggests that this status is vital to the efficient functioning of an
intelligence machine. 	 Many of the officers who served in th
N.I.D. in junior positions in both World Wars aspired eventually
to the highest panks.
The Political Appreciation of Naval Intelligence
The political appreciation of naval intelligence is as importan
as that of the Service. Not only must it ultimately exercise the
necessary political control but it must pay all the necessary respect
to the work of intelligence. Some politicians believe that much
1.	 Strong: Intelligence at the Top. P.85.
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intelligence is a waste of time and unimportant. There is obviously
some truth in this, but it is very dangerous to arbitrarily separate
what appears to be the trivial from the important. The reason for
this is that at the time that much intelligence work is carried out
it is not always possible to know what is useful and what is wasteful,
to assess what is trivial and what laLer might become of national
importance. There is a danger here for the politician - that he might
become complacent, or just develop a desire not to be told.
Similarly, his control over aggressive espionage must be
firm. It would be highly dangerous, though equally unlikely, for a
repetition of Hall' s activities to occur today. The politicians must
decide how far it is necessary to keep abreast of all naval develop-
ments in territories of potential enemies, and whether or not to tell
a potential enemy that one has his secrets. In the modern world it
would seem reasonable to suppose that no potential enemy will declare
war on a nation because that nation has stolen its secrets, but, it
may be deterred from going to war if it is realised that those secrets
have been discovered.
Responsibility to the Public
Politicians and naval staff have a great responsibility to the
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public to ensure that naval intelligence is efficient. The public have
no measure of its effectiveness, in peace or war. Nor can a British
political party make political capital from its naval intelligence. The
public is more likely to be affected by the converse - the activities
of other nations' intelligence organisations, (as revealed, for instance
by spy trials) and the resulting suspicion cast on Britain's own securiw
and intelligence services. The politician must carefully stage-manage,
in the interests of the state, any knowledge the public gains of intelli-
gence aims, methods, and results.
Naval Intelligence in the Nuclear Age
It is appropriate to conclude this study by taking a brief
look at naval intelligence in the nuclear age. The whole concept of
naval strategy has changed - the various parameters of the past are
now subservient to the primary role of nuclear maritime deterrence.
It is this which controls the other variables. The weapons of the super
powers attempt, at least, to keep abreast of one another. For naval
intelligence this has always posed one great question, which Professor
L.W. Martin has, in another context, aptly described thus: ttIn essence,
however, since conventional war must henceforth be limited war,
the question boils down not to the outcome of such a war, but of how
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large and unfavourab].e a conventional war either side would accept
before resorting to limited or complete nuclear retaliation. The
answer would seem to be that such options would be exercised well
before the western war effort faced strangulation. How long before
must remain a question for the event. The case is essentially
similar to the "pause" in Europe. NATO doctrine calls for the use
of nuclear weapons rather than acceptance of defeat on the ground.
Much the same would be true at sea." The problems for intelligence
are, therefore, manifold - the more significant of which are the
detection of the danger signs of a pre-emptive nuclear strike and the
allied diplomatic and psychological precursors to this, the detection
and analysis of the use of naval power for political ends without
recourse to war (paramount now in the nuclear age), and the question
of the psychology of deterrence in terms of naval weapons systems
vis-.-vis potential enemies. Security in the nuclear age may be more
concerned with hiding weaknesses, than strengths. Intelligence
may well advise, for instance, that it may be more advantageous
to release performance figures of certain of the best and latest
weapon systems to convince a possible enemy that the deterrent
remains effective. Nonetheless data regarding enemy weapon
systems is still a primary target of intelligence, along with strengths,
1.	 L,W. Martin: The Sea in Modern Strategy. P.43.
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tactics, ranges and endura.nces, deployment and location, the state
of morale, training, and fighting efficiency. Knowledge of tactical
nuclear weapons is as vital as the deterrent systems, and in the
age of the nuclear hunter-killer submarines knowledge of the state
of anti-submarine warfare and the capabilities of submarines is
equally essential, assuming the possibility of limited, conventional
warfare. An ever-present danger today is the possibility of an
enemy gaining arms secrets from those countries to whom Britain
sells arms. The danger is that their security may not be satisfactory,
or that an aUiance or friendship may end before he arms themselves
have lost their efficacy. Furthermore, when looking at the forces
of possible enemy fleets intelligence must always survey their
overall commitments. It may be a very false prophecy indeed which
ascribes to enemy fleets a limited number of purposes which the
event totally disproves.
It is relevant to re-iterate a point made earlier - that
naval intelligence cannot be separated from the other intelligence
studies which assist in the analysis of the make-up of other nations.
The advent of nuclear weapons has destroyed the simple assumptions
underlaying the pre-1945 political-military world. What intelligence
overall must look for is any shifts in the factors that sustain
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deterrence - it cannot be assumed to be an immutable balance.
Intelligence must still be able to warn, and Britain's defences must
remain constantly responsive. In the event of limited war and the
actual or threatened use of tactical nuclear weapons the availability
of accurate intelligence, timely produced, may determine whether or
not the fighting escalates. Hence there is a need to keep pace with
the technology of intelligence, and to counter the efforts of possible
enemies.
In the contemporary world most people in the west hope
that they can rely upon the increasing destructiveness of weapons to
prevent total nuclear war, notwithstanding the possibilities of limited
conventional war. History has shown though that any theory which
claims that war can be made so terrible that all nations will remain
at peace has no foundation. It is with this in mind that xrrodern military
intelligence should continue its incessant work. The period of this
study witnessed how energetic, ambitious, and predatory leaders
resorted to war regardless of the consequences of their actions for
their nations and the world. There is no reason to suppose that this
danger has gone forever with the advent of nuclear weapons. Intelli-






An Example of Hard Intelligence Data:
Below are listed the ranges of German units in 1939. It
was this sort of quite simple, yet invaluable information which the
N.I.D, had to acquire quickly if it was to be able to assist Operations
in determining the waters in which German units might operate. A
10, 000 ton pocket battleship, for example, with a range of 8, 000
nautical miles could be expected to head for the South Atlantic,
allowing for neutral waters, and the American security zone, and the
need to pass via the Denmark Strait from the north German ports to
the Atlantic. A radius of action for each class would have to take
into account outward and homeward passage, and the fuel which might
be consumed at full power and when in battle - probably a 20 per cent
reserve for these contingencies.
Type	 Nautical Miles
TypeiXU-Boat	 9,600
10, 000 ton pocket battleship
	 8, 000





Tirpitz, Bismarck, and diesel-
driven destroyer of the Z-Plan 	 3., 200
Heavy cruiser	 2, 700
Type V11C U-Boat 	 2,600
1914-1918 Battlecruiser and
Cruiser	 2,400
Type VIIA U-Boat	 1, 700




Directors of Naval Intelligence 1882 - 1945
1882-1889:	 Hall, Captain William Heiiry: see last part of
Appendix C.
1889-1894:	 Bridge, Admiral Sir Cyprian: 1839-1924; entered
RN 1853; Captain 1877; DNI 1889-1894; C.in-C.
Australia 1894-1898, China 1901-1904. Wrote two
major books - The Art of Naval Warfare (London
1907), and Sea Power and Other Studies (London 1910).
1894-1899:
	
Beaumont, Admiral Sir Lewis Antiony: b. 1847;
entered RN 1860; Rear-Admiral 1897; DNI 1894-98;
C.-in-C. Pacific 1899-1900; C...in-C. Australia
1901-1903; Admiral 1906; C.-in-C. Devonport 1905-
1908.
1899-1902:	 Custance Admiral Sir Reginald: 1847-1935; ADNI
1886-1890; naval attache Washington and Paris 1892-
1895; DNI 1 899-1902; second-in-command Channel
Fleet; an opponent of Fisher's Dreadnought policy;
author of The Ship of the Line (London 1912).
1902-1905:	 Battenbu, Prince Louis, Admiral of the Fleet:
entered RN 1868; joint secretary naval and military
committee on defence, 1894; ADNI 1900; DNI 1902-190E
second in command, Mediterranean 1907; C. -in.C.
Atlantic 1908; Second Sea Lord 1911; First Sea Lord
1912; resigned October 1914.
1905-1907:	 Ottley, Rear-Admiral Sir Charles: b. 1858; entered
RN 1871; Captain 1899; naval attache Washington,
Rome, Tokyo, St. Petersburg, and Paris, 1899-1904;
on staff of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1904;
DNI 1905; Secretary of the C.I.D. 1907-1912.
1907.	 King-Hall, Admiral. Sir George Fowler: b. 1850;
entered RN 1863; Captain 1891; Rear-Admiral 1904;
DNI 1907; Admiral commanding on the coast of Ire-.
land 1906-1908; Vice-Admiral 1908; Admiral 1912;
C. -in-C. Australia station 1910-1913; retired 1914.
1907-1909:
	
Slade, Admiral Sir Edrnond John Warre: 1859-1928;
entered RN 1872; Commander 1894; Captain 1899;
served in HMS Hecla during the Egyptian war 1882;
May 1904 Director of Senior Officers War Course,
RNC, Greenwich; DNI Nov. 1907-March 1909; C.-in-C.
East Indies 1909-1912; retired 1917; Director of the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
1909-1912:	 Bethell, Admiral Hon. Sir Alexander Edward:
b, 1855; entered RN1869; Commander 1891; Captain
1898; Rear .-Adrniral 1908; DNI 1909-1912; C.-in-C.
East Indies 1912; Vice-Admiral 1913; Commandant
RN War College 1913-1914; commander battleships
3 Fleet 1914; commander Channel Fleet, 1915;
C.-in-C. Plymouth, 1916-1918; retired 1918.
1912-1913:	 Jackson, Rear-Admiral Thomas: b.1868; entered
RN 1881; Commander 1899; Captain 1905; Rear-
Admiral 1916; naval attache, Tokyo, 1906; DNI Jan.
1912-Oct. 1913; Director of the Operations Division,
Jan. 1915-June 1917.
1913-19 1 4:	 Oliver, Admiral Sir Henry Francis: b. 1865; entered
RN 1878; Commander 1899, Captair 1903; Rear-
Admiral 1913; DNI 1913-1914; DCNS and Chief of
Admiralty War Staff 1914-1918; Vice-Admiral 1918;
Vice-Admiral commanding Home Fleet 1919-1920;
Second Sea Lord 1920-1924; Admiral 1923.
1914-1918:	 Hall, Admiral Sir William Reginald: 1870-1943; son
of the first DNI, William Henry Hall; entered RN
1884; Commander 1901; Captain 1905; naval assistant
to the Controller of the Navy, 19 11-1913; Captain
HMS Queen Mary 1913; B, of Heligoland Bight, 28
August, 1914; DNI 1914-1918; CB 1915; KCMG 1918;
promoted Rear-Admiral 1917; Vice-Admiral 1922;
Admiral 1926; Hon. DCL Oxon. 1919, Horn. LLD
Cantab. 1920; MP (Con) West Derby Division of
Liverpool 1919; principal agent of the Conservative
Party, 1923; MP (Con) Eastbourne, 1925. Retired
from politics, 1929. A drawing by Francis Dodd,
Imperial War Museum.
1918-1921:	 Sinclair, Vice-Admiral Hugh Francis Paget: entered
RN 1886; assistant to Director of Naval Ordnance
1904-190 5; Commander of RN Barracks, Portsmouth
190 6-1909; Director of the Mobiisation Division,
Admiralty 1914-1916; Captain HMS Renown 1916-1917;
Chief of Staff Baltic cruiser forces 1917-1919;
DNI 1919-1921; Chief of Submarine service 192 1-1923;
retired list 1926.
192 1.- 1 9 2 4:	 Fitzmaurice, Rear-Admiral Maurice Swynfen: b. 1870;
ADNI 1910; NID staff and Admiralty War Staff 1912-
1914; senior officer on the Yangtse 1914; Captain
HMS Triumph 1914-1915; principal naval transport
officer, Dardanelles and Salonika 1915-1916; Chief
of Staff Eastern Mediterranean, 1916-1917, Captain
HMS Dreadnought 1918; senior naval officer
coast of Palestine, 1918; commodore commanding
British Aegean squadron 1919; DNI 1921-1924.
1924-1927:	 Hotham, Rear-Admiral Alan Geoffrey: b. 1876;
DNI 1924-1929.
1927-1930;	 Dornvile, Admiral Sir Barry Edward: 1873-1971;
entered RN 1892; Commander 1909; Captain 1916;
Rear-Admiral 1927; Asst.Sec. C.I.D. 1912-1914;
Director of Plans, Admiralty, 1920-1922, DNI 1927-
1930; Vice-Admiral commanding third cruiser
squadron, Mediterranean, 19311932; President
RNC Greenwich, 1932-1934; Admiral and retired list,
1936.
1930-1932:	 Usborne, Vice-Admiral Cecil Vivian: b. 1880; Captain
HMS Colossus 1913; Deputy Director of Gunnery
Division, Admiralty, 1922; Director of the Tactical
School 1925; Rear-Admiral 1928; DNI 1930-4932;
retired 1933.
1932-1935:	 Dickens, Vice-Admiral Sir Gerald Charles: b. 1879;
entered RN 1894; Commander 1914; Captain 1919;
Deputy Director Plans Division, Admiralty, 1920-1922;
Directing Staff, Imperial Defence College, 1926-1929;
Rear-Admiral, 1932; DNI 1932-1935; commanding
reserve fleet 1935-1937; Vice-Admiral 1936; retired
list 1938.
1935:	 Scott, Rear-Admiral Malcolm Maxwell: b. 1883;
entered RN 1898; Captain 1925; Rear-Admiral 1936;
Capt. -Supt. of contract built ships 1929-193 1; Captain




Troup, Vice-Admiral Sir James Andrew Gardiner:
b.1883; Commander 1916; Captain 1922; Rear-Admiral
1935; DNI 1935-1939; Vice-Admiral 1939; retired 1939.
1939-1943:	 Godfrey, Admiral John Henry: 1888-1971; Captain 1928;
Rear-Admiral 1939; Vice-Admiral 1942; Admiral 1945;
Deputy Director, Plans Division, Admiralty, 1933-1935;
Captain EMS Repulse, 1936-1939; DM1 1939-1943; Flag
officer commanding Royal Indian Navy, 1943-1946.
1943-1946:	 Rushbrooke, Vice-Admiral Edmund Gerard Noel:
b. 1892; Commander 1918; Captain 1936; Chief of the
Intelligence staff, China station, 1937; Captain HMS
Guardian 1939; HMS Argus 1940; HMS Eagle 1941;
DNI 1943-1946; Rear-Admiral 1945; retired 1947; Vice-
Admiral on the retired list 1948.
The following obituary for Captain William Henry Hall, Royal
Navy, appeared in The Times on 13 March, 1895:
We have to record the death, after a few days' illness, of
Captain W. H. Hall, late of her Majesty' s Ship Resolution, who was
recently appointed Captain-Superintendent of Pembroke Dockyard.
He was sub-lieutenant of the Challenger during the Mexican expedition
of 1861, including the occupation of St. Juan d'Ulloa, Vera Cruz.
The following facts are given as they appear in "Lean's Royal Navy
List":- "It was in 188Z that the Foreign Intelligence Committee was
established, mainly at the instance or insistence of one or two men
like Sir John Colomb and Lord C. Beresford. Captain W. H. Hall
was put in charge, and he had as his assistants one marine officer,
two clerks, and a copyist. Up to that time there was no distinct
department of the Admiralty for registering what other nations are
doing, can do, and are ready to do in the event of war. Captain Hall
took this work in hand, and of the way in which he did it we may judge
when Mr. Campbell-Bannerman speaks of it, 'as of the highest
importance to the efficiency of the naval service.' The four years of
the existence of the Foreign Intelligence Committee were four years
of arduous labour for Captain Hall. In 1887 it was decided to graft
upon the basis of the Foreign Intelligence Committee the larger and
more important department to be called the Naval Intelligence
Department. The staff was largely increased, and at first it was
proposed to place an Admiral at the head of the newly created bureau.
It was, however, soon recognised that to displace Captain W. H. Hall
would be a grave mistake, and that officer was installed as Director
of Naval Intelligence. The wisdom of this step has been fully proved,
and is recognised by the service generally. To the excellent
business arrangements, untiring efforts, and exceptional tact of
Captain Hall, the celerity and comprehension which have characterised
the execution of the functions of the new department are largely due."
Captain Hall held the appointment till January, 1889. He was joint
secretary to the Royal Commission on Army and Navy Administration
in 1888; and received his captain's good service pension in June, 1894.
He was succeeded in the position of Director of Naval Intelligence by
Captain, now Rear-Admiral, Bridge. Captain Hall then commanded
the Severn in the China Squadron, and was afterwards appointed to the
command of the Vernon as had of the School of Torpedo Instruction
at Portsmouth; subsequently, in the manoeuvres of 1893, he cornrnandec
the Blenheim. He was afterwards appointed to the Resolution, and
was in command of that vessel when she encountered storm at the end
of 1893 which compelled her to put back from the Bay of Biscay. He
remained in the command of the Resolution until a very short time ago,
when he was appointed to succeed Captain Penrose-Fitzgerald as
Captain-Superintendent of Pembroke dockyard. He was on his
way to take up that appointment when he was taken ill in the train.
He was removed thence to his bed, and died on Sunday. As Director
of Naval Intelligence he was principally responsible for the schemes
of naval manoeuvres from 1887 - the Jubilee year - until he was
succeeded by Admiral Bridge. Both from the point of view of
practical experience and general intelligence he was a most
distinguished officer, and had he survived to be promoted to flag
rank he would probably have attained a very distinguished position.
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Civil Assistant to the D,N.I.
Personal Assistant to the D.N.I.)
Private Secretary	 )




A.D.N.I. (E) Technical (N.I.D.)
A.D.NIII. (T) Topographical






Mr. E. L, Mrrett





Mr. A. F. Wells





Section 2 The Americas	 Mr. Wilding




Section 4 Far East, Pacific,
Australasia, India,
Indian Ocean
Section 16 Russian Section
Section 20 Unoccupied France,
North and West Africa,
Spain, Portugal, and
pos sessions
Lt. Col. Cordeaux RM,
Major Harris, RM,
Lt. Cdr. Rosevere
Commander Barry, Major Hicks
R. M., Lt. Cdr. Leggatt.
Commander Chatwin, Mr.
Fletcher-Cooke
Commander Jenning, Lt. Cdr.
Rayner, Captain A. H. Hillgarth,
Mr. Pritchett.
Section 5 Geographical Handbooks Professor Mason
Section 6 Topographical (l.S.T.D.) Colonel Bassett RM, Captain
Law, Mr. A.F,Wells
Section 7 Technical 	 Captain (E) Charley, Eng.
Commander Cannan
Section 8 Operational InteUigence
	 Vice-Admiral N.E.Denning
Centre Submarines,	 Hon. Mr. Justice Winn,
Germany, Italy and Japan Commander Barrow-Green
Section 9 Communications
Section 10 Security
Section 11 Admiralty Photographic
Library
Section 12 Intelligence Summaries





Commander Montagu, R. N.V.R.
Commander Pearce, Miss
Came ron
Section 17 Operations and Intelli-
	 Captain Baker Cresswell*
gence, J.I.C. and
	 Captain Drake, Major Lordon,
J.I.S. Cover Plans




Section 21 Contacts Section
Section 21(a) Contacts Register
Lt. Cdr. M&Lachlan, R. N. V. R.
Mrs.J.S.G.Saunders, Miss
Marjorie Napier, Commander
Robe rts on- MacDonald.
Lt. Harling, R.N.VSR.
Mr. Wannacott
This list is taken from the unpublished Memoirs of Admiral 3. H.
Godfrey, Vol. 5, Part 2, P.	 It is possible that there may be
errors in this list, as Admiral Godfrey compiled it from memory.
The ranks indicated are those officers later attained in their
careers.
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